

SOCIETY

A TEXTBOOK OF SOCIOLOGY

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PREFACE

The present volume is a rewriting, with substantive additions, of the author's earlier work, *Society: Its Structure and Changes*. It has been undertaken at the request of a number of teachers who desired to follow the lines of the former work but needed a volume that had more definitely a textbook character and, particularly one that would be more serviceable to those students who are for the first time approaching the subject through its pages. To this end much illustrative material has been added, while the scheme of interpretation has been clarified and made more explicit. The order of exposition has been changed so that the logical framework may be more clearly revealed, and subheads have been introduced throughout.

In this as in the earlier work I have endeavored to lead the student towards the understanding of the peculiar and elusive system of reality we name *society*. It is in the progressive understanding of systems that all genuine knowledge abides—and all genuine education. A text, even an introductory text, should present, not an agglomeration of disconnected materials but the orderly exposition of that scheme of things which constitutes its proper subject matter.

What the proper subject matter of sociology is, what it includes and excludes, is still very imperfectly realized. In my judgment the chief difficulty is the frequent tendency to identify the social with what anthropologists call the "cultural," that is, with the whole area and range of human activity. Many general texts of sociology treat economic and religious and technological and other topics as parts of their subject, for their own sake, as it were, and not for the light they throw on the questions of social relationship. There is, of course, no form of human activity which does not have a social aspect. But there is also none which does not have, say, a psychological aspect or an economic aspect. Our problem is first to

disentangle the social factor, and then to interpret it by showing its dependence on or relation to the other factors of human life. Only thus can we avoid the embarrassing inclusion of multifarious subjects without unity and without focus. Only thus can we develop a distinctive subject matter of sociology.

Sociology, concerned with the relationships of social beings as they cohere into systems and as they change in response to all the conditions that affect human life, calls for an art of revelation as well as a science of analysis. The facts and the figures, the complex changing patterns of social behavior, have a meaning beyond themselves. To present them aright we must first seek to *understand* them. Consequently I would here reiterate these words from the Preface of the earlier volume: "Sociology is not an easy study. It is full of embarrassing but fascinating difficulties. I hope this work will serve as a text for students, but I have not attempted to write down for them. Genuine students resent this too familiar process. In any event a textbook should not be a substitute for a teacher but rather should provide him with an opportunity for his art."

If in the present volume I have been able to approach perhaps a little nearer to this ideal I owe it largely to those teachers who have given me the benefit of their advice. To them—and among them I desire particularly to mention Professor Willard Waller—I hereby express my most sincere thanks.

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April, 1937

A WORD ABOUT SOCIOLOGY ITSELF

Abundant controversy has arisen over the question whether there is at all a subject deserving to be named sociology, whether if there is, it is a science, whether in that event it is a generic or a specific science, and so forth. We do not feel it necessary here to deal with such questions. In a sense the whole of this book offers an answer to them. It may suffice to state at the outset that for us the subject matter of sociology is social relationships as such. This is not the essential, certainly not the exclusive concern of the other sciences included under the rubric of "social." Anthropology studies man (especially primitive man) in terms of the whole scheme of his activities and his products; it is as much interested in his arts and techniques, his myths and his superstitions, as in his social institutions. Economics studies man as a wealth-getter and wealth-disposer and inquires into the relation of wealth (measured by money) and welfare. History studies the record of man, following the time-order of significant events. Psychology studies man as a behaving individual, or, as some prefer to put it, the interrelation between the organism and the world to which it responds. Social psychology is then a branch of psychology concerned with the ways in which the individual reacts to his social conditions. Sociology alone studies social relationships themselves, society itself. Thus the *focus* of none of these other sciences is identical with that of sociology, and it is always the focus of interest which distinguishes one social science from another. We should not think of the social sciences as dividing between them physically separate areas of reality. What distinguishes each from each is the selective interest.

Our interest then is in social relationships, as social, not merely as economic or political or religious. These are aspects, not compartments, of society. If two people meet in the market place, they are not just two "economic men," but two human beings, and they enter into relationships which are not simply economic. Our life

as social beings is not "made up" of our economic life and our political life and our family life and our aesthetic life and our religious life and our club life. We select these aspects for study according to our interest, and this is very necessary alike for the progress of our knowledge and for practical applications. But in thus selecting we are also abstracting from the actual social relationships into which social beings enter and neglecting for the time being the greater coherence of society which consists in the marvelously intricate and ever-changing pattern of the totality of these relationships. We are breaking up in thought, for the convenience of study or for the sake of practical control, that which is indissoluble in reality, and we cannot or should not be satisfied until our thought has restored the unity which it has taken away.

To find the focus of our subject is therefore of first importance. In particular, we should recognize that in studying society we are not attempting to study everything that happens "in society" or under social conditions, for that includes all human activity and all human learning. We shall be concerned with culture, but only for the light it throws on social relationships. We shall not, for example, study religion as religion or art as art or invention as invention. Unless we find and keep some focus we lose our way in the welter of phenomena, and this danger is always besetting the student of sociology. The only way to avoid this danger is to keep our interest focused upon social relationships themselves.

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BOOK ONE
INITIATION

PART ONE
THE NATURE OF SOCIETY

FOREWORD

There are certain primary concepts that the student of society must grasp and learn to use as his first step on the road to science. He must learn, that is, to attach a clear and definite meaning to the terms that signify his field of study and to the major distinctions within that field. The looseness of popular usage must be converted into the precision of scientific reference. So in Chapter I we define these terms and thus endeavor to clarify our essential concepts. Thence we proceed in Chapter II to another set of distinctions of a psychological nature which are logically prior to social relationships and which will play a large part in our analysis of the social structure. Of these distinctions the most important for our purpose is that between *interests* and *attitudes*, and, among interests themselves, that between the *like* and the *common*.

Thus prepared, we make in Chapter III a preliminary attack on the fundamental question on which men have reflected in every age—long before there was a subject called sociology—the question of the individual and the social unity. What does it mean to be a member of a community or group? What is the nature of the bond that unites us with our fellow men? It would be possible to proceed with our study of society leaving this question aside. But society will mean more to us and our study of it will be more significant if we see the nature of the problem and try to answer it for ourselves.

I

PRIMARY CONCEPTS

SOCIETY

Why we begin with definitions.—In everyday conversation we employ such terms as "society," "community," "crowd," "institution," "custom," "social organization," and so on. Throughout this book we shall be employing the same terms. But whereas in everyday conversation we do not (and usually need not) explain in advance what we mean by them, in a textbook of sociology it is highly important that we do so. The reason is as follows. When in the course of conversation a speaker makes mention of, say, "the community," we generally know the particular reference from the context. He may be talking of "the local community" or "the Italian community in Greenwich Village" or "the community of churchgoers" or "the community chest" or "the community of property." Though in each of these expressions the term "community" has a different meaning, we have usually no trouble in deciding between the various possible meanings. Again, when someone speaks of "the crowd," he may be referring to "the rush-hour crowd" or "the sporting crowd" or "the crowd at So-and-so's party"; and though an entirely different kind of social phenomenon is signified in each of these instances, we do not need to ask the speaker which meaning he intends.

But when we approach the study of society we can no longer be content to use the same term in varying senses. As sociologists, we are interested in social phenomena in the way in which botanists are interested in plants. We are interested in *the* community as a mode of social life, distinct from other forms of social organiza-

tion. We are interested in its common characteristics and in its various types. We are interested again not merely in this crowd or in that crowd, not merely in the description of a particular crowd at a particular time; we want to understand *the* crowd as a social phenomenon, to contrast, for example, the way men behave in crowds from the way they behave in other social relations.

So we must attach a clear and single and precise meaning to our terms, in spite of the fact that, being terms of ordinary speech, they have many variant usages. From this point we must start. The fullness of meaning, the richness of content of our concepts, will and must vary with the training and experience of each of us, but if we are to study anything together we must, when we use a word or phrase, be denoting, mentally pointing out, as it were, the same object. This necessity is most imperative for the primary terms, the key words of our study. To understand them fully would be to know all that is to be known, more than anyone does know, about their objects. The meaning grows and grows as we advance in knowledge, but the beginning of knowledge is that fixed reference or denotation which enables us to distinguish one object of thought from another.

Besides the fact that our terms are those of everyday speech, unlike the majority of terms in the natural sciences, there is a further reason why in the study of society we must exercise particular care over our definitions. The phenomena we are dealing with are not external tangible things, or kinds of thing, that can be identified directly by the senses. We cannot see or touch social relations or social organizations. Institutions cannot be handled and customs cannot be weighed in a balance. We cannot apply to them a microscope or a spectroscope or other scientific instrument to aid our senses. We cannot isolate our units in a laboratory. Our laboratory is itself the world of everyday living. It is this we must explore. It is there we must make our researches.

Our first task then is to define our primary terms in a brief preliminary account of the objects which these terms will signify throughout this work. In doing so we must remember that in the developing science of modern sociology there is no accepted authority, whether created by scientific tradition or otherwise, to impose a common terminology. Other writers will be found to use some of these terms in a different way. But if we form the habit of meaning always the same object when we use any of these terms, the present variety of usage will not seriously trouble us.

What we mean by society.—Our first, the most general of our

terms, is *society* itself. Social beings express their nature by creating and recreating an organization which guides and controls their behavior in myriad ways, which liberates and limits their activities, which sets up standards for them to follow and maintain, which in fact, in spite of all the imperfections and tyrannies it has exhibited in human history, is a necessary condition of every fulfillment of life. It is a system of usages and procedures, of authority and of mutual aid, of groupings and divisions, of controls and liberties. That whole organization we call society.

Society is the web of social relationships, but what do we mean by social relationship? We may approach the answer by contrasting the social with the physical. There is a relationship between a typewriter and a desk, between the earth and the sun, between fire and smoke, between two chemical constituents. Each is affected by the existence of the other, but the relationship is not a social one. The psychical condition is lacking. The typewriter and the desk are in no intelligible sense aware of the presence of one another. Their relationship is not in any way determined by mutual awareness. Without this recognition there is no society. It exists only where social beings conduct themselves, or "behave" towards one another in ways determined by their recognition of one another.

Here then is the ground of our definition. Any relationships so determined we may broadly name "social." It is true that among such relationships there are some which express mere conflict or unmitigated hostility, such as the relationships between two armies in time of war. Armies in the field are certainly aware of nothing so much, and their activities are animated by nothing so much, as the presence of one another. But if we call such relationships "social" we should certainly observe that the great majority of social relationships depend in some degree on a principle which these particular relationships expressly deny, the sense of community or of belonging together. As sociologists we may well study alike the conditions that unite and those that separate human beings. But if there were no sense of community there would be no social systems—there would be practically nothing for sociologists to study. Hence the relationships which are central to sociology are those which involve, in addition to mutual recognition, the sense of something held or shared in common.

It is clear that by this definition society is not limited to human beings. There are animal societies of all degrees. Even—or especially—among the insects, such as the ant, the bee, the hornet, there are remarkable social organizations. It might perhaps be contended

that wherever there is life there is society, because life means heredity and, so far as we know, can arise only out of and in the presence of other life. But in the lowest stages the social awareness, if it exists, is extremely dim and the social contact often extremely fleeting. Among all higher animals at least there is a very definite society, arising out of the necessities of their nature and particularly out of the conditions involved in the perpetuation of their species. In passing, one may point out that there may be society, as above defined, between animals of different species, as between a man and a horse or a man and a dog.

Society involves both likeness and difference.—It is often said that the family, in some form, was the first society, and it is certainly true that sex relationship is a primary and essential type of social relationship. Observe that it involves both likeness and difference in the beings whom it relates. Without likeness and the sense of likeness there could be no mutual recognition of "belonging together" and therefore no society. This is what Giddings meant when he said that society rested on "consciousness of kind," though we must be careful not to interpret the word *kind* too narrowly. Society exists among those who resemble one another in some degree, in body and in mind, and who are near enough or intelligent enough to appreciate the fact. In early society the sense of likeness was focused on kin-membership, closely uniting the ideas of likeness of body and of mind. The conditions of social likeness have broadened out in modern societies, but even so extensive a principle of union as nationality contains the basic conception of likeness which primitive man identified with the kin.

But society depends on difference as well as likeness. If people were all exactly alike, merely alike, their social relationships would be very limited. There would be little give-and-take, little reciprocity. They would contribute very little to one another. What is true of the family is true, in its degree, of all social systems. They involve relationships in which each complements the other, in which a true exchange takes place. In society each seeks something and gives something. It is the creation of interdependent complementary beings. There are natural differences such as those on which the family rests; differences also of aptitude, of capacity, and of interest. This is the condition of that primary division of labor which, as Adam Smith showed so well, is the foundation of social economy. On the basis of these natural differences further differences are developed in the process of specialization. But always, in the making of society, the difference is subordinate to the likeness.

Thus the division of labor is co-operation before it is division. It is because they have *like* wants that people associate in the performance of *unlike* functions. Their like wants bring them together in a common organization, and the economics of organization requires the differentiation of functions for the fuller satisfaction of these wants. The part played by difference as well as likeness—primary likeness and secondary difference—in the social structure will appear more clearly when we come to consider how society grows. We shall see that as society increases in range and in complexity the secondary differences are multiplied at the same time that the sense of likeness is broadened.

Man as social animal.—We have still to mention the fundamental attribute, fundamental beyond even the sense of likeness, on which society depends. It was expressed by Aristotle when he said that man was a social animal.¹ It is evidenced in man's reflection on society ever since the beginnings of recorded thought, the reflection that it was not good for man to be alone. Man is dependent on society for something more than protection, comfort, nurture, education, equipment, opportunity, and the myriad definite services which it conveys. He has in him the yearning for society. He is born in society and the need of society is born in him. If all his organic needs could be perfectly satisfied without society he would still need it as intensely as ever. Solitary confinement is one of the most fearful of all punishments because it prevents the satisfaction of this fundamental need. The hermit leaves the society of men only because he imagines he can find another kind of society in communion with God, and if he is not mad at the outset he becomes so in the end. Normal humanity must have social relationships to make life livable. The need of society is inwrought in our essential nature.

In sum, then, society is the system of social relationships in and through which we live.

COMMUNITY

Definition of community.—The second of our primary concepts is that of *community*. Let us begin with examples. It is the term we apply to a pioneer settlement, a village, a city, a tribe, or a nation. Wherever any group, small or large, live together in such a way

¹ *Politics*, 9-12, p. 1253a. Aristotle goes on to say that the person who is incapable of sharing a common life is either below or above humanity, "either a beast or a god."

that they share, not this or that particular interest, but the basic conditions of a common life, we call that group a community. The mark of a community is that one's life *may* be lived wholly within it, that all one's social relationships *may* be found within it. One cannot live wholly within a business organization or a church; one can live wholly within a tribe or a city. This does not mean that to be a community the circle must be all-inclusive. Among primitive peoples we find communities, sometimes communities of no more than a hundred persons, as for example among the Yurok tribes of California, which are almost or altogether isolated. But civilized communities, even very large ones, are much less self-contained. We may live in a metropolis and yet be members of a very small community because our interests are circumscribed within a narrow area. We may live in a village and yet belong to a community as wide as the whole area of our civilization or even wider. No civilized community has walls around it to cut it off from a larger one. Communities exist within greater communities, as the town within the area of the country.

A community, according to our definition, is always a group occupying a territorial area. One basis of its coherence is locality. Even a nomad community, a band of gypsies, for example, has a local, though changing, habitation. At every moment they occupy together a definite place on the earth's surface. But most communities are settled and derive from the conditions of their abode a strong bond of solidarity. To some extent the local bond has been weakened in the modern world by the extending facilities of communication, itself the condition of the larger but still territorial community. The importance of the conception of community is in large measure that it reveals the relation between social coherence and the geographical area. Although this relation has been modified by civilization, yet "the basic character of locality as a social classifier has never been transcended."²

Today we find, what never existed in primitive societies, local areas which seem to lack the other conditions of social coherence necessary to give them a community character. The residents of a ward or district of a large city may lack sufficient contacts or common interests to constitute a community, to possess a community spirit. Here the physical neighborhood has lost much of its significance. Its social value, if not lost, as some think, is transferred to the larger community and to the various associations which have come to supplement the social bonds of the community proper.

² A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization* (New York, 1929), Chap. XII.

Such cases illustrate the fact that locality, though a necessary condition, is not enough to create a community. A community, to repeat, is an area of common living. There must be the common living as well as the common earth.

Borderline cases.—Since a modern community represents a degree of common living and not a complete boundary of it, the question of where to draw the line in particular cases becomes a difficult though not very important one. Shall we call a monastery or convent a community in our sense? Shall we call an immigrant group, which in the midst of a large American city cherishes its own customs and speaks its own language, a community? Shall we call a social caste, the members of which exclude their fellow citizens from the more intimate social relationships, a community? It is quite reasonable to answer the first two questions in the affirmative, but the third is better answered in the negative. The reason is that, in order to satisfy our definition, the community group must by itself occupy a particular location. The external aspect of a community is an area within which its members live together by themselves, though not necessarily, as we have seen, without contacts over a wider area.

Community and the spread of civilization.—The wholly self-contained community belongs to the primitive world. In the modern world the nearest approach to it is found in the large country-community included within the frontiers of a single state, especially when the state seeks to "co-ordinate" the whole national life, as in National Socialist Germany, or when, as in Soviet Russia, it establishes a form of economy very different from that of the rest of the civilized world. But modern civilization unleashes forces which break down the self-containedness of communities great or small. These forces are partly technological, such as the improvement of the means of communication and transportation; partly economic, such as the demand for markets and for wider areas of economic exchange necessitated by the newer processes of industrial production; and partly cultural, since the thought and art and science of one country are inevitably carried on the wings of civilization to others. In fact we may be approaching a stage where no completely self-contained community can be found on any scale unless we extend the limits of community to include the whole earth.

But the smaller communities still remain, though only in degree. As civilized beings, we need the smaller as well as the larger circles of community. Living in the smaller we find the nearer, more inti-

mate satisfactions; but the larger bring to us opportunity, stability, economy, the constant stimulus of a richer, more varied culture.

The significance of the term "community" is most clearly brought out when we contrast it with our next term, "association."

ASSOCIATIONS

Associations as means of pursuing ends.—There are three ways in which men seek the fulfillment of their ends. They may act independently, each following his own way without thought of his fellows or their actions, but this unsocial way has narrow limitations wherever men live together. They may seek them through conflict with one another, each striving to wrest from the others the object that he prizes, but this method, when unalloyed, is precarious and wasteful and is opposed to the very existence of society. The conflicts that society permits, such as the competitive struggle, are limited and regulated. Lastly, they may pursue their ends in company, on some co-operative basis, so that each is in some degree and manner contributing to the ends of his fellows. This socialized method gives rise to associations. The co-operative pursuit may be spontaneous, it may be casual, it may be determined simply by use and wont, by the customs of a community. On the other hand, a group may organize itself expressly for the purpose of pursuing certain of its interests together. When that happens, an association is born.

Definition of association.—An association, then, is a group organized for the pursuit of an interest or group of interests in common. It is not a community but an organization within a community. A community is more than any organization, it is the matrix of organization. The difference is obvious. We contrast the business or the church or the club with the village or city or nation. We can ask, for example, what churches stand for, why they exist, and answer in terms of the particular interests around which they are organized. But we cannot ask why communities exist, any more than we can ask why life itself exists, and expect a definite answer. (We can ask why a community, say a city, exists *where it is situated*, but this is a different question.) Here another contrast between the community and the association reveals itself. Because the association is organized for particular purposes, we belong to it only by virtue of these purposes. We belong to an athletic club for purposes of physical recreation or sport, to a business for livelihood or profits, to a social club for fellowship. Membership of an association has a

limited significance. An association may engage our whole devotion, but we belong to it only by virtue of specific interests which we possess; we have, in the economic phrase, a limited liability with respect to it. Consequently, there can be a multitude of associations within the same community. The object of an association can be important or trivial, wide or narrow, but it is never all-comprehensive. Some part of our life always escapes organization. A community, on the other hand, can be, and often is for many of its members, an area within which the whole of life is lived. It contains all sorts and conditions, men, women, and children; the wise man and the fool, the well-to-do and the destitute, equally belong to it. We are born into communities, but we create or are elected into associations.

The family as an association.—There are two organizations which may seem to lie on the border line between associations and communities. One is the family. In some of its older forms it had many of the attributes of a community, circumscribing largely or even wholly the life of its members. People toiled, played, and even worshiped almost wholly within its orbit. In modern society, as in all complex civilizations, it becomes definitely an association, so far as its adult members are concerned. For the original contracting parties it is an association specifically established with certain ends in view, and vastly important as these ends are, they are nevertheless limited. The functions of the family are more and more limited and defined as social differentiation proceeds. On the other hand, the family, for the new lives that arise within it, is more than an association. For them it is a preliminary community, preparing them for the greater community. By imperceptible degrees it is transformed for them also, as they grow up, into a kind of association.

The state as an association.—The other association is the state. We are still apt to confuse the state with the community. But in reality the state is one form of social organization, not the whole community in all its aspects. We distinguish, for example, the state from the church, the political from the religious organization. It is highly important, for the understanding of social structure and particularly of the evolution of that structure, that we should realize the associational character of the state. The state is an agency of peculiarly wide range, but nevertheless an agency. At a certain stage in the evolution of western society it took an absolutist form, claiming to control every aspect of human life. Even if it had achieved its full pretensions in this respect—which it never could—

it would still have been, not the community, but an organization controlling the community.

Human beings engage in many social activities, not as citizens of the state, but as members of families or churches or clubs, as friends or lovers, as scientists or artists associating with their kind, in short, as social beings.

The state is different in important respects from all other associations. It is limited more by the way in which it pursues interests than by the kinds of interests which it pursues. It has certain powers over all other associations. It is a territorial organization, and therefore may be described as an agency of the community rather than an agency within it. Its jurisdiction extends over all within the territory it organizes, whether they are in a strict sense members (citizens) of the state or not. All other associations, in a modern society at least, are voluntary. We belong only if we want to; we can leave them if we want to, except in the case of the family, where the state, recognizing the peculiar obligations of the marriage contract, sets limits to this privilege. The state alone has the last resort of compulsion.³

Our use of the term "group."—We have defined association as a group expressly organized around a particular interest. By a group itself we mean any collection of social beings who enter into distinctive social relationships with one another. Sometimes the term is used more broadly. Oppenheimer, for example, though he denies the term to a number of people who simultaneously put up their umbrellas when it begins to rain, yet would designate as a group a number of people who read in their separate rooms the same newspaper.⁴ Since these people do not on that account enter into social relationships with one another, they would not form a group by our definition. A group, as we understand it, involves reciprocity between its members. The qualification, *expressly organized*, enables us to distinguish between associations and other social groups. A social class, for example, is not—any more than a community itself—an association. Organizations established on class lines are associations, but a class itself is not a group expressly organized to pursue certain ends or to fulfill certain functions.

Associations as agencies.—Associations in their pure forms are simply means or agencies through which their members realize their interests, like or common. It belongs to the essence of social organ-

³ Other organizations, such as gangs and rackets, do exercise sheer enforcement, but not in terms of a right recognized by the community.

⁴ F. Oppenheimer, *Allgemeine Soziologie* (Jena, 1923), II, p. 463.

ization that they act, not merely through leaders, but through officials or representatives, as agencies. The officials may control the organization so that the interests of the majority are subordinated to their own—wherever there is organization the problem of liberty arises—or they may be controlled by the members to the service of the inclusive interest. But in its executive operations as distinct from its mere deliberations, the association normally acts through agents who are responsible for and to the association. This fact gives the association its distinctive character and its peculiar legal status. For though an association has in truth no purposes that are not the purposes of some or all of its members, it has methods of operation peculiar to it as an association. It owns property which is not simply an aggregation of individual properties; it owns funds which the members cannot at pleasure distribute among themselves, since they are assigned to the express purposes of the association; it possesses rights and obligations, powers, and liabilities, which the members cannot distributively exercise. A public utility, a bank, a trade-union, a club, a church, has in virtue of its organization and function certain duties and certain privileges as such, as a unity. When this condition is legally established and the limits of these duties and privileges are legally assigned, the association becomes a *corporation*.

INSTITUTIONS

Distinction of institution and association.—Anything socially established we are apt to call an institution, and according to this wide usage the family and the state, no less than marriage and government, would be so described. But we shall gain a clearer view of the social structure if we make a distinction between institutions and associations. In this book we shall always mean by institutions the *established forms or conditions of procedure* characteristic of group activity.

When men create associations they must also create rules and procedures for the despatch of the common business and for the regulation of the members to one another within the ambit of the organization. Such forms are distinctively institutions. Every association has, with respect to its particular interest, its characteristic institutions. The church, for example, has its sacraments, its modes of worship, its rituals. The family has marriage and inheritance—these may perhaps be reckoned as institutions of the state, being under its guardianship, but the family has besides its own institutions, such as the home, the family meal, and so forth. The state

has its own peculiar institutions, such as representative government and legislative procedures. It should be observed that there are institutions which are established by communities as well as those which associations set up. Such are, for example, festivals, ceremonies expressive of important occasions, modes of recreation and amusement. Communal institutions, unlike many associational institutions, do not result from a deliberate act of establishment. They gradually attain social recognition, they grow into establishment.

Distinction of institution and custom.—The difference between a social usage or custom on the one hand and an institution on the other may therefore be one of degree. Institution implies a more definite recognition. We would call the marriage feast an institution, but courtship a custom, and certainly we should call marriage itself an institution and not a custom. Institutions have external insignia, marks of public recognition, which customs as such do not require. Again, a custom is always a social *mode* of conduct, whereas an institution is often a social *condition* of conduct. Thus no one would call property a custom though it is certainly an institution.

These examples suggest another difference. The term "institution" stresses the impersonal factor in social relationships. When we speak of customs we think of the accepted ways in which people do things together, in personal contacts. When we speak of institutions we think rather of the system of controls which extends beyond personal relations, which is the bond between the past and the present and between the present and the future, which links men not to their families and their neighbors but to their ancestors and their gods, and which ramifies into the greater organizations of the political and the economic life.

We belong to associations but not to institutions. Sometimes a confusion arises between institution and association because the same term, *in a different reference*, may mean either one or the other. There is no difficulty in deciding, according to our definition, that the church is an association and communion an institution, that the trade-union is an association and the union label an institution, that the family is an association and primogeniture an institution. But which term shall we apply to a hospital, a parliament, a cabinet, a college? When we speak of a hospital we may be thinking of a building for the cure of the sick, a system of medical service, a provision publicly or privately established to meet certain social needs—in other words we may be thinking of it as an institution. But we may also think of it, from the inside as it were, as a body of

physicians, nurses, attendants—in other words, as an association. This suggests the simple clue by which we can find an answer to our question. If we are considering something as an organized group, it is an association; if as a mode or means of service, it is an institution. Do we think of it in terms of membership, as something which people belong to, then it is in our reference an association. When we regard a college as a body of teachers and students, we are selecting its associational aspect, but when we regard it as an educational system, we are selecting its institutional features. We cannot *belong to* an institution. We do not belong to marriage or primogeniture or property systems, but we do belong to families and to states.

Institutions and interests.—There are certain institutions which are exhibited by associations of all sorts, such as initiation into membership, election of officers, and a form of management. There are others which are peculiar to or characteristic of this or that type of association, depending on the nature of the special interests that it pursues. The relation between associations, institutions, and interests is exemplified in the following table.

ASSOCIATIONS DEFINED BY INSTITUTIONS AND INTERESTS

<i>Association</i>	<i>Characteristic institutions</i>	<i>Special interests</i>
Family	Marriage, the home, inheritance	Interests of sex, home, parentage
College	Lecture and examination system, graduation	Learning, vocational preparation
Business	Bookkeeping system, incorporation, share capital	Profits
Church	Creed, communion, forms of worship	Religious faith
Political party	Primaries, party "machine," political platform	Office, power, national policy
State	Constitution, legal code, forms of government	General regulation of the social order

MORES AND FOLKWAYS

Significance of the folkways and mores.—Underlying and sustaining the more formal order of institutions and associations there exists an intricate complex of usages or modes of behavior developed spontaneously or apart from specific establishment or enactment. Sometimes these usages are referred to as the customs of a group, but this term is not sufficiently inclusive, and so they have come to be called "folkways" and "mores." These names were

made familiar by W. G. Sumner through his book entitled *Folkways*. He used the term "folkways" in a very comprehensive sense.

They are, like products of natural forces which men unconsciously set in operation, or they are like the instinctive ways of animals, which are developed out of experience, which reach a final form of maximum adaptation to an interest, which are handed down by tradition and admit of no exception or variation, yet change to meet new conditions, still within the same limited methods, and without rational reflection or purpose. From this it results that all the life of human beings, in all ages and stages of culture, is primarily controlled by a vast mass of folkways handed down from the earliest existence of the race, having the nature of the ways of other animals, only the topmost layer of which are subject to change and control, and have been somewhat modified by human philosophy, ethics, and religion, or by other acts of intelligent reflection.⁵

The *mores* are the folkways considered under a particular aspect, as *regulators* of behavior, not merely as ways of behaving. Every social usage is also in degree a social control. Even the most superficial convention, even the most trivial rule of etiquette, attaches to itself the quality of being the right or proper way, the prescribed way, of doing things. Hence we should not think of the mores as something different from the folkways. They *are* the folkways, in their capacity as instruments of control, expressing the group standards, the group sense of what is fitting, right, and conducive to well-being. The mores represent the living character of a group or community, operative in conscious or unconscious control over its members. They are at once the expression and the limitation of the group life, an omnipresent influence towards conformity, forever molding and forever restraining the tendencies of every individual. From infancy to old age they mete out to each member the strong medicine of praise and blame, approval to those who follow them and, still more, disapproval to those who seek to defy them, with all the penalties which attach to the displeasure of the group.

The mores are authorities with which one cannot argue, for they are guarded most tenaciously by those who reason least. They are not the result of intelligent contrivance or foreseeing design. In part, no doubt, they incorporate the social experience of the group. But

⁵ *Op. cit.* (Boston, 1907), § 4. See also W. G. Sumner and A. G. Keller, *The Science of Society* (New Haven, 1927), I, § 20.

one has only to look at the conflicting mores of different groups to realize that chance and accident and the vagaries of use and wont also play a large role in their creation. One group uncovers the head to show respect, another the feet. One group prohibits the marriage of its members with outsiders, another prescribes it. One group condemns the remarriage of widows, another commends it. One group has a strict sex code for the married but not for the unmarried, another group follows the opposite system. Such examples could be extended indefinitely.⁶ Possibly the mores register a vast amount of forgotten experience, but at most it is experience detoured by the happy or unhappy conjunctures which impress the memory of the group, transformed and stereotyped into tradition, distorted by dominant interests, and reinforced by fear or dislike of the untried. The mores are thus generally agents of conservatism. Nevertheless they have only the appearance of fixity, for they change subtly from age to age, and sometimes important elements of them may be revolutionized in some social upheaval.

The mores and social unity.—The mores are in the last resort the guardians of solidarity. Every social unity has its own mores. There are mores for each sex, for all ages, for all classes, for all groups from the family to the nation or the civilization. Since the mores of different communities are widely divergent and often quite contradictory, their control diminishes in those large-scale societies where diverse groups are brought together. They are more compulsive, more integrated and more integrating, in the rural than in the great urban communities. Moreover, with the evolution of society the mores differentiate within themselves, appearing as a series of special codes, custom and fashion and law and the codes of variant religious and other cultural groups. Thus their control is rendered more flexible and the varieties of social experience are allowed a freer and fuller expression.

⁶ Numerous illustrations will be found in W. I. Thomas, *Primitive Behavior* (New York, 1937).

II

INTERESTS AND ATTITUDES

DEFINITIONS

The social and the psychological.—In this chapter we shall be concerned with certain psychological conditions of social relationships. In other words, our attention will be turned not to the relationships themselves, but to the related units. When we study the nature of the behaving units, the structure of the individual consciousness which expresses itself in social relationships, we are taking the psychological point of view. When we study the relationships themselves we take the sociological point of view. Psychology and sociology are concerned with different aspects of an indivisible reality. Individuals cannot be understood apart from their relations nor their relations apart from the units (or terms) of the relationship. We are *also* students of psychology when we study society; we are no less students of sociology when we study the mentality of the human being. In the last resort the difference depends on the focus of our interest.

What the sociologist is interested in is pre-eminently the way in which beings endowed with consciousness act in relation to one another. Beyond or beneath that consciousness there lie realms of being which other scientists seek to explore, but it is on the level of that consciousness that the sociologist pursues his quest. He is not directly concerned with the psychoneural conditions of behavior, with the physiology of sensation or perception, with the biological processes of inheritance, with the functioning of the glands, and so forth, except in so far as they may throw light on his own distinctive problems. He is not directly concerned with those organic

activities and responses, such as reflexes and tropisms, which are not directed or conditioned by the conscious mind. Although neuromuscular activity is always a concomitant of conscious behavior, although in fact the latter is for us inconceivable apart from the former, it remains gravely doubtful whether a study of physiological structures and processes can help us to interpret or understand the processes of consciousness. A musician does not understand music the better by studying the physiology of the ear and brain, and it is difficult to see how a sociologist can understand society the better by studying neurons and synapses. For our present purpose at least it seems unnecessary. We shall draw on the conclusions of psychology throughout, as occasion arises. But there is one distinction of a psychological nature which seems to us of peculiar importance as a ground of sociological analysis, and this we must develop. It is the distinction between *interests* and *attitudes*.

Interests and attitudes as correlative.—Put in one list such terms as *fear, love, surprise, pride, sympathy* and *veneration*, and in another list such terms as *enemy, friend, discovery, family, victim of accident*, and *God*. Terms of the first group connote attitudes; those of the second, interests. The former signify subjective reactions, states of consciousness relative to objects; the latter signify the objects relative to the subjective reaction. When we mention love or fear we define an attitude; when we mention friend or enemy we define an interest. Until we relate interest to attitude or attitude to interest the situation itself remains undefined. Suppose, for example, we say that a person is "afraid." Without further explanation we do not identify the situation to which his fear is a response. He may be afraid of snakes or the police or publicity or women or ill-health. (There are, it is true, certain terms for attitudes, such as "timidity," which imply a tendency to respond in a particular way to practically all situations.) Similarly, if we say that a person is interested in law or in religion or in the stock market we do not reveal the attitude that attends the interest. The burglar, the policeman, the jurist, the respectable citizen, and the reformer, all have an interest in the law, but it is needless to point out that their attitudes are diverse. The atheist and the worshiper alike are interested in religion. The speculator, the economist, and the banker alike are interested in the stock market.

Interest, then, is the correlative of *attitude* in the sense that any actual behavior situation is revealed when we know both the attitude, the mode of consciousness, and the interest, the object of consciousness. When we define an interest as the object of conscious-

ness, we do not, of course, mean by "object" merely a material or external fact. It is anything, material or immaterial, factual or conceptual, to which we devote our attention. Since in the reality of experience subject and object are never separate we cannot speak of an interest without implying some sort of attitude, and often the very mention of the interest sufficiently indicates the nature of the attitude. An interest in health or recreation, for instance, obviously implies an attitude of attraction towards these objects.

ASSOCIATIVE AND DISSOCIATIVE ATTITUDES

Attitudes and social processes.—In our account of the structure and changes of society we shall have frequent occasion to refer to attitudes and interests. In some parts of the work, when, for example, we are dealing with associations, we shall lay stress on the role of interests, for, as we shall see, all specific social organizations are built upon like or common interests. When, on the other hand, we are dealing with social processes, such as assimilation and accommodation, we shall be more concerned with attitudes and the changes that occur in them. The reason of this will appear in the remaining sections of this chapter.

For sociological purposes a fundamental distinction between attitudes centers about the question whether they are such as tend to unite or such as tend to separate those affected by them. In the sociological lens, says a well-known German sociologist, L. von Wiese, "the colorful confusion of interhuman life falls into patterns of avoidance and approach."¹ We should note here that certain attitudes are in themselves tendencies to approach those towards whom they are directed while others express tendencies to avoidance. Love seeks to approach, fear or disgust to avoid. Hate separates, socially if not physically, and sympathy unites. Dissociative attitudes, such as distrust and envy, may unite those who share them but only in common resistance of those towards whom they are distrustful or envious.

Every social relationship involves in fact an adjustment of attitudes on the part of those who enter the relationship, and the varieties of adjustment are as numerous as the varieties of social process. Friendliness, for example, may be met by friendliness or by indifference or by enmity. Aggressiveness and submissiveness form a pair of complementary attitudes which often appear in social situations. Even when we employ the same term for the attitudes

¹ *Systematic Sociology* (ed. Becker, New York, 1932), p. 39.

exhibited by each of the related persons, these may have a complementary rather than a like quality. The love of a parent for a child is very different from and is complementary to the love of the child for the parent.

While as between individuals there is an endless and constantly changing variety of attitude-adjustments, there is a tendency in every social group towards the development of like attitudes on issues relevant to the group as a whole. Attitudes are very responsive to suggestion and to education. The extraordinary changes which have taken place in national attitudes with the establishment of sovietism in Russia, fascism in Italy, and Hitlerism in Germany, offer obvious illustrations of this point. Masses of people, for example, quickly come to venerate (or to execrate) symbols which formerly were entirely a matter of indifference, such as the swastika, the lictor's rods or fasces, the hammer and sickle. Everywhere we find groups, tribal, local, racial, national, kin, and class, displaying characteristic attitudes and attaching them to symbols. These attitudes in part arise out of common social situations and in part depend on the indoctrination which the group controls bring to bear on the members. They are thus sustained and perpetuated within the mores of each group.²

Classification of attitudes as associative and dissociative.—If we take the common terms for attitudes, we can put them in classes according as they imply tendencies to promote or to deter social relations between those who have the attitudes and those towards whom they are directed. Before we do so, however, certain cautions are necessary. In actual experience attitudes are subtle, complex, and changeful modes of consciousness. They are constantly being modified by our training, our reflection, our health, our circumstances of every sort. When we attribute an attitude to a person, we can judge its character only by certain external signs—looks, gestures, words. These signs suggest to us fear or love or pity, but in so naming the attitude we do not fully describe the conscious fact. All that we mean is that the attitude-factor so named is dominant or at least recognizable in the subject. Our pity, for example, may contain love and fear as well. The term we apply to a state of consciousness carries an element of selection and of judgment. The terms themselves shade into one another. Consider, for example, the difference between "respect," "esteem," and "admiration." And the mental realities they denote shade still more subtly into one another, since

² See, for example, E. S. Bogardus, *Immigration and Race Attitudes* (New York, 1928) and Bruno Lasker, *Race Attitudes in Children* (New York, 1930).

our names for psychological facts are utterly inadequate, as every novelist knows and every sociologist ought to realize.

Take, for example, attitudes which seem poles apart, like love and hate. Even with respect to these it is an old observation that they may be combined in one perplexing attitude towards a single person or object. The Roman poet Catullus wrote thus of his Lesbia: "I love and hate her; if you perchance ask me why, I do not know, but I feel it within me and am in torment."³ Again, we must remember that the attitude we seek to fix down by a name is itself often variable and inconstant, like a color seen in a changeful light. An attitude is always a valuation. It is a way of regarding persons or things, with its own emotional coloring, a way of assessing them in relation to ourselves and ourselves in relation to them.

For these reasons a classification of attitudes is difficult. They are so complex, so blended, so variant, so individualized that any classification must be, as the logicians say, "artificial," and no classification can be complete. In other words, our classification must depend on our purpose in making it. In the classification that follows we are considering attitudes from a sociological, rather than a psychological, viewpoint. We place attitudes in three main columns according as they tend to prevent, to limit, or to promote social relationships. And we divide the columns horizontally into three groups, according as the attitudes imply inferiority or superiority, or have no such implication in the relationships of the persons affected by them.

The classification is merely illustrative and is in no sense exhaustive. It will be seen that in each class belong attitudes which are clearly dissociative, others which are without restriction associative, and others which at once sustain and limit social relationships. Thus the attitude of veneration is placed in Class I because it implies a sense of inferiority in the subject towards the person venerated, and it is included in the last-mentioned group under that class because, while it sustains one type of social relationship, it has a restrictive quality, checking in other directions the expression of the personality of the subject towards the being who evokes the attitude. It should be noted that in this classification we are concerned only with attitudes as directed towards other social beings, not with attitudes as displayed towards external things, towards

³ Odi et amo; quare id faciam fortasse requiris.

Nescio, sed fieri sentio et excrucior.

Odes, lxxxv

A CLASSIFICATION OF ATTITUDES

(Attitudes of persons exhibited in relations with other persons)

I. *Attitudes implying some present sense of inferiority in the subject with respect to the object of the attitude*

<i>Dissociative</i>	<i>Restrictive</i>	<i>Associative</i>
Dread	Awe	Gratitude
Fear	Veneration	Emulation
Terror	Worship	Imitateness ⁴
Envy	Devotion	Hero-worship
Bashfulness	Humility	
	Submissiveness ⁴	
	Subservience	
	Modesty	
	Snobbishness ⁵	

II. *Attitudes implying some present sense of superiority in the subject*

Disgust	Pride	Pity ⁷
Abhorrence	Patronage	Protectiveness
Repugnance	Tolerance ⁶	
Scorn	Forbearance ⁶	
Contempt		
Disdain		
Superciliousness		
Intolerance		
Arrogance		

III. *Attitudes not necessarily implying a difference of plane or status*

Hate	Rivalry	Sympathy
Dislike	Competitiveness	Affection
Aversion	Jealousy ⁸	Trust
Distrust		Tenderness
Suspicion		Love
Spitefulness		Friendliness
Malice		Kindliness
Cruelty		Courtesy
		Helpfulness

⁴ Imitativeness and submissiveness rather than imitation and submission, since the former are attitudes and the latter processes. But often there is only one term to describe both the attitude and the process.

⁵ Snobbishness, looking downward, discourages social relationship; looking upward, seeks to extend it. This attitude is placed in Class I on the assumption that while it involves a sense both of inferiority and of superiority, the former is the stronger element in the complex.

⁶ Tolerance not in the sense of open-mindedness, but as the attitude corresponding to the process of toleration.

⁷ Pity might seem to fall more appropriately in the restrictive class, but that is because it is so frequently associated with such attitudes as patronage. Pity as such, as for a friend fallen in misfortune, has no such implication.

⁸ Jealousy might seem to fall in Class I, since it is so closely associated with a sense of inferiority. But though a sense of inferiority may underlie jealousy, it is not necessarily present in the attitude of the jealous person towards the person for whom he has a jealous regard.

nature, for example, or towards our possessions, or towards events or actions. We do not include, therefore, such attitudes as courage, hopefulness, remorse, despair, avariciousness, and so forth, though of course such attitudes often arise out of and often affect our attitudes towards persons. Nor do we include what may be called self-directed attitudes, such as complacency.

Attitudes and social relations.—The infant acts as though he were the center of the tiny universe in which he lives and feels, and as he comes to appraise things he does so at first solely in terms of their quality of bringing pleasures or pains to himself. He does not conceive of others as persons, he does not relate himself to others as persons. The mother's breast and the bottle, the hands that tend him and the cot he rests in, the nurse that wheels him and the carriage in which he is wheeled, the words his parents speak over him, and the noises of the wind—these are all alike construed in terms of their impact on his own imperious being. In short, his attitude is entirely egocentric.⁹ In the process of mental growth the young child learns to distinguish between persons and things and only then does he become capable of social relationships. He comes to conceive of himself as bound up with other *persons*, he distinguishes his own folks from other folks, establishing various degrees of nearness or intimacy, with parents and other members of his family, with playmates and schoolmates, reaching gradually into wider circles. He learns to say "we" instead of merely "I." Generally he invests with a halo of superiority the near circles to which he belongs. His mother is more wonderful than all other women, his father more wise than other men, his school more honorable than other schools. Thus arise those attitudes which, directed to still larger circles, become the determinant of devotion to clan or tribe, to race and nation, to class and culture group. And that is why the social prejudices of men are so deeply rooted in their social nature and offer such stubborn resistance to the development and organization of common interests beyond the range of their established loyalties. We shall consider another aspect of this problem when we turn to the subject of *self-limited* and *group-limited* interests.

A note on the "measurements" of attitudes.—A considerable part of the sociological literature on attitudes is devoted to the

⁹ It is more accurate to say of the infant that his *attitude* is egocentric than that his *interest* is self-limited. On the egocentric character of the child's attitude see Jean Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (Eng. tr., New York, 1932).

question whether attitudes can be "measured," and if so, how.¹⁰ Some writers, in fact, have drawn up attitude measurement scales and profess to be able to measure by certain techniques the attitudes of different people towards the church, the Negro, birth control, prohibition, and so forth.¹¹ Since these attempts illustrate very clearly the problem of the quantitative treatment of psychical attributes, we shall comment on them briefly, as a way of bringing this controversial issue to the attention of the student. We pointed out in the preceding pages that attitudes were complex and variable modes of consciousness. They are expressions or aspects of the whole personality of the social being, and it is no easy matter for the observer to apprehend their quality from the external signs. This suggests the need for a careful study of attitudes before we attempt to apply techniques of measurement.

Moreover, there is another preliminary study which the attitude-measurers too often ignore. In their zeal for measurement they may fail to ask, What *in the attitude* is it that we are undertaking to measure? We do not measure *things*, but only certain *quantitative aspects* of things. We do not measure a table, but its length and breadth and height and weight. We do not measure the sun, but its radiation, the composition of its light, its size, its weight, its apparent motion among the stars, and so forth. What *aspects* then of an attitude do we set out to measure? It has no physical aspects like the table or the sun. What mental aspects are quantitative and measurable, and with what measuring rod? Usually the attitude-measurers are thinking of the degree of favor or disfavor with which the subject regards some object. Can we *measure* degrees of favor or disfavor, of liking or disliking? The student can answer this question for himself if he will first seek the answer to the following questions:

(1) When we say that we like or dislike something mildly or heartily or extremely, do these quantitative ratings imply a continuum or quantitative scale such that, if we could define our attitudes completely, "mildly" might stand for say 62 per cent,

¹⁰ A few references are L. L. Thurstone and E. J. Chave, *The Measurement of Attitudes* (Chicago, 1929); D. D. Droba, "Social Attitudes," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 38 (1934), 513-524; Reid Bain, "Theory and Measurement of Attitudes and Opinions," *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 27 (1930), 357-379; see also the volume *Social Attitudes*, edited by Kimball Young (New York, 1931). For a balanced and not unsympathetic critique see Clifford Kirkpatrick, "Assumptions and Methods in Attitude Measurements," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 1 (1936), 75-88.

¹¹ See Thurstone and Chave, *op. cit.*

"heartily" for say 80 per cent, and "extremely" for say 94 per cent of an absolute maximum of liking or disliking?

(2) Every measuring rod is divided into equal units, as the inch or centimeter is a unit of length. Can we find any *quantity* of liking or disliking which is the similar unit in the measuring rod of favorable or unfavorable attitudes towards any object?

(3) Every measuring rod can be applied with equal accuracy to a whole category of measurable objects. The yardstick, for example, enables us to compare accurately the respective lengths of various tables or various pieces of cloth. Can we find any measuring rod that can be applied equivalently and indifferently to the attitude expressions of different persons, so that we can conclude that A approves of "democracy" 65 per cent and B 83 per cent? 83 per cent of what?

(4) Observe that the attitude-measurers are generally concerned with attitudes not in their full significance, as reverence and admiration and respect and so forth, but in a simplified colorless form as merely expressing favor or disfavor of some object (or interest). Even if we accept this limitation, has the object itself precisely the same significance for the various persons who exhibit attitudes towards it? Does "democracy" or "religion" or "birth control" *mean* the same thing to them? If not, can any measuring rod yield exactly comparable results when applied to the attitudes of different persons?

If the student answers "yes" to these four questions, then he will also answer in the affirmative the question: Can attitudes be measured? If, like the writer, he is compelled to answer "no" to all four questions, then he must take the contrary position. He will conclude that there is a very important distinction between *grading* or *rating* on the one hand and *measuring* on the other, and that the former method is applicable to many situations which preclude the latter altogether.

INCLUSIVE AND EXCLUSIVE INTERESTS

Ground of the distinction of inclusive and exclusive interests.—Every sentence we utter, every judgment we pass, states a relation between a subject and object. Every fact of experience involves a relation between the experiencing subject and the experienced object or, what amounts to the same thing, a relation of attitudes and interests. Consequently every *social* experience involves an adjustment between the attitudes and interests of two

or more persons. In our discussion of attitudes we took as the fundamental ground of sociological classification the distinction between associative and dissociative attitudes. No less fundamental is the distinction between *inclusive* and *exclusive interests*, that is, between interests which tend to unite the different individuals or groups who pursue them and those which tend, socially if not physically, to set them apart. Dividing interests are those which are exclusive to one individual as against others (*self-limited*) or to one group as against others (*group-limited*). The uniting interests, as we shall explain presently, fall into the types of *harmonious* interests and *common* interests. The student should here note that attitudes can be harmonious but cannot be common, in the sense in which we are applying that term to interests. Different people cannot have a common attitude any more than they can feel a common pain. They can have only *like* pains and *like* attitudes, because the subjective element is always individualized. But they can have common interests, just as they can have common possessions. That is why we speak of inclusive and exclusive interests.

Self-limited interests.—If someone you trusted and loved were to show by his conduct that in his relations with you he was studying merely his own advantage, you would suffer a keen sense of disillusionment. You could no longer have trust in him. Even if you continued to love him you could no longer feel that you and he shared any common ground. The former relationship, the satisfying sense of "togetherness," is destroyed. You are not valued as yourself, you are merely a means within his scheme of values. So you can no longer feel at one with him. He has in effect denied that he has anything *in common* with you. His interest in you was a self-limited interest, the kind of interest a man has in any object from which he derives a private gain.

In the example just cited one of the two parties to the relationship was animated by an inclusive interest, the other by a self-limited interest, a situation from which many love tragedies arise. But there are also many social relationships of a give-and-take character, in respect of which both parties are animated alike by self-limited interest. This is the level on which most trading relationships take place. It is generally the level of contractual relationships, of legal relationships, of the incessant interchange of services which a highly specialized society involves. Wherever we are primarily concerned with the services rendered to us, apart from the personal values of those who render the services, we act on this level. Usually, in such relationships, there is some implicit

recognition of the fact that those who render services to us in return for services rendered are *social persons*. We recognize, that is, that as persons they are values-to-themselves, and that, as social persons, they belong within the same system of values which includes ourselves. But the ordinary give-and-take relationships of modern urban society are relatively independent of this recognition. Our relation to the grocer, when we order goods from him and he takes our money for his goods, tends, apart from surface courtesies, to be almost entirely utilitarian. The interest of both parties is then essentially a self-limited one. It is still more obviously so when we are dealing with an impersonal organization, such as a department store or a utility company.

Just as there is self-limited interest, so there is group-limited interest. The latter term is appropriate wherever any or all members of a group act so with respect to other groups that they do not recognize those other groups as included with themselves in a common scheme of values. If, for example, we think and act as though there were no common conditions of well-being uniting us with the members of other nations, then we are exhibiting a group-limited interest.

Observe here that when we speak of interests we are referring to what people actually seek, not what they ought to seek. When a nation reveals a group-limited interest in its dealings with other nations, it may be mistaken as to the grounds on which its own well-being rests. Lack of concern for others may be foolish policy as well as inferior morality. And so an individual in treating others as the mere means to his ends may be deceived concerning the conditions of his own welfare. He may be acting in opposition to his own "best interests" or "real interests," as it is sometimes put. What is meant by such expressions is that he might attain a fuller satisfaction or a greater degree of happiness if his interests, in our sense of the term, were less self-limited and more inclusive. His well-being and his interest-complex are at variance.

Types of relation between self-limited interests.—The self-limited interests of one person may be related in diverse ways to the self-limited interests of others. There are several types to be distinguished.

(1) When people bargain with one another or enter into any kind of give-and-take arrangement, the self-limited interests of each are so adapted to the self-limited interests of the rest that each reaps some advantage from the transaction. In the case of simple barter A wants x , which B possesses, more than y , which he him-

self possesses, and B wants y more than x . The immediate interests are thus *unlike, complementary*, and, at least in degree, *harmonious*.

(2) When two or more people all fear the same thing, an enemy, an impending danger of any kind, and get together to protect themselves, then the self-limited interest of each is harmonious with that of the others of their group. Here we have a case where immediate interests are *like*, whereas in the previous instance they were *unlike*.

(3) When two or more people want the same thing, a business order, promotion, a prize or honor, and when the attainment of it by one impedes or prevents its attainment by others, then their immediate interests are *like* and *conflicting*. Observe that this is the type of competitive interest and is quite distinct from the type of bargaining interest, which came under our first head.

Like and common interests.—The distinction between *like* and *common* interests is a fundamental one for sociological analysis but is subject to much confusion, partly because of the ambiguity of words. We say, for example, that people have common capacities, common habits, when we really mean that they have like (or perhaps identical) capacities and so forth. The like is what we have distributively, privately, each to himself; the common is what we have collectively, what we share *without dividing up*. The credits we receive at college belong to the first order, the college life in which we participate belongs to the second. Observe that the like is often the *source* of the common. A sense of likeness frequently creates common ground, common possession both material and spiritual. One of the great processes of society, as we shall see later, is that whereby the common is built out of the like, common interests growing out of what were at first merely like interests.

Society could not endure if all our interests were self-limited. If other people were merely means to our satisfactions we would have no interest in them as people. We would not belong together as social beings. We would have no direct concern for their systems of values. Love and friendship and family affection and group devotion, in so far as they existed at all, would lose the quality which gives depth and assurance to our lives. We would sustain no relationship with others any longer or any further than it satisfied our egoism. We would know nothing of genuine sympathy. Bereft of altruistic feelings, we would become emotionally shallow and superficial. Everywhere man seeks his fellows. Everywhere he sets up common values in which he and they are joined.

The two great forms of common interest.—We have seen that a common interest is one which cannot be privately owned or distributively apportioned. If men pursue an interest together in order that each may receive his "dividend," then no matter how close is the co-operation, and no matter whether the dividend is tangible or intangible, whether it is money or honor or power, the interest is not common but like. Only when men identify themselves with some inclusive indivisible unity of their fellows, or with some cause that pertains equally to all who seek it, does the truly common interest reveal itself.

We have just suggested a distinction between two forms of common interest. The first form is exemplified by the loyalty of men to their family, their city, their country, to any community to which they think of themselves as really *belonging*. The second form is exemplified by the interest in science, in art, in techniques (apart from their utilitarian service), in religion, in tradition, in philosophy, in sport; in anything which of itself excites the curiosity, the enthusiasm, the devotion of men; in anything which they want to see flourish even though they themselves are not there to enjoy it. The first is an attachment to a personal unity, the second to an impersonal goal of endeavor.

Thus his science is a common interest of the scientist in so far as he thinks of it as a worth-while goal, in so far as he pursues it not merely for a living or for the distinction his own scientific achievement will bring him. Of course he may at the same time make his living as a scientist and he may seek repute as a practitioner of science, but if his whole interest in science were determined by the dollars he earned or by the kudos it brought him, he would be an unsatisfactory scientist. He would not be working for the sake of a common value, the value which unites him with all other scientists. He would lack the common interest which makes science a value in itself and is the spur to the most unstinted service.¹²

In nearly all human activity common and self-limited interests

¹² In his book entitled *Inventors and Money-Makers* (New York, 1915), Professor F. W. Taussig showed that inventors, like workers in pure science, are not actuated simply by the prospect of profit but are often dominated by the interest of discovery itself, as revealed by the happiness they derive from inventing, by their devotion to useless or unprofitable devices, and by the difficulties they have in managing the business end of their inventions. Even the financially successful Edison engaged his whole fortune in a New Jersey ore venture which resulted in remarkable engineering achievements but failed disastrously. When he heard that his losses amounted to four million dollars he said, "Well, it's all gone, but we had a hell of a good time spending it."

are variously combined. For as it is inevitable that men should seek after their private interests, so it is perhaps equally inevitable that they should find an intrinsic worth-whileness in the groups to which they belong and in the things to which their thoughts are continually directed, to which their capacities are devoted and to which their habits are attuned.

Common interests as primordial as self-limited interests.—It should not be assumed that common interests of either type are a later development of social conditioning and that self-limited interests are the original driving forces of man, expressing his most fundamental impulses, those of self-preservation and self-expression. Man is at once egocentric and sociocentric. How can anyone say that either element dominates when they are so inextricably fused in all man is and does? He lives for himself and he lives for his group. He lives for himself and he lives for the causes that are dear to him. And however far we pierce back to the earlier stage of human life—or even into animal life below the human level—we find the same ingredients of self-regarding and self-transcending interest.

The manifestations of common interest are of special significance for the sociologist because they throw light on that essential solidarity which makes men members of any community and which in the last resort holds society together.

ATTITUDES AND INTERESTS AS MOTIVATIONS

The quest for motivations.—We are always seeking to discover the motives behind the overt behavior of our fellows. Particularly when someone we are acquainted with does some unexpected act we at once hunt for the motive which will explain it. When the detective is trying to identify the author of a crime of violence, he asks himself who, among the potential suspects, had a motive for committing the crime. When the guilty person is found, again the judge and jury inquire concerning the motive for the deed, since the same external act, say murder, is one or another kind of crime in the eyes of the law, or even no crime at all, according to the motive which prompted it. On a larger scale the historian and the biographer are constantly engaged in seeking to unearth the motives which lay behind the doings they record. And the novelist and the playwright make great use of their privilege of inside knowledge concerning the motives of the characters they depict.

What is the significance of this endless search for motives? In the first place, we are all conscious that our own external behavior is an expression of our attitudes and interests, and consequently we endeavor to probe to the inner determinants of the behavior of others. In the second place, we generally assume, though the assumption may not infrequently involve an undue simplification of the truth, that in the complex of an individual's attitudes and interests there is some dominant factor or factors which can explain his behavior in a particular situation. Such a dominant factor we call his motive. Sometimes we lay stress on the attitude aspect, as when we attribute an act to envy or jealousy or fear; sometimes on the interest aspect, as when we say the motive of an act was money or prestige or popularity.

Levels of motivation.—We think then of motives as the effective or operative valuations which lie behind our acts, behind the show of things. And in seeking for them we may descend, as it were, to various levels of the conscious or subconscious life. We may look for the immediate motive behind the datum of behavior, as when we attribute an activity, say churchgoing, to the desire to be thought respectable or to considerations of the social or business connections which it promotes or to religious devotion. We may seek for motives not merely behind the external act but behind the mentality associated with it, as when we attribute an attitude of respect to a recognition of personal worth or achievement or to an acceptance of authority or to a desire to stand in well with the respected person; or when we attribute a man's interest in money to a desire for power or for prestige or for security or for the advancement of his family. We may adventure still further and undertake the hazardous attempt to discover hidden subconscious urges or tendencies which find their expression in conscious activity under various disguises. The peculiarity of this psychoanalytic explanation is that it regards the individual's own belief that he is animated by this or that motive as often merely a delusion masking the real determinants of his action. Its exponents find evidences of complexes and "fixations" developing early in the life history of the individual. They find them likewise attested to by the practices, such as rituals and taboos, of primitive peoples. These complexes they regard as active below the conscious level and as symbolically emerging in dreams. In the Freudian form sex elements are given a dominant role.

Why the quest for motives is hazardous.—There are grave difficulties in the way of any exploration of human motives. There

is particular dubiety surrounding the attempt to discover "unconscious motives," if indeed such an expression is permissible. The Freudian interpretation of dreams, of primitive customs, and of adult life histories is full of precarious inference and has been attacked by psychologists and anthropologists. This does not mean that it may not have an element of truth, but it is evidence that the general principle involved is far from being established. Even on the conscious level the quest for motives is full of difficulty. It is hard for anyone to analyze his own motives; it is still harder for an outsider to discover them. If the student asks himself why he came to college, he can probably give some answer, but reflection will often show that the answer simplifies the motivation. He should therefore exercise caution when he is dealing with questionnaires or other modes of inquiry which ask people *why* they did so and so, why they left the country for the city, why they chose a particular occupation and so forth. Finally, it is difficult to generalize concerning people's motives. What moves one man leaves another unmoved. The motives of conduct are as complex as the personality itself. We tend in retrospect, even in action, to see in them a simplicity which they do not possess.

Pareto's theory of human motivation.—Perhaps the most famous attempt by a sociologist to deal with the problem of human motivation is that of Vilfredo Pareto, and as it illustrates very well the hazards which every such attempt encounters we shall briefly describe its character.¹³ According to Pareto, human conduct consists very largely of what he calls "nonlogical actions," actions which do not scientifically relate the means used to the end proposed. Human conduct is essentially inspired by certain constant elements of human nature, but people's opinions and doctrines disguise or rationalize the conduct thus inspired, so that there is a vast discrepancy between what they think—and still more between what they profess—and the actual motivations of their conduct, the constant elements which express themselves in the fundamental "sentiments" of man. Thus, for example, a moralist may be very busy denouncing all aberrations from a strict code of sex while all the time he is being dominated by his own sex "residue." Pareto uses the term "residues" to connote the constants of human nature, which he classifies under six main groups, residues of combinations (the faculty of associating things or thinking them together),

¹³ Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society* (*Trattato di Sociologia Generale*, ed. Livingston, New York, 1935). For a series of critical estimates of Pareto, see *Journal of Social Philosophy*, Vol. I (1935), nos. 1 and 3.

of group persistence (the conservative tendency), of self-expression, of sociability, of individual integrity, and of sex.¹⁴ But these human drives are obscured by all sorts of unsound reasonings and misleading explanations which Pareto names "derivations." They are manifestations of the human being's hunger for thinking, and they constitute a veil of pseudo logic between him and the realities of his nature.

It would not be in place here to examine the elaborate argument, buttressed by thousands of illustrations, by which Pareto seeks to establish his case. But we may point out that his implicit assumption that certain grounds of behavior or types of motivation are genuine or fundamental while others, including the more idealistic motivations, are shallow and pretentious, is nowhere established. His illustrations are often suggestive and revealing. It may well be, for example, that when a politician appeals to the electors on the grounds of his patriotic services, when he rolls out periods about the glorious nation to which they belong, he is not expressing his real sentiments but is using these devices to further his own ends. He says, "Elect me, because I stand for this worthy cause." He *means*, "Elect me, because I am ambitious and want to be elected." Even so, there is another side to the story. Why does he appeal in these terms at all? Because he knows that his audience will respond to such sentiments. Unless *they* were really stirred by the idealistic motivation, it would be useless for him to assume it. One might multiply illustrations forever to show that human nature is motivated thus and so—and as many illustrations would remain over to show that it is motivated otherwise. Not by this road do we arrive at the goal of truth.

The complexity of motivation.—In favor of Pareto it may be said that there is much evidence of the human tendency to "rationalize"—or perhaps we might say to "socialize"—motives. As social beings, we are disposed to select socially esteemed reasons for our conduct and present them to others, and also to ourselves, as the grounds of our action. We form habits of concealing petty and self-seeking motives under high names, like duty and honor and patriotism. We want to stand well in the sight of others, we want to justify ourselves. Thus we "rationalize" our conduct, and such rationalization is the more easy and the more convincing—to ourselves at least—because it is always hard to disentangle the valuations which are deeply embedded in our nature. Psychoanalysts like Freud, sociologists like Pareto, political thinkers of the school of

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, 888 ff.

Machiavelli, and certain modern historians such as Beard and Robinson have done signal service in seeking to penetrate the façade of rationalization which often hides the moving forces of history and the inner springs of conduct.¹⁵ And the same mission is zestfully popularized by the biographers who in our days rewrite the lives of the great figures of history.

Yet such interpretations may be liable to an opposite simplification to that which their authors assail. They may sometimes be open to the charge which the philosopher Hegel brought against some of the writers of his day when he called them "psychological valets" who bring their heroes "down to a level with—or rather a few degrees below—the morality of such exquisite discerners of spirits."¹⁶ There is always the danger that we simplify the motives of behavior, whether the motives we attribute be lofty or petty, altruistic or self-limited. We are discovering with the advance of medical science that the human organism is marvelously complex. Why should we assume that the human personality is so simple in its workings? As a corrective of one-sided views the "debunkers" serve a useful purpose, but their own views may be no less one-sided. Certainly the great novelists and dramatists do not portray human nature in any such simple terms. "A history of philosophy and theology," says Robinson, "could be written in terms of grouches, wounded pride, and aversions, and it would be far more instructive than the usual treatments of these themes."¹⁷ Perhaps more instructive, but perhaps not less one-sided or misleading. Of all quests none seems more difficult than the adequate understanding of motivation, which is nothing less than the understanding of human nature itself, in its baffling variations and complex reactions—human nature conditioned in each variant human being by the unique series of experiences which are the history of the individual life and yet exhibiting in us all the universal traits of humanity. In this respect, however, the task of the sociologist is not so overwhelming as that of the historian, for his interest is primarily in group phenomena rather than in particular events, and where numbers act in like ways or maintain common institutions the hazard of interpretation is somewhat reduced. When the same gestures or external signs are employed by many or repeated on

¹⁵ Charles A. Beard, *The Economic Basis of Politics* (New York, 1934) and other works; J. H. Robinson, *The Mind in the Making* (New York, 1921).

¹⁶ Quoted by Morris Ginsberg, *Studies in Sociology* (London, 1932), p. 62. The reference is, of course, to the saying that no man is a hero to his valet.

¹⁷ Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

many occasions, we can with greater assurance infer their meaning. The motives of a crowd are easier to read than the motives of an individual. But this is a theme which we must postpone till a much later stage of the argument.

III

MAN AND SOCIETY

· IN WHAT SENSE MAN IS A SOCIAL ANIMAL

The fundamental question of sociology.—Having defined our primary terms we might at once proceed to deal with the various elements and aspects of society. But our understanding of these will be enriched if first we endeavor to think through a preliminary problem, which in its full comprehension is actually the biggest and hardest one that sociology offers. Its significance grows greater the further we advance in our study, and at this stage all we can expect to attain is a proper orientation to it. What does it really mean to be a member of a community? In what sense do we belong to society? In what sense does society belong to us? What is the nature of our dependence upon it? How shall we interpret the unity of the whole to which our individual lives are bound? These questions are aspects of one fundamental question—the relation of the unit, the individual, to the group and to the social system. We may find it easiest to approach this question by an examination of two misleading and opposing answers to it. These are found respectively in the “social contract” theory and in the “social organism” theory.

The contract theory of society.—That society exists “not by nature but by convention” (or ordinance) was a view put forward by certain Greek sophists or “professors of wisdom” who were rebelling against the traditions and mores of their age in the fifth and fourth centuries before Christ. This view was an expression of the theory that society is a contrivance deliberately set up by men for certain ends. According to some who have espoused this theory

society is a means for the protection of men against the consequences of their own untrammelled natures; according to others an artificial device of mutual economy; according to others again, merely a scheme by which the strong exploit the weak. The last-mentioned position was taken by the sophist Thrasymachus in Plato's *Republic*,¹ when he declared that "justice is the interest of the stronger;" a position which is similar to that of certain modern theorists of the "class struggle." One famous expression of the theory was the "social contract" doctrine as developed by Thomas Hobbes in his *Leviathan*.² According to this philosopher "men have no pleasure (but on the contrary a great deal of grief) in keeping company, where there is no power able to overawe them all," and while he admits that certain living creatures, like bees and ants, are social animals, he declares that "the agreement of these creatures is natural; that of men, is by covenant only, which is artificial."³ He has therefore to postulate a social contract, in which men, weary of the incessant warfare of their natural state, come together and solemnly create society by agreeing to give up their natural liberties and to be bound by laws. A similar conception of society underlay the eighteenth-century doctrines of individualism, which maintained that man was "born free and equal." In another form it is suggested by the economic philosophy of Adam Smith, which conceives men as like competing units who work out the good of the whole by pursuing their own self-limited interests. Nor has the view that society is an artificial invention entirely disappeared in our own days, though it no longer commands the influence which it once possessed.

Defects of the contract theory of society.—There are good reasons why we should reject the theory that society is something men have at some time invented and set up. In particular, such a theory rests on the false assumption that human beings are, or could become, human beings outside of or apart from society. It implies that men are individuals before they "enter into" society and that they establish a social order to protect their property or their rights or their lives or for some other end which seems good in their eyes. This assumption is quite erroneous, as the following considerations show.

(1) There is some evidence of a quasi-experimental kind. Of course it is hardly possible to make experiments by isolating infants

¹ *Republic* i. 338 ff.

² See particularly *Leviathan*, Chaps. XIII and XVII.

³ *Ibid.*, Chap. XVII.

from all social relationships, though certain absolute monarchs, from King Psammetichus of Egypt to King James IV of Scotland, are reported to have done so. But chance or accident and in one instance, at least, an evil design have furnished sufficient evidence.⁴ It shows that, apart from the social environment, human beings may grow up physiologically but cannot realize their distinctive qualities as human beings, cannot develop their intellectual and emotional capacities, are cut off from the world of speech and the other modes of expression, from that interplay of mind with mind in which alone individuality can arise and reveal itself. In most instances these socially disinherited children are described by observers as having the aptitudes and habits of the lower animals and in many instances they are reported as having the appearance of idiots or imbeciles. A peculiarly significant case is the famous one of Kaspar Hauser, because this ill-starred youth was in all probability bereft of human contacts through political machinations and therefore his condition when found could not be attributed to a defect of innate mentality. Hauser, when he wandered into the city of Nuremberg in 1828, could hardly walk and had the mind of an infant and, like an infant, could only mutter a meaningless phrase or two. By this time he was seventeen years of age but his mind, in consequence of his enforced isolation, was utterly undeveloped. It is noteworthy that Kaspar mistook inanimate objects for living beings. In the five years before another political intrigue ended his life he made distinct progress, but in some respects his native potentialities were permanently checked, and it is particularly noteworthy that a post-mortem revealed the brain development to be subnormal.⁵ As the criminologist von Feuerbach phrased it, the denial of society to Kaspar Hauser was "a crime against the soul of a human being."

(2) There is also evidence derived from the study of the process in which the child develops the capacity for society. The emergence of this capacity is an aspect of the growth of self-hood, of personality. The child does not merely imitate the social usages of adults, as a parrot might pick up language. He is certainly imitative, but in the process of imitation his own social nature is gradually revealed. We saw that in the earliest stages the child makes no distinction between persons and things—the mother's

⁴ For a collection of such instances see R. Briffault, *The Mothers* (New York, 1927), Chap. I.

⁵ This historical case is the subject of Wassermann's novel so entitled. For the facts of the case see *Meyers Konversationslexikon*, s. v.

breast and the nipple of the bottle are equally and solely means of organic satisfaction. Similarly his first conversations are monologues in which the child talks aloud to himself, but these gradually pass into conversations in which a real interchange of thought takes place.⁶ As the child becomes a self he discovers thereby that others too are selves. As he advances towards autonomy he becomes truly capable of social relations. His first play seems mere imitation and he plays to and for himself, but gradually he learns to play with others, while the rules of the game cease to be external restraints imposed by others and become rules for the maintenance of which he feels himself responsible.⁷ In a great variety of ways it can be shown that the sense of society emerges in the very process in which the organic and intellectual potentialities of the child are developed.

(3) When we comprehend the relation between our individuality and the social heritage into which we enter we find another and very potent reason for discarding the idea that society is something artificial or contractual. Then we appreciate the truth of Aristotle's famous phrase, that man is a social animal.⁸ In the first place, every individual is the offspring of a social relationship, itself determined by pre-established mores. Further, every person, as man or woman, is essentially a term in a relationship. The individual is neither beginning nor end, but a link in the succession of life. This is a sociological as well as a biological truth. But it does not yet express the depth of our dependence as individuals on society. Society is more than a necessary environment, more than the soil in which we are nurtured. Our relation to it is even more intimate than that of the seed to the earth in which it grows. It is the selective processes of society which have determined our heredity, our being. We are born to a social heritage which becomes in time our mental equipment, not merely an external possession. That heritage, reinforced by our continuous social experience, evokes and directs our personality. Society liberates selectively and also limits our potentialities, not only by affording definite opportunities and stimulations, not only by placing upon us definite restraints and in-

⁶ See, for example, the admirable study of Jean Piaget, *The Language and Thought of the Child*, Chap. II.

⁷ Cf. Jean Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (New York, 1932), Chap. I.

⁸ There are some common misunderstandings of this truth. It does not mean that man is a *sociable* animal. Men vary greatly in this respect. It does not mean that man is *altruistic* or other-regarding in his impulse toward society. Nor does it mean that he is social by virtue of some *original* constitution of human nature,

interferences but also, subtly and imperceptibly, by molding our attitudes, our beliefs, our morals, and our ideals.

The organismic theory of society.—We have seen that we can scarcely exaggerate our dependence, as individuals, on society. But in making full acknowledgment of it we must avoid an opposite error to that of the individualists. This error is implicit in the view which regards society (or some area of society, such as the nation) as a kind of organism. It is a very ancient view, at least as old as the contract idea. It has so wide an appeal that even individualists like Thomas Hobbes or Herbert Spencer have inconsistently borrowed its language. In its essence the organismic theory is, however, totally opposed to the contract theory.⁹ It conceives society as a biological system, a greater organism, alike in its structure and its functions, exhibiting the same kind of unity as the individual organism and subject to similar laws of development, maturation, and decline. Its cells are individual persons, its organs and systems are associations and institutions. Some of the exponents of this theory go to extreme lengths in identifying specific structures of society with biological organs and systems, as when the medieval writer Nicolas of Cues called the laws the nerves and the constitution the brain of the body politic, or when writers like the Russian sociologist Novicow and the German political scientist Bluntschli find in society counterparts of the brains, the lungs, or the limbs of the organism.¹⁰ Others, like Comte, Hegel, and their followers, have been more concerned to show that the unity of society and the participation of individuals within it are to be thought of in terms of an organism. Others again, like Spengler, seek to show that society, as nation or as cultural unity, passes through the organic processes of birth, youth, maturity, old age, and death.

Closely related to the organismic position is the theory that society should be thought of not so much as a greater body but as an inclusive mind. This too is both an ancient and a modern doctrine. It was definitely formulated by Plato in his *Republic* (Book II) when he called the community the individual mind "writ large"

⁹ The French sociologist A. Fouillée sought to make the best of both worlds by naming society a "contractual organism" (*La Science Sociale Contemporaine* [Paris, 1904]).

¹⁰ For the medieval fantasies on this theme, see Otto v. Gierke, *Political Theories of the Middle Age* (tr. Maitland, Cambridge, 1900), pp. 103 ff. For modern variants of the theory see F. W. Coker, *Organismic Theories of the State* (New York, 1910) and P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (New York, 1928), pp. 200 ff.

and when he sought to divide social functions and classes according to the "faculties" of the mind. It is stressed by the Hegelian school of philosophy which conceives of a greater mind as both constituting and animating society as a whole.¹¹ It is upheld by writers of other schools, such as the psychologist William McDougall, who insists on the reality of the "group mind."¹² If such attributions signified merely that a group or collectivity exhibits certain traits characteristic of its members generally, that there are certain mental qualities or attitudes that Englishmen or Frenchmen or Germans are apt to display, there would be no problem raised, but the writers referred to mean much more than that—they insist that society is itself a mind, a mind *common* to its members.

Defects of the organismic theory.—So long as we merely compare a group or community to an organism, in order to bring out such aspects of society as the interdependence of individuals within the unity of the social system, we are using a simple and sometimes helpful analogy. But the situation is very different when we describe the social system as actually an organism. This view is untenable, as we shall show, on various grounds, but principally because it confuses the *like* with the *common*. Consequently it fails to do justice to the individuality of the social being, just as the contract theory failed to do justice to his social nature. It is misleading to say, as some (such as the French sociologist Fouillée) have said, that it is only society that lives and breathes in its individuals, that our consciousness is only an expression of the social consciousness. We can at least reply that it is only in us, its individuals, that society lives. It is misleading to say that we belong to society as the leaves belong to the tree or the cells to the body. Society can have little meaning unless individuals are real. As one writer well puts it, ". . . if, when I think, it is society that thinks in me, there is no thought, and no society."¹³

We can state very briefly the reasons why the characterization of society as an organism or a greater mind fails to do justice to the fact of individuality and thus tends to give us a wrong view of the unity of society and of the relation of the members to one another and to the whole. There are significant resemblances between a social and an organic structure, but there are also very significant differences. Herbert Spencer, though he was fond of

¹¹ Cf. B. Bosanquet, *Philosophical Theory of the State* (London, 1920), Chap. VII.

¹² W. McDougall, *The Group Mind* (Cambridge, 1920), esp. Chap. I.

¹³ W. E. Hocking, *Man and the State* (New Haven, 1926), Chap. XV, § 157.

considering society as an organism, pointed out one great difference when he said that society has no "common sensorium," no central organ of perception or of thought. We speak of sharing our feelings and our thoughts, but it is only individuals who think and feel. We can communicate our feelings so that others may sympathize with us and, if they too have had similar experiences, can appreciate what our feelings are. But there is a sense in which they cannot share our feelings. In this sense every self is, as it were, insulated. Feelings are *like*, not *common*. No one *feels* another's happiness or sorrow, another's pleasure or pain, however understanding or sympathetic he may be. At most he may induce in himself a sorrow for the sorrow of another. In this sense "the heart knoweth his own bitterness; and a stranger doth not intermeddle with his joy." Mind communicates with mind, but they do not form a single mind. The same influences may stir a people or a crowd, but only as they pulsate in its several members. If we speak of the mind of a group we have no evidence and therefore no right to conceive of it as anything but the minds of its members thinking or feeling in like ways, making like responses and being moved by like or common interests.

There are significant differences, both structural and functional, between the relation of the cells to the organism and that of the individuals to the social system. There is also a significant difference between the way in which organisms reproduce themselves and the way in which social unities are perpetuated. But the vital distinction we have just mentioned is sufficient for our purpose. It shows that we do not belong to society as the cells "belong" to the organism. The only centers of activity, of feeling, of function, of purpose which we know are individual selves. The only society which we know is a society in which those selves are bound together, through time and space, by the relations of each to each which they themselves create or inherit. The only experience we know is the experience of individuals, and it is only in the light of their struggles, their interests, their aspirations, their hopes and their fears, that we can assign any function and any goal to society. When we speak of the "group interest" we mean only the interest in the group which its members, or any of them, feel. The group has no fulfillment except that of its members, present or future. It has no thoughts, no desires, save those that animate the hearts of its members. Underlying all our conscious striving there is a sense of values, desirable states of being, which we seek to attain. We seek them for others as well as for ourselves. We seek, in the degree of our social-mindedness, to establish such social relationships that

these values shall be attained as widely as possible. We seek to maintain them for the future as well as in the present. But where and how are these values realized? Only in the lives that individual persons live. Perhaps it is the gravest danger of the false view we have been criticizing that it implies that in some mysterious way society exists in its own right and that its welfare can be realized apart from or even at the cost of the welfare of its individuals. It is sometimes assumed that it is possible, and even desirable, to sacrifice the welfare of "the individual" (not, observe, of some individuals) to that of society. The best corrective of this error is to remember that the only values we know, the only ends we humanly strive for, are those which in the last resort are realized by and in individuals. The only thing to which we are able to attach value, when we think of it as end and not as means, is personal quality.

Society, therefore, the system or structure of social relationships with all the traditions, the institutions, the equipments which it provides, is for us a great changeable order of life, arising from the psychical no less than from the physical needs of human nature, an order wherein human beings are born and fulfill themselves, with whatever limitations, and wherein they transmit to coming generations the facilities of living. We cannot agree with those thinkers who, like Hobbes or even John Stuart Mill, wrote as though society were in its very nature inimical to the expression and development of individuality. Still less can we accept the views of those thinkers who, like Benjamin Kidd, declare that the individual *should* be subordinated to society; or who, like certain followers of the philosopher Hegel, suggest that society itself has a value beyond the service which it renders to its members; or who, like certain religious writers, assign to society some other function than the realization of the interests which its members pursue.¹⁴ The reason for the rejection of these views will be brought out more fully as we turn now to the more positive side of our analysis of the relation of individuality and society.

INDIVIDUALITY AND SOCIETY

The nature of social unity.—Various types of unity may be distinguished in accordance with the functional relation of the units

¹⁴ For the views of the writers mentioned above, see Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Chap. XXI; Mill, *On Liberty*, *passim*; B. Kidd, *Social Evolution* (new ed., New York, 1920), and *Principles of Western Civilization* (London, 1902); and, as an example of the Hegelian doctrine, B. Bosanquet, *Philosophical Theory of the State*, Chaps. V and VII.

or parts to the whole. One type is the organism, in which we interpret the cells and organs and the various systems that these compose—circulatory, glandular, nervous, and so forth—as deriving their significance solely from their utility to the life of the organism as a whole. Another type is the mechanism, of which the specific form is the humanly contrived machine. The machine is not autonomous or self-sustaining or self-reproducing like the organism, but in it too the various parts, the wheels and gears and transmission belts and so forth, are understandable only as contributing to the function of the machine as a whole. From these types of unity we distinguish the type to which a social system belongs. Every system of social relationships grows and changes in accordance with the changing attitudes and interests of its members, of some or all of the units or individuals who compose it. Here the system derives its significance from its support of and contribution to the ends of the units themselves. It is this principle which makes possible the harmonization of individuality and society. To bring out the nature of this type of unity we must first make clear the meaning we attach to the term *individuality*.

The meaning of individuality.—We speak of individuality in various references. We sometimes use the term in a physical reference, as involving the physical detachment of one unit from another. Here there are borderline instances which may puzzle us. Is the plant that sends a new rooting shoot from underground, or the tree, like the banyan tree, that sends down new roots from its branches, to be regarded as one or more individuals? There are simple forms of life which reproduce by fissure so that what was one individual becomes two. Such examples suggest that even physical individuality is a matter of degree. It is less evident in the simplest than in the more complex forms of life. If we care to apply the term “individuality” to inanimate objects, another aspect of this truth is seen. Two drops of water or two clouds fuse together so that they become one without distinction of the constituents. Individuality has obviously little meaning as applied to objects so inchoate or formless in themselves that this is possible. *

Again, we may think of individuality not in a physical but in a *biological* reference. In this sense we would say that a living creature is the more individualized the more it is self-determining, the more selectively, in terms of its own developed character, it responds to stimuli from without, the more it can control or utilize its environment to serve a variety of needs particular to itself. An organism that drifts with the winds or tides is less individualized

than one that contrives to move at will with or against the currents. An organism that is capable of only a few simple reactions or that has few and only roughly differentiated organs to serve its various functions is less individualized than one that is organized to finer and more sensitive adjustments.

We can now extend the meaning of individuality to its *sociological* reference and say that a social being has more individuality when his conduct is not simply imitative or the result of suggestion, when he is less the slave of custom or even of habit, when his responses to the social environment are not quasi-automatic and subservient, devoid of understanding or of personal purpose. Individuality is that attribute in virtue of which the member of a group is yet more than merely a member, is a self, a center of activity and response expressive of a nature that is his own. It need not mean just originality; it certainly does not mean eccentricity. A strong individuality may express more fully the spirit or quality of his age, but he does so, not because he is quickly imitative or easily suggestible, but because it is deeply rooted in his own nature. It is true that when the members of a group are more individualized they will reveal greater differences and they will express themselves in a greater variety of ways. But the criterion of individuality is not how far each is divergent from the rest but how far each, in his relations to others, acts autonomously, acts in his own consciousness, and with his own interpretation, of the claims of others on himself. When the possessor of individuality does as others do, at least in matters which he deems important, he does it not simply because others do it, but because his own nature responds in the same way. When he follows authority, except in so far as he is compelled to, he follows it because of conviction, not because it is authority. He does not superficially accept or echo the opinions of others—he has some independence of judgment, some initiative, some discrimination, some strength of character. The degree in which he exhibits these qualities is the degree in which he possesses individuality.¹⁵

The principle of harmony between individuality and society.—It is generally admitted that individuality, as we have just defined

¹⁵ In order not to complicate the argument, I have not attempted here to distinguish between individuality and personality. Personality, as I understand the term, is the integral character of a being, all that he is and has experienced so far as it can be comprehended as a unity. Individuality, as above defined, is an aspect of personality. Hence in my *Community* I state the principle that "sociality and individuality"—as the two aspects of personality—"develop together" (Book III, Chap. III).

it, is less developed in primitive societies, with their relatively rigid customs and taboos, than in more highly organized ones. It can also be reasonably maintained that in the more highly organized societies there is both a greater demand and a greater opportunity for the expression of individuality. There are many evidences that justify this conclusion. Consider, for example, how far the evocation of individuality depends on the flexibility and richness of language, on the fineness of this primary instrument of education and of communication. Add to this the numerous other tools of expression which a complex society affords. Remember also that the more civilized societies supply a greater variety and range of contacts, of callings, of interests and of opportunities, in short, of the general and the specific stimulations to which the differences involved in individuality can appropriately respond. An outstanding sociological treatise, *The Social Division of Labor*, by Émile Durkheim, is written around this theme.¹⁶ Durkheim admirably shows that in primitive societies, with rudimentary division of labor, likeness—the belonging to the same kin, the acceptance of the same beliefs and mores—is the dominant condition of social cohesion, while in the more advanced societies, with more elaborate division of labor, the social structure is built on difference as well as on likeness; thus admitting and evoking a greater degree of individuality among the members.

The broad truth underlying Durkheim's formulation—a truth developed also by many sociologists, such as Herbert Spencer, Georg Simmel, F. Tönnies, J. M. Baldwin, and C. H. Cooley—cannot be gainsaid, although there are not infrequent reversions of civilized societies to more primitive attitudes.¹⁷ If all men thought alike, felt alike, and acted alike; if they all had the same standards and the same interests; if they all accepted the same customs and echoed the same opinions without questioning and without variation, civilization could never have advanced and culture would have remained rudimentary. There would be little specialization, little exchange, little interdependence, and what did exist would be of a

¹⁶ *De la Division du Travail Social*, translated by G. Simpson as *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York, 1933).

¹⁷ These reversions are apt to occur in times of war and social crisis. For the views of the writers mentioned above, see Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, I, Part II; G. Simmel, *Über Soziale Differenzierung* (Leipzig, 1890); F. Tönnies, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (Leipzig, 1887); J. M. Baldwin, *The Individual and Society* (Boston, 1911), esp. Chap. I; C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York, 1902), Chap. I. See also the present author's *Community* (New York, 1929), Book III, esp. Chap. III.

superficial and rather artificial character. The profounder aspects of social co-operation would be lost, the fruitful stimulation of social contacts would be lacking. There would be no initiative, enterprise, and experiment. There would be no resistance to regimentation and thus no hope of development. As we shall see later, one of the best criteria of the evolution of society is the degree in which it can enlist in reciprocal or in common service the variant individualities within it.

Limitations of the principle.—What is here implied is that, so far from there being any inherent antagonism between individuality and society, each is essentially dependent on the other. Conflicts and clashes, repressions and revolts, are always occurring. Within every group, and between groups, there is an incessant struggle of diverse and opposing interests. There are frictions, maladjustments, competitive jealousies and hindrances, sheer repressions and exploitations, which interfere with the harmony of individual and society and limit the integration of individuals and groups within the social order. That order is itself institutionalized in ways which give privilege and dominance to one group or class over another. These facts our broad principle of the dependence of individuality on society does not deny.

What individual has not at some time or other resented the regulation of society? Who has not at some time resisted and perhaps been defeated by the mores of his community? We are not referring merely to the suppression of antisocial impulses, for that can be more easily reconciled with our general principle, but to the suppression of impulses, of needs, even of ideals, which the mere rigor, uniformity, intolerance, or else the inequity and ruthlessness, of the social system impose. Who has not at times yearned for a cloak of invisibility so that he might be liberated from the inquisitiveness or the tyranny of society as from an Argus-eyed and intolerable censorship? It has been maintained that many of the mental strains and grave neuroses of modern life are due to the sense of an insistent social pressure.¹⁸ It has been claimed by champions of liberty that "society has now fairly got the better of individuality."¹⁹

Again, we acknowledge the manifold and serious limitations to any complete harmony between individuality and society. Nevertheless the essential facts remain: (1) that society is a fundamental condition for the development of individuality—in fact society is a

¹⁸ Cf. T. Burrow, *The Social Basis of Consciousness* (New York, 1927).

¹⁹ J. S. Mill, *On Liberty*, Chap. III.

condition of every satisfaction we find or seek or even dream of; (2) that the more there is of individuality the more it depends on and the more it can give to society.

In later chapters we shall discuss the significance of the limitations mentioned above.²⁰ Society breeds discord as well as harmony, but without the harmony there would be no society. Society evokes conflict as well as co-operation, but unless the co-operation penetrated deeper than the conflict, society could not endure. We may say in brief that society is co-operation crossed by conflict. This aspect of the relation of individuality and society we shall pursue further in the preliminary analysis of co-operation and conflict that follows.

CO-OPERATION AND CONFLICT

Modes of co-operation.—Men cannot associate without co-operating, without working together, in the pursuit of like or common interests. Social activity is thus essentially co-operative activity and the range of co-operation is the range of society. Its multifarious modes may for this preliminary survey be divided into two great types, which we shall call respectively *direct* and *indirect co-operation*. Under direct co-operation we include all these activities in which people do like things together—sing together, play together, worship together, till the fields together, weave or spin together. In such activities there may still be minor diversities of task, but their essential character is that people do in company the things which they can also do separately or in isolation. They do them together, either because the togetherness is a stimulus to the performance of the specific task or because it brings social satisfactions outside the task. A variant type of direct co-operation is that where people perform together and in the same manner a task which would be too difficult for one of them to perform alone, as when they pull together on a rope or raise together a heavy weight.

Under indirect co-operation we include all those activities in which people do definitely unlike tasks towards a single end. Here the famous principle of the division of labor is introduced, a principle whose economic significance was first fully revealed by Adam Smith.²¹ But the division of labor has other than economic significance. It is embedded in the very being of social life. It is revealed in the procreation of life or in the upbringing of a family. It is

²⁰ Pages 377-388.

²¹ The classical statement, which every student of sociology should read, is to be found in *The Wealth of Nations*, Book I.

revealed wherever people combine their differences for mutual satisfaction or for a common end. With technological advance indirect co-operation increases at the expense of direct co-operation. In industry, in government, in scientific research, functions tend to become more and more specialized. Even in the rural community the "husking bees" and the "threshing rings" are disappearing, and people have to satisfy in other ways the need for direct social stimulation formerly satisfied in the workaday life.

Modes of conflict.—Conflict expresses itself in numerous ways and in various degrees and over every range of human contact, from the strife of individuals to the clash of civilizations. Its modes are always changing with changing conditions. It is an error, therefore, to assume, as some writers have done, that because struggle is eternal any one form of it, such as war, is also necessarily eternal. Taking the term "social conflict" to include all activity in which men contend *against one another* for any objective, we may distinguish *direct* and *indirect conflict* as its two fundamental types. Direct conflict occurs where individuals or groups thwart or impede or restrain or injure or destroy one another in the effort to attain some goal. It has milder forms, such as litigation and polemic and propagandistic activity; it has more violent forms, such as the duel, the vendetta, revolution, and war. Indirect conflict occurs where individuals or groups do not actually impede the efforts of one another but nevertheless seek to attain their ends in ways which obstruct the attainment of the same ends by others. Competition in all its varieties comes within this class. Competitors do not, as such, interfere with the activity, but only with the success, of one another. An element of indirect conflict is present also in all bargaining, as also in all gambling and speculation.

It may be here observed that struggle is a more inclusive concept than conflict. Men are forever struggling to master difficulties, to overcome obstacles, to achieve ends in other ways than through conflict with their fellows or with forces that in any proper sense can be said to be attacking or even opposing them. When a man pants for breath, when he works on an invention, when he endeavors to express himself in any art, he certainly struggles, but the struggle is not strictly conflict. Nor does all social struggle fall within the area of conflict. A man strives to win the favor of his lady, but conflict between him and her may be utterly remote from his thought. A man seeks to emulate the achievements of another whom he admires; obviously there is no necessary conflict involved in such

emulation. Only when emulation changes to rivalry does a sense of conflict enter.

The combination of co-operation and conflict in human life.—Co-operation and conflict are universal elements in human life. They are present together over a vast range of human activities. Just as, in the physical world, there are forces of attraction and of repulsion simultaneously operative and determinant of the relation of bodies in space, so, in the social world, there is a combination of co-operation and conflict revealed in the relations of men and of groups. When men co-operate their interests are harmonious (or common) only up to a point. Nearly always, even in the most friendly relations, even in the most intimate associations, there is some point where interests diverge, or where attitudes are not in accord. The closest co-operation within the family does not prevent the occurrence of quarrels. The devotion to a common cause does not rule out, among those who espouse it, strong differences of opinion or conflicting ambitions. There are stresses and strains that often accompany the deepest love.

On the other hand, conflict is generally limited in its scope and method by conditions involving some co-operation of the contestants outside the area of conflict, or even within that area. Thus competition is not unmitigated conflict, because, as we have seen, the competitors at the same time work together for ends that are harmonious or even common. In fact, the only form of conflict which is not thus limited is war, war when it is waged without rules, war *à outrance*.

Obviously, when men recognize a common interest they tend to co-operate towards its achievement. They co-operate not only from a perception of the greater efficacy of co-operative over isolated action but also because it is of the very essence of a common interest to bring men together, to make them translate their sense of oneness into co-operative activity. Men cannot be united in devotion to a cause, whether it be family or nation, whether it be creed or science, without being impelled to join in its pursuit. There are many evidences that human beings are driven by deep-seated impulses to rally to the banner of some common cause and to find their most enduring satisfactions in united efforts on its behalf. The kings and leaders of men would be idle figures gesticulating in the void were it not for their capacity to touch the springs of these profoundly social impulses.

Co-operative activity exists on another level in the pursuit of harmonious like interests, as when men combine to take advantage of the division of labor, to pool their resources in business, to get

favors from a government, or to beat a dangerous competitor. Competitors want to increase the general demand for their goods, they want to keep down the costs of doing business, the costs of the materials they use, of the labor they employ, even of the competition in which they engage. In these and other respects their like interests are harmonious and prompt to a degree of co-operation. Economic organization is pre-eminently the area of this form of co-operation. It involves a degree of calculation which is not characteristic of the co-operative devotion to a common cause. In the former situation the co-operative impulse depends not on the nature of the interest itself, but on the mere fact that the interest of one happens to harmonize with the interest of another. It is therefore secondary. If the harmony is disturbed, the desire to co-operate is likely to vanish. The co-operative *attitude* is merely a consequence of the self-regarding attitude under conditions which reconcile the two. These conditions are subject to frequent disturbance and therefore the co-operation itself is unstable. The co-operation of employers and workers is disrupted by strikes and lockouts. The co-operation of business partners is likely to break down if the partnership proves to be unprofitable. The alliance of competitors for their mutual advantage is forever endangered by the intensity of competitive struggle and the feelings it engenders. One of the reasons why a society with a highly developed division of labor is more unstable than a simpler society is that the former must depend so largely on the harmony of like interests, a harmony which is crossed and threatened by myriad disturbances.

In this respect the type of co-operation which is rooted in the sense of a common cause has an advantage. Here the co-operative attitude is primary, not secondary. It is involved in the very nature of the interest, since that interest is indivisible and one cannot pursue it at all without pursuing it for the rest. The attitude of co-operation and the interest itself are therefore inextricably bound together. Hence the tendency to co-operate is less dependent on success in co-operative achievement. In fact, defeat or frustration may bind the members more closely than success. Men will join in the support of their creed in the face of extreme persecution. They will face death with those they love. The mere self-limited interest cannot unite men by such strong ties in co-operative endeavor.

Conflict and like interests.—Conflict, like co-operation, is found on different levels. There is conflict wherever like interests are in-harmonious. The simplest case is that of two or more persons or groups who want the same individual thing. "What I want you

want" means co-operation where the interest is inclusive or common; conflict when the interest is exclusive. Anything that is scarce relative to the competing desires of people to have and to enjoy, whether it be a commodity, a loved one, an honor, a position of power, is a condition of conflict.

Three orders of inharmonious like interests may be here disentangled. All economic goods, wherever men are in a position to compete or to bargain or to fight for their possession, are spurs to conflict, because they have a scarcity-value and because the desire for them, both on the part of those who have much and on the part of those who have little, is rarely satiated. Again, exclusive emotional attachments are apt, under various conditions, to breed rivalries and jealousies and envies and to result in latent or open conflict. Finally, there are interests which by their very nature can be neither harmonious nor common. These are the interests of power and distinction. They cannot be harmonized because they are *relative*. Economic goods can be so apportioned that what I have you have also. But the intangible goods of power and distinction can never be so apportioned. A society can be ordered on the basis of equality of wealth but never on the basis of equality of power. There is only one kingpin in the set. There is no authority where all have authority. There is no power where power is equal. Hence the quest for power, for prestige, for preferment, for influence, for any control over the minds or the bodies of men, involves unending conflict.

Conflict and unlike attitudes.—So far we have been dealing with conflict as arising out of the disharmony of like interests. We turn now to the other great type. Reduced to its simplest element the conflict-situation here takes the form, "What I love, you hate." This is primarily an expression of *unlike attitudes*.²² These may themselves arise out of discordant like interests, as in class warfare, or may be largely independent of such conditions, as in religious antagonism and other forms of cultural clash. Frequently a difference of economic interests is translated into a profounder cultural antagonism, and frequently the prejudice of race or class justifies itself by appealing to a deep cleavage of interests. Thus attitudes and interests reinforce one another and intensify the spirit of conflict. When men hate one another, they find it necessary to ration-

²² It might be said that since in this case each party feels unfriendly or hostile towards the other, their attitudes are *like*, as being equally attitudes of hostility; but this would be a confusion. If one man hates what another loves and loves what another hates, their attitudes are essentially unlike in respect to the total situation.

alize their hatred, as is seen in the history of every war. When men have divergent interests they readily attribute evil motives to their opponents, as is illustrated by the propaganda of anti-Semitism.

Unlike attitudes may be expressed by indifference or by aversion or by positive conflict. A man who lives for sport and cares nothing for art may be merely indifferent to one who lives for art and cares nothing for sports. But the neutrality of complete indifference is rare, for men are apt to be unfavorably disposed towards those who are cold to the things they value. To hold aloof is itself usually an act of implicit disapprobation. The outsider, the alien, the stranger, the nonconformist usually excite unfavorable prejudice and are usually for most men, civilized and primitive alike, objects of suspicion as potential threats to their own systems of values.

Aversion is the repudiation of common interest. It is a form of emotional hostility, for it denies and disparages the values of those towards whom it is manifested. Thus the élite who despise the vulgar or the vulgar who scorn the "high-brow," or the sophisticated city-dwellers who feel superior to the rustic or the ruralists who think the city-dweller effete or immoral, are in effect maintaining a resistance to alien values. Cultural differences engender attitudes of aversion, particularly among those who live in relative isolation from other groups than their own or who cherish a strong orthodoxy within their group. By aversion they set up walls of defense against the encroachments of the values they reject.

It is only one step from defense to offense, from aversion to active conflict. When the conflict is unequal, it takes the form of persecution and suppression; when more equal, it becomes the effort of either party to upset the other by attacking the things it values and frustrating its purposes. The conflict may take place within a framework of law, as in economic struggle, the strife of political parties, contests for prestige and preferment, the counteractivities of propagandism and proselytism, and the myriad disputes of everyday life. Partially unrestrained by law are feuds and vendettas, riots and lynchings, revolutions and other uprisings, and even the efforts of the law-maintaining forces to defeat and apprehend the outlaw offender, the criminal. Outside the greater law lies the warfare of states.

It is obvious that the less it is limited by law, the more conflict must rely on physical force and the more destructive it becomes. This is particularly true if the strength of the opposing parties is approximately equal. Conflict is then impartially destructive not only

of the interests ostensibly involved in the struggle but also of all the other interests of the parties. This point is illustrated by the history of modern wars between great nation states.

Common interest and conflict.—The common interests of groups are potent spurs to conflict, as war also reveals. Within the range of common interest conflict is moderated and takes less destructive forms. But the common interest both includes and excludes, and in the latter process it gives rise to the most significant and the most persistent type of conflict. It is an observation frequently made that a group becomes most conscious of its unity when it is threatened by another group. Hence it is part of the technique for the stimulation of common interest to present it as being menaced by an opposing interest and to rally all possible prejudices in support of it by heightening the contrast between the values of the group and the alien and aggressive values of other groups. In the eyes of the Ku Klux Klan, Jews and Catholics and Negroes are engaged in a vast and dastardly conspiracy against the high ideals of the true American. To the military patriot the pacifist is a cowardly traitor. The politician paints the program of the opposing party as ruinous folly. And when the autocratic ruler is afraid of internal dissensions he is likely to divert attention from them by pointing to the foreign enemy and in the last resort by seeking a pretext for war.

The common interest thus harbors the native prejudices as well as the native loyalties of men, being sustained at once by their love and by their hate. That is why the conflicts which it engenders between religious and other cultural groups, political parties, classes, and nations are so persistent and so significant. Since the common interest unites men of diverse types and of diverse capacities for experience, it tends also to seek the common level and to take on a simplified and unduly exclusive character.

Special features of group conflict in the United States.—In every community group conflict assumes forms which distinctively reflect the conditions and cultural standards of the community. We may take the United States as an example. Here we have an unusual multiplicity of diverse groups, racial groups, nationality groups, religious groups, cultural groups of all sorts. Here also we have, with the mobility of population and the rapidity of economic expansion, unusual variations in the social experience of different groups. The pioneer mentality coexists with the sophisticated mentality of the cosmopolite. The immigrant population presents all degrees of assimilation, from the culturally resistant first generation through the culturally disturbed second generation to their fully

assimilated children. In this welter and flux of groups the lines of conflict are confused and constantly changing. There are not the permanent cleavages of the type found in European communities where different racial groups live side by side in relatively fixed relationships. The conflict of capital and labor is crossed by other issues which prevent it from assuming the highly organized and fundamental character which it takes in the industrialized countries of Europe. Group conflict is apt to be less regulated by established mores, and hence it tends to take more spasmodic and violent forms. This point is illustrated by the alliances between local politics and criminal elements. It finds many illustrations also in the history of strikes and lockouts, which is so largely a record of intimidation on both sides, "strong-arm" methods and ruthless reprisals.

There is another side to the story. An observer well qualified to judge, Professor Florian Znaniecki, after commenting on the prevalence of "impersonally egoistic" relationships in the United States, proceeds as follows:

Yet a longer and more intimate acquaintance with this civilization and an unprejudiced comparison with European conditions would show that the only human interest which is really relatively scarce in America is pure hatred. Outside of some narrow and circumscribed fields—like gang warfare, race relationships in a few backward communities, and conflicts between labor and capital in industries still ruled by the old predatory type of "captains"—genuine vengeful hostility is incomparably more difficult to find than in Europe.²³

The resolution of conflict.—A conflict-situation is a very unstable situation, since conflict is itself a means for the settlement of an issue. Competitors seek, each for himself, to win a position of advantage which would lessen the competition of the rest. Bargainers seek to conclude a deal. Belligerents seek to end war by the defeat of their opponents. Litigants strive for a judicial decision of their dispute. In every case, as the conflict proceeds, the attitudes and the interests of the parties to it undergo change, since their own activities are effectively altering the situation.

Victory and defeat end conflicts for a time, but they are likely to accentuate rather than end the conflict-situation, except in the rare cases where defeat exterminates or utterly subdues one of the contending parties. There is another way in which conflicts end which we may call the "resolution of conflict." This occurs, for

²³ *Social Actions* (New York, 1936), p. 585.

example, when in the course of a conflict the contestants discover a ground of harmonious like interests. Competitors, when they realize that they would all be benefited if they limited or ended their competition, set up price agreements or enter a combine. In other forms of conflict the antagonists may discover that the mutual destructiveness of the struggle outweighs the gain of prospective victory and then may form an alliance. Or they may all find themselves threatened by a greater danger beyond the immediate conflict and join forces to meet it, as when political parties cease their strife in time of war or when quarreling nations unite in face of a more formidable enemy.

Sometimes the resolution of conflict comes about directly through the transformation of hostile attitudes rather than through the discovery of harmonious interests. This occurs when hostility is due to prejudice that disappears on better acquaintance or fuller knowledge; when differences, at first regarded as essential, are seen to be relatively unimportant; or when for whatever reason the sentiment of comradeship or community wins out over the opposing sentiment, and the alien or outsider is admitted into the fold.

BOOK ONE
INITIATION

PART TWO
SOCIETY AND ENVIRONMENT

FOREWORD

Before we proceed to study the structure of society and the changes it undergoes we may prepare ourselves further by considering the conditions of the outer world on which social life, as all life, depends, and the nature of that dependence. There are two large questions that here loom before us. Since every social group, whether racially or nationally defined, whether distinguished as class or as community or by any other criterion, differs in manifest respects from other groups, we face the question whether these differences are determined mainly by heredity or by the conditions of life. The answer we give to this question has very important practical implications and, indeed, colors our whole view of society. This subject we take up in Chapter IV. The other question concerns the manner and degree in which the various aspects of environment respectively affect the social life of man. This question occupies the rest of this Part, and our study ends with an attempt to show how two great types of human environment, the urban and the rural, create distinctive differences of social attitude and of social organization.

IV

ENVIRONMENT AND LIFE

THE MEANING OF ENVIRONMENT

The intimate relation of environment and life.—When a seed is put into the ground, under appropriate conditions, it germinates, pushes its seed leaves up to the air, and sends its rootlets down into the soil. It enters into a set of relations with its environment so complex that if it were completely detached again, as the seed once was, it would perish. In this complex process the plant develops the potentialities of the particular seed, and no others. It becomes a variety of wheat or of corn, a sunflower or a ragweed, after its kind. But whether it flowers or fruits or withers prematurely, whether it grows strong and full-statured or becomes weak and dwarfed, whether it is crowded out by other plants or holds its own, depends essentially on the environment. Different kinds of plants are adapted to different habitats, to marsh or to stony soil, to the dry desert or to the rich humus of well-watered plains, to heat or to cold, to sunlight or to shade. The same kind of plant will exhibit significant differences if the climate changes. This relation of plant to soil is so full of significance that a special branch of botany, called plant ecology, is devoted to its study.

Animals are not attached to the soil like plants, but they are no less dependent on and responsive to environment. Human beings are unusually capable of passing from one environment to another as well as of changing the conditions of a given environment to suit their own purposes. But they are not on that account more independent of the kind of environment in which they live. The environment is not simply the outside world, thought of as something

that surrounds or "environs" us. If we think of it in that way, we underestimate its role. In truth, the relation of life and environment is extremely intimate. The organism itself, the life structure, is the product of past life and past environment. Environment is present from the very beginning of life, even in the germ cells. We think of our organisms as ourselves, and environment as that which lies outside us. But the capacities and attributes of the organism are relative to the whole environment in which they manifest themselves. The environment is more than a "conditioning" factor of a life that can be conceived of apart from it. Imagine, for example, that we were suddenly transported to a much larger planet. Our bodies would instantly become much heavier, and that fact alone would involve a myriad of other differences. We would no longer know ourselves, we would no longer, assuming we could exist at all, *be* ourselves. We never know life except in an appropriate environment, an environment to which it is already adjusted. Life and environment are, in fact, correlates.

So closely interwoven are the two that every variety of life, every species, in fact, every individual living thing has its own particular environment, in some degree different from that of others. Environment is not one but infinitely various. In the American Museum of Natural History in New York City there is an exhibit of over one thousand species of insect found in a suburban yard. That little space contained more than a thousand varieties of environment for insect life alone. A curious instance of the specificity of environment is the distinction between the head louse and the body louse, neither of which is found in the environment of the other. The environment is as specialized as the life that is lived within it. Furthermore, every change in a living creature involves some change in its relation to environment, and every change in the environment some change in the response of the organic being. Our environment is our habitation in the completest sense. It includes the conditions which are common to all and the conditions which are peculiar to each group. In its totality, as relative to any group (and ultimately to any individual), it is thus a factor of great complexity. Every difference of environment means a difference in our habits, our ways of living; while on the other hand our habits, our ways of living, in so far as they differ, create for us a different environment, a different selection within it and a different accommodation to it. Through a process of constant selection and constant adaptation the moving equilibrium of life is maintained.

Application to society.—The correspondence of life and environment is amply illustrated in the case of social groups. Just as every region of a country is in some respects different from every other, so also are the inhabitants of each region. An inhabitant of the Ozarks or of the Kentucky mountains thinks and feels differently from an inhabitant of New York City, just as a New Englander differs from a prairie dweller. The difference in some way—though, as we shall see, the precise expression of the relationship is fraught with great difficulties—is relative to the environment in which they respectively dwell. Common observation tells us that as people change from country to city, from agriculture to industry, from mountain to plain, from hot to temperate climates, they become accommodated to the new conditions, undergoing a process of change as their environment changes. It is obvious that a well-to-do group has a different environment from a poor one, a colored urban group from a white one, a professional class from an artisan class. Take the largest effective community we can find, whether that of a nation or of a whole civilization, and its character is seen to be in some way reactive to that of the total environment within which it has grown. Take the smallest group, such as the individual family, and there, too, the correspondence manifests itself.

The revelation of the manner in which the environment molds and itself is modified by the life of the group is one of the chief achievements of sociology. From ancient times men observed certain rough correspondences between broad physical conditions and modes of living. It was noted, for example, that the inhabitants of tropical regions exhibited characteristic differences from those of temperate or of arctic regions, and again that the seafarer was typically distinct from the inlander. These observations have been gradually refined and elaborated into a more scientific form. French sociology has been specially prominent in the development of such studies from the time of Montesquieu to the present, inspired by leaders like Le Play, Demolins, and Brunhes.¹ American sociology has similarly developed the "ecological school," which has particularly devoted itself to the social and cultural phenomena associated with

¹ Frédéric Le Play (1806-1882) put forward in his important study of European workingmen (*Les Ouvriers Européens*) the thesis that *locality* determines *work* and thus has a great influence on the economic organization of the family and the social institutions of the people. Edmond Demolins continued the work of Le Play and in the periodical *La Science Sociale* published various studies showing the social characteristics of particular regions of France. For J. Brunhes see below, Chap. V.

certain urban areas.² These phenomena, as the term "ecological" implies, are regarded as revealing a process of adjustment or accommodation of the life of the group to the special conditions represented by a locality. All such studies combine to reveal both how complex an environment is and how completely it penetrates the life of a social group.

The fundamental problem of heredity and environment.—In the light of our growing knowledge there can be no doubt regarding the intimate correspondence of life and environment. But a deeper question remains. There are those who maintain that, so far at least as the differences between human beings and between their social groups are concerned, the environment is far less determinant than the vital factor that we call heredity. There are others who maintain as strongly the contrary position, that the difference of environment is the essential determinant of group differences. Since on our answer to this question must depend our understanding of the very nature of society as well as of the incessant changes which it undergoes, we cannot proceed without facing it. And first we shall seek to clarify some preliminary points.

The three levels of adaptation.—To avoid confusion, we should observe that, like the term "individuality," the term "adaptation" may be employed in a physical, a biological, and a social reference. There is in the first place a *purely physical* adaptation which occurs whether we will it or not, which is independent of our strivings and of our aims. The sun will tan our skin if we expose ourselves to it. That is a form of physical adaptation, whether it helps us to live in a sunny climate or whether it does not. Fresh air will stimulate our lungs and poisonous gas will destroy them. Physically, the one is no less an adaptation than the other. Strength or weakness, health or sickness, is equally an expression of natural law. The green leaves of spring and the falling leaves of autumn are alike obedient to this necessity. Death itself is the final statement of the adaptation which nature everywhere demands. Whatever the conditions are, whether wilderness or city, penury or prosperity, whether in the eyes of men they are favorable or unfavorable, good or evil, this unconditional adaptation remains with all its compulsion.

But we also speak of adaptation in a *biological* sense, meaning that the life is fitted to survive or to prosper under the conditions of the environment. We say that fish are adapted to a marine environment or tigers to the conditions of life in the jungle. In this sense, though not in the former, we can speak also of maladaptation. A

² See below, p. III.

tiger is maladapted to the conditions of the desert or of the polar snows. We mean thereby that the conditions are not such as to permit the adequate functioning of the organism, that in fact the inevitable *physical* adaptation is detrimental to the biological demands. In order that a certain equilibrium, involving the survival or fulfillment of the organism, be attained, the environment *must* be such and such. But the *must* here is an imperative, addressed, as it were, to the organism.

An extension of this biological meaning of adaptation brings us to the concept of *social* adaptation. It is adaptation in terms of a standard of values, a conditional adaptation. It is what is called by various sociological writers a process of adjustment or accommodation, though the latter term stresses particularly the adaptation of the social being to the given conditions rather than the adaptation of the conditions to the social being.³ If we are to live in ways we desire we must find or make an appropriate environment. Man does what every living creature does in proportion to its intelligence; he selects and modifies his environment in such a way that the inevitable adaptation shall admit the greater fulfillment of his wants, the completer expression of his nature. In this social sense adaptation definitely implies valuation, whereas in the sheer adaptation always necessitated by nature there is no implication of well-being, no virtue or merit. When we speak of maladaptation or maladjustment we do not mean that the universal principle is defeated, we mean that the existing adaptation involves a less complete satisfaction of our wants and of our ideals than would be possible if the environment were altered in a particular direction. It is obvious that, in the light of the restless questing nature of man and the multiplicity of his desires, every equilibrium of his life with his environment contains some degree of "maladjustment." In the light of our desires we criticize the adaptation which, as a natural phenomenon, is always perfect. What we are really criticizing is the environment to which our lives are thus adapted, or ourselves because of our failure to control it, to change the conditions of the equilibrium.

The inner and the outer environment of the social being.—In his incessant efforts to modify environment, man creates a new type of environment on the level of which the eternal struggle is continued. This new environment for which man is responsible has a twofold character, an outer and an inner aspect. The outer consists

³ Cf. the article "Accommodation" by E. W. Burgess in the *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*.

of the physical modification of nature, our houses and cities, our means of transportation and communication, our comforts and conveniences, the whole apparatus and machinery of our civilization.* The inner is society itself, with its organizations and regulations, with its traditions and its institutions, with its repressions and its liberations, with all the social heritage that it sustains. For every member of society this system is just as much a part of the environment as is the world without, except that his adjustment to it is not of the same inexorable character, not being imposed by natural law. Nevertheless he cannot escape its influence, for he is trained up and habituated to it, and none of his desires can be fulfilled unless he takes it into account. We may say then that the total environment of every human being consists of (1) an outer environment in various ways modified by man, in the centers of modern civilization vastly modified, but under all conditions still requiring an unconditional adaptation, and (2) an inner or social environment made by man himself to which he is adjusted through conscious response and habituation. Man is constantly active in changing, to satisfy the better his never-satisfied wants, both the outer and the inner environment, both nature and society.

Civilization and adaptation.—In the more recent stages of social evolution this twofold process of change has been peculiarly rapid. It is sometimes claimed that man's successful efforts to change his environment have furthered some of his needs at the expense of others, that human nature is not at home in the world of civilization which it has made for itself. One aspect of this criticism has found a well-known expression in the contention of Graham Wallas that the modern environment balks some of our "instinctive dispositions." "Man is born with a set of dispositions related, clumsily enough but still intelligibly, to the world of tropical or subtropical wood and cave which he inhabited during millions of years of slow evolution." These dispositions, he maintains, have been through ages adjusted to respond to the stimuli offered by such surroundings, and being thus suddenly (in terms of the span of evolution) dissociated from them they function uneasily and capriciously.⁵ According to this view man is biologically adapted to the life of the fields and the woods, not to the life imposed by the city, the factory, and the office.

* E. Rignano points out that this physicotchnical structure would endure for some time if the society itself perished, whereas the institutional structure ends with the society. "Sociology, Its Methods and Laws," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 34 (1928), 429-450.

⁵ *The Great Society* (London, 1920), Chap. IX.

It is no doubt true that in modifying our environment to satisfy more fully some of our desires we may make it less favorable for the satisfaction of others. But whether we should accept the contention just stated is open to some doubt. There are many maladjustments created by the conditions of modern life, in the new complex environment that man has made for himself, but it seems possible to explain them without reference to inherited habituations. If man inhabited caves for ages we do not find any great yearning on his part to return to that mode of life. Rather, what he most lacks in many urban environments is a full share of the universal requirements of a healthy human organism, such as fresh air and sunlight and freedom of movement and the refreshment of the world of outer nature. For many city-dwellers the conditions of habitation and of work are cramped and unhygienic. At the same time these conditions make demands and offer excitations which, unless limited and controlled, induce nervous strain. Particularly to those brought up in the country the transition to the life of the city, like any other transition from familiar surroundings, often brings a sense of deprivation, of nostalgia; and as in the rapid growth of cities a large proportion of their population is country-bred this malaise must be a widespread phenomenon. These present factors, most of which may be remediable within the environment, may account for the indications interpreted by Wallas as balked hereditary dispositions. Where the environment has been subject to rapid modification through the development of technique, there is sufficient evidence of two forms of temporary maladjustment. On the one hand there is the personal disturbance of the individuals who, habituated to one set of conditions, are brought in the process into relation with a different set, and on the other hand there is the general "lag," as Ogburn has expressed it, between the social conditions conformable to the new technical order and the social conditions inherited from a past order.⁶ The more difficult and obviously less demonstrable assumption of a deeper discrepancy, between man's conscious desires as they are active in the remolding of his environment and his organic or "instinctive" dispositions, should be resorted to only if the other and more demonstrable explanations prove inadequate.⁷ Such facts as the improvement in the health and amenity of cities as the new environment has come

⁶ *Social Change* (New York, 1922), Part II, Chap. VIII, and Part IV, Chap. I.

⁷ For a somewhat different view, cf. A. G. A. Balz, *The Basis of Social Theory* (New York, 1924), Chap. IV.

under greater control, if taken in conjunction with the statistical evidence that city-bred youth do not evince so definite a longing for the permanent life of the country as country-bred youth show for that of the city, make us hesitate to attribute the tensions of city life to the inherent unfitness of human beings for the environment of civilization.

HEREDITY AND ENVIRONMENT

Heredity versus environment.—We must now consider the controversial question mentioned in the previous section. It is an age-old observation recognized in the solidarity of family and kind and displayed in the consciousness of race, that the blood of the parents flows in the children, that like begets like. The difference in heredity, then, might account for the difference in the traits and qualities of individuals or groups, even in very different environments. To this explanation the biologist naturally leaned while the students of environment were stressing the other aspect. Thus a great dispute arose as to the relative importance of the two, and it still rages. In explaining the variations of human beings and their societies some claim that heredity is far the more weighty determinant, while others belittle heredity in the name of environment. Some claim that certain qualities, such as those of health or intelligence, depend mainly on heredity while they admit that other qualities, particularly the social qualities expressed in morals, customs, and beliefs, depend more directly on environment.

The whole issue was raised in a definite form by Galton, when in 1869 he published his pioneer work on *Hereditary Genius*. He sought to show in this work that, while there is seeming chance in the appearance of genius, the probability of the occurrence of highly gifted children is vastly higher when the fathers are of superior intelligence. The work of Galton was carried on by Karl Pearson, who applied his method of correlation to the problem and was led to the conclusion that, in the explanation of important human differences, the influence of environment was far less than that of heredity. He actually claimed that it was possible by his method to measure the relative efficacy of the two and gave evidences purporting to show that for people of the same race within a given community the factor of heredity was more than seven times as important in the determination of differences as was that of environment.⁸ Many other researchers have followed the path of

⁸ Karl Pearson, *Nature and Nurture* (London, 1910), and other papers in the Eugenics Laboratory Lecture Series.

Pearson. Some have taken class or occupational categories and shown that the groups with the higher social or intellectual rating have been more productive of men of genius or distinction. Thus Woods discovered that royal families produce in proportion more geniuses than any others,⁹ Visser that the families of the clergy produce in America the largest proportion of notable men, followed in order by the other professions, businessmen, farmers, skilled and semiskilled laborers,¹⁰ Cattell that American men of science emanate in largest numbers from the professional classes and in smallest numbers from the agricultural class,¹¹ and so forth. Others have taken racial or national categories and by the application of psychological tests have brought out considerable differences between them, as in the well known army tests of immigrant groups in the United States and more generally of native-born, foreign-born, and Negro groups.¹² Particular attention has been devoted to the comparison by "intelligence tests" of white and colored groups, giving in all cases a higher rating to the whites.¹³ Others again have taken selected family groups for comparison, giving us the famous contrast between the prosperous and distinguished lineage of Jonathan Edwards and the wretched descendants of the Jukes and the Kallikaks.¹⁴

The danger of superficial conclusions.—From such studies conclusions are frequently drawn that reveal an inadequate and superficial analysis of the problem. On the whole, what most of these studies have done is to give more precise and scientific evidence regarding matters of common observation; that those who are born in the families or groups possessing distinction or prestige and who in consequence are brought up in a more favorable environment are more likely to develop intellectual or other attainment. An example of these results is shown in the following table from Visser:

⁹ F. A. Woods, *Mental and Moral Heredity in Royalty* (New York, 1906).

¹⁰ S. S. Visser, "Study of the Type of the Place of Birth etc. of Fathers of Subjects of Sketches in *Who's Who in America*," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 30 (1925), 551-557.

¹¹ J. McKen Cattell, *American Men of Science* (3rd ed. New York, 1921), p. 783.

¹² See, for example, R. M. Yerkes, *Psychological Examining in the U. S. Army, Memoirs*, National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 15 (1921).

¹³ A tabulated statement of results is given in P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, Chap. IV.

¹⁴ A. E. Winship, *Jukes-Edwards* (Harrisburg, Pa., 1900); H. H. Goddard, *The Kallikak Family* (New York, 1912); R. L. Dugdale, *The Jukes* (New York, 1877), and A. H. Estabrook, *The Jukes in 1915* (Washington, 1916).

THE OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF THE FATHERS OF 18,400 INDIVIDUALS WHOSE NAMES APPEARED IN THE 1922-23 EDITION OF *Who's Who in America*¹⁵

	Number of fathers of persons report- ing in <i>Who's Who</i>	Number of eminent persons per approx- imately 48,000 men
Men of leisure	49	?
Unskilled	94	1
Skilled laborers	1,165	30
Farmers	4,310	70
Businessmen	6,473	600
Professional men, except clergymen	4,265	1,035
Clergymen	2,036	2,400

Facts of this character are interesting and important, but when we deal with them it is essential to distinguish fact from inference. What they tell us directly is that, accepting a certain criterion of distinction, certain occupational groups in a particular country produced eminent persons in varying proportions to their numbers, the divergence between classes being so great that the son of a clergyman, born a generation or two before 1922, had a chance of inclusion in *Who's Who* perhaps eighty times as high as that of the son of a skilled laborer. The criterion itself may be an imperfect measure of eminence, just as the psychological test may be an imperfect measure of "intelligence," but for our purpose that is a minor consideration which we need not here discuss. What we must observe is that such figures tell us nothing directly about either heredity or environment. They tell us something about various combinations of the two, for, as we saw in the last section, every specific group has a different specific environment. Many of the researchers who have collected these facts draw from them the conclusion that heredity is a more potent factor than environment, but the facts themselves might just as well—and just as illegitimately—be used to support the opposite conclusion. Thus Woods declares that the resemblances between members of royal families must, in view of the different milieus from which their ancestors came (but they were all alike members of royal courts!), have been brought about "through the germ-cells alone." And Popenoe and Johnson declare that, as revealed in his lower intellectual rating, "the negro lacks in his germ-plasm excellence of some qualities which the white race possesses."¹⁶ To establish such conclusions it

¹⁵ S. S. Visher, *op. cit.* Visher computed on the basis of the 1870 Census that 48,000 unskilled laborers would contribute, on the average, one notable son to *Who's Who in America*, 1922-1923.

¹⁶ Paul Popenoe and R. H. Johnson, *Applied Eugenics* (New York, 1926), Chap. XIV.

would be necessary to discount the effect of different environmental conditions, a problem to which we must return. It may be observed in passing that Galton himself was much more guarded in his inferences, as when he said, "There is no escape from the conclusion that nature prevails enormously over nurture *when the differences of nurture do not exceed what is commonly found among persons of the same rank of society and in the same country.*"¹⁷ If we give as much weight to the condition which I have here italicized as to the first part of the statement, no objection can be taken to the conclusion, but in that case it tells us nothing about the "potency" of heredity as compared with that of environment.

Some cases examined.—Let us briefly examine some of the evidences in order to show the danger involved in drawing general conclusions regarding the "role" of heredity from figures revelatory of total situations. Since men fall into many serious errors regarding the nature of social classes, of race distinctions, of national unities, and of other subjects of great sociological importance because of mistaken views regarding the relation of heredity and social environment, we shall use a variety of examples to bring out the need for careful analysis.

Case One: We will take first one of the various studies of the comparative intelligence of Negroes and whites. Yerkes, from the data provided by the psychological tests applied to U. S. army recruits, found the average mental age of the Negroes to be 10.4 years as contrasted with 13.1 years for the whites.¹⁸ Such a result requires interpretation, and there are two important questions which it immediately raises. In the first place, how far can we conclude concerning the general level of mentality of the two races from the results of specific tests applied to selected groups? The problem of sampling we may disregard, inasmuch as the results are on the whole in conformity with those attained by many other investigators. The problem of the validity of the specific tests is harder to meet. There are two difficulties here. One concerns the hypothesis that tests involving degrees of facility in performing particular operations under particular conditions faithfully represent degrees of general intelligence or "mental age." For example, a test requiring accuracy measures accuracy with respect to the operation in question, and if a time factor is included it measures accuracy in conjunction with quickness of reaction. Can we conclude from these results regarding the general and hard-to-define

¹⁷ *Inquiries into Human Faculty* (London, 1883), p. 241.

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*

attribute we speak of as "mental age"? The other difficulty concerns the cultural background of the two groups. Are the common tests impartial in the sense that they measure equally those aptitudes through which intelligence displays itself under the life conditions of each group? The woodsman, for example, would fail miserably in the test in which the bank clerk would score highly, and *vice-versa*, and it is no easy matter to devise common tests which could give reliable indications as to their comparative "mental age." The fact that the background of the Negro in general differs from that of the white makes the difficulty here too a serious one.

Let us suppose, however, that these difficulties are surmounted. Then we come face to face with our second main question. We have found, we now assume, adequate indices of the "mental age" of the two groups. Shall we then conclude that our indices reveal the hereditary or racial difference in intelligence of the two peoples concerned? By no means, for we have done nothing so far to eliminate the factor of differential environment. No such tests can discount the influence of differential training, experience, home life, social opportunity. If in linguistic tests the Negro comes off worse than in music tests, has the environment nothing to do with it, the environment as a whole, including not only such aspects as economic disadvantage, inferior linguistic schooling, the shorter school year, but also the less objective aspects such as the lack of the social stimulations and prospects which the white enjoys? The environment of the past is written in our lives as well as the environment of the present. Can we ever so deal with it as to measure its influence and therefore also the influence of heredity? It is sometimes claimed that we can, and to the meaning of this claim we must return. All that we here assert is that no such tests as we have mentioned permit us to assess heredity. They are useful as showing differences that exist here and now, but at best they are not absolute measurements of anything except that which is actually tested, a specific performance of the human product of race and environment. If we examined in the same way the intelligence rating of the army recruits of different nationalities we would see that a further consideration must be reckoned with, that of selection—in this case, the social selection involved in the immigration movements of the various peoples.

Case Two: Let us take a second example in which some of the above-mentioned difficulties appear to be absent. Physical traits are more concrete and certainly more easily measurable than mental traits. In this case the range of variation for groups of different

nationalities can be easily represented by frequency curves. Measurements of Japanese and of American soldiers show a range of variation for the former between something under 56 to 69 inches and for the latter between something over 61 to nearly 75 inches.¹⁹ The average stature for the one group is 63.24 and for the other 67.51. It may be observed in passing that such figures do not accurately measure the comparative average stature of the males of the two populations—which is perhaps an impossible task—but they are certainly useful indications of difference. The chief danger would lie in the assumption that they measure, with any degree of accuracy, an hereditary difference between the two groups. We have not yet eliminated the effect of continuous subjection to different environments. We cannot say that the conditions of life, the kind of food, the kind of nurture, the kind of climate, have nothing to do with the differences revealed. There is considerable evidence that when children are subjected to conditions of an unfavorable character, when, for example, the food supply is reduced during a war or a severe depression, their stature, as well as their weight, is affected. There is also evidence that with improved methods of feeding their stature increases.²⁰ The studies of Boas on the physical differences between the American-born descendants of immigrant groups and their parents indicate changes in stature and even in head formation.²¹ Further investigation on a larger scale and over several generations is desirable, but in view of the present evidences it is mere dogmatism to assert that heredity is alone responsible for the physiological differences between national or racial groups.²²

Case Three: Let us take a third example in which the factor of race does not present itself. Karl Pearson, in his *Eugenics Laboratory studies*, found a correlation between the stature of parents and that of their children equal to $+0.50$ and concluded that this is a measure of the influence of heredity. We are not for a moment denying in this instance, or in the previous ones, that heredity contributes towards the measurable result, but we do deny that the figure quoted has been shown to be an accurate measurement of its contribution. We have evidence that some environmental

¹⁹ For graphs showing these results see R. E. Chaddock, *Principles of Statistics* (New York, 1925), p. 227; see comments in F. H. Hankins, *Racial Basis of Civilization* (New York, 1926), Part II, Chap. II.

²⁰ Some of these evidences are collected in Morris Ginsberg, *Studies in Sociology*, Chap. X.

²¹ F. Boas, *Changes in Bodily Form of Descendants of Immigrants*, Vol. 39 of the Reports of the Immigration Commission (Washington, D. C., 1912).

²² See on this point F. Hertz, *Race and Civilization* (New York, 1928).

conditions affect stature; we know, for example, that it may be affected by nutrition and by disease in the period of growth. Even if we could regard the small samples as fully representative, we still are ignorant as to whether the environment of the families of the less tall children was equally favorable for the trait of physical height as that of the families of the taller children. The problem of the measurement of hereditary differences is far more complicated than the biometricians generally realize. We know, through Mendelian and other studies, that offspring inherit in some degree qualities or traits which may be latent in their parents but are revealed in their grandparents or remoter ancestry. In other words, we must think of heredity in terms of several generations at least. If, on the other hand, we think of environment in terms of a single generation we may draw misleading inferences regarding its importance. There is reason to believe that the general stature of European peoples has increased since the days of armored knights. If so, then it is hard to rule out the long-run influence of environment as well as of heredity. And if this is true of physical traits it is more obviously true of mental and social traits, which, as we shall see, bear indubitable indications of the efficacy of the social heritage.

Case Four: Our next case is taken from a study of the social origins of American business leaders, a study which, according to the authors of it, "strongly suggests" that "inequality of earnings between the several occupational classes has its origins in a fundamental inequality of native endowments, rather than in an inequality of opportunities."²³ The evidence on which this conclusion was based was derived from a questionnaire filled out by a large and representative list of business leaders, defined as the partners or owners or higher executives of businesses having a volume of sales or gross income exceeding \$500,000. Of this list it was found that 36 per cent were the sons of "big" businessmen, that in all 56.7 per cent were the sons of "businessmen of one kind or another," whereas only 12.4 per cent were the sons of farmers, 5 per cent of clerks or salesmen, 8 per cent of skilled laborers and 2.2 per cent of unskilled laborers.

How then did the authors arrive at their conclusion that "lack of native ability rather than lack of opportunity" explains the disproportionate representation of these various occupational groups? Regarding "capital and connections" as the environmental factors

²³ F. W. Taussig and C. S. Joslyn, *American Business Leaders* (New York, 1932).

"most essential in contributing towards success in business," they asked the following questions: (1) Were any of your relatives or friends interested as owners or executives, (a) in the business which you first entered, (b) in your present organization when you entered it; and (2) Did you, during the early stages of your business career, receive substantial aid (not less than \$10,000) through the provision of capital from any of the following sources (a) inheritance, (b) relatives or friends? Of the respondents 11.6 per cent reported "substantial financial aid" from the two sources mentioned, and 35.9 per cent reported "influential connections as that term is defined in the questionnaire." Of the total number 31.9 per cent were college graduates.

It was from such evidences that the authors drew their conclusion regarding the relative unimportance of opportunity and environment generally in the explanation of the genesis of business leadership. In view of our previous discussion we leave it to the student to consider whether the evidences "strongly" support the conclusion. Are the questions which were asked sufficient for the assessment of the influence of environment as between economic groups? Do the answers to the questions give any clear indication that as between occupational classes, native endowment counts for more than opportunity? How is the conclusion the authors reach actually attained? How is it reconciled with the fact which they themselves incidentally establish, that "business leaders in the United States are today [circa 1929] being recruited, to a substantially greater extent than was the case thirty or forty years ago, from among the sons of major executives"? On the larger question of the relative roles of heredity and environment can we draw any valid conclusion whatever from the figures which they give us?

Case Five: Our last example will be the famous contrast between the family of the Jukes and that of the Edwardses. In 1877 twelve hundred descendants were identified of a certain Juke, who was born in New York in 1720. Of these 440 were physically defective or diseased, 310 were paupers who had already amassed between them 2,300 years of life in poorhouses, 300 had previously died in infirmaries, and of the 130 who had been convicted of crimes 7 were murderers. More than half of the women plied the trade of prostitute, while scarcely any of the men knew any trade beyond that of professional beggar. A further investigation in 1915 unearthed 2,820 descendants, and of these 600 then living were mentally defective. The cost of the family to the state was calculated at

around two and a half million dollars. Against this picture of squalor and crime, prostitution and feeble-mindedness is set the bright record of the descendants of Jonathan Edwards, of whom 1,394 were identified in 1900. No less than 295 of these were college graduates, and many of them adorned the professions as lawyers, clergymen, physicians, professors, army and navy officers, and so forth. Thirteen were presidents of important colleges and one was a vice-president of the United States. Others had made a success in business. Not one, so far as the record showed, had ever been convicted of a crime.

The contrast is certainly striking, but those who immediately claim that it reveals the incontestable supremacy of heredity over environment are ill-advised. In the first place we must ask, in what sense are the Jukes and the Edwardses of the present generation the same families as those of nine generations back? Each generation is a fresh admixture, and the blood of countless admixtures flows in each of us. "Many a person bears the name of some distinguished ancestor but does not have a single one of his chromosomes or hereditary traits, whereas others who do not bear his name . . . have received his chromosomes and are his true inheritors."²⁴ If we can accept current biological teaching regarding the mechanics of heredity we learn how precarious is the imputation to far-off descendants of the qualities of ancestors. "These germinal causes of traits, which are called genes, are transmitted unchanged, but in the fertilization of the egg one-half of the genes from each parent is lost and is replaced by half from the other parent. So numerous are the genes that the combinations of them in the offspring are rarely, if ever, the same in two individuals, and so complex is their influence upon one another and upon the process of development, that no two sexually produced individuals are ever exactly alike. Consequently the best traits may appear in parents and be lost in their offspring; genius in an ancestor may be replaced by incompetence, imbecility, or insanity in a descendant."²⁵ The differences observable between members of the same family support the warning, and the study of these introduces new environmental factors to complicate our search for causes. We discover, for instance, that some socially manifested differences between children are related to such conditions as the order of birth and the changes in parental attitudes as the parents grow older and their social and economic

²⁴ E. G. Conklin, *Heredity and Environment* (Princeton, 1923), p. 312.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

position changes.²⁶ We may still accept the position of the more moderate eugenists, that like *tends* to beget like.²⁷ We have no more justification for denying the importance of heredity than some eugenists have when they deny the importance of environment. What the above-mentioned considerations impress upon us is, first, the complexity and uncertainty of heredity itself, and, second, the rashness of imputing solely to the character of some ancestral stock the social qualities or defects of some group of "descendants."

The nature of the Juke-Edwards exhibit suggests in other respects the need for caution. "The number of eminent among the Edwardses makes a composite of about 600. Out of how many? One thousand three hundred and ninety-four identified out of a possible 50,000? No one can state the *number omitted* any more definitely than he can state that the blood of Elizabeth Tuttle is the determining factor in effecting the eminence of the Edwards clan."²⁸ Observe also that the more easily identifiable members of the clan are those who have won some kind of distinction, just as in the case of the Jukes it is those who have failed most signally who are most easy to trace. Still, no doubt, the difference remains; we search for the Jukes in asylums and poorhouses and find some of them there, while for the Edwardses we look successfully in the roll of distinguished service. But at this point we must not forget that the Jukes had an unfavorable social environment whereas the Edwardses had a favorable one. To claim that the group determines the environment more than the environment the group is to prejudge the case. We cannot deny that in the making of college graduates opportunity, economic, social, and educational, is a factor, and that therefore it affects the entry to the professions which the Edwardses adorned. There is evidence that some members of the Juke family who moved out of the unfavorable environment became decent members of the community. If it is said they moved out because they were different, may it not also be said that they were different

²⁶ See, for example, Blanche C. Weill, *The Behavior of Young Children of the Same Family* (Cambridge, Mass., 1928).

²⁷ For example, Leonard Darwin, in *What Is Eugenics?* (New York, 1928, p. 18) puts the case for heredity in the following reasonable terms: "We cannot foretell what will be the qualities of a man before he is born. But if we know the qualities of his near relations we can tell a good deal about what his qualities will *probably* be. This means that, though we should make many bad shots, we should be generally far nearer the truth than if we went by chance."

²⁸ P. A. Witty and H. C. Lehmann, "An Interpretation of the Heredity Background of Two Groups of Mental Deviates," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 34 (1928), 28. See also an article by the same authors "The Dogma and Biology of Human Inheritance," *ibid.*, Vol. 35 (1930), 548-563.

because they moved out? It seems impossible to get away from this incessant interaction. Those who disparage environment see only one side of it, those who disparage heredity only the other. Since the character of the environment and the character of the group are always correlates, it is easy to draw opposite conclusions from the same phenomena. The correlations themselves are well established—there is no doubt that the children of successful parents are on the whole more successful than the average. But our prior attitude is apt to determine whether we ascribe their degree of success wholly or in greater measure to heredity or to environment.

Is a scientific answer possible?—In this scientific dilemma various researchers have sought for methods by which either of the factors could be held constant while the other varied, on the principle that the differences revealed in such experimentation, where society admits or supplies it, can then be attributed solely to the variant factor. The botanist can take the seeds of the same plant and grow them under varying conditions of soil and climate. He can then attribute the differences to the environmental factor, or, more precisely, to the combination of the same heredity with different environments. Can the sociologist discover similar instances? It has been maintained that he can, and that so this baffling problem may be solved. Let us turn next to examine these claims.

CRUCIAL INSTANCES AND SOME CONCLUSIONS

Types of situation wherein an answer may be sought.—From the beginning of the scientific study of heredity special attention has been devoted to those cases in which the biological inheritance might be regarded as practically identical since these afford a peculiar opportunity for assessing the role of the variant environmental factor and thus of heredity also. The opportunity is supplied by the occurrence of "identical" twins, derived from the same ovum. Galton initiated these studies and from the very marked similarity which such twins exhibited under all conditions reinforced his conclusions regarding the dominant part which heredity played in the causation alike of human resemblances and of human differences.²⁹ Some later investigators in turn have endeavored to find the reverse situation, in which children of different heredity have been brought up in practically the same environment. Both these types of situa-

²⁹ *Inquiries into Human Faculty*. A review of the series of researches initiated by Galton is given in Gladys C. Schwesinger, *Heredity and Environment* (New York, 1933), pp. 175-231.

tion encourage the hope that we can surmount the difficulties which embarrassed the studies already dealt with.

Studies of identical twins.—It has been well established that twins exhibit closer resemblances, physical and mental, than siblings who are not twins. Among others Thorndike has shown that for twins as compared with ordinary brothers and sisters the coefficient of correlation derived from various tests is very distinctly higher.³⁰ He claimed also, though here the evidence is less conclusive, that the degree of unlikeness that exists between them is not reduced but rather tends to increase during longer subjection to the "same" environment, from which he infers, also somewhat dubiously, that the inborn differences are thus finding expression. Others have made studies limited to identical twins, or at least to twins of the same sex who, because of unusually high resemblance, might be regarded as such.³¹ They have found some instances of such exact resemblance, both of mind and of body, as to justify the favorite old plot presented in the *Comedy of Errors*.³² And again the triumphant conclusion has been drawn that the influence of environment is feeble as compared with that of heredity.

Unfortunately these instances are not so crucial as at first sight they might appear. In the first place the instances of extreme resemblance are such as naturally to have attention drawn to them, so that they may receive undue importance as a basis for generalization. Nor must we forget that twins *begin* in the same environment, the womb of the mother, and that usually through their most plastic years they remain in the same family environment. Here then we have an extraordinary conjuncture of our two factors, and this must be adduced in the explanation of the extraordinary resemblance. Some instances are recorded where the twins were separately brought up from infancy, but they still remained in somewhat similar environments. The really crucial instance would be one in which from birth the twins were reared in vastly different situa-

³⁰ E. L. Thorndike, *Measurement of Twins* (New York, 1905) and *Educational Psychology* (New York, 1914), III. It may be observed that the degree of resemblance between ordinary twins is very variable, so that the fifty pairs which Thorndike investigated form an inadequate sample for statistical generalization. The writer has twins of his own, boy and girl, who differ markedly both in appearance and in temperament.

³¹ For an example, see A. Gesell, "Mental and Physical Correspondence in Twins," *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. 14 (1922), 305-331; 415-428.

³² The diagnosis of identity in twins is by no means so simple as it is often thought to be. See, for example, H. H. Newman, "Studies of Human Twins," *Biological Bulletin*, Vol. 55 (1928), 283-297.

tions. If one were brought up in an American home and the other in the wilds of Africa, or if one of the two suffered the fate of Kaspar Hauser, then we might have a conclusive test, and it is reasonable to surmise, from such indications as we shall give in later chapters of this book, that it would vindicate the title of environment to be a coequal arbiter of our development and of our fate.

Identical twins reared apart.—The relatively few instances of presumably identical twins reared apart which have been studied are certainly far from conclusive. Professor H. J. Müller investigated a pair of identical twins who were reared in somewhat different environments from the age of two weeks. As adults, they showed certain variations in personality traits but insignificant differences in mentality as measured by intelligence tests.³³ Muller concluded that mental ability is genetically determined while the variations in "nonintellectual" characteristics must be attributed to environment. But a later series of studies made by Professor H. H. Newman did not support this conclusion. In two of the first three cases he investigated the twins revealed a great similarity of emotional and temperamental traits together with a quite significant difference of intellectual qualities.³⁴ In one of his later cases (number nine), of two girls separated at the age of three months and brought up in homes of very different cultural character, the differences between the twins both in intelligence and in temperament were quite striking. The girl brought up in the less favorable environment was repressed, timid, and socially awkward, in contrast with her easy-mannered, alert, as well as more intelligent, twin sister. Further light has been thrown on this subject by recent experiments in which one of a pair of identical twins has been from infancy trained by experts in child development while the other has been left to "normal" home training. In one such experiment conducted at Columbia University a marked difference in the tempo and character of development began to appear after the age of two or three months. Two boy twins, Johnny and Jimmy, were the first subjects of the experiment, and Johnny, trained at the child development clinic, advanced in nearly every respect more rapidly than his twin brother. While still under two years of age

³³ H. J. Müller, "Mental Traits and Heredity," *The Journal of Heredity*, Vol. 16 (1925), 433-448.

³⁴ H. H. Newman, "Mental and Physical Traits of Identical Twins Reared Apart," *ibid.*, Vol. 20 (1929), 49-64; 97-104; 153-166.

he could swim under water, roller-skate, climb ladders, and had no fear of trying to do anything he was asked to do.³⁵

These investigations discount any theory that claims to measure the exact potency of heredity and any theory that attributes, in respect of the differences between individuals and groups of the human species, a dominant role to heredity as against environment. It is still possible for the geneticist to argue that even in "identical" twins there are hereditary differences. And it is equally possible for the environmentalist to relate the differences which they display to the life situations within which they are expressed. If Professor Newman is right regarding the biology of "identical" twins when he maintains that they need not be genetically identical, then we must abandon the assumption that in these instances we can regard heredity as the constant and environment alone as the variant, and may well accept his own conclusion that from them "no definite law is to be posited as to the relative potency of nature and nurture."

Studies of children of different parentage brought up together.—Let us turn now to the alternative quest, which hopes to solve the problem from the study of instances in which environment may be taken as the constant. It is, as we have seen, impossible that any two individuals should have an identical environment in all respects. The best approximations we can find are instances in which children of different heredity have been brought up from infancy or early childhood in the same foster home. A number of studies have been made along these lines, two of which are contained in a recent work devoted to the whole subject we are now discussing.³⁶ They differ somewhat in their conclusions. In one, conducted by Freeman and two other investigators, evidence is offered to show that the character of the foster home definitely affects the degree of intellectual ability attained by the children subjected to its influence, that children admitted to the superior home at an earlier age made greater intellectual progress than those who entered it at a later age, and furthermore that in the superior environment of such a home some children exhibited an advance both in conduct and in ability greater

³⁵ Myrtle B. McGraw, *Growth: A Study of Jimmy and Johnny* (New York, 1935).

³⁶ *The Twenty-seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education* (Bloomington, Ill., 1928). The studies referred to in the text are: F. N. Freeman, K. J. Holzinger, and B. C. Mitchell, *The Influence of Environment on the Intelligence, School Achievement, and Conduct of Foster Children*; and Barbara S. Burks, *A Comparative Study of Foster Parent-Foster Child Resemblance and True Parent-True Child Resemblance*. For a criticism see the article of Witty and Lehmann, already cited, in the *American Journal of Sociology* for January, 1930.

than the character and intellectual status of their parents might have led one to prognosticate. These results stand in interesting contrast to some we have already mentioned. Here, too, caution is necessary when we pass from the facts to the interpretation. There is too much of the unpredictable about individual heredity to justify general conclusions concerning the influence of environment from such indications as the authors give. The environment is always complex and always changing; the heredity can never be fully known. But all studies of this kind at least help us to see more fully that we must always reckon with environment no less than with heredity, and here the authors avoid that misleading and illogical precision which pretends to measure the exact contribution of either.

Measurement is once more attempted in the second investigation. Miss Burks, in a study of the resemblance exhibited by foster children and foster parents as contrasted with that of children and parents proper, not only concludes that heredity is vastly more potent but actually tells us the percentage in the variability of children which is attributable to differences in home environment—it is 17 per cent! In view of what has already been said it is easy to perceive that a result of this type could be attained only through the acceptance of several quite untenable assumptions. The investigator in question points out, in another contribution to the same volume, some of the statistical pitfalls which lurk in this field of study. But there are also nonstatistical pitfalls, and she herself does not escape them. The statistical result is reached on the false assumption that the heredity of the children is definitely knowable and that it is actually measured by the tests applied. By no such mechanical process can valid measurements of innate ability be found. In this approach the complexity of environment is not realized nor the intricate interaction between the growing life and the changing life conditions. Even if we accepted the figures offered us, we might still wonder how the investigator drew from them her conclusion that environment is relatively unimportant, being “dwarfed” by the force of heredity. We are informed that the best home environment may contribute 20 points to the child’s I.Q., and that the worst may depress it by the same amount. This is a comparison within the range of American home life—it is not a comparison between the “best” and the “worst” of possible environments. By what logic then can the investigator conclude that “the total contribution of heredity (i.e., of innate and heritable factors) is probably not far from 75 or 80 per cent”?

Right and wrong questions about heredity and environment.—

We waste our labor if we persist in asking the wrong kind of question. We are asking the wrong kind of question, as our argument to this point shows, if we start with the assumption that we can ever say, as between heredity in general and the environment as a whole, which of the two is the more important or the more potent. Every phenomenon of life is the product of both. Each is as *necessary* to the result as the other. Neither can ever be eliminated and neither can ever be isolated. Both are, in every particular situation, exceedingly complex. Both have been operative, to produce every particular situation, through unimaginable time. For these reasons it seems impossible even to conceive two situations involving precisely the same combination of hereditary and environmental factors. Every situation is in this respect unique, just as every human face is in some way different from every other. Where two or more factors are equally necessary for a given result, it is vain to inquire which in general is the more important. Is labor more necessary than capital for the production of a manufactured good? Is food more necessary than air for the sustenance of life?

Heredity—the germ cells—contains all the potentialities of life, but all its actualities are evoked within and under the conditions of environment. What then is the kind of question which we can intelligibly ask and which we may hope to answer? It is never a question regarding the *absolute* contribution of either factor as a whole. But there remain questions of vast significance both to the biologist and to the sociologist. The biologist, for example, is interested in tracing the inheritance of those unit characteristics, such as blue eyes, albinism, hemophilia, and so forth, which suggest separable specific determinants in the hereditary mechanism. He is interested in the manner in which specific organic predispositions, such as the tendency to certain diseases, reveal themselves under varying conditions of environment. The sociologist is interested, for example, in the way in which a group deals with its general environment. He is interested in the way in which a group, brought up in a given environment, is affected by changes occurring within it or by their transference to a different environment. An immigrant group, no matter what its hereditary antecedents, exhibits new like characteristics when transplanted from Italy or Greece or Ireland to North America. One cannot but be impressed by the way in which customs, attitudes, and modes of life change in response to changed economic conditions, to new occupational activities, and so forth. We have numerous examples of how the

transition from poverty to wealth or *vice-versa* registers itself in the attitudes and standards of individuals and groups. We have so many historical examples of how the aspect of group life has altered when some change has occurred in the conditions. The proud vengeful marauding Scottish clans of the seventeenth century were transformed into the settled industrious population of the eighteenth. The mores of pioneer life are transformed as the frontier of civilization moves on. Primitive peoples have shown characteristic reactions when the techniques of western civilization have been brought to or forced upon them. Agricultural populations all over the earth, in America or Russia or Japan, have revealed significant changes in the process of industrialization. In spite of innumerable variations, we can discover typical responses to typical changes within the environment. Here we have a clue to the understanding of the relation between environment and life.

The study of these changes will not tell us whether heredity or environment is the more "important," but at least it will tell us *why* each is important and in what ways its importance is revealed. When a new element is injected into a situation and a significant change results, we must not attribute the change solely to that new element. A seemingly minor change in a chemical formula may mean all the difference between a food and a poison, but it is the new combination of the constituents which is poisonous, not any one by itself. So likewise in the profound unity of hereditary and environmental factors, a seemingly minor change may induce a definitely new situation, but we must not on that account conclude that environment is more important. The social demand for inventive talents which the machine age fosters has brought to eminence men who in an earlier age would have remained in obscurity; the modern opportunity to amass wealth through the capitalistic system has brought distinction and power to men brought up in humble surroundings, such as Carnegie and Ford and so many of the industrial and financial magnates of America, who in the feudal age would in all probability have remained mere clerks or toilers. A new social situation or a happy chance may give a genius the opportunity to reveal his power, but no amount of favorable conjuncture will turn a person of mediocre mentality into a genius. On the other hand, we must not assume, with some protagonists of heredity, that genius will make its way no matter what the environmental impediments may be. If some have triumphed over circumstance, does that entitle us to conclude that all potential greatness must be able to "break its birth's invidious bar"? In this field we

must particularly guard our judgment against the subtle forms of bias which are prompted by our station, our class consciousness, and our degree of success or failure in the struggle of life.

Some broad conclusions.—Heredity is potentiality made actual within an environment. All the qualities of life are in the heredity, all the evocation of qualities depends on the environment. It follows from this initial principle that the higher the potentiality the greater is the demand made on environment. Instead of seeking to exalt the importance of one factor over the other, we should therefore recognize, as one aspect of the correlation on which throughout we have been insisting, that the finer or the greater the heredity the more does the fitness of the environment matter. Thus the more subtle differences in environment may have little effect on beings with low potentialities, while they are vastly significant for beings more responsive to them. A seemingly minor change in a situation, a stimulus to success, an encouragement, a rebuff, may prove decisive to a sensitive nature while scarcely affecting a less sensitive one. Hence the imponderables of the social environment become more important for civilized individuals and groups. These conditions, such as social esteem or disesteem, the presence or absence of incentives to higher efforts, and so forth, are not measurable, but if we neglect them we may have a totally false picture of the difference between one human environment and another.

The more plastic the life the more is it at the mercy of environment save in so far as it learns to control the environment for its purposes. Man, the most plastic of all animals, has therefore been seeking through unknown ages to make his environment more conformable to his growing needs. The quest of the more appropriate environment is for him, alone of all the animals, eternal. We may add that for a like reason the fitness of the environment matters most during the most plastic stage, the earlier years, of human life. The stimulations afforded by the milieu in which we live—and likewise its depressing influences—affect us most when we are most impressionable. For this reason if for no other, we should accept the coequal importance of these two ultimate determinants of everything that lives.

V.

THE GEOGRAPHICAL ENVIRONMENT

GEOGRAPHY AS A SOCIAL DETERMINANT

Definition.—Within the total environment of man we can broadly distinguish the geographical conditions from those conditions that are themselves dependent on human activity. We take the geographical environment to mean therefore the conditions that nature provides for man, the earth's surface with all its physical features and natural resources, including the distribution of land and water, mountains and plains, minerals, plants, and animals, the climate and all the cosmic forces, gravitational, electric, radiational, that play upon the earth and affect the life of man. We distinguish this primary environment both from the modifications of it introduced by man, when he makes clearings or cultivates the soil or builds roadways and cities or harnesses natural forces, and from the inner or social environment of customs and institutions, folkways and mores, that every human group provides for its members.

The habitat of mankind is the surface of a small planet, swinging in its orbit around one of the countless suns of space, a mere speck in the immensity of the universe but one provided with that rare conjuncture of conditions, such as atmosphere, moisture, and range of temperature, which are necessary in order that life, as we know it, should exist. Of the factors which together make up the geographical environment some are utterly beyond the control of man while others in various degrees bear the imprint of his activity.

Controllable and uncontrollable factors.—Among the uncontrollable factors must be reckoned the relation of the earth to the sun and to the moon, the area of the earth, the extent and location of

its mineral resources, the distribution of continents and oceans, of plains and mountains, rivers and lakes, the seasons, the tides, the ocean currents, the rainfall and the winds, the electric energies. Man cannot change, save infinitesimally, these factors; if they do change it is through forces beyond his power. Man is not wholly at the mercy of these elemental facts, for in degree he can utilize them, seize the advantages which they offer him, overcome some of the barriers which they present to his purposes. He cannot control the winds but he can set his sails to catch them. He cannot remove mountains but he can tunnel through them. He cannot direct the path of the thunderstorm but he can make electricity convey his words and operate his machines. He cannot alter the seasons but he can protect himself against the heat and the cold. There are other geographical factors which are in part amenable to the direct control of man and which he can modify and not merely utilize. These are principally the distribution of animal and plant life and the fertility of the soil. He takes those animals and plants which serve his needs, breeds and cultivates them, dispossessing or destroying others to that end. The result is that the "natural" balance of organic life is completely overthrown by man. Selecting a few species, he breeds varieties of them such as wild nature neither knows nor tolerates, and gives them pride of place upon the earth. Large areas are characterized by a vegetative life introduced and assiduously maintained by man alone, belts of wheat and cotton and corn and tobacco and rice, and these in turn become associated with the culture and the social institutions of the regions where they occur. Thus in addition to and often crossing the geographical areas demarcated by natural phenomena there arise new areas determined by human exploitation of the other forms of organic life.

Having destroyed the natural balance, man has to fight continuously to maintain this artificial balance against other exploiters whom he has not succeeded in conquering, against weeds, insect and other pests, fungi, and microorganisms. The specialized cultivation of the earth by man tends to exhaust its natural fertility, but he has gradually learned the art of restoring and even of enhancing the properties of the soil. Where five hundred years ago in Europe the yield was only about four times the seed sown, now it is fifteen-fold or greater. There is some evidence to associate the fall of the ancient civilizations of the eastern shores of the Mediterranean with the impoverishment and desiccation of the soil.¹ In our modern

¹ See, for example, V. G. Simkhovitch, "Hay and History," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 28 (1913), 385-403.

civilization man has gained increasing if still limited control over this geographical factor. The forest-buried cities of the Maya civilization witness impressively to the manner in which nature reasserts her ancient sway. In the central regions of the United States there are large areas that today, owing to deforestation and soil erosion, are threatened by the invading desert and can be saved only by large-scale methods of scientific conservation.

The geographical school of sociology.—From early times men have reflected on the influence of geographical conditions on human society. Perceiving the differences between the modes and exigencies of human life in the mountains, on the plains, and by the seaboard, in the desert and in the forest, in temperate regions and in the tropics, and so forth, various thinkers attributed a dominant role to geography, regarding it as the primary determinant of the wealth and health, the size and energy, of populations, of their customs and social organizations, of their creeds and philosophies. From such observations arose at length a definite school of human or social geography. One of the pioneers was Frédéric Le Play, who was followed in France by E. Demolins and others. In Germany an important branch of the school was developed by F. Ratzel in his extensive work entitled *Human Geography*. In England H. T. Buckle wrote a history of civilization along similar lines. Among American representatives of this school may be classed Ellen C. Semple, a follower of Ratzel, and E. Huntington and E. G. Dexter, who lay most stress on the influence of climatic conditions.²

Much of the work of the geographical school presents the difficulty that it deals exclusively with one aspect of the total environment as though it were a separate and sufficient cause instead of an influence deeply entangled with other influences. The discussion of heredity and environment in the preceding chapter showed the need for great caution in this respect. This caution is not infrequently lacking in the writings of the more extreme members of the geographical school, as when Le Play attributes the particular form of the family to the conditions of work determined by the nature of the locality, when Buckle says that the growth of wealth depends entirely on soil and climate, and when Huntington in his *Civilization and Climate* seeks to show that favorable climatic conditions are a main determinant of the onward course of civilization. We have already pointed out that civilization itself modifies the influence

²For an account of the geographical school see P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (New York, 1928), Chap. III.

of geography. If we follow this point further we shall attain a more adequate view of the relation between geography and society.

Civilization and geographical conditions.—One of the most important aspects of civilization is the control over the external environment which it affords. The relation of man to geographical conditions is revealed in the principle that, as civilization advances in this respect, he becomes less directly and less completely dependent upon and influenced by the immediate or local environment in which he is situated. The character and the justification of this principle will be shown in the present chapter. The geographical environment alone never explains the rise of a civilization. There seems to have been no cause inherent in the geographical conditions to account for the birth of a great civilization in the island-center of Crete instead of, say, in the island-center of Sicily, or to explain why the great Maya civilization should have developed in the forest lands of Central America instead of in the highlands or coastal areas. There have been short-lived and long-lived civilizations arising under the same or under similar geographical conditions.³

It is clear that a virtually identical combination of the two elements [nonhuman and human] in the environment may give birth to a civilization in one instance and fail to give birth to a civilization in another instance, without our being able to account for this absolute difference in the outcome by detecting any substantial difference in the circumstances, however strictly we may define the terms of our comparison. Conversely, it is clear that civilizations can and do emerge in environments which are utterly diverse. The nonhuman environment may be of "the fluvial type" which has given birth to the Egyptian and Sumeric civilizations and perhaps to an independent "Indus Culture" as well; or it may be of "the plateau type" which has given birth to the Andean and the Hittite and the Mexic civilizations; or it may be of "the archipelago type" which has given birth to the Sinic and the Indic and the Western civilizations, and to the Orthodox Christian Civilization in Russia; or it may be of "the jungle type" which has given birth to the Mayan civilization.⁴

Man-made agencies of communication have made possible new foci of civilization. Agricultural fertility has become less determinant of the size or the wealth of a population. Industrial skill, commercial and financial enterprise, and those economic opportu-

³ On this subject cf. A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (Oxford, 1934), Vol. I, pp. 249 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 269.

nities dependent in part on man's control over nature have caused great shiftings of the centers of population. In England the center of population changed after the Industrial Revolution from the agricultural south to the less fertile north, while more recent economic changes have tended to displace it again. Economic conditions established the textile industry in New England, whence in turn it has migrated in part to the Carolinas—but the geographical factors have remained the same. The incessant movement of economic, political, and cultural dominance is sufficient to reveal this relative independence of society from the sheer determinism of the immediate geographical factors. One writer has sought to show that the march of civilization has been "coldward" since the age of the Sumerian and the Egyptian empires up to the present.⁵ The generalization is doubtful and the implied connection between higher civilization and lower temperature is precarious. What the record of these changes does effectively demonstrate is the way in which forces generated within society determine increasingly the habitat of the leading civilizations.

It is not difficult to explain why this should be so. In primitive life man is circumscribed by the limitations of locality. He is dependent on the food products, the building materials, the fabrics for his clothing, provided by the immediate neighborhood. If there is a local drought he has no recourse against famine. His whole economic activity is directed upon the products which the locality offers freely or yields to his limited techniques. His arts and crafts are responsive to the local environment. Anthropologists are fond of describing primitive cultures in terms of some characteristic product of the region, such as the *buffalo culture*, the *maize culture*, and so forth. Religion, like everything else, is localized in terms of the natural phenomena of the neighborhood. The growth of civilization diminishes the influence of all these local conditions. The civilized man draws products in great variety from many regions. Many of his occupations have no relation whatever to the geographical environment. His means of communication bring him into contact with the customs and the ways of living of other lands. The way is open for the more rapid diffusion of cultural influences. There is less local homogeneity on the one hand and less cultural contrast between localities on the other. In the new world, built up by modern civilization without the restraining influences of old

⁵ S. C. Gilfillan, "The Coldward Course of Progress," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 35 (1920), 393 ff. For a criticism see Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 182-185.

cultural conditions, we find the same modes of life and attitudes prevailing over vast areas of very different geographical character, although in the great urban centers marked diversities live side by side. In the old world we still find interesting cultural differences as well as dialectical variations between near localities, and the more so the more remote they are from the pervasive influence of those triumphant techniques which mark the latest stage of human control over nature. It is often held that these influences induce a cultural uniformity lacking in the richer, finer, and deeper qualities which characterize the indigenous life of the region, and European writers sometimes express the fear that Europe is becoming "Americanized" in this respect. It may well be that the cultural qualities have profounder roots in human nature than such speculations suggest. What is certainly true is that with the growth and expansion of civilization the varieties of geographical location less positively and less distinctively correspond to the varieties of cultural expression.

How civilization modifies man's dependence on the immediate geographical environment.—As man's control over nature increases, or, more precisely, as he learns better to utilize for his own ends the inexorable laws of nature, his dependence on the nearer geographical conditions is modified in two primary ways. On the one hand he gains geographical mobility and thus a greater power to select and to change his physical location. He can now move swiftly, without personal exertion, and with relatively little economic cost, from one part of the earth to another. The effective limits to migration are now set by society, not by geography. On the other hand he becomes subject to the impact of influences developed in more remote environments. His way of life, his thought, and his social organization are affected by what men do and think thousands of miles away, just as his diet contains articles produced in distant lands. In a word, as the social heritage grows, the immediate geographical factors assume a less important role in the interpretation of society.

Direct influences of geography on society.—Nevertheless geography has still to be reckoned with. It still exercises both an evident and a more subtle influence on the life of society. More obviously, geography provides certain conditions which remain of great economic significance. Jean Brunhes has pointed out six main types of human activity which take their specific character more directly from the geographical facts, these being habitat and housing, the character and direction of the roads, the cultivation of plants, the breeding of animals, the exploitation of minerals, and the devasta-

tion of plants and animals.⁶ The importance of the geographical facts varies with the development of the industrial arts and in general with the degree of civilization. Thus coal beds became important when the industrial age began, and more recently oil fields and the sources of hydroelectric energy have assumed an importance they never possessed before. The strategic centers of trade change as the modes of communication and transportation change. Countries have become prosperous and populous with the aid of geographical factors and later, as the technical arts have advanced or spread to other lands, have lost their advantage. Changing conditions brought dominance to Venice or to Cadiz or to the Hanse cities, and new changes took their leadership away. Always it is the relation of the geographical to the technological and social factors which counts, but always some geographical factors are significant. A good illustration is found in the location of the great cities of the world. Thus in the United States "of the twenty large cities . . . nine (Boston, Providence, New York, Newark, Jersey City, Philadelphia, Baltimore, New Orleans, and San Francisco) are located on the coast, five more along the northern lake frontier (Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, and Milwaukee), and five on the Mississippi and Ohio rivers (Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Louisville, St. Louis, and Minneapolis.)"⁷

Indirect influences of geography on society.—It is when we turn to the more subtle influences of geography that particular caution is necessary. It is easy to find correlations between climatic or other physiographic conditions and social phenomena. A group of writers, such as Dexter and Huntington, have pointed out correlations between climate and crime, suicide, insanity, physical and intellectual vigor, and so forth.⁸ But correlation is not explanation, it is merely a challenge to further study. Even a perfect correlation would not establish causation. Should we find a high correlation between sunspot activity and economic prosperity it might or might not *mean* anything. Should we find, as one writer does, a correlation between the motions of the planet Jupiter and the death rate, it in all probability *means* nothing. We must be able to trace the connection between the physical and the social fact before we can attribute any causal significance to the former. Hot weather does not breed crimes against the person in the way that the sun melts snow. We

⁶ Jean Brunhes, *Human Geography* (New York, 1920), Chaps. I and II.

⁷ E. C. Semple, *American History and its Geographic Conditions* (New York, 1933), Chap. XVI.

⁸ E. G. Dexter, *Weather Influences* (New York, 1904); E. Huntington, *Civilization and Climate* (New Haven, 1924), and other works.

have still to discover the intermediate links in the chain. We have to discover the relation of the climatic fact to the condition of the human organism; we have to relate in turn the latter to the motivations which express themselves in the social phenomenon. Since motivations are obviously subject to other than climatic conditions, we are likely, as we pursue our researches further, to discover situations in which the initial correlation does not hold. Thus a number of criminologists have shown that crimes against the person are more frequent in summer than in winter. There are some fairly obvious reasons which can be offered in explanation of this fact, such as the opportunity for a greater range of personal contacts which the summer provides in the temperate zone. But these explanations must be tested. We learn, for instance, that in South Carolina the maximum number of homicides occurs in December, with July taking second place. We find that the correlation in this state between the mean monthly temperature and the number of homicides is very low. On the other hand we find that the maximum of homicides occurs on Christmas day, a fact which at once suggests an explanation in terms of social and not climatic factors.⁹

A rare and admirable investigation of the nexus between a climatic factor and a social phenomenon is presented in Durkheim's study of suicide. Many previous researches had shown that in European countries the proportion of suicides in the warmer half (March to August) was always greater than in the colder half of the year. But a further analysis shows that the actual temperature level has little to do with the fact. The monthly variations in temperature do not accord with the variations in the suicide rate. Moreover, there are some very hot countries in which the suicide rate is quite low. We turn therefore to the correlations between suicide and certain social factors, correlations which have more direct significance. The number of suicides increases as the level of civilization rises. Moreover, there are in proportion more suicides in the city than in the country, there are more among the single or widowed than among the married, and there are more among Protestants and among non-religious persons than among Catholics. This suggests an explanation of a social character—in fact, that suicide occurs characteristically where conditions encourage social isolation, where people lack the sense of solidarity created by strong social responsibilities, where they are most apt to be thrown back on their own resources for comfort, companionship, and consolation. Of course Durkheim

⁹ See H. C. Brearley, *Homicide in South Carolina*, in *Social Forces*, Vol. 8 (1929), 218-221.

does not attempt to explain all suicide in this way. What he does is to put forward an hypothesis which has a more definite meaning than the hypothesis that high temperature impels to suicide. With it in mind we turn back to the climatic correlation, and the suggestion occurs that, after all, the chief conditioning factor may not be the temperature of the summer months but the greater length of the day. In the longer day of summer, social life is more active and more intense. It provides greater opportunities for those wider contacts in the very presence of which the sense of social isolation is most apt to develop. With much ingenuity Durkheim shows that this theory is in accord with the variations of suicide from season to season, from month to month, and from one day of the week to another. The fact, for instance, that suicides occurred most frequently on Mondays, when the work of the week was renewed, while nevertheless there were more suicides of women on Sundays, since on that day more women were likely to pass beyond the social contacts of the home, fits excellently into the explanation.¹⁰

We have dwelt on this study because it seeks to meet the requirements of a rigorous methodology, often unhappily neglected in the interpretation of environmental influences. Geography provides an external set of conditions under which the life of man in society proceeds. These conditions can never be ignored by the sociologist, but his task is to show their relation to the direct determinants of social phenomena, the attitudes and interests of men. Man adapts himself to all kinds of geographical conditions, but he is not resourceless in meeting them. He changes, in ways still largely unexplored, when he is subjected to a new environment, but he also puts his imprint upon it. The white man living in the tropics becomes a different white man, but he brings with him his own civilization. The Englishman in India develops differences from the Englishman at home. Climatic conditions affect his energies, but he does not usually become contemplative and mystical as the Indian tends to be. Other factors are obviously present, an alien civilization, races to which he feels alien and over which he exercises authority. It is not only the land that is different but his whole situation. Many environmental factors conspire wherever human societies exist.

¹⁰ E. Durkheim, *Le Suicide* (Paris, 1897), especially Book I, Chap. III. See also M. Halbwachs, *Les Causes du Suicide* (Paris, 1930), in which he develops and refines the methods of Durkheim, while differing from him on a number of minor points.

LAND AND POPULATION

Population and the means of subsistence.—We have reserved for separate consideration a fundamental question concerning the relation of geography and society. While the territory that a group of human beings occupies has an influence on their health and their wealth, their work, their opportunities, and their modes of living, beyond all this it is an important condition of their very numbers. There are areas of the earth, deserts and jungles and mountain ranges and arctic snows, where population is scattered and sparse; there are areas, the industrially propitious regions of the temperate zone and the great plains of China and India, where the population is continuous and dense. Man is utterly dependent on the productivity of the earth, including not only the fertility of the soil but also the availability of mineral resources, both for his sustenance and for that equipment which turns mere living into a standard of living. The size of a particular population or of that of the earth as a whole and the material advance as well as the numbers of a society are obviously related to the provision thus made by nature.

The doctrine of Malthus.—This fact was impressively stated by Malthus at the beginning of that age which saw the greatest technological advance in history. There were prophets of that time who in the light of scientific discovery predicted a new and happier time in which comfort would be universal and the drudgery of toil abolished. Men like Godwin and Condorcet anticipated a future "golden age," a new Eden for humanity, as the result of technological advance.¹¹ But Malthus declared that such conjectures "far outstrip the modesty of nature." Science might advance, but the capacity of the land to supply the primary needs of men was limited. The "natural" rate of reproduction is such that, unless in some way checked by deliberate control, it inevitably surpasses the potentiality of the earth to feed the growing population. As Huxley in a later day put it, "the Eden would have its serpent, and a very subtle beast too."

What Malthus said in effect was that the limiting factor alike to the growth of population and to the advance of society was the geographical one. In his *Essay on Population* Malthus drew a sharp contrast between the fertility of mankind and the potentiality of the food supply.¹² Population is always multiplying up to—and

¹¹ Godwin, *Political Justice* (1793) and *The Enquirer* (1797); Condorcet, *Tableau Historique de l'Esprit Humain* (1794).

¹² See particularly the first two chapters of the *Essay* (edition of 1803).

beyond—the limits of subsistence. The gains of civilization are taken out in a larger population, not in a higher standard of living, and still the pressure continues. Nature interposes, when the limit of her provision is overstepped by the “instinct to multiply,” her own dread agencies, starvation and disease with their concomitants of war and of vice, to restore the necessary balance. Scientific and technological advance will not raise the standard of mankind unless some powerful incentive can be adduced to control the rate of increase. To this end Malthus set the preventive check of “moral restraint” against the “positive” checks of nature, but the tenor of his argument, aided by his survey of the history of population in various countries, scarcely encouraged the hope that it would prove effective against the imperious urge to reproduction.

The relation of land to population has been the subject of much investigation and also of much controversy since the days when Malthus undertook to refute Godwin. Many investigators have accepted, though in different terms, the rather pessimistic outlook of Malthus. His followers expressed it in “the law of diminishing returns.” Later writers have pointed out that the extraordinary increase in the population of Europe and America which occurred in the last hundred and fifty years must be regarded as an exceptional, in fact an unprecedented, occurrence due to an unusual conjuncture of favorable conditions. They point out that there remain now no virgin agricultural lands to be exploited by modern science, that the new lands of America are, as they fill up, consuming more and more of their own agricultural products. They maintain, with Professor East, that mankind is still at the crossroads, having to choose between lower fertility and lower civilization.¹³ They take stock, with W. S. Thompson, of the capacity of the earth to produce wheat and corn and cotton and other basic commodities, and find that the still rising tide of population menaces the future.¹⁴ They point out the international perils which the pressure of population on resources, in the more congested or less favored regions of the earth, is creating.¹⁵

Others have taken a more optimistic view. Earlier American economists, such as Carey, were apt to see a concomitance between the growth of population and the growth in comfort. Various European writers also, such as Kropotkin and Leroy-Beaulieu,

¹³ E. M. East, *Mankind at the Crossroads* (New York, 1923).

¹⁴ W. S. Thompson, *Population; a Study in Malthusianism* (New York, 1915); see also his later work, *Population Problems* (New York, 1930).

¹⁵ W. S. Thompson, *Danger Spots in World Civilization* (New York, 1929).

emphasized the unexplored possibilities of scientific agriculture.¹⁶ The larger population of the world is far better fed than the smaller population of preindustrial days. The advance of science, striking as it appears, may be only a beginning. The price of the basic commodities has fallen rather than risen in comparison with other prices. The farming industry is depressed in consequence, and the trouble is a relative surplus rather than a scarcity of the products of agriculture. Under such circumstances the alarms of Malthus seem less formidable today.

Social factors Malthus did not allow for.—It is still true that the increase of means of subsistence cannot possibly keep pace with the reproductive powers of any population. It is true that nearly all the fertile areas of the earth are already subject to cultivation. It is true that many lands are so densely peopled that the great mass, under existing methods of cultivation, live on the margin of subsistence. But in the regions of modern civilization new phenomena have developed which are of vast importance and which set the problem of population in a new light altogether. In civilized lands the potential fertility of the population has ceased to correspond with the actual fertility. The birth rate has been falling for all classes and in all civilized countries, but most of all for the more prosperous classes and in the most prosperous countries. The “instinct to multiply” has been checked, not in the way which Malthus preached, through “moral restraint,” but through the use of methods of birth control. New problems have thus been brought into being, but certainly (for the groups subject to these influences) the old Malthusian problem has lost its significance, and if, as seems not unlikely, these methods spread to other groups over an ever-wider range of population, the particular menace which Malthus raised may, at length, disappear. If so, it would disappear for the first time in recorded history, for Malthus rightly showed what later researches have sufficiently confirmed: that the pressure of population on the means of subsistence has been at all times, save for a few favored classes and a few dominant peoples, ruthless and insistent, revealed in widespread misery and internecine strife, and mitigated only, for the most part, by such alternative evils as abortion and infanticide.

The saving fact in the new situation is that the higher the standard of living the more effectively it puts in operation forces leading to its preservation and checking the “natural” or biological

¹⁶ P. Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid* (London, 1902); P. Leroy-Beaulieu, *La Question de la Population* (Paris, 1913).

rate of multiplication. The higher standard of living, in other words, introduces checks on population long before the level is reached at which the positive checks, the eliminative forces that maintain the absolute equilibrium between gross numbers and the gross food supply, begin to operate. The Malthusian danger exists only in so far as populations live at or near a subsistence level. It is diminishing therefore for the peoples of modern civilization. It remains for them rather as an indirect threat from those peoples whose multiplication is checked only by the drastic methods that rule the lower organic world. But they too are gradually adopting or having thrust upon them the techniques of our own modern civilization and to that extent are likely, at length, to become subject to the same influences which limit multiplication.

Geography as a limiting condition.—Once again we see therefore that the geographical factors represent rather limiting conditions than immediate determinants of the social situation. On the one hand the numbers which the land can sustain depend on the techniques which man has developed. Ratzel and his school have shown how the density of population varies with the manner of making a livelihood. Hunter tribes, according to the conditions, require anything from a few square miles up to two hundred per person. Pastoral nomads exhibit a density of from two to five persons per square mile. When they combine primitive agriculture with the pastoral life, the ratio rises to from ten to fifteen persons per square mile. The agricultural peoples, under favorable conditions, can support one to two hundred persons and, with the aid of some industry, as high as five hundred to the square mile, while of course industrial populations exhibit sometimes a much greater density.¹⁷ On the other hand the mere potentiality of subsistence ceases to determine the numbers of a population as human control extends from the external conditions to the processes of life itself.

¹⁷ See, for example, E. C. Semple, *Influence of Geographic Environment* (New York, 1927), Chap. III.

VI

THE TOTAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE SOCIAL BEING

ENVIRONMENT AND THE SOCIAL HERITAGE

Concept of a total environment.—The environment in which man dwells is never and never has been a merely physical or “natural” one, and even the purely physical aspects are construed by him in ways expressive of his own nature. To the savage the woods are places where he can hunt and where spirits, no less than animals, wander, places conceived in terms of his hopes and fears, his experiences and his imaginations. The objects that surround him are never mere physical realities, they are the properties of his life, colored and interpreted by his mentality. It is so also for the child. The “infant appears in a world where nothing is ‘physical’ and just that, where nothing appears in the stark skeletal inflexibility that is signalized by science. . . . ‘Things’ are things that are owned, found, made, aided, feared, loved and sought after, hedged about with prohibitions or colored with possibilities of enjoyment, full of promise if action be aggressive or demanding prudent retreat. Things are nuclei of social relationships.”¹ Nor is it otherwise with the civilized adult save that the meaning of things is for him at once socially enriched and scientifically refined. We never stand face to face with sheer objective nature. Our social heritage always intervenes. In the process we call civilization we increasingly modify the physical environment so that it will respond more nearly to our demands upon it and at the same time we modify our conceptions

¹ A. G. A. Balz, *The Basis of Social Theory*, Chap. II.


of its character in correspondence with the experience thus gained. But in this more perfect correspondence of our thoughts and the outer realities we do not, any more than does the savage or the child, treat the world without us as a separate and purely objective reality. The scientist does so as a scientist, not as a social being—and to the physical scientist this world is not environment but only nature.

Thus in the experience of the social being the environment appears as a complex totality of many aspects. He does not separate the geographical environment as one order of things from the social environment as quite another. The fields which we designate as physical environment are for him property, the houses are homes—the social and the physical aspects are blended in every concrete reality. Similarly the institutions and organizations which we classify as the inner environment have external embodiments. The church is revealed in an edifice, the holiday manifests itself in the changed aspect of the world about us. We distinguish the various factors of the total environment for purposes of study, but they are merged together in our experience. When man turns a territory into a country or a plot of earth into a home, he is fusing into one the physical and the social environment. His own activity, as he clears and cultivates the soil, dams rivers, builds roadways, and so on, in time makes it impossible to tell where the geographical or nature-given environment ends and the man-made environment begins. The physical becomes at the same time the symbol of the social. It is charged with human memories, human traditions, human values. It becomes the external aspect of social institutions.

Classification of the aspects of a total environment.—The total environment, from the point of view of the individual, contains one category in addition to those that constitute the environment of a social group. This category is the group itself, which is an important environment so far as its individual members are concerned. More fully, we may set out the difference as follows:

- (1) Geographical conditions are environmental both for a community or other social group and for its individual members.
- (2) The social heritage is environmental both for a community or other social group and for its individual members, since the group itself is born into this heritage.
- (3) The community or other social group is environmental for its individual members.
- (4) The community or larger group is environmental for the small group which in any degree shares in the life of the larger.

In the classification that follows we are viewing the total environment of the individual within society.²



The significance of the social heritage.—Through unknown ages man has been active in and upon his environment, and this process takes on a cumulative character because man is less content than the other animals with mere habituation and adjustment to given conditions, because he acquires thereby a social heritage which is the basis of further acquisitions. The term *social heritage* was used by Graham Wallas to signify “the knowledge and expedients and habits” which are socially, not biologically, transmitted, being handed down from generation to generation through some process of social participation and education.³ The arts, devices, techniques, lores, traditions, symbols, and institutions of man—all his agencies for the control of the outer environment—are social possessions.

² For a somewhat different classification of environmental factors the student is referred to L. L. Bernard, *Introduction to Social Psychology* (New York, 1926), pp. 75-76.

³ *Our Social Heritage* (New Haven, 1921), p. 14.

If the earth were struck by one of Mr. Wells' comets, and if, in consequence, every human being now alive were to lose all the knowledge and habits which he had acquired from preceding generations (though retaining unchanged all his own powers of invention, and memory, and habituation) nine tenths of the inhabitants of London or New York would be dead in a month, and 99 per cent of the remaining tenth would be dead in six months. They would have no language to express their thoughts, and no thoughts but vague reverie. They could not read notices, or drive motors or horses. They would wander about, led by the inarticulate voices of a few naturally dominant individuals, drowning themselves, as thirst came on, in hundreds at the riverside landing places, looting those shops where the smell of decaying food attracted them, and perhaps at the end stumbling on the expedient of cannibalism.⁴

Such tales as that of Kaspar Hauser indicate the utter dependence of man on socially transmitted powers. Instinct suffices for those orders of life which have no record of achievement, which simply accommodate themselves to the realities among which they live. Man is never satisfied with reality, and his dissatisfaction becomes effective through social rather than biological agencies. Instinct, losing its fixity, is supplemented by folkways; the tool, and then the machine, comes to the help of the hand. We have thus, as Wallas pointed out, become "biologically parasitic on our social heritage."

The nature of the social heritage.—This new dependence is the correlative and condition of that advance which successfully rejects certain of the demands of the outer realities. The price we pay is that we have become, even biologically, less fitted to live without the aid of our social heritage. But again this truth must not be misunderstood. It does not mean that our life has ceased to be "natural," provided it is in accord with human nature. Why should we call it natural for human beings to live that resourceless and stunted life from which the presence of the social heritage delivers us? The so-called state of nature, in which life remained "poor, solitary, nasty, brutish, and short," has no valid claims upon us. Nor does it mean that we are biologically weaker. We have lost some of the qualities with which the savage is endowed. Our teeth may be weaker; the process of childbirth is harder. But civilized man, with the aid of his own arts, is "on the average much stronger, more efficient, and longer-lived than the savage."⁵ We do not raise the

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

unanswerable question as to which is the happier, for because the kind of happiness attainable is relative to the kind of life comparisons are impossible. But biological fitness has surely no other measure than that of success in living, maintained throughout the generations.

It is because we depend so utterly on this growing heritage that education is of ever-increasing importance in human society. This social heritage of ours differs in certain significant ways from a mere economic inheritance. It is not simply handed over to us to enjoy and use forthwith. We are only conditional heirs to it, the condition being that we must qualify ourselves to receive it, and make it ours by our own efforts. Social in one sense, it has nevertheless to be individualized part by part, in the various members of the society. Some parts of it are easily acquired—we soon adapt ourselves to the comforts and amenities of civilization, and with comparative ease we utilize most of the inventions and mechanisms which human ingenuity has devised. Some parts we acquire by simple habituation, such as our speech, our manners, many of our devices and techniques, and most of our customs and folkways. Other parts are more difficult to acquire, demanding of us, in the first place, exacting proof of our fitness to receive them. The skill that contrives and improves the means of civilization belongs to the few, but the many can enjoy the advantages provided by that skill. On the other hand the appreciation of the higher elements of culture is rare enough. Those parts that are easy to acquire have a less intimate relation to personality. They reveal the nature of the society in general, rather than of particular individuals within it. If at birth any of us had been transferred to a foreign country, we would have as readily acquired the different manners and modes of speech which it exhibits as those we actually practice. The parts of the social heritage that are harder to acquire depend in greater degree on our hereditary qualities. They are more fully individualized in those who achieve them. They are more selectively interpreted, and assume for each of us a personal aspect. Music, art, philosophy, the finer expressions of literature or of religion—they mean something distinctively different to each of us. Moreover, universal as their appeal is, they embody in a profounder way the qualities of the society in which they originate.

The social heritage, then is something which the members of society unequally possess. This we shall see more fully when we come to the distinction between civilization and culture (Chapter XIV). No individual, in our complex world, can master more than

a fragment of the social heritage. Specialization applies to the process of learning no less than to the tasks we severally perform. It is not necessary for the full personal life that we should possess individually more than a fragment of the social heritage, though it is desirable that the cultural portion of this heritage should be shared as widely as possible.

THE PROCESS OF ADJUSTMENT TO A TOTAL ENVIRONMENT

Organic versus technological adjustment.—We have seen that our environment is not the world about us but rather that world, with all its aspects, as it comes into relation to our lives. The more complex the life, the more complex must the environment be and the more complex the adjustment to this total environment. As we pass from lower to higher forms, direct physiological adjustment becomes a smaller part of the whole system of relationships. Organic adaptations are more and more supplemented by the devices of civilization. The animal has no tools and must adapt its own organs to the performance of new functions. It must develop claws to cut and fangs to tear. But man devises, for such purposes, knives and shears and saws and a great variety of other tools, thus extending vastly his range of operation. Using tools, he does not have to follow a simple scheme of behavior determined by direct organic conditioning. When the machine supervenes on the tool, his range of alternatives becomes still greater. Thus inherited patterns of conduct lose their rigidity and the more flexible patterns learned through the social heritage become increasingly important. Consequently the adjustment of the civilized man to his total environment differs typically from that of the savage, and, *a fortiori*, from that of the lower animals.

The process of adjustment between civilized man and his total environment is consequently so intricate and varied that within our limits we can accord it only the most broad treatment. We shall here consider it under two aspects, first, with respect to the differences between the typical adjustment of civilized man and that of primitive man, and second, with respect to the manner in which civilized man readjusts himself to a new or drastically changed total environment.

The adjustment of civilized man to his environment.—(1) In a higher civilization man attains a less complete, a less all-round adjustment to the totality of conditions under which he lives.

The reason for this will appear when we discuss the relation of civilization and culture (Chapter XIV). To his complex changeable world man can achieve only a partial adjustment, a compound of conflict and accommodation (by the latter term we mean the process in which the person or the group comes to fit into a given situation and to feel "at home" within it).⁶ Civilized man rarely feels in perfect harmony with his environment. His wants are so complex and the conditions are so complex that a perfect sense of equilibrium is hard or impossible to attain, except for those dulled by the combined influence of age and economic prosperity. The eternal discontent of civilized man is the spur of his incessant endeavor towards new achievement.

(2) The adjustment of civilized man is less stable. He has more controls over his environment, is always changing it and always seeking to change it. The more he modifies the primary nature-given environment, the more he is impelled to modify it still further. The environment of civilized man is forever in flux. His habituations to it, even were they perfect in some hour of unlikely coincidence, are always liable to disturbance either through external change or through the insurgence of new demands within himself.

(3) The adjustment of civilized man is highly selective and endlessly variant compared with that of primitive man. Suppose a number of modern men went wandering through the same forest. One might be a hunter, one a woodsman, one a bird-lover, one an entomologist, one a town-bred artisan; and the forest would be a different environment for each of them. Each would be equipped to see and to respond to a different aspect. But the members of any group of American Indians, whose home was in the forest, knew it in the light of similar necessities and habituations, similar beliefs and similar lores. Again, in the same urban environment there exists a myriad of different milieus, such that those accommodated to one would feel themselves totally alien in many of the others.

(4) Finally, the adjustment of civilized man is one which, for all its complexity, perhaps rather because of it, permits a re-

⁶ The term "accommodation," as we are using it, refers particularly to the process in which man attains a sense of harmony with his environment. This emphasis is perhaps implied in the use of the term by the "ecological school"; see, for example, the article "Accommodation" by E. W. Burgess in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*. The term "adjustment" implies more particularly the process in which man deliberately contrives to fit his needs to the environment or the environment to his needs. See the author's article "Maladjustment" in the *Encyclopaedia*.

markable degree of mobility, a power of relatively swift readjustment to other and different environments. Civilized man acquires a certain mental versatility in coping with the changing complexity of his situation, and this enables him to adjust himself more readily to other environments. He can range from the tropics to the polar snows, just as he can migrate from his own world of civilization to that of the primitive savage.

Readjustment to a new environment.—While modern man is thus more capable of readjustment to new conditions, he is sometimes confronted with situations in which the readjustment demanded is drastic and difficult. This problem arises in two ways. (1) It may be the result of the inherent instability of the civilized social structure, culminating in a revolution, peaceful or violent, in which the old order is overthrown and men must come to terms with a new order that rejects many of their cherished traditions, their articles of faiths, their loyalties, their privileges, or their claims. The numerous postwar revolutions in Europe are examples of the more violent type of transition in which not merely governmental systems but whole schemes of life are abruptly reversed. (2) The problem of drastic readjustment is created also by the increased mobility of modern life which frequently brings people into new environments requiring very different habituations from those they have already acquired. This happens, for example, when the countryman migrates to the city or the urban dweller to the country, when the youth leaves the home environment to work or to study in a very different social atmosphere, and most conspicuously when men enter as immigrant aliens into a new community. These situations, particularly the last-mentioned, are peculiarly characteristic of the mobile civilization of the United States.

Some types of situation in which the problem of readjustment to a new environment arises.—The conditions under which individuals or groups enter an alien social environment are so diverse and so complicated that only a few general indications of the resultant processes can here be offered. Where the newcomers belong to a widely different racial or cultural organization from that into which they enter, the process of accommodation is naturally rendered more difficult. If they are the bearers of prestige and of power, they may dominate the native population and even, where the disparity is very great, be the cause of their extinction, as the white immigrants in Tasmania and in parts of Melanesia have been; the decline of most American Indian tribes bears witness

to the same process. Under other conditions the dominant incomer may build an alien endogamous society from which the natives are excluded and to which they may oppose an active or passive resistance, such as has developed in India. Under other conditions miscegenation may take place, involving the gradual dilution of the original native stocks, which thus acquire some degree of adjustment to the new civilization imposed upon them. This has occurred, for example, in New Zealand. Communities of higher culture, such as the Chinese, may successfully oppose the political and economic domination of the immigrant foreigner, while at the same time the gradual infiltration of the technical civilization of the latter tends to undermine the basis of their own culture or assimilate it to that of the alien. These are but a few of the types of situation which arise in the clash of widely different cultures within the environment of either of them.⁷ The problem of the Negro in North America presents its own distinctive features. In the age of slavery the status of legal inferiority determined the mode of his accommodation to the new environment. The formal abolition of that status created a new situation, fraught with new potentialities as well as with new dangers. Social inferiority remained, though subject to protest and occasional challenge as educational and economic opportunities were slowly widened. Thus was created the present state of uneasy partial accommodation. So long as the prevailing bar (whether legal or social) on intermarriage endures, this condition must persist with all its difficulties, unless the subtle processes of social selection, operating within the Negro race in the new environment, create in the course of centuries an approximation of physical type and even of color such as will bring about a gradual "passing" and a final assimilation.

The case of the immigrant to the United States.—From every country of the earth the immigrant has come to the American continent, and notably to the United States, bringing with him the habituations of every civilization and the valuations of every culture. Since he often joins with groups of his fellow countrymen, there arises a problem of group no less than of individual accommodation. But more difficult and formidable than any of these problems is that created by the presence of a large minority belonging to another of the main divisions of humanity and marked off by color and other physical traits from the dominant peoples. It will be noted that for the Negro as for the immigrant from Europe the

⁷ See, for other illustrations, G. H. L. F. Pitt-Rivers, *The Clash of Culture and the Contact of Races* (London, 1927).

crux of the problem is one of social adjustment, not of biological adaptation. Thus the United States offers a unique laboratory for the study, in its endless varieties, of the process by which men and groups of men, transplanted from one social environment to another, learn to live within a society other than that in which they or their fathers were born and bred. When the entrant into a new social environment neither possesses in himself nor arouses in others any strong sense of "social distance," of inferiority or of superiority, the process of accommodation is obviously facilitated. There seem to be considerable differences in the ease with which different individuals and groups on similar cultural levels learn to feel at home in a new environment. The Serbian scientist Pupin after a preliminary struggle becomes wholeheartedly devoted to the American scene; the Jewish writer Lewisohn, conscious of racial antagonisms, finds the conflict unending.⁸ The Scottish immigrant seems to lose the feeling of exile more readily than, for example, the French. The aspect of an alien environment often leads immigrant groups, especially when they form "colonies" or semicommunities, to cling the more closely for a time to their own folkways, sometimes to prize them more highly than they did in their native land. They feel their unity the more because of their detachment from the conditions which created it. The Greek frequents his coffee shop, the German his beer cellar, the Southern Italian sets up his patriarchal type of household, the Ukrainian has his native dances, the Irishman celebrates with fervor St. Patrick's Day.

But in time, unless a dividing line of caste is set up between the immigrant and the native-born, the influences of the new environment encroach upon and then triumph over the resistances derived from the old. This is sufficiently revealed in the changed attitudes of the children of immigrants. One external evidence is the extent of intermarriage.⁹ Another is the decline of foreign language newspapers. The original speech, the idioms and turns of phrase, the customs of the old land, the reunions and celebrations commemorative of it, all lose their appeal. Often a difficult transitional stage is entered upon in which the younger generation, finding the ways of their parents despised in the larger community

⁸ M. I. Pupin, *From Immigrant to Inventor* (New York, 1923); L. Lewisohn, *Upstream* (New York, 1923).

⁹ See Julius H. Drachsler, *Intermarriage in New York City* (New York, 1921); E. de S. Brunner, *Immigrant Farmers and Their Children* (New York, 1929); Niles Carpenter, *Immigrants and Their Children*, Census Monograph (Washington, 1927).

into which their schooling, their work, and their play initiate them, revolt from the family traditions and reject the nearer social controls before they have acquired the discipline of experience. Such a state of disorganization is at least suggested by the prevalence of delinquency among these groups.¹⁰ An undue eagerness to "Americanize" the children of immigrants may exaggerate the problem.¹¹ The child of the immigrant has the hard enough task of accommodation to a total social environment containing the diverse and unreconciled mores of family and community. He must build for himself a new pattern of life. "The immigrant coming to America was born into customs that were so old that they were no longer questioned. For the first generation these customs have been doctrines of welfare and a guide to correct living. Then in America their children question the desirability of such standards and customs. As the second generation becomes disorganized, the immigrant parents think of the American culture as something pernicious, and Americans think of the disorganization as evidence that the immigrants are undesirable. Neither sees it as a matter of conflict of cultures which inevitably leads to disorganization."¹²

Accommodation less rigorous in higher civilization.—Much has been written regarding the manner and degree in which individuals and groups accommodate themselves to the social conditions of a new environment and the problems and resistances which they encounter in the process.¹³ The conditions of accommodation are too complex and variable to admit of summary statement, and we must here be content to point out one general principle, revealed in the contrast between a more primitive and a more evolved society. In the latter, because of the differentiation within it, there can be no question of the complete assimilation of the newcomer to an entire set of community patterns. The differences in manners and morals, in customs and beliefs, necessarily make the demands of the community less rigid and less inclusive. The new member has more opportunity of selecting his social relationships, of finding his own place, of expressing under the new conditions his own individuality.

¹⁰ Cf. E. H. Sutherland, *Criminology* (Philadelphia, 1924), pp. 100-101.

¹¹ Cf. Edith Abbott, *The Immigrant and the Community*, p. 226: "In our zeal to teach patriotism we are often teaching disrespect for the history and the traditions that the ancestors of the immigrant had their part in making. This often means disrespect for the parent himself."

¹² L. G. Brown, *Immigration* (New York, 1933), p. 254. See also E. B. Reuter, *The American Race Problem* (New York, 1927), pp. 93-94.

¹³ Special reference may be made to R. E. Park, *Old World Trails Transplanted* (New York, 1921); R. C. Dexter, *Social Adjustment* (New York, 1927); and E. C. Lindeman, *Social Discovery* (New York, 1924).

In the advanced society, for the immigrant as for the native, there are many mansions. Yet the readiness with which the entrant into the new society becomes accommodated to its conditions is not wholly dependent, apart from his own adaptability, on the evolutionary stage. Some communities are by disposition more tolerant or more receptive than others, less swayed by authoritarianism or by the exclusiveness of religious and national dogma. The Chinese, for example, have historically exhibited these qualities, as is seen from the fact that the Chinese Jews have become, while retaining their religion, completely integrated in Chinese social life.¹⁴

Social accommodation versus physical adaptation.—In conclusion, the manner in which groups adapt themselves to their physical habitat should not be confused with the process in which they accommodate themselves to a pre-existing social milieu. In botany or zoology the term "ecological" is applied to those variations of plant or animal life which are attributable to differences of physical environment reacting on the distribution and the characteristics of the species subjected to them. The social variations exhibited by or within human groups cannot be regarded as "ecological" in this sense. This follows from the truth that the total environment of the human being is never merely physical. We may very profitably take local geographical areas as a basis of social investigation, but we must never assume that the conditions we discover are explained by the external characteristics of these areas. If we find, for example, that the rate of delinquency in the city of Chicago is highest in the zone immediately beyond the Loop and recedes progressively as we advance outwards, we cannot assume that the locality as such is in any degree responsible, that the greater frequency of the phenomenon represents a process of adjustment to the physical factors of the area.¹⁵ Geographical distribution in a social environment is in no sense geographical determination. Every social phenomenon is a function of a total situation, and the search for causes is only begun when we have delimited it in terms of a physical environment. Moreover, as we have seen, the social environment is very complex and there are all kinds and degrees of accommodation to its manifold aspects represented in the modes of living characteristic of a social group. The following quotation from *Middletown* admirably illustrates this fact.

¹⁴ Cf. Maurice Fishberg, *The Jews* (New York, 1911), pp. 134-136.

¹⁵ The illustration is taken from C. R. Shaw, *Delinquency Areas* (Chicago, 1929).

Living moves along in Middletown, as we have seen, at a bewildering variety of gaits. Differential rates of adjustment in the performance of the same function have been observed between elders and their juniors and between people living next door to each other, while the females have exhibited greater conservatism than the males at many points, and the males, with seemingly no more coherence or pattern in their adjustments, are more resistant to adaptation at many other points. In many activities, as has been repeatedly pointed out, the working class today employs the habits of the business class of roughly a generation ago; if it were possible to differentiate clearly the gradations by which each of these two major groups shades into the other, it might appear that many changes are slowly filtered down through various intermediate groups. Shifts sometimes diffuse, however, in the reverse direction, from working class to business class, as has been noted, for example, in the use of commercially baked bread and canned foods.

Not only do these variations, in many cases pronounced enough to affect markedly one's capacity¹⁶ to deal with one's world, appear between individuals and between different age, sex, and other groups within Middletown in the performance of the *same* life-activity, but the city as a whole and groups within the city live in different eras in the performance of *different* life-activities. It is apparent that Middletown is carrying on certain of these habitual pursuits in almost precisely the same manner as a generation ago, while in the performance of others its present methods bear little resemblance to the earlier ones. Among the six major groups of activities a rough hierarchy of rates of change is apparent. Getting a living seemingly exhibits the most pervasive change, particularly in its technological and mechanical aspects; leisure time, again most markedly in material developments such as the automobile and motion picture, is almost as mobile; training the young in schools, community activities, and making a home would come third, fourth, and fifth in varying order depending upon which traits are scrutinized; while, finally, on the whole exhibiting least change, come the formal religious activities.¹⁶

With such diversity before us it might seem that the attempt to discover causal connections between the social structures and the external factors of environment is baffling and hopeless. Certainly we cannot hope to find that any environmental factor is *the* cause of any social phenomenon, but such an hypothesis could be entertained only by those who have an antiquated and erroneous idea of the nature of all causation. What we actually find is that human beings exhibit typical social diversities relative to every type of

¹⁶ R. S. and H. M. Lynd, *Middletown* (New York, 1930), pp. 496-497.

total environment. How far these diversities are attributable to specific features of that environment is, as we have already seen, a very difficult question to answer. The total environment, both as physical and as social, is always affecting those who are subject to it. The nature of the question will appear more fully in the following chapter, in which we shall relate the diversities of social life to two great types of total environment, the rural and the urban.

VII

CITY AND COUNTRY

THE TERMS OF THE COMPARISON

Preliminary considerations.—One of the broadest and most revealing of all social contrasts is that exhibited in the differences of rural and urban life. The city is itself an environment created by society, in which for the purposes of common living many aspects of the natural environment are modified or entirely eliminated. Consequently the contrast brings into conspicuous light the very nature of society, the conditions of its control over environment and the tendencies of human relationships where they are least obstructed or limited by the forces of outer nature. Under rural conditions social attitudes and social institutions present characteristic differences from those developed within the city. Nevertheless the comparison is beset with difficulties. To describe the differences is itself no simple task; to interpret them is much harder. However, when we push our analysis back into the problem of causes; when in seeking to discover the pure influence of environment we are forced to discover once more that environments select and attract as well as influence those who live in them; when we remember also the incessant process in which man modifies as well as readjusts himself to an environment so that conditions found at one stage of city growth, say certain health conditions, will not be found at another; when lastly we reflect on the interplay and unequal exchange of influences that radiate from one environment to another; it is then that at once the deeper interest and the greater difficulty of the comparison appears.

Unless we realize these complicating factors we are most apt

to draw false inferences from our comparison. It is so with all comparisons of social groups, whether of nations or classes or localities or occupations. The socially untrained person is constantly being misled, even when his observations are true and he does not generalize rashly from a few examples, because he imputes the differences between two total situations to some one element in each. He compares, say, the English and the French, the Gentile and the Jew, the immigrants to the United States from West European and from East European countries, and attributes the observed differences, usually themselves grossly simplified and exaggerated, simply to race. He compares the social characteristics of Protestants and Catholics and attributes the differences solely to religion. He compares the politician and the businessman, the inventor and the money-maker, the artist and the executive, and makes their respective occupations responsible for the qualities they display. He compares the New Englander with the Southerner and the outcome is explained as due to climate. We shall best avoid these simplifications if, as in the comparison before us, we analyze the various factors which enter into the complex of each contrasted situation as it now appears, and if, furthermore, we examine the historical process in which the two situations have developed to their present forms, each in relation to the other. The latter of these requirements of a proper comparison we shall seek briefly to satisfy in the present section, the former in the sections which follow.

Difficulties of comparison: (1) urban and rural a matter of degree.—City and country are for our present purpose the two great generic modes of human habitation. But between the two there is no sharp demarcation to tell where city ends and country begins. Scattered farmsteads pass imperceptibly into villages, villages into towns. A country mansion set in the forest or a hotel on the mountaintop may be essentially urban in character. We draw lines for statistical convenience, and decide that every area with a certain density of population to the square mile, or every cluster of habitations containing 500 or 2500 or 10,000 people, shall be regarded as urban. Differences in the method of reckoning are often a source of confusion. Differences within the groups respectively accounted urban and rural put more serious difficulties in the way of comparison, since the social characteristics of a town of 2500 inhabitants are obviously unlike those of a great metropolis.

(2) *The manifold environments within the city.*—There is the further complication that the city, especially the large city, is not

only a whole environment for all its inhabitants but also a series of extremely different environments for the groups within it. While rural environments differ considerably one from another, each one exerts in far greater measure a common influence on its inhabitants than does the city. In the city the ways of life are legion, and the diversities of its man-made scene admit extreme variations of equipment and opportunity. There is no sense of a common and vital dependence on the aspects of the seasons and the vagaries of the weather. There is no sense of a common earth, a common fortune, and a common fate. There are few common tasks, few incidents in which all men share. There are no impressive signs to call out at the same moment those universal comments and reflections which make man feel kin to man—the devastation of the storm, the flow of the sap, the fall of the leaf. There are no common hours of work and rest, no common occasions of meeting for personal gossip or public discussion. The heterogeneity of city life is enormous. Within a few blocks of one another its inhabitants live alien and utterly disparate lives. If we take vital statistics alone, we find remarkable differences in birth rates and death rates, in conditions favorable to health or to disease, for different groups and districts. A great metropolis, like London or New York, will exhibit for localized groups within it extremes of healthiness and unhealthiness, no less than of wealth and poverty, surpassing those found elsewhere in the whole countries to which they belong.¹ The city is the home of opposites, and in these respects it is misleading to take the average figures for city and country respectively, to treat as unities for the purpose of comparison the less homogeneous and the more homogeneous.

(3) *Transitional features of the growing city.*—The difficulties just mentioned can be met by adequate statistical analysis, but a still more formidable difficulty remains. The phenomena we are comparing do not stay constant. The cities tend to grow at the expense of the country, and in large measure through migration from the country. This is peculiarly true within our own civilization. In this process the city comes to include a much larger proportion of country-bred residents than the country does of those bred in the city. There are two factors here to be considered. One is the greater comparative fertility of country populations, the other

¹ Thus with respect to health "London shows greater extremes of excellence and superiority" but "the worst in London are lower than the worst elsewhere." (W. L. MacKenzie, *The Health of the School Children*, p. 65, quoted by P. Sorokin and C. C. Zimmerman, *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology* [New York, 1929], p. 170).

consists in the technical-economic conditions which bring it about that the city affords a livelihood for an increasing proportion of the total population. As a result of their joint operation the city must readapt to its own changing environment large numbers who were born in and habituated to very different conditions. It is therefore quite possible that many phenomena which we attribute to the city as such are in part phenomena of cityward migration rather than of urbanization proper. We hear, for example, of the loneliness and unfriendliness of city life, and it would be worth while inquiring how far this trait belongs to the experience of the newcomer as distinct from the experience of those brought up within the city. Or again, if we turn to physiological adaptation, we know that certain groups, Negroes for example, have higher death rates from tuberculosis in the city than in the country, and it would be important to discover how far the greater incidence of the disease applies to migrants and how far to those born in the cities. So far as the writer can discover, the knowledge is not at present available.

How and why cities grow.—The growth of cities and the migration from the country to the city have been witnessed in the course of every great civilization. In fact, the original meaning of the word "civilization" is just urbanization. As Nineveh and Tyre, Mycenae and Tiryns, Troy, Babylon, Athens, Sparta, Rome, Carthage, the Egyptian Thebes, Alexandria, Byzantium, Florence, Venice, rose in influence and power, so did the corresponding civilizations grow; as these cities declined, so did their civilizations decline. Cities grow wherever a society, or a group within it, gains control over resources greater than are necessary for the mere sustenance of life. In ancient civilizations these resources were mainly acquired through the power of man over man, and the growth of city life rested on the precarious foundations of slavery, forced labor, and taxation by the conqueror or ruling class. In modern civilizations, though exploitation of man has not been absent, a surer basis has been found in the power of man over nature. It is the great extension of this power in recent times, an extension the limits of which are not discernible, which has been the primary cause of the unprecedented growth of cities and the ever-growing proportion of city-dwellers in the total population. It is not so much the Industrial Revolution, in its narrower interpretation, as the agricultural revolution which is responsible. Whoever makes two blades of wheat grow where one grew before is adding to the size of cities. Every improvement in the machinery of the

farm, in the use of fertilizers, in the quality of the seed sown or of the breed of cattle, in the preservation and transportation of the products of agriculture, is likely to increase the percentage of the urban population.

These advances have been followed both by an increase in the population and by a higher standard of living. The latter tendency has, we have seen, operated to restrict the former, and has thus still further encouraged the growth of cities. As the standard of living rises for a whole country or for any group within it, there is an increasing demand for the kinds of commodities and services which are supplied in and by cities, as contrasted with the relatively inelastic demand for agricultural products. Because of the improved technique of agriculture, a smaller percentage of the population can supply the agricultural needs of the whole; because of the increased demand for the specific products of civilization, a larger percentage can win a livelihood in the cities. The proportion of urban to rural inhabitants is thus not a matter of choice. It is, on the whole, determined by economic conditions. If, for example, more females than males migrate to cities like New York and Philadelphia, while more males than females go to Akron, Ohio, or Flint, Mich., or Gary, Ind., the obvious explanation is economic.² Migration within a country is determined, except that political barriers do not interpose, by much the same principles as international migration. It moves in the direction in which economic opportunity presents itself. We must not, as is sometimes done, regard country and city as equally competing attractions, between which people can decide at will. The city is a selective environment, rather with respect to the types than of the numbers which it attracts, and because the numbers are determined mainly by the possibilities of making a living in one or the other environment, other and more imperative considerations than personal preferences play an important part. This also must be borne in mind in our comparison, especially as people frequently deplore the "rush" to the cities and the "depopulation" of the countryside.

With these cautions before us we may now proceed to compare the social characteristics of country and city. The simplest procedure will be to describe first those social features that belong to rural life everywhere, in so far as that life is not seriously invaded by the influences of the city, and then show how these features stand in contrast to the corresponding features of urban life.

² See *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1930, pp. 22-25.

CONTRASTS OF URBAN AND RURAL LIFE

Features common to rural life everywhere: (1) semi-isolation of the family.—If in spite of all the cross-differences of race and climate, of location and of resources, there is still a marked and general contrast to be drawn between the social life of the country and that of the city, it must be on account of factors which belong exclusively or predominantly, under all conditions, to one or the other environment.

Most obvious is the relative isolation of the country life. It is an isolation, not of the individual, except in the case of occasional solitary trappers, hunters, and prospectors, but usually of the homestead or group of homesteads. It is the semi-isolation of the family. The family circle must supply the greater part not only of the economic needs but also of the social needs of its members. The necessities of common toil and reciprocal service strongly corroborate the ties of family relationship. The unity of the family is the dominant social fact. It is emphasized by the physical separation of the homestead. It has often been observed that in a sparsely settled district neighboring families are apt to be at strife with one another, and this may be explained by the intense and exclusive cohesion of the individual group. Its attitudes are family attitudes, its morals are family morals. It grows self-centered and to a large extent spiritually self-sufficient. The habits of the group, undisturbed by the constant succession of new contacts and new stimuli which await the city-dweller, grow more deeply rooted. The rarer contacts with the outside world are apt merely to sharpen in the mind of the country-dweller the contrast between his ways and theirs and to confirm him in his own. He has neither the opportunity to cultivate an attitude of broad-mindedness nor the temptation to become a superficial seeker after new things. Custom rules over him, and for fashion he has, generally, nothing but contempt. His ways are fixed for him, and his vicissitudes are mainly those which come in the natural sequence of the seasons and in the inexorable course of human destiny.

(2) *The impact of a predominant mode of occupation.*—Outside of the most primitive peoples the countryman is pre-eminently a farmer, a tiller of the soil and a breeder of cattle; but whether he is farmer or hunter or fisherman he is in constant contact with nature, an engrossment little mitigated by the presence of his fellow men. He sees nature not as the artist who observes her moods in the detachment of aesthetic appreciation nor as the

scientist who seeks to know her secrets for their own sake, but as the practical worker who must wrest a living from the soil. He sees nature as friend and as enemy, as the ripener of crops and the sender of weeds, as the bringer of drought and moisture, of storm and sunshine. He must win her rewards through struggle and endure her caprices with resignation. It is the reproductive forces of animate nature on which his livelihood depends and to which his main effort is directed. He is thus inclined to view all nature as animate. The forces which he must utilize are largely beyond his control and even beyond his reckoning. In their presence the countryman grows imbued with religion and with superstition. He must come to terms with inscrutable powers, and the limits of his own power are the portals to a land of traditional beliefs, often rendered the more somber by the austerity of his experience.

This predominant occupation of agriculture has other attributes which impress themselves on the mentality of the countryman and are reflected in his social life. He is not, like the urban wage earner, an employee working under immediate supervision at a task specifically assigned to him. Whether he is a tenant or a freeholder, even where he is a serf, his times and seasons, his varying tasks and his alternations of work and rest, are set for him not by the commands of a master but by the exigencies of nature. Frequently he owns or partly owns the soil he cultivates, and when he does not his ambition is still to possess the most seeming-substantial of all heritages and the primary source of all other wealth, the land itself. He has therefore, unless under grave oppression, a strong sense of the rights of property, with a consequent belief in the fixity of the social order. But his conservatism differs here from the more nervous conservatism of the capitalist-employer. It is not dependent on an unstable distinction of economic class. The countryman is not a professional employer of labor. Most often he has no permanent helpers beyond his own family, and when he does hire one worker or, at most, a very few, he still engages in the same manual tasks as his help. He remains both artisan and employer in one.

(3) *Variety instead of specialization of work.*—Furthermore the work of the countryman is unspecialized as compared with that of the city-dweller.*Specialization grows in direct ratio to the size of the community, for obvious reasons. The direct operations of agriculture are themselves diverse, and beyond them the agriculturist must be conversant with a dozen other crafts, as woodsman and carpenter and cattle-doctor and tanner and smith and hunter

and so forth. He is incessantly turning from one kind of task to another. If modern invention has lightened his labors it has also made a new craft imperative, that of the mechanic. For his wife the round of daily duties is even more variegated. She must help where she can in the farm work, hoeing weeds, feeding animals, milking cows, she must add to her household tasks the preparation of many commodities, their number varying with the distance or accessibility of a country store, which the city housewife buys ready-made; she must cook and wash and knit and sew and darn and spin and weave in the intervals of bearing and caring for the many children of the usual country home. Some of these tasks are eliminated or lightened as the means of communication improve and modern retail trading penetrates to remoter parts, but the typical contrast between the diversity of work entailed on the countryman and the specialized and concentrated labor of the city-dweller remains. The toil of the former is generally more arduous and unremitting, and this fact, too, finds expression in his social attitudes, in his moral code, and in his philosophy of life. Nor does he have the hope, which even the most exploited wage earner can cherish, of promotion or at least of a change of work. His lot in life is more deeply fixed, and so are his ways and his thoughts.

(4) *Simplicity and frugality of living.*—Finally, the rewards of his toil are rarely bountiful. If they are also somewhat speculative, it is usually between the limits of penury and a modest livelihood. In bad years he falls into debt, in good years he does little more than recover. If he is a proprietor he is still a manual worker and his income is nearer to the average income of the whole class of manual workers than to that of property owners.³ His mode of living, even when times are good, is simple and frugal. It is not, after the manner of the city, competitive. The countryman feels less the spur to "keep up appearances," for the range of wealth in the country neighborhood is narrower, contacts are fewer, and in the intimate cohesion of the family life he is less tempted to the adventitious and superficial struggle to set a pace for his neighbors or keep one set by others. In this, as in other ways, he is less subject, for better or worse, to the stimulations which come from social proximity. Where, as in various older civilizations, primitive, feudal, and oriental, a class system pervades the life in the country,

³ It is very hard to obtain comparable figures of the income of farmers and other classes, but such figures as exist substantiate the above statement. For North America see references in Sorokin and Zimmerman, *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology*, Chap. III.

it has a relatively fixed or castelike character, so that again it offers little incentive to the ambitions of the mere tiller of the soil.

Here, then, we have the elementary factors which distinguish in general the rural from the urban life. Together they form an environmental complex which acts on the mentality of the countryman and profoundly influences his social responses. In the city, roughly in proportion to its size, the antithesis of these conditions is established; aggregation instead of physical isolation, associations of many kinds supplementing or supplanting the functions of the family, contacts with humanity superseding contacts with nature, the differentiation of economic classes and the specialization of economic tasks ranking and grading men in ways unknown to the country, limiting and also intensifying the work of each, and therewith endless diversities and disparities of opportunity and of fortune creating an intricate design of competitive living utterly alien to the rural scene. Here we have the basis for the social contrasts we next proceed to describe.

The mores of command and family solidarity more dominant in the country.—Let us consider first the fundamental aspect, the manner in which the individual belongs to his society. It may be said generally that in the rural life, with the dominance and relative self-containedness of the family, a group responsibility prevails which tends to be more and more dissolved in the growth of the city. In the comparative absence of other forms of relationship, the family retains the patriarchal type and imposes a greater control over its members. The status of the individual is likely to be the status of his family. Property is thought of as a family possession. There is a family opinion about most matters of interest, which is apt to permeate all its members. There is less individual questioning, less individual rebellion. Marriage is a duty to the family, a responsibility of the individual for the maintenance of its name and its property, determined largely by the family for its members, as to both whether and whom the individual shall marry. Not only his marriage but also his religion, his occupation, his mode of living, his recreation, his politics, are far more strongly influenced by family tradition in the life of the country than in that of the city. His morals are the morals of family cohesion. There is less tolerance of aberration from the established code, especially in sex relations, since this is above all an offence against the unity and the function of the family. It is true that prohibited sex relationships occur, but more often in the form of casual and shamefaced outbursts of repressed desires, with little semblance of romantic

love. Divorce is generally less frequent than in the city. There is little place for the man, and still less for the woman, whose orbit has not some family hearth as focus.⁴

In the city, although in this as in every other respect it exhibits great diversity of social attitudes, the family is typically less engrossing. We have already dwelt on the manner in which the city denudes the household of economic functions and throws the individual into associational relations determined by specific interests of work and temperament. In drawing the contrast, however, between the self-determination of the city-dweller and the subjection to family and communal mores of the country-dweller, it is important to avoid the bias of personal predilection. It does not follow that the city-dweller is less profoundly a social animal because his family relationships are less inclusive and because many of his contacts are of a more impersonal character. The scale and variety of his relationships are extended so that they can range from the most superficial to the most profound. In the country relationships gain in quality because they are more persistent; in the city because they are the more definite choice of the individual. It does not follow either that the countryman is more stupid or that the city-dweller is more superficial because the responses of the latter are attuned to a greater variety of social stimulations. It does not follow that the family in the city is "decadent" because its functions also, like those of all urban organizations, are specialized and limited and it must now find its place alongside of other organizations. The city leaves the choice more to the individual's own nature, but that nature is no less a social nature and the choice is no less a social choice. Society is not to be identified with its own undifferentiated forms. The city brings the like to the like and separates them from the unlike. The city fosters all differences, including the differences in the social natures of men. In a word, it gives more opportunity to the driving forces of human nature, whether for good or for ill. Nor should we be too ready to call the life of the city "unnatural" or even "artificial." It is no more unnatural for man than the life of the hive is for the bee or of the anthill for the ant. It is human nature, human desires and human impulses, which makes it what it is, and still more what it is coming to be as men learn more fully to control the urban environment. Finally, we should be chary of

⁴ These general characteristics are borne out by all important studies of the life of agricultural classes, where they exist in relative isolation. They are well illustrated by Le Play and his successors as well as in such modern works as W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant* (New York, 1918).

accepting the grandiose but unsubstantiated theories, such as those of Hansen and Spengler, which declare that the city drains into itself the vitality of the countryside and there sterilizes it, so bringing about the downfall of successive civilizations.⁵ In the city man loses the healthful influences of the out-of-doors—though improved communications make occasional contacts with the country possible for ever larger numbers—but the city today, thanks to the arts it has developed and imparted to the world, is healthier than the country was a hundred years ago. In the city the birth rate falls, but this phenomenon, with its accompaniment of a falling death rate, is an aspect, as we shall show in a later chapter, of a new equilibrium of life, a necessary condition of any high civilization, fraught with great hopes if also with some risks. In the city men get furthest from the complete absorption in the primary necessities of animal living which marks the life of the peasant, spent in the toils of sustenance and procreation. In the city man takes greater risks and seeks greater chances, but this, too, is in accordance with his nature. It is civilization itself, and civilization is the great adventure of mankind.

Social concomitants of urban specialization.—The most conspicuous difference between the social structure of the city and the country, and the source of innumerable minor contrasts, is the specialization which urban concentration develops. As Adam Smith pointed out, one condition of specialization is "the size of the market." The country calls for the "all-round" man, the city for the skilled artisan, the technician, the professional man, the inventor, the business administrator, the politician, the financier, the artist in all his varieties. Even unskilled labor has its work specialized in the city, by limitation to a single type of task, while skilled labor grows more specialized both by limitation of tasks and by differentiation of skill. Look up the trades directory of a large city and you will find among their bewildering variety the most curious and unsuspected of callings. This economic differentiation is the source of social groupings, both "vertical," i.e., involving compartmental divisions on the same social level, and "horizontal," or in terms of status. But these divisions are furthest removed from the immobile caste divisions which characterize the older types of country life. For the city is in all things competitive, and men move up or down its social scale according to their ability and eagerness

⁵ G. Hansen, *Die Drei Bevölkerungsstufen* (Munich, 1915); Spengler, *Decline of the West* (tr. Atkinson, New York, 1926), II, Chap. IV.

to seize the opportunities which it offers. This competitiveness is always the concomitant of high specialization. The process of selection is keener, and the chances of promotion for the possessor of ability are greater. Business is keyed to a higher pitch, and management selects employees more rigorously and is more ruthless in discharging those who fall below the competitive standard. The able man has a greater incentive to utilize and improve his ability, for he is always pitted against his equals or his superiors. In this mobile society men are rated more in terms of their individual capacity than in the more slowly moving countryside. The city has its particular place for all, from the lowest to the highest, according to the economic and cultural standards of the community. The city sifts and segregates. Take education as an example. It provides separate schools for the rich, the moderately well-to-do, and the poor; but it also provides distinctive schools for different forms of education, elementary and advanced, cultural and technical, professional and artistic; and it is beginning to provide schools designed for different grades of intelligence, for the mentally defective, for the backward, for the average, and for the bright scholar. In the isolated country environment these would all have been thrown together. This illustration may serve to show that while status still is a determinant and limit of opportunity in the city its lines are forever being crossed and broken by the lines of individual choice and of sheer competitive advantage.

One aspect of this process of urban specialization is the blocking out of distinctive areas within the city which show marked peculiarities, both social and cultural.

There are regions in the city in which there are almost no children, areas occupied by residential hotels, for example. There are regions where the number of children is relatively high, in the slums, in the middle-class residential suburbs, to which the newly married usually graduate from their first honeymoon apartments in the city. There are other areas occupied almost wholly by young unmarried people, boy and girl bachelors. There are regions where people almost never vote, except at national elections, regions where the divorce rate is higher than it is for any state in the Union, and other regions in the same city where there are almost no divorces. There are areas infested by boy gangs and the athletic and political clubs into which the members of these gangs or the gangs themselves frequently graduate. There are regions in which the suicide rate is excessive; regions in which there is . . . an

excessive amount of juvenile delinquency and other regions in which there is almost none.⁶

The larger the city the greater is the specialization. Thus in a metropolis like New York there are, to take only the specializations in wholesale trading, areas predominantly devoted to the buying and selling of fur, of silk, of clothing, of shoes, of leather, of millinery, of jewelry, of drugs, of paper, of hardware, of tea and coffee, of dairy produce, of fruit, of fish, and of meat.

With specialization and competition the speculative element enters more strongly into the life of the city. With greater opportunity and greater mobility comes greater uncertainty as to the future. Where so many possibilities of individual enterprise are opened up, the mere vagaries of fortune, good and ill, have increased play. A man's career is not, as in the country, foreordained in his own sight. An accident, a lucky contact, a sudden opportunity seized or missed, a change of fashion, a happy or unhappy forecast of some event far beyond his control, may revolutionize his prospects in a day. The sense of chance is always present in the city, and although it does not essentially diminish the intensity of the competitive struggle—the operation of what, so far as the individual is concerned, is simply the turn of fortune's wheel—it frequently affects the rewards.

Different qualities evoked in the two modes of life.—These combined influences of the urban scene react on the mentality and conduct of the city-dweller and are thus in turn accentuated. They stimulate what may be called, for short, an associative individualism. In the thronging presence of his fellow men, and more immediately and variously dependent on their specialized services than is the countryman in his direct struggle with nature the city-dweller must selectively organize his social relationships. He is accepted by his fellows more in terms of his own specific qualities. His social instincts are fulfilled, not in one hereditary or familial all-embracing milieu, but in a series of more or less independent memberships. He must co-ordinate these into the unity of his own social life. Here too he has greater chances of success or failure, of a finer harmony or of a graver disharmony. As a unit he must make his own terms with society; he is detached except for the stronger or weaker attachments of his will. This condition distinguishes the

⁶ R. E. Park, in *The Urban Community* (ed. Burgess, Chicago, 1926), pp. 11-12.

whole wide range of social attitudes characteristic of the city. Its collectivism and its individualism belong to the same order.

The constant initiative demanded in the social relationships of the city as well as in the whole character of its competitive struggle evokes qualities which stand in marked contrast with those demanded by the country. The country calls for persistence, a rather stern and dogged fidelity to the appointed lot and way of life; the city calls more for alertness, the quick mind that responds to the changing occasion. What is seen superficially in manners is revealed more profoundly in morals. "Urbanity" belongs to the city, the polite manner which makes casual contacts easy and smoothly accommodates itself to the diversities of personality and of situation. Likewise, in the diversity of moral codes, of religions, of modes of life, of tastes, and of opinions which are presented before him the city-dweller is more likely to learn tolerance and to make allowances. It is generally the more rural communities which seek to put a legislative ban alike on doctrines and on ways of living which the majority disapprove. The countryman is less subject to the comparative criticism which leads alike to the refinement and to the limitation of belief. In their traditional and unswerving character his moral codes are formally as strict as his beliefs. Consequently the violations of the code, which occur frequently enough in every countryside, lead to more bitter estrangements and to greater moral tragedies. Yet the countryman is generally secure from the questioning spirit of the city, which undermines weak beliefs, brings distraction to the lives of many, and permits strength of faith only to those who can find the roots of it in their own hearts.

The city and the social position of women.—A very interesting and still very unexplored subject is the influence of the city environment on the social life and attitudes of women. It is obvious that the changes and functions of the family which the city develops have been of peculiar significance to woman, alike as mother, as wife, as housekeeper, and as economic producer. It has limited her tasks and liberated her from the exclusiveness of domesticity. But in this respect there is a vast difference between the cities of older civilizations and those of our own. It is not the city as such but the city as itself changed by modern industrialism which has revolutionized the life of woman. In the older cities, alike of the West and of the East, it was only the women of the upper classes, if even these, who were citizens in the wider sense of the term; apart from them there was only one class of women who found a differentiated role. A woman could be a queen or a courtesan, but

little else outside the traditional duties of the home. We need not repeat the story of how modern industry and trade, concentrated in cities, has opened up a myriad of careers, has put men and women on a more equal footing, economic and social, has given a special importance to women as the consumers and distributors of surplus wealth, has admitted the development of individuality and variant capacity which society once accorded to men alone, and has detached them from that exclusive significance, in their own eyes and in those of men, which found expression in the denomination of women as peculiarly "the sex." The individualization of women has undoubtedly been fostered by urban life, and the freer reciprocity of relationship between men and women, as individuals, which has resulted from it is exercising and will doubtless continue to exercise, since the process is still advancing, a profound influence on the whole structure of society.

Some cultural contrasts between city and country.—We cannot conclude this brief survey without referring to certain cultural contrasts, as these are affected by the two broad types of environment and in turn affect the two broad types of society. It is perhaps true, as Spengler maintains, that all great cultures of the past, in the general forms of creative imagination and world outlook which inspired them, have originated in the country and been developed in the city. It is certain that a purely urban culture, divorced from the sources of inspiration which the life of the country contains, would be fundamentally unbalanced and spiritually impoverished. The country has the secret of permanence. It leads man beyond the circle of humanity, into the vision of the majestic forces of nature and into the presence of the teeming interdependent life of plant and animal, of the mightier pattern of which his own life, for all the power of his civilization, is but a part. It offers the ageless wonders of life, beside which all the works of man's hands are puny and pretentious and ephemeral. It reveals, for those who can see and hear them, an infinitude of forms and colors and harmonies and rhythms which may bring constant renewal and fresh inspiration to the arts of man. Thus the country provides the raw materials of the cultural as well as of the economic life. In the life of the countryside they retain a relatively simple form, as folk lore, folk legends, folk songs, folk dances. They are taken up into the arts of the city and reshaped to its different and variant demands. For the city, being changeful and habituated to many stimulations, wants novelty and excitement, though besides the many who seek these things it contains as well those who can appreciate and welcome the

higher creations of the human mind. So it utilizes these materials in its own distinctive ways, in its superficial aspects merely embroidering or cheapening them into sophisticated and transient forms, in its profounder and rarer aspects transforming them into something rich and strange, something finer and higher, just as the symphonies of Beethoven are vastly more than mere variations of the simple folk airs which he adopted for his purpose.

There are numerous detailed contrasts to be drawn between the culture of the countryside and the culture of the city, contrasts which stand in spite of the great diversities exhibited within the latter. We cannot discuss them here. They are pursued in those demographic studies and surveys which were first developed by Le Play and his school and which have since grown so numerous. They are revealed, often more finely though under the guise of a "local habitation and a name," in the works of the greater novelists depicting town or country life. The very spirit of the countryside breathes, for example, in such novels as Hardy's *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* or *The Return of the Native*, or Hamsun's *Growth of the Soil*, or Rølvaag's *Giants in the Earth*. If it is harder to name works which with equal comprehensiveness present the spirit of the city, it is because the latter is so much more variegated and complex. The social structure of the city is necessarily as complex as its culture, presenting as many extremes and modulations as does the latter, but always, in contrast to the countryside, with a difference, with a certain accentuation, intensification, or sophistication which in the last resort is the consequence of environment, of the nature, kind, and number of contacts to which the members of each group are exposed.

INTERACTION AND DOMINANCE

The city as a center of dominance.—In the preceding section we sought to portray certain typical differences between the urban and the rural mode of life. In depicting such differences we had to depend on common observation rather than on specific indices of a quantitative character. Moreover, since our object was to present a broad contrast, we treated each mode of life as though it were self-contained, as though no influences emanating from either of them affected the character of the other. In this section we shall qualify and complete our picture by considering the process of interaction between city and country, presenting definite evidences of the changing relationship between the two.

In the process of interaction the attitudes, the modes of life, and the institutions of the city tend to become, in biological terms, prepotent over those of the country. The reasons are not difficult to trace. The city has the prestige of power and wealth and specialized knowledge. It holds the keys of finance. It is the market place to which the countryman must turn in order to buy and sell, to lend and to borrow. Its people, habituated to contacts, have the advantage, when town and country meet, of being more articulate, more expansive, and, superficially at least, more alert. The products which the city sends to the country, unlike those it receives from it, carry with them something of the urban scheme of life, of its techniques and adaptations. Consequently, in the intercourse of city and country the former tends to dominate. In all the great civilizations of the past, where nevertheless the vast majority of the population remained peasants, the influence of the city has dominated. In our own civilization that influence has been greatly intensified by two new phenomena. On the one hand the contacts of city and country are far closer and more numerous than ever before. On the other hand the urban population has been increasing in proportion to the rural, until now, in practically all lands where industrialism is well advanced, an actual majority of the total population are in some sense town-dwellers.

The growth of cities.—The distinctive rise of these two related phenomena belongs to the history of the past century and a half. By the close of the eighteenth century the growth of cities was already manifest in England, the home of the Industrial Revolution. But while at this date England had 21 per cent of its population inhabiting cities of 10,000 or more, France had less than 10, Prussia about 7, and Russia and the United States were close together with less than 4 per cent. The rural population of these and other countries has been declining in proportion ever since, with remarkable regularity as decade succeeds decade. The United States Census of 1920 for the first time recorded an excess of urban over rural population, an aggregation of 2,500 and over being reckoned as urban; and between 1920 and 1930 the rural population had fallen from 48.6 per cent to 43.8. In Germany, with an urban limit of 2,000, the rural population had fallen by 1921 to 35.6 per cent, and in England, with the urban limit set as high as 5,000, the rural population in 1931 was only 20 per cent. Until the depression beginning in 1929 caused some minor recessions the countries were few in which every new census did not show a further advance of the process.

During this process cities themselves have been both growing in size and differentiating from one another. Moreover, the concentration of population is increasing in the areas of higher density. In the United States the population of the metropolitan zones increased from 36 per cent in 1900 to 48 per cent in 1930, and in the areas adjoining the deep-water rim it increased in the same period from 36.6 per cent to 45.1.⁷ While there is still, in most countries a metropolis outtopping all the rest in its intense concentration of power and influence, other great cities have arisen, diverse in quality and in form, each a distinctive embodiment of the urban spirit. Chicago has a different character from Philadelphia, Philadelphia from Detroit or from Los Angeles. Beside them flourish smaller cities of all ranges, mediating between the metropolis and the countryside and often more alien to the former than to the latter. At the other end of the scale tower a few cosmopolitan centers, pre-eminently New York, London, Paris, and Berlin, whose power and influence radiate far beyond the boundaries of any state, holding among their other prerogatives the financial dominance of the world.

The vast range of difference between the world-city and the country-town adds a further complication to the general contrast of the urban and the rural environment. Moreover, as has already been mentioned, the continuous growth of the urban population, involving a great migration not only from country to city but also from city to city, may lead us to misinterpret as intrinsic or inevitable factors of urban life conditions which either reflect a period of uncontrolled expansion or express the maladjustment which accompanies any process of uprooting and transference from one environment to another. At least some of the restlessness and loneliness and tension and nervous instability which are laid to the account of the city may be properly reckoned as phenomena of growth and of migration.

Technical advance and urban dominance.—If most of the great civilizations of history were city-fostered and, at least in their later stages, city-dominated, they still left the country on the whole unchanged in spirit. They could tax it for their luxury or devastate it for their wars, but they could not change its nature. The peasant, as Spengler has said, was "beyond history." Modern civilization knows no such bounds. It is not simply that the tech-


⁷ See R. D. McKenzie, "Metropolitan Communities," in *Recent Social Trends* (New York, 1933), Vol. I, pp. 445-446, or for a fuller account consult his monograph, *The Metropolitan Community* (New York, 1933).

nique of our civilization is inexorably turning the majority of the population into city-dwellers but rather that the very technique which draws men to the cities carries the influence and spirit of urban life to the remotest recesses of the countryside. One of the chief manifestations of the power on which it rests is the annihilation of physical distance as a barrier to intercommunication, to the contagion of ideas and modes of living. Of the factors we enumerated in the last section as determinant features of the rural environment, one in particular, the cultural isolation of the country, is being eliminated, and with its elimination the influence of the remaining factors—agricultural occupation, the presence of nature, and the relative social isolation—is inevitably reduced. For it is a commonplace of sociological observation that social influences radiate from the centers of prestige and wealth and power. The new techniques enormously facilitate this process. One has only to think of the profound role being played by the automobile, the airplane, the telephone, the radio, the press, in linking the remotest parts to the urban foci. The two last-mentioned are pre-eminently the carriers of culture, though no implication is here made as to whether the culture so carried is "higher" or "lower." The point is that it is always the more urban culture which they carry to the country, and not *vice-versa*. It is the radio stations of the great cities which speak and advertise and sing and play to the countryside. It is the syndicating offices of the great cities which supply the country newspapers with the cheap "boiler plate" which fills their columns.

The spread to the country of urban types of organization.—Behind the social prestige of the city and behind its technical advantages there lie other explanations of its growing dominance. Wherever the opportunity presents itself, the tendency is for specific common interests to become articulate and organized. The small isolated community holds these interests under restraint. Its foci of organization, its meeting places, from the corner grocery to the church, necessarily assume a general level and an inclusive interest. Its social occasions, the feast, the funeral, the parade, the village entertainment, the husking bee, can make little provision for the varying desires of different men. Where locality is the basis of association the sense of community is pervasive but undifferentiated. There is a certain repression of all interests that cannot be accommodated to the more homogeneous life. The repression may be unrecognized, especially in the older members who have grown habituated to it. But that it is real is shown by what happens whenever communications and contacts are facilitated. The locality basis

of organization gradually yields to the demands of specific interests. The country approaches nearer to the form of social organization characteristic of the city. This change is brought out graphically in the following chart taken from an article by a writer who has done much to illustrate the distinctive quality of rural organization.⁸

THEORETICAL GRAPH SUGGESTING THE RELATION OF INTEREST GROUPS
TO LOCALITY GROUPS



Possible conditions of dominance in the selective character of migration to the city.—The city is the nurse of innovation, and with this constant impact of one-way influences the social conservatism, the established custom, of the country is steadily undermined. The results are evident in many directions. Statistics of many lands, viewed over a period of from thirty to sixty years, show that, with respect to birth rate, death rate, age at marriage, infant mortality, divorce, suicide, church affiliation, and so forth, rural indices are moving nearer to urban indices. These changes could not take place unless the more subtle and less measurable characteristics of urban life, its competitive spirit, its less rigid moralities, its more questioning attitudes, were filtering into the rural environment. It is sometimes held that the migration to the cities of such large numbers of the country-bred has, on the other hand, conveyed to the urban environment "all the essential characteristics of the rural

⁸ J. H. Kolb, "Family Life and Rural Organization," *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. 23 (1928), 147.

people and their culture.”⁹ But the migrants, dispersed within the urban environment and subject to its direct influences, sooner or later adjust themselves to city conditions and lose their rural characteristics. All the evidences point to the domination of the urban culture. Another factor is here involved which, being much more difficult to estimate, we have so far left out of the account, namely, the selective action underlying all this migration. There is also some evidence that the city attracts to itself the adolescent and the younger adult rather than the very young or the old. One investigation showed that over half of the migrants to cities of the United States ranged in age from ten to nineteen, the proportion of young migrants being higher for the large cities.¹⁰ There is also some evidence that the city attracts young women no less but rather more than it does young men, possibly because the country offers less economic opportunity to the former than to the latter.¹¹ But when we turn to the *quality* of the migrants as compared with that of those who stay behind, we enter a region of controversy over the dubious interpretation of statistics. From certain studies made in Minnesota the inference has been drawn that it is from the less successful farm families that children most often migrate, but this conclusion, even if more widely corroborated, throws no light on the question whether it is the more or the less efficient members of farm families whom the city chiefly attracts and whom it retains.¹² There are those who are urged to the city by sheer economic pressure, since the country birth rate is higher and its occupational opportunities are diminishing. There are also those who find their capacities repressed and their ambitions thwarted in the rural environment and who eagerly turn to the avenues of advance which the city offers. It can scarcely be doubted that among the latter there is a high proportion of the more gifted among the country-born. The larger cities provide better schools and more specialized training, both cultural and professional, and after training they promise “the career open to talents.” Such studies as that of Huntington, showing that of the country-born persons sufficiently prominent to be listed in *Who's Who in America* and in the corresponding German volume the overwhelming percentage live in the cities, merely confirm conclusions which are in accord with com-

⁹ See Sorokin and Zimmerman, *op. cit.*, p. 615.

¹⁰ Hornell Hart, *Selective Migration*, University of Iowa Studies, 53 (1921).

¹¹ See A. F. Weber, *The Growth of Cities* (New York, 1899), Chap. V.

¹² See C. C. Zimmerman, *Migrations to Towns and Cities* (New York, 1899) Chap. V.

mon observation and a knowledge of human nature.¹³ Huntington also found that, on the basis of listings in *Who's Who in America*, more leaders in certain fields, including agriculture, education, religion, science, and government, are born in the country while in other fields, including art, business, engineering, and music, more leaders are born in the city.¹⁴

Besides the talented and the necessitous there are those whom the city attracts on other grounds, the restless, the seekers after amusement or excitement, the exploiters, the nonconformists, the lovers of crowds. To such classes, including the genius and the criminal, the sensitive and the superficial, the makers of civilization and those who prey upon it, the atmosphere of the great city is far more congenial than that of either the small town or the countryside. The city is a complex selective agency, even though the rapid expansion of the urban population blunts its discriminative efficacy. And the nature of this selection is such as to enhance the dominance of the city.

Nor should it be forgotten that within the city itself a further selective process takes place. There is migration from as well as to it. There are types of temperament and of constitution, perhaps also of nationality or of race, which adapt themselves more quickly or more thoroughly to its conditions. Here we are making no assumption that such types are "better" or "fitter" in any broad moral or biological significance, for there is adaptation to city slums as well as to its "residential areas," there is adaptation to the privations which the city, with its congestion and its high cost of living, enforces on the poor no less than to the luxuries which it opens to the rich. The principle of social selection, as will be shown in a later part of this work, is far too intricate and many-sided to be reduced to the delusively simple dichotomy of better and worse. Every environment is selective in manifold ways, by its attraction for certain types and groups and by its operation on those who live within it, sorting and segregating, affecting grade and station, success and failure, even life and death. It appeals to some types more than others, calling them from without, but it also modifies all types within its range. The total result alone is clear to our eyes. So with the urban environment. How far urban characteristics are due to the fact that the city attracts particular types, how far to the fact that it works selectively on all within its influence, no one can tell.

¹³ E. Huntington, *Pulse of Progress* (New York, 1926), Chap. IV.

¹⁴ See J. Davis and H. E. Barnes, *Introduction to Sociology*, Book II, Part I (by E. Huntington), Chap. VI.

We find, for instance, that statistics of many kinds corroborate the thesis that, whether the standard of comparison is health or intelligence, city children display a greater range of deviation from the mean than do country children. We find also that, *with reference to the standards devised for the purpose of intelligence tests*, the average and the median rating is higher for city than for country children. We have numerous facts of the type that there is less illiteracy in the city, that there are more suicides, and so forth.¹⁵ But the reader who has followed the argument of Chapter IV will realize the hazard of the attempt to measure the respective contributions of modification and of attraction, of heredity and of environment, to the substantive result. As well might one seek to discover whether the warp or the woof of a blanket does more to keep out the cold. As well might one reason that, because two parts of hydrogen combine with one part of oxygen to produce water, hydrogen is 66.6 per cent "responsible" for water. Here we must be content with the conclusion that the selective action of the city upon its membership combines with its attractive action to produce those types which establish its cultural and social dominance.

Pessimistic interpretations of urban dominance.—This dominance of the city is regarded by one group of sociologists as offering an explanation not only of the development but also of the decay of civilizations. The most impressive statement of this view is that given by Spengler in his chapter on "the soul of the city."¹⁶ For him the world-city, the cosmopolis, represents a stage in the history of each great civilization, a stage which prepares its dissolution. The world-city fulfills a tendency inherent in all city life. It evokes to the full the intellect of man and equally undermines his instinct. Its artificiality is set over against the native simplicity of the country; its tension against the animal harmony of the peasant life. It dissipates the solidarity of the kin, the family, the "blood," the nation, and within its competitive stress fosters the disintegrating attitudes, as the author regards them, of individualism, of socialism, of rationalism, of cosmopolitanism. At length the meaning of these attitudes is revealed in the sterility of civilized men, the failure of the racial will to live. Depopulation ensues. "The wheel of destiny rolls on to its end; the birth of the city entails its death." The chief difference between the doctrine of Spengler and that of various other proponents of the cataclysmic role of the city is that while

¹⁵ Numerous evidences of this sort will be found in Sorokin and Zimmerman's *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology*.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, Chap. IV.

Spengler speaks as though the city were the *cause* of these "phenomena of decay," he really thinks of it as merely a symptom of an inevitable process. He is dominated by the mystical analogy of the organism. The great city is for him merely the environment appropriate to a late stage in the fated life history of every civilization.

Criticism of these views.—The view that all great civilizations end in an "appalling depopulation" after the cities have drawn to themselves and "sterilized" the best blood of the country is an unjustified generalization from the fate of certain empires which once flourished in the Eastern Mediterranean and the lands beyond its eastern coasts, an area that, through the devastation of wars, the unscientific exploitation of the soil, or changing climatic conditions, grew progressively more barren, deforested, and desiccated. But these considerations are beyond our present scope. We must be content to point out a few factors which apply within our own civilization and negate the more extreme views regarding the destructive role of the city. In the first place it should be noted that, so far as healthful living is concerned, man is gradually making the urban environment more adjusted to his needs and perhaps at the same time is adjusting himself more adequately to its conditions. It is simply a matter of the intelligent extension of a quite feasible control over the urban environment, as is evident from the fact that the most favorable districts of the city at least equal in healthfulness and length of life the best records of the country, while the once so deplorable summer death rate of infants in the larger cities has now been reduced to such an extent that in a number of countries infant mortality is even lower in the urban than in the rural districts. It is true that, lumping the best with the worst into a general average, we find the country still distinctly superior to the city in its health statistics. But it is also true that there has been a vast and progressive improvement in the health of cities as a result of improved sanitation and the development of preventive medicine. That much further improvement is possible is obvious to all who realize the remedial evils of urban congestion, who appreciate how relatively little has yet been done to abate such evils as city smoke and the lack of light and air and living space in its crowded tenements, who know how haphazard and uncontrolled and exploitative has been the growth of most cities and with how little care for the health and convenience of the poorer citizens they have generally been administered. It is only in quite recent years that most urban communities have begun to realize that city planning is something vastly more important than the laying out of a checkerboard design.

The city, as Park and Burgess remark, is "the natural habitat of civilized man." To establish a greater harmony between his physiological needs and the urban life which expresses his cultural needs is a task upon which man has already embarked with much promise of success.

The belief that the great city could not maintain its numbers by its own fertility, that its continuance (not merely its growth) depended on the constant influx of country migrants, and that the urban family tended to die out within three generations or so, may well have been justified under the unhygienic conditions of urban life in past centuries. The rough estimates that we possess, such as those of John Graunt for seventeenth-century London, indicate a mortality which more than counteracted the natural increase.¹⁷ But as cities grew healthier there came a time when they were able to offset deaths by births. This was the situation in the nineteenth century in Western Europe.¹⁸ It is acknowledged by Sorokin and Zimmerman, who exhibit at certain points an antiurban bias, that since the middle of the nineteenth century the city population has on the whole been able to maintain itself in the equilibrium of births and deaths.¹⁹ It is true that in quite recent times the urban birth rate in the center of Western civilization has fallen to new low levels, too low for the continued maintenance of the existing population; but we shall show in a later chapter that no inference as to the longer future can be actually drawn from this fact.

Even if, as is sometimes suggested, the city had some as yet unknown biological effect tending to restrict not fertility but actual fecundity, the possibility still would remain that this effect was a phenomenon of transition or migration rather than a permanent condition. For vast numbers of city-dwellers the process of adjustment to urban life has only begun. There is in this respect an interesting contrast between the vital statistics of certain newly urbanized groups and other groups that are more inured to urban conditions. For example, the Negroes of the United States have only in quite recent years migrated to any extent to the cities, whereas the Jewish people have experienced many centuries of urbanization. The statistics show that city life has a particularly

¹⁷ John Graunt, *Natural and Political Observations* (London, 1676). Graunt calculated that in the city of London there were, on the average, 12 burials for every 11 christenings while in the country there were 53 christenings for every 52 burials (p. 57).

¹⁸ Weber, *op. cit.*, Chap. VII; R. Kuczynski, *Zug nach der Stadt* (Stuttgart, 1897).

¹⁹ Sorokin and Zimmerman, *op. cit.*, p. 532.

unfavorable effect on the fertility and on the vitality of the Negro population as compared with the whites generally. On the other hand, they show that the Jewish people have maintained a peculiarly low death rate in the cities with a relatively high birth rate. If their birth rate has recently shown a considerable decline, it would therefore seem reasonable to attribute it to the permeation among them of the practice of birth control.²⁰

It remains true that the growth of cities could not have taken place save for the influx from the country, but it is no less true that the country could not have maintained its higher fertility, without a relapse into the poverty of previous centuries, were it not for the economic opportunities which the city afforded to its surplus. The remarkable process revealed in the growth of cities is one to which both city and country have made equally important but very different contributions.

Recent assimilation to one another of the two types of environment.—We have shown how the influence of the city is dominant in our civilization. But the city and the country can no longer be viewed as standing apart, in relative isolation and perhaps in antagonism. The two great types of human environment are tending to coalesce. The country is becoming, in important respects, urbanized, and a new environment is being shaped for large numbers of city-dwellers which includes an element of the country. The city throws its suburbs further and further into the country. With improved means of communication it is already possible for many to live in the country and work in the city, and for still larger numbers to spend their week ends and their holidays in some contact with nature. The development of electrical power is removing the economic advantage of industrial congestion. The city is creating a great hinterland which is gradually forming one community with the urban nucleus. Just as the dwellers in city and in country are being brought nearer to one another in the process of interaction and dominance, so, in lesser degree, are the environments of city and country tending to become the common possession of men. This also may be a tendency of great import for the future of civilization.

²⁰ For evidences consult Niles Carpenter, *The Sociology of City Life* (New York, 1931), pp. 193 ff.

BOOK TWO
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

PART ONE
ORGANIZATIONS AND FUNCTIONS

FOREWORD

Society should be conceived as an invisible structure. It is the organization of human relationships, built, sustained, and forever being changed by human beings. In this part we shall be concerned with the character of the structure itself, particularly as it has developed under the conditions of modern Western civilization.

The complex pattern of the social structure comprises three broadly distinctive modes of grouping. In the first place there are *communities*, those areas of social living within which the threads of specific relationships are incessantly spun. In the second place there are the more or less spontaneous configurations responsive to the like and the common interests that develop within the community. These may be enduring—the *social classes*—or they may be quite transient, such as crowds and other gatherings. They differ from the third type in that they are not formally set up. In the third place there are *associations*, specific forms of organization deliberately established for more or less specific ends. They are, in short, ways in which like and common interests are expressly formulated and pursued. They constitute the most definite part of the social structure, and they gain in coherence, definition, number, and efficacy as the conditions of society grow more complex. They combine into elaborate functional systems.

In the analysis of the social structure the role of the diverse attitudes and interests of social beings is revealed. In particular, associations, being definitely functional, correspond closely to interests. A classification of interests therefore provides a basis for the study of associations. This classification rests on the broad distinction between *cultural* and *utilitarian* interests, a distinction which assumes major importance for the interpretation of social change in the final book of this volume.

The student should observe that the range of social participation is most complete in the community; that it is relatively wide, though much less complete, within the social class; and that it is most clearly defined, and generally most limited, in the association. In this respect the community stands at one end of the scale, and the large association, with its impersonal and highly individualized character, at the other.

SCHEMATIC VIEW OF THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

A	B
<i>Groupings or Organizations</i> (persons in relationships)	<i>Forms or Systems</i> (modes or conditions of interpersonal relations)
<p>I. <i>Inclusive territorial unities</i> Generic type: <i>Community</i> Specific types: Tribe Nation Neighborhood Village City</p> <p>II. <i>Interest-conscious unities without definite organization</i> Generic type (a): <i>Social class</i> Specific types: Caste Elite Competitive class Corporate class Generic type (b): <i>Crowd</i> Specific types: Like-interest crowd Common-interest crowd</p> <p>III. <i>Interest-conscious unities with definite organization</i> Generic type: <i>Association</i> Specific type (a): <i>Primary group</i> Varieties: Family Play group Club Specific type (b): <i>Large-scale association</i> Varieties: State Church Economic corporation, etc.</p>	<p>I. <i>Folkways and mores</i> Specific types: Custom Ceremony Ritual Creed Fashion</p> <p>II. <i>Institutions</i> Generic type (a): Established conditions of social relations Example: Property Generic type (b): Established modes of social relations Example: Marriage Specific types under (a) and (b): Political Economic Religious Familial Educational <i>Note.</i> Types under B I and B II need not be mutually exclusive.</p> <p>III. <i>Functional systems</i> Generic type (a): <i>Institutional complex</i> Generic type (b): <i>Interest complex</i> <i>Note.</i> Under III (b) we include the two great orders of <i>culture</i> and <i>civilization</i>. These should be regarded not as parts but as foundations of the social structure.</p>

VIII

THE COMMUNITY

PHYSICAL CONFIGURATION

The community as concentration.—If we study a population map, whether of a countryside, of a whole country, or of the world itself, we observe that it presents curious configurations, the seemingly irregular massing and thinning of habitation, the nuclei of greatest density shading off into the more sparsely settled areas. We observe that the areas of higher congestion in some degree but by no means wholly correspond with physiographically determined areas. In some regions, such as the prairie plains, it seems geographically accidental that here should be stray farmhouses, here a village and here a town; and even when we examine the variations in soil conditions or other natural resources and the natural facilities for communication and for the amenities of living, some degree of physiographical indifference may remain. In other regions the location of the nuclei is clearly responsive to naturally determined advantages, apparent in the site of most great cities, for example; though here, too, the natural advantage has to be understood in the light of the existent state of civilization, and the density of the nucleus as of the surrounding areas may require further explanation in terms of historical process and mere conjuncture. The interpretation of relative densities is an interesting demographical study which does not here concern us. What we see before us in our density map are ranges and types of community.

There are, as Gras points out, areas of scattered homesteads which possess no visible focus, amorphous communities with no communal division of labor and therefore with no centers in which

economic and administrative functions inhere.¹ But most communities possess some center of their social activities. In particular, wherever human habitation is congested in an area too small to contain within itself enough land for its primal needs, there a community center exists, in rudimentary or developed form since this condition implies exchange and specialization. The center provides some common meeting place, such as the market square of the small town or the general store of the village. If the community is small, the center is undifferentiated: if large, it is of course more elaborate and specialized. In the large city there may be one dominant focus of its pulsing life, but it has also distinctive foci of business, of finance, of retail trade, of recreation, and so forth. The center is itself relative to the community; a market place may be the center of the town-community, but the town itself is a center for a region and the metropolis for a country. What distinguishes externally the center from the periphery is the fact that there the lines of communication meet. Without communication there can be no community, and the life of the community revolves around the points where communication is most intense.

The community and communications.—The relation of a community to communications is manifest in various ways. A community frequently arises at a terminal of transportation, where topographical conditions conspire with economic advantage of other kinds to create a settlement, where a ford, a port, a crossroad, a railroad junction, a river mouth, a strategic island, or similar feature, presents itself. Its size varies from a village to a metropolis, according to the trading facilities, the economic resources of the region it serves, and the general level of civilization. The large community is both a terminal and a starting point, but it has in a peculiar degree the aspect of a destination, both in a psychological and in a geographical sense. It is the end of the road more than the beginning, and this fact is often emphasized by its position beside some natural barrier, the sea or a lake or a mountain range, a forest or even a desert. Hence large urban communities have hinterlands, regions which, as it were, lie behind them and on which they depend for their economic necessities and the resources of wealth and population which they attract not only by their facilities for trade and finance but also by their opportunities for cultural stimulation and for the more elaborate and exciting forms of living and spending.

¹ N. S. B. Gras, *Introduction to Economic History* (New York, 1922), pp. 50 ff.

Relation of community to locality.—In our definition of a community we insisted on its distinctively territorial character. It implies a common soil as well as a common living. The relation of communities to the regions in which they appear has been in recent sociology a subject of much interest and of intensive study. The local area is not only the condition of those continuous personal relationships which weld a group together and give it distinctive social form as well as biological unity, it is also a specific common environment with whose peculiar characteristics men in their group life must come to terms and to which they make appropriate responses. Particularly since the time of Le Play, with his insistence on the dependence of the family on its work and of its work on the locality, sociologists have sought to relate social differences to regional differences. They have pointed out the significance of such factors as the natural vegetation, the types of soil cultivation and of animal domestication favored by the region, the climatic conditions. They have shown how in primitive life, and to some extent in our own, the areas of particular culture correspond with geographical areas.² They have, especially in America, sought to find a parallel between the relation of variant plants and animals to their respective habitats and that of human groups to their local or regional conditions—terming this procedure the *ecological* approach.³

But we must be careful to avoid the assumption that there is any full correspondence between the process of physical adaptation in vegetative life and the vastly more complex process of social differentiation in terms of locality. We saw in Chapter VI that every social group adapts itself to a total environment of which the physical locality is but one factor. Every group creates, for all its members, an environment of its own. There are very significant differences, both obvious and subtle ones, between the groups living

² Cf., for example, Clark Wissler, *Man and Culture* (New York, 1923), pp. 55-61, and *Introduction to Social Anthropology* (New York, 1929), pp. 303-355. Interesting examples of the "regional approach" are offered in the publications of the Institute for Research in Social Science of the University of North Carolina and in the issues of *Social Forces* edited by Professor Howard W. Odum.

³ For a statement of this approach see R. D. McKenzie, "The Study of Human Ecology," *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. 30 (1924-1925), 141 ff., and the chapter by the same author, entitled "The Ecological Approach to the Study of the Human Community," in Park and Burgess, *The City*, Chap. III. Statements of the "ecological approach" sometimes fail to bring out the point that the process by which a group, as each younger generation grows up, accommodates itself to itself, in the continuity of present and past, is different from the process by which it adjusts itself, at any given time, to the external environment.

in different territories, but we must never assume that the differences can be explained solely in terms of the physical environment. Many factors combine to bring a group together and to hold it together in a given area, and it is exceedingly difficult to isolate the influence of any one of these, since they are all interactive in determining its social character. If we take the simplest community, the neighborhood, understanding by that term the "first grouping beyond the family which has social significance and which is conscious of some local unity," we find that already a variety of factors are interwoven conditions of its solidarity, "such as topography and original vegetation, nationality bonds, religious purpose, the migration from a common place of residence and economic and social purposes."⁴ The relative importance of these factors, once the group is formed, is always changing. Some factors grow more prominent, such as, in certain groups studied by Kolb, the educational and the religious, others dwindle, such as the kinship consciousness. Shifting of population, changes in communication and transportation, changes in leadership, rising or declining economic opportunities, the impact of new influences from without—these and other forces are always at work. We should therefore, while insisting on the importance of locality as a basis of study, be careful to avoid the assumption that the basis of study is also the basis of interpretation. But the reader who has followed the argument of the preceding chapters will need no further warning on this point.

The external structure of the community.—Every community reveals a structural character. A country is not simply a number of towns and cities scattered over a delimited territory, as a constellation is composed of a number of stars scattered over an area of the sky. There cannot be common living or common earth except within some pattern of relationship. The country has its metropolis, its capital; it has its functionally specialized cities and the network of connections between them. The city is not an aggregation of households or families, but a system or pattern into which the units, families, occupations, and so forth, are fitted. The pattern tends to grow more elaborate as the city increases in size, but it is present in a rudimentary form even in the smallest village. Generally the latter centers at the point where a main line of communication is intersected by a secondary line; sometimes at a point where several lines converge. With the growth of the city the

⁴J. H. Kolb, *Rural Primary Groups*, in Research Bulletin 51, Agricultural Experiment Station, University of Wisconsin.

single focus differentiates into a number of foci for different activities, a financial center, an administrative center, a fashion center, a recreational center, and so forth. At the same time the various trades and other functional activities aggregate in special areas, as we noted in Chapter VII. Some of the centers of dominance, such as the administrative and the financial, tend to be relatively permanent with respect to location; others, such as the fashionable shopping center and the recreational center, are more liable to change with changing conditions. The various types of residential area are also subject to change and to the encroachment of one on the other, some locations rising and others falling with respect to social estimation and to its reflection in land values. Changing means of transportation, changing business conditions, considerations arising out of the increase or decrease of population, and even changing fashions are constantly at work to modify the urban pattern.

Unlike the pattern of an association, that of a community is usually unplanned, determined by the forces which are generated wherever people in any numbers are thrown into close relationships—forces of competition, attraction, struggle for dominance, cooperation for the sake of economy of effort and so forth. Thus the city takes spatial form, emblematic of its inner life. Here there is the financial center, perhaps overtopping all the rest with the skyscrapers that rise from narrow, crowded thoroughfares; here the political center, broadly architectural; here the fashionable shopping center, its aspect changing from time to time; here the brightly lit center of night life, often somewhat tawdry by day; here the drab industrial areas with their tall chimneys; and filling the interstices and flowing out to the periphery the myriad homes of human beings, where economic and cultural forces bring groups together in areas that range through all degrees of “highly desirable” locations down to the slums. The pattern changes somewhat as the city continues to expand or as the greater forces which are shaping man’s civilization and culture bear upon it, but always there is the physical configuration, the distinctive form of a community.⁵

⁵ The forces that determine community structure are so variant and so complex that we cannot deal with them here. Some suggestions are offered in the following studies: Dwight L. Sanderson, *The Rural Community* (Boston, 1932), pp. 226-325; Niles Carpenter, “Urban Growth and Transition Areas,” *Publications*, American Sociological Society, Vol. 24 (1929); R. M. Hurd, *Principles of City Land Values* (New York, 1903); E. W. Burgess, “Residential Segregation in American Cities,” *Annals*, American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 140 (1928), 105-115; R. D. McKenzie, “The Ecological Approach to the Study of the Human Community,” *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 30 (1924-1925), 287-301, and the same author’s *Metropolitan Community*.

COMMUNITY SENTIMENT

Basis of community sentiment.—Wherever human beings are thrown together, separated in whole or in part from the world outside so that for the time they must live their lives in one another's company, as on a long voyage or in a camp, we can observe the stirring of those primal social impulses which bring men all over the earth into communities. A present-day novelist thus describes the process which occurs among the passengers on shipboard.

Every slightest action betrayed their inordinate consciousness of one another. Those who walked, walked either more emphatically than was their wont, or more sheepishly, aware of the scrutiny, more or less veiled, of the ^{flow} of sitters. Those who sat in deck chairs were conscious of their extended feet, their plaid rugs and shawls, and the slight physical and moral discomfort of having to look "up" at the walkers. The extraordinary feeling of kinship, of unity, of a solidarity far closer and more binding than that of nations or cities or villages, was swiftly uniting them; the ship was making them a community.⁶

In this nascent but short-lived community smaller groups quickly form, the like draws to the like, degrees of nearness and of distance are established, but over all there is this sense of participation in a common life.

In the more permanent communities of everyday life the same influences work more profoundly, rooted in the historical conditions which have created the spiritual or cultural possessions of every territorial group. The land they occupy together is for them much more than a portion of the earth's surface—it is their greater home, enriched by past association and present experience. The sense of what they have in common—memories and traditions, customs and institutions—informs and defines the general impulse of men to live together, establishing the community sentiment. The community becomes the permanent background of their lives, the projection of their individualities. Other attachments may be more intense, but no other is so broad-based as that which binds men to their community. It is developed by education, working through prescription and authority, social esteem or disfavor, until habits and conformities become the ground of loyalties and convictions. No living being

⁶ Conrad Aiken, *Blue Voyage* (New York, 1927), Chap. II. The author may have exaggerated the intensity of community sentiment created in these circumstances.

can grow up within a community—except congenital idiots incapable of experience—without having this sense of community impressed in the depths of his nature, until it is no longer an outer compulsion but an inner necessity, within which he must find the liberty of his being. Even if he revolts against some of its codes, he still belongs in his heart to some community. For on a social heredity has been impressed a socializing experience which from its ceaseless impact has determined that profound and ineluctable set of the individual heart and will which we call the sense of community.

Analysis of community sentiment.—It must not be assumed that in so characterizing the community sentiment we are implying that it is altruistic or other-regarding. Such terms like their contraries, *egoistic* or *self-regarding*, are misleading as applied to any kind of group-attachment. Self-interest and unselfishness are motivations, group-attachments are attitudes, and we have already pointed out the danger of confusing the two.⁷ We may seek to analyze the community sentiment and discover within it various elements subtly compounded. We may distinguish, for example, the following. (1) There is the sense of communion itself, of collective participation in an indivisible unity, the feeling that makes men identify themselves with others so that when they say “we” there is no thought of distinction and when they say “ours” there is no thought of division. This “we-sentiment,” or the “we-interest,”—to use Oppenheimer’s expression—is found wherever men have a common interest, but it takes profounder character where the interest is the commonweal itself.⁸ It is the sentiment which swells most strongly when the commonweal is threatened, so that men are ready to sacrifice all their private interests in order to save it. Yet even here, even in the white heat of such devotion, we should be cautious in using the ethical judgment which distinguishes between self-interest and altruism. It is rather that the interest of the individual is identified with or merged in the larger interest of the group, so that he feels indissolubly bound up with it, so that in his thought the community is “bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh.” (2) Another ingredient in the community sentiment is the sense of place and station, so that each feels he has a role to play, his own part and duty to fulfill in the reciprocal exchanges of the social scene. This feeling, involving subordination to the whole on the part of the individual, is obviously fostered by training and habituation in the daily discipline of life, and thus wrought into character it

⁷ See Chapter II.

⁸ F. Oppenheimer, *Allgemeine Soziologie* (Jena, 1923), I, p. 295.

expands until in some degree it expresses the mode in which the individual normally realizes his membership within the whole community. There are, it is true, other and narrower attachments, such as those of class or economic interest, which are apt to conflict with it. (3) Closely associated with this feeling there is the individual's sense of dependence, which makes him cling to the community as a necessary condition of his own life, a physical dependence, since all his material wants are satisfied within it, and a spiritual dependence, since it is his greater home, the nearer world which sustains his spirit, which embodies all that is familiar at least, if not all that is congenial to his life, his refuge from all the phantasms of solitude and from the spiritual fears that in his individual insulation lie all around the adventure of living.

So far we have been considering community sentiment as the spirit animating the *common* interest in the community, and the peculiarity of this common interest is its broad or inclusive character. It is attached not to specific objects but to the whole background of daily life, to place and folk together. It embraces both *what belongs to us*, the heritage of tradition, the position we occupy in the community, the possessions and the familiar features of the greater home, and *what we belong to*, the obligations and responsibilities that hold us within the accepted order of life. These strands are variously interwoven into the community sentiment. The common interest here as elsewhere combines with the self-limited interest in various proportions, that is, with the perception of the private benefits and advantages, perhaps also with the sense of the prestige or the privilege or the power, that our particular community bestows on us. But in so far as the common interest reaches, it is an attachment directed towards the inextricable unity, for the minds of those who feel it, of the place and the group. It is no simple bond. We should not think, for example, of mere kinship as the condition of coherence in a primitive group. It is the kin as occupying a terrain, and without this qualification we can understand neither the nature nor the limits of the attachment. This point is well brought out in Lowie's little book, *The Origin of the State*.⁹ He points out that among various primitive peoples in the administration of justice and the prevention of internecine strife the principle of the territorial unity of the group is at work. "Not only do local ties coexist with those of blood kinship, but it may be contended that the bond of relationship when defined in sociological rather than biological terms is itself in no small part a derivative of local contiguity."

⁹ Cf. R. H. Lowie, *op. cit.* (New York, 1927), Chap. IV.

Indications of community sentiment.—Common living on a common soil engenders distinctive likenesses in the members of a group, and the recognition of these in turn reinforces the community sentiment. They are revealed in the peculiarities of speech which characterize different regions, for the genius of the spoken tongue is perhaps the most subtle index of the character of a group. There are turns of speech, idioms, peculiarities of pronunciation, special words, and uses of words which characterize localities, although the more extreme distinctions, such as dialects, are being diminished by closer communications and easier and more frequent contacts between community and community. But every community has its own distinctive marks of some sort, its local habits and customs, its local spots of interest, sometimes its peculiar beliefs and superstitions or its own folk tales and myths. Thus the members are likely to be, not only physically but also psychically, nearer to one another than to those outside. One indication is the love of gossip about neighbors. It is more interesting to talk about those who belong to the same community. What they do excites a more intimate emotion than the more intrinsically significant acts of those who are more distant from us. This interest is nowadays generally supported by a local press, which gives far more space to the daily life of the community than to the events of the outside world. Other indications of community sentiment are the belief in the excellence of local products and the pride in the success or prestige, particularly outside the community, of a community member. These attitudes do not necessarily imply that the members of a community feel a strong devotion to one another—gossip, for example, has often a spice of maliciousness, and men often condemn conduct in their neighbors which they would condone in strangers. Rather they reveal that the members of a community feel a peculiar interest in one another, that they contrast themselves with the members of other communities, and that they appreciate more vividly and with a warmer imagination what anyone in their own group does or suffers.

Changing character of community sentiment in the modern world.—We have seen that there are many ranges and degrees of community in the modern world. The civilized man does not belong to one inclusive community, but to nearer and wider communities at the same time. He is a member of various associations, so that his social interests become specialized. Part of the allegiance that formerly men gave to their local communities tends to be transferred to specific interest-groups. The development of communica-

tions enables them more and more to transcend the limits of any one community. As a result the community loses much of its former coherence. This is obvious in the large city. The newcomer, for example, does not enter into the community as a whole but rather affiliates himself with those organizations within it to which his previously developed interests attract him. He joins a club, a nationality group, a trade-union, a church, and so forth. These interests are not, for the most part, focused in the particular neighborhood in which he settles. For him—or for the established city-dwellers even—the neighborhood as such scarcely exists. Another evidence of the lessening of the coherence and intensity of the local community sentiment may be found in many rural neighborhoods, as they come more and more within the orbit of some urban center. The automobile, the radio, the invasion of the urban newspaper, the coming of the chain store, and generally the increasing dominance of the city which we have already dwelt on, weaken the attachment to the locality and reduce the number of interests which depend upon it. The contacts with the city become both more numerous and more important.¹⁰

But the sentiment of community is deeply ingrained in man, and when it loses one outlet it seeks another. Under modern conditions civilized man, seeking for unity in his social life, has tended to find it in the sentiment of nationality. This relatively modern form of community sentiment is of such importance for the understanding of the social structure and raises such problems concerning its future development that we must examine it more closely.

NATIONALITY AS A TYPE OF COMMUNITY SENTIMENT

What is nationality?—In the world of our present-day civilization the nation is the largest effective community. By this we mean that the nation is the largest group which is permeated by the consciousness of comprehensive solidarity. There are interests which extend far beyond national frontiers, there are international associations of many kinds. But there is as yet no international community in any effective degree. The expansion of community has so far not prevailed against the barriers of the state. But the nation itself has all the earmarks of a community. This becomes clear if we examine the nature of the sentiment which animates it. Like all communal

¹⁰ Cf. *Recent Social Trends*, Chap. X, "Rural Life," by J. H. Kolb and E. de S. Brunner.

sentiments—as contrasted, for example, with class-consciousness—it is essentially democratic. In other words, it admits no grades, no hierarchy of membership. It does not exclude the poor or uncultured, it does not distinguish between the highborn and the lowborn, the intelligent and the stupid. It is the attachment to the most clearly defined order of life that the modern world presents, since the state with its determinant frontiers both sets a limit to it and organizes it under a system of laws.

Hence the sentiment of nationality does not depend on peculiar interests or specific attributes attaching to all the members of a nation. It does not depend on speech or race or economic interest or religion or physical type or even history. The Swiss are a nation, but they have no common speech. Race, for groups on the scale of a nation, is never an exclusive common possession, and even the sense of common race, delusive as it is, is a bond of union which many strong nations do not need. The Americans are a nation, though they are so obviously composed of the children of many races. What conditions then does the sentiment of nationality demand? What differentiates it from the felt unity of the tribe or of the village? We find the answer in the relation of the nation to the state, which has developed in the history of nation-making. There are nations which do not rule themselves politically, but we call them nations only if they seek for political autonomy. This is the only criterion which enables us to distinguish the nation from other groups. The Jews, for instance, are a race-conscious people, but we would not apply to them the term “nation.”¹¹ So we define nationality as a type of community sentiment, a sense of belonging together, created by historical circumstances and supported by common spiritual possessions, *of such an extent and so strong that those who feel it desire to have a common government peculiarly or exclusively their own.* It will be seen that we are defining the nation in terms of the sentiment which the members share. In this too it resembles other types of community. For while common territory and common living are the conditions of any community, they do not of themselves demarcate it—how much common territory, we might ask, how much common living? Just so much, our answer must be, as actually inspires the sentiment. As Oppenheimer says, “the consciousness of nationality makes the nation and not the nation

¹¹ We distinguish here *nation* from *people*, meaning by *people* any large group possessing some degree of cohesion but without implying a political or other specific bond of union.

the consciousness of nationality.”¹² Communities, for all their external marks, are not objective things, they are spiritual realities. The limits of community are psychological limits, and its expansion, in a world provided with the physical means of communication, is an expansion of attitudes.

Nation versus race.—A nation, so defined, is obviously distinct from a race. A race is often thought of as a group biologically different because representing a common and distinctive heredity. But strictly there are no pure races in this sense. What we can discover are characteristic physical types prevailing in some region of considerable size. We may call these types races, but we cannot regard them as the product of an exclusive heredity, since some inmixture of outside stocks is found in every large group and since the physical type itself has environmental determinants and is certainly subject to environmental selection. Much nonsense, inspired by group egoisms, has been written on races and race qualities, as though races were pure biological categories uninfluenced by environment and underived from the intermixture of diverse elements.¹³ But all these theories ignore or fail to understand the relation between life and environment with which we dealt in Chapter IV. Even the classification of races—Alpine, Nordic, and so forth—involves serious difficulties, and the races so distinguished are not found as integral social groups. It is only when we find marked social barriers between human types exhibiting physical differences, in other words where on a basis of physical differences reinforced by social-historical discrimination race-consciousness develops, that the tendency to intermixture is checked, and the discriminated groups stand out as races. This has determined the distinctiveness of the Jewish race, and is obviously at work in maintaining the broad color-divisions of humanity.

¹² Oppenheimer, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 644. Cf. Ramsay Muir, *Nationalism and Internationalism* (London, 1916), Chap. II: “In the last resort, we can only say that a nation is a nation because its members passionately and unanimously believe it to be so.”

¹³ Since this was originally written, a portentous addition to the pseudo-scientific identification of race and nation has been made by the Aryan theorists of Nazi Germany. As a corrective to these misleading representations see, for example, F. H. Hankins, *The Racial Basis of Civilization* (New York, 1926); F. Hertz, *Race and Civilization* (New York, 1928); T. R. Garth, *Race Psychology* (New York, 1931); P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, Chap. V. F. Boas, in his study, *Changes in Bodily Form of Descendants of Immigrants* (Washington, 1911), and in later investigations, presented evidence that even in a single generation environmental conditions may modify the physical type, and though these findings have been questioned, his evidences have not been disproved.

The ground of the sentiment of nationality.—On the scale of the nation, community sentiment must be reconciled with the fact that millions of people of every estate are equally entitled to share it and together constitute the object to which it is devoted. On such a scale it is hard to find like qualities characteristic of the group as a whole. A sense of unity undoubtedly permeates a nation, a sense of its distinctive qualities, traditions, and achievements. But when we seek for specific *likenesses* that characterize the members of any one nation in contrast to all others, we are faced on a larger scale with a difficulty inherent in the nature of all community sentiment. In the last resort it is rather what the members have in common than what they have alike that provides a sure ground for the sense of solidarity. There are indeed typical expressions of the character of a nation, revealed in art, literature, and historical event.¹⁴ But they are elusive, subtle, and variable, and most attempts to state them exhibit the uncritical egoism of the devotee who, in exalting his own nation, disparages the rest. On the other hand, most concrete representations of the national type are exaggerations or caricatures, such as the figures of John Bull or Uncle Sam. The Latin is thought of as logical and volatile, the Englishman as stolid and unemotional and a lover of sport, the Teuton as heavy and disciplined and thorough, the American as standardized, mechanistic, and engrossed in the pursuit of the dollar—though closer acquaintance in every case reveals the countless exceptions to the popular rule. The sentiment seeks higher ground in admiration of the cultural, economic, and political achievements of the group taken as a whole, but these achievements are the creation of the few, and the glory they reflect on the many who make the nation is of dubious validity. For lack of a specific object the sentiment is apt to take a traditional or mystical form, as seen in the adoration of the flag or other national symbol. It is difficult for the average man to grasp the content of the nation-idea, and therefore men are readily susceptible, especially in a crisis, to propagandist teaching. This is very obvious in time of war, when even the most cultured and the most scientifically trained are swayed by utterly misleading ideas about their own and other nations. The nation-sentiment has thus distinct affinities with the crowd spirit later to be described. It exhibits, in time of crisis, a characteristic emotional tone, the enlarged egoism, the irrational love and hate, the de-individualizing sense of absorp-

¹⁴ One of the more intelligent attempts to state some *typical* likenesses and differences will be found in S. Madariaga, *Englishmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards* (London, 1928).

tion, and the thrill of a vaguely conceived common purpose which are the universally recognized attributes of the crowd.

Diverse forms of the sentiment.—The sentiment of nationality consequently expresses itself in very diverse ways. In one form it coheres about the idea of the fatherland or the homeland, and when this thought inspires altruistic devotion it is properly named *patriotism*. The profession of patriotism may indeed be and often is a cloak for selfish interest or narrow conservatism or class pride or the hatred of other nations, but in itself patriotism is a deep communal emotion, capable of inspiring the most devoted and disinterested service, in peace no less than in war. In another form the sentiment of nationality turns into *nationalism*, an attitude of profound import for good and for evil in the modern world. Nationalism is the spirit which seeks to make the nation an effective unity. This spirit has developed remarkably in recent times. At the Congress of Vienna, after the Napoleonic Wars, the second French delegate was a Bavarian, and the councilors of Russia consisted of a Prussian, a Corsican, a Greek, and a Vaudois. The contrast between this situation and that of the conference which a century later met at Versailles, after the Great War, is most significant.

The nationalism that grew to strength in the nineteenth century demanded the unity and integrity of the nation, its political autonomy, its liberation from the dominion of alien powers. At this level it has been a powerful influence in the breakup of feudalism and in the making of modern territorial states. It has prepared the way for our modern democracies, since the demand for self-government expands into the demand that the nation really govern itself. Having assaulted the feudal dynastic order it assaults in turn the state which stands for a ruling class instead of for the nation itself. The spirit of nationalism has broadened the basis of the state. But nationalism, having achieved this goal, tends, like every other sentiment of solidarity, to become exclusive, and here its great danger lies, since the agency of exclusiveness is the armed might of the state. It serves well as a source of unity and harmony within the state, but it is dangerous when it denies the common interest that binds nation to nation, thereby defeating the true national interest itself. In this form it becomes *chauvinism*, which is intolerant and boastful, or *imperialism*, which seeks economic or political domination over others. The true service of nationality is as a basis for the pursuit of common interests, not as a line of demarcation cutting off the interests of one nation from those of another.

The spirit of nationality may therefore express a splendid ideal

of unity or else be a curse and a sword of division. For this reason it has been as much denounced by some as it has been extolled by others. The prophets of nationality, like Mazzini, have regarded it as the very breath of life stirring in a people, while Lord Acton, representing the opposite view, declared it an evil thing whose course "will be marked by material and moral ruin, in order that a new invention may prevail over . . . the interests of mankind."¹⁵ It is easy to find justification for either view, as we look on the constructive or on the destructive work of nationalism. Nationality has a high principle so long as the nation is itself in the making, and so far as, once the nation is born, it makes for harmony within it. But it is too easily turned into the fear and hate and contempt of other nations, too often made the specious cloak of selfish economic exploitation and political aggrandizement, too readily inflated with the pride and vainglory of the mob. In the modern world, as a limit to the range of community, nationalism is disastrous. It was in Europe that nationalism first became a potent force, but in Europe today we best see its evil aspects, not only in the smaller nations of the east but also in the great nations of the west. For its dividing walls disrupt the economic interest which they might share, and foster the deadly mutual distrust which leads to war. Western Europe exhibits the menace of opposing nationalisms to the unity or even the maintenance of civilization, while Eastern Europe presents the pathetic spectacle of small self-defeating nationalisms with their dreams of enclosed greatness, prevented from any hope of realization just because they are enclosed. Nationalism in these forms prevents the understanding of one nation by another and in its separatism it distorts all social values, creating false views of the condition on which alike economic wealth and social welfare depend.

Nationality and international order.—Yet, on the other hand, nationality itself is the condition of that further advance to internationalism which its extremest forms prevent. The extension of effective community beyond the limits of the state has for its prerequisite a system of nation-states. The unity cannot be secure unless the units are themselves real units. The growth of nationality has prepared the units. They rest on the conviction of each nation that each is a true community. It is this conviction which has brought Norway and Sweden, Belgium and Holland, Greece and Italy, and more recently the nations of Eastern Europe, into autonomous being as national entities. The process has meant and still means a serious disturbance of the former equilibrium; any further

¹⁵ *History of Freedom and Other Essays* (London, 1907).

advance is beset with grave practical difficulties. Nevertheless the practical necessities are more urgent than the practical difficulties. Civilization makes the world one, and our sentiments must ultimately adjust themselves to the facts. Traditional loyalties and traditional hates are resistant, but the lessons of experience may here as elsewhere be learned in time.

There are indeed serious obstacles to the establishment of an international order in which national communities will be effectively united, but the most serious is the atmosphere of emotional prejudice, the product of excessive nationalism abetted by the narrower interests of various economic groups, which beclouds the problems of international organization and prevents the application to them of scientific statesmanship. The nations are slow to realize the necessities imposed upon them by the growth of a world civilization. The expansion of civilization seems an irresistible process, an inevitable consequence of physical science. Social science, which, unlike physical science, must be the possession of the many if its fruits are to be attained, lags behind. The East, once thought so impermeable to such influences, is taking over the civilization of the West. Japan has done so already. China, which at first had merely suffered from its alien impacts, is beginning to do so in the very attempt to rescue herself from internal misery and external exploitation. India is learning from the West more lessons than the West wanted to teach. Turkey discards the insignia of her aloofness, the fez and the veil, and follows the economic and political pathways of the West. Russia, converted to an anticapitalist faith, only the more eagerly develops a program of western industrialization. Industry and capital, whether under the banner of socialism or of individualism, are making the world one civilization.¹⁶

COMMUNITY AND INTERCOMMUNAL DIFFERENCES

Differences that support the sense of community.—Every community is founded on the consciousness of solidarity which pervades its members, but that solidarity always admits, even in the smallest groups and most obviously in the larger ones, the presence of differences. There are differences which do not disrupt the sense of community; there are others which even support it; there are again others which weaken, threaten, and may at length destroy it. In the former categories belong functional differences which assign to

¹⁶ For the meaning of civilization, as employed here, see Chapter XIV.

members a recognized and accepted place in the social economy, and all such class differences as are rooted in a system of authority which holds the minds alike of the subordinated and of the superior groups. Caste itself, though it prevents the free participation in the affairs of the community of large sections within it, may, provided it conforms to the beliefs and indoctrinations of the great majority, be a strong social bond. For example, the reverence in which the Brahman is held by the lower caste orders in India is of vast significance in explaining the cohesion of Indian society. On the other hand, in a mobile modern society the differences between political parties, in so far as they are issues determined freely and fully by resort to the vote, are quite compatible with communal solidarity. For the implied agreement that all will accept the majority verdict involves that deeper sense of unity, that loyalty to the whole, which Rousseau named the "general will." This system, unlike the caste system, allows differences to express themselves freely, but it is practicable only in so far as the differences themselves are held subordinate to a fundamental unity, in so far as they are differences of policy with respect to commonly accepted ends. Given some basic agreement, there is room for the play of a thousand minor differences, competitive and other conflicts, which need not and normally do not impair the sentiment of community.

Differences antagonistic to the sense of community.—There are other differences which are prejudicial and may even prove fatal to the sentiment of community. In the days of classical Greece it was said that every city was two cities at war with each other, a city of the rich and a city of the poor.¹⁷ Economic disparity may prove a dividing sword, especially when associated with class distinctions which are no longer tolerable to the subject classes. These dissensions are aggravated by conditions involving rapid change when a feeling of the instability of things is combined with a sense of social injustice. And it has often been remarked, since the observation was first made by Thucydides, that the crisis of war precipitates such economic cleavage.¹⁸ Often the immediate effect of war is to stimulate an intense solidarity within the belligerent community, obliterating or overwhelming the strife over domestic issues, but as the war continues or after it is finished, the strains and pressures it creates and the attitudes bred by the resort to force are apt

¹⁷ Plato, *Republic*. iv, 422.

¹⁸ "In peace and prosperity communities and individuals alike are better disposed, but war is a violent master and assimilates the temper of most men to the existing state of things,"—Thucydides. iii, 82.

to accentuate old differences and to breed new ones. It has been observed from ancient times that an aftermath of war is class war. No better illustration of this old principle could be found than the intensification since the World War of class struggle as a result of economic pressures and privations. Most of the countries that suffered the stresses of war have undergone or are still undergoing a stage of extreme unsettlement in which bitter internal strife threatening to disrupt the national community succeeded the feverish absorption of all energies in war aims. In some countries, such as Russia and Italy and Germany, the struggle ended only in the complete suppression of one or the other of the contending sides. In others a state of high tension persisted or still persists.

A further type of difference which always threatens solidarity is that which is expressed in race-consciousness. For racial antagonisms are bitterly subjective. They are easily inflamed and most apt to blind men to a reasoning consideration of their common interest. Even in long-established communities they not infrequently remain half-submerged, ready to intensify other disturbances, as in the situation of the Swedes and the Finns in Finland or of the Flemish and the Walloons in Belgium. Differences of speech, as in the instances just mentioned, tend to perpetuate racial distinctions. So do marked external signs of race—what Park calls “racial visibility.” The most conspicuous of these signs is color, and the “color line” is thus the most formidable barrier to solidarity where groups of different color meet. Another important though diminishing danger to solidarity arises from the contact within a community of different strongly dogmatic religions. “How can we live at peace,” said Rousseau, “with those whom we believe to be damned?” In many civilized communities a partial answer has been found to this question, but in others—in India, for example, where Mussulmans and Hindus meet—religious difference is still a grave cause of division.

The three types of difference we have mentioned—economic, racial, and religious—sometimes separately, but often combined in various degrees, have been throughout history the great precipitants of civil war and revolution. Such convulsions are relatively rare, but the differences themselves are generally operative to limit or thwart the sentiment of community. Of the three the economic is the most universal breeder of dissension. The conflict of the “haves” and the “have-nots” is everywhere latent or active, even under communism. There is no prospect that it will wholly disappear, but its revolutionary forms are the product of sheer destitution or

ruthless exploitation, and these conditions at least it is within the power of social intelligence to abolish.

Immigrant groups and communal solidarity.—The American continent offers peculiar opportunities for the study of the manner in which the growth of communal solidarity embracing groups of diverse origins and national characteristics is advanced or retarded. Immigrant groups, entering a social environment which at first is alien to them, tend to cherish their old customs and seek, through the establishment of clubs, institutions, newspapers and other agencies of intercommunication, to guard their group traditions and group individuality. By such means they mitigate the abruptness of the transition to the new life, provide themselves with a temporary status and often support a self-respect which the sudden impact of an alien environment might otherwise endanger.¹⁹ But gradually, unless strong social discriminations are roused by racial or religious prejudice, these groups become integrated within the larger community. This process will be examined at a later stage. It will suffice here to point out that the principle of communal solidarity does not demand uniformity, the elimination of differences, and least of all is achieved by coercive suppression, as a myriad historical instances, from the fate of the Israelites in Egypt to the subjection of the German-speaking groups in the Austro-Italian Tyrol, sufficiently reveal. What instead is requisite are conditions under which the diverse groups can learn to feel "at home" in the community, thus spontaneously establishing habituations which assure a sufficient sense of familiarity to permit them freely to participate in its life.

The disintegration of community through the clash of cultures.—A very different and far less soluble problem is presented by the situation arising when groups representing peoples of markedly different cultural levels live together in the same area. One of the broad social tragedies of world history is the destruction of the communal spirit of primitive peoples under the impact of alien civilizations. The civilized people impose upon the primitive their laws and their morals, their industrial methods and their mechanisms, bringing also their unwanted services, their vices, and their

¹⁹ Interesting examples are given in R. E. Park and H. A. Miller, *Old World Traits Transplanted* (New York, 1921) and K. Bercovici, *Around the World in New York* (New York, 1924). The nature of the problem is well revealed in E. S. Bogardus, *Immigration and Race Attitudes* (Boston, 1928). A comprehensive review of the whole subject is offered in L. A. Dawson and W. E. Gettys, *Introduction to Sociology* (New York, 1929), Chap. VIII-XIII, following mainly the treatment of Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago, 1924).

diseases, destroying the old habituations and the ancestral customs, sometimes through the misguided zeal of ignorant missionary enterprise but often through the greed of economic exploitation. Thus have the Maoris perished and the Andamanese, thus have the ancient peoples of South America been wiped out, thus have the Fijis and the Hawaiians and many Indian tribes dwindled to insignificance. A few examples of fine restraint relieve the dark picture of communal disintegration presented so frequently in Asia and Africa and Polynesia, but the economic and military power and the scornful superiority of the civilized peoples have made mutual accommodation difficult and often impossible.²⁰ In the relationships of civilized and primitive peoples solidarity in the strict sense is ruled out, not merely because of differences in power but also because the civilized people have the ever-present and not unreasonable fear that the admission of the native to equal participation in communal rights would lower or imperil their own cultural standards.

Another scarcely less difficult, if less tragic, situation is that of the meeting of alien cultures each of which asserts its own superiority while one is politically dominant over the other. A case in point is that of the British and Indians in India. Certainly Britain could not have maintained so long its now precarious Indian suzerainty if it had not been respectful of the custom, the rule of life, of the politically subject culture. In fact, as Maine pointed out, "a nervous fear of altering native custom has, ever since the terrible event of 1857, taken possession of Indian administrators."²¹ But while respect for native usage is the basis of comparative harmony when the subject people is on a distinctly lower cultural level, it proves quite inadequate when that people has reached the stage in which nationalism awakens, as the Indian situation has more recently illustrated.

Some conclusions.—The fuller consideration of these problems is beyond our present scope. What we have sought in general to show is that the solidarity of a community depends not on the absence of differences within it but rather on the absence of certain barriers to the liberation and the consequent modification or adjustment of these differences. In this respect the chief barriers to

²⁰ On the problem of accommodation see James Bryce, *The Relations of the Advanced and the Backward Races of Mankind* (Oxford, 1902). An example of comparatively successful accommodation is suggested in M. Mead, *Coming of Age in Samoa* (New York, 1928).

²¹ Sir H. Maine, *Village Communities* (New York, 1889). The "terrible event" is of course the Indian Mutiny, which developed out of the infringement of native custom.

solidarity would seem to be: (1) the coercion of group by group within the community—this need not be physical coercion but may be social and economic pressure or discrimination directed against politically disfranchised groups, economic classes, racial or religious minorities; and (2) the lack of those free contacts which mitigate both cultural and physical aloofness—cultural aloofness as expressed in the contempt of group for group, a feeling which often means the failure of one to comprehend the life of another, and physical aloofness which prevents the expansion of any community sentiment, as exemplified in certain ethnic blocks of the western prairies and particularly in extreme separatist groups such as the Mennonites, Doukhobors, Hutterites, and similar bodies. Often these settlements have an intensely communal life of their own, but under conditions which prohibit their participation in the wider community.

IX

CLASS AND CASTE

THE CLASS PRINCIPLE

Definition of social class.—We pass from the community, viewed as a whole, to the divisions within it. These divisions are primarily social classes, the stratifications of society. They are different from mere associations, in that they are, like the community itself, more or less spontaneous formations expressive of fundamental social attitudes, not simply instrumentalities for the furtherance of particular interests. The class system, as we shall see, emanates from and profoundly influences the whole mode of life and thought within the community.

But first we must explain the sense in which the term “social class” is here employed. A “class” may mean any category or type within which individuals or units fall. We may speak, for instance, of bachelors or novel readers or theatergoers or social reformers as constituting a “class.” Here we are not dealing with a group, in our sense, at all. We may speak of artists and doctors and engineers as classes. Here we are thinking of occupational categories, but not of coherent groups definitely related to one another in a social structure. These are, to use a common expression, at most “vertical” divisions of the community, whereas the divisions which are of real moment for the understanding of the class principle are the “horizontal” divisions, those which involve comparative status, a graded order. Wherever social intercourse is limited by considerations of status, by distinctions between “higher” and “lower,” there the class principle is at work. *We shall then mean by a social class any portion of a community which is marked off from the rest, not by*

limitations arising out of language, locality, function, or specialization, but primarily by social status. Such a subjective factor involves also, as a rule, objective differences, income levels, occupational distinctions, distinctions of birth, race, culture, and so forth, within the society. But these differences, apart from a recognized order of superiority and of inferiority, would not establish cohesive groups. It is the sense of status, sustained by economic, political, or ecclesiastical power and by the distinctive modes of life and cultural expressions corresponding to them, which draws class apart from class, gives cohesion to each, and stratifies a whole society.

It should be observed that we have not defined social class in purely economic terms. This alternative mode of definition, generally maintained by the followers of Karl Marx, stresses a very important factor that commonly underlies class distinctions, but it is inadequate sociologically for two important reasons. In the first place there are class differences which do not correspond to economic differences. In the Hindu caste system members of the highest or Brahmin caste, without diminishing their "social distance," may be the employees or servants of members of a lower caste and very inferior to the latter with respect to wealth. Again, an old-established landed class frequently regard themselves as socially superior to an industrial class of *nouveaux riches*. In the second place the concept of class loses its sociological significance if it is *defined* by any purely objective criterion, such as income level or occupational function. Class does not unite people and separate them from others unless they *feel* their unity or separation. Unless class-consciousness is present, then no matter what criterion we take, we have not a social class but a mere logical category or type. If "white-collar" workers do not regard themselves as belonging to the same class as artisans, then they do not together form one social class. There is no social group whose members do not share some sentiment of what they have in common, and we cannot, without destroying the very meaning of the term, make class an exception to this rule.

The definition of social class offered by the great German sociologist Max Weber is an interesting attempt to give prominence to the economic aspect while still retaining the essential subjective element. Class he defines as the community of those who as a group have the same lot in life, or the same "life-chances," as determined typically by material possessions, rank or station, and cultural factors.¹ This is a more satisfactory definition, but it has a clearer application to the more integrated forms of class, such as caste or

¹ *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen, 1922), III, Chap. IV.

feudal class than to the looser class distinctions of a competitive modern society. Hence we prefer the definition we have offered above.

Class and occupation.—For reasons already given we cannot identify social classes with occupational categories, or more broadly with the social functions of different groups, although there is an intimate historical association between mode of occupation and social class. Class distinctions rest in the last resort not on function but on *status*. By status we mean here the social position which determines for its possessor, apart from his personal attributes or social service, a degree of respect, prestige, and influence. The distinction between a class order and a functional order is well illustrated by the elaborate classification adopted in the 1911 Report of the British Registrar General, in which the population is grouped under the following main divisions:

- Class I. Capitalists, enterprisers, managers, scientists, artists, professional workers, etc.
- Class II. Small shopkeepers, artisans where work contains some element of the artistic and creative, and the lower (operative) ranks of the professional, scientific, and artistic groups. Farmers, i.e., agricultural employers.
- Class III. Skilled labor, including transport service, metal trades, building, furnishing, leather, paper trades, etc. Domestic service.
- Class IV. Labor requiring a lower grade of skill, where strength is usually essential.
- Class V. Unskilled labor. Street traders, etc.

These five categories may be taken as constituting an economic hierarchy or status-system, but only with important qualifications. If we take only the broad divisions, such as that between the wage-earning and the professional classes, between the salaried and the *rentier* classes, between employer and employee classes, or between skilled and unskilled labor, the factor of status is obviously present. But within some of the major divisions, and particularly in Class I, there are numerous differences of status, which depend only in part, if at all, on occupation. In fact, while the main groupings are seemingly based on status, the subclassifications are solely determined by function. Status, unlike function, is a subjective variable. If the student asks himself how far the classes from I to V in the above list correspond with such degrees of status as may remain in present-

day Soviet Russia, he will see that the relation of function and social class varies with the conditions.

The student might ask the further question whether a class-ranking of occupations in the United States would not differ in some respects from the classification given above. He will notice, in particular, that farmers are included under Class II, intermediate in position between the professional class and the class of skilled workers. In a country less industrialized than England the farmers would naturally constitute a whole class by themselves, and they reveal in a very interesting way the nexus between occupation and status. Formerly there were two great classes associated with the soil, the landowner and the land-cultivator or peasant. Through the introduction of a money economy and other far-reaching social changes, and in North America through the parceling out of the land into homesteads or small farms, an intermediate class of owner-cultivators rose into prominence. They differ from the "free" husbandmen and yeomen of earlier days in that they are no longer dominated by a landowning aristocracy. This difference is accentuated in North America by the greater mobility of the farming class, as witnessed by the fact that in recent years one-tenth of the total farming population has migrated every year to the towns or back to the farms.² Thus the land loses its old character as a family inheritance and becomes more nearly an investment of capital, like any other. These farmers employ few laborers outside of the members of their own families, and their relation to the hired worker, who is often a temporary or occasional helper, is entirely different from that of the landlord to the peasant. In fact the peasant in the old sense has dwindled with the decay of feudalism and in North America is practically nonexistent. Consequently the social and economic difference between the owner-farmer and the tenant-farmer has diminished, and the two together form an agricultural class with common interests and common problems, with common characteristics arising from the nature of their occupation, with a more or less common standard of living, and a common class-consciousness. They form a social class as we have defined it, for the factor of status is bound up with their mode of living, their sense of proprietorship, their relatively low and inelastic income, their economic solidarity set over against that of other groups, and their relative, though diminishing, segregation from the cultural influences which

² R. Heberle, *Über die Mobilität in den Vereinigten Staaten* (Jena, 1929), Chap. III, § 5.

play upon urban populations.³ Here we have in fact the whole complex of factors which is requisite for the constitution of a social class.

The basis of class distinctions.—The class principle is clearest when status is associated with one controlling factor around which the others cohere. This is witnessed to by the fact that the commonest as well as the oldest social classification is a dichotomous one. Its various forms distinguish the few and the many, the gentry and the commonalty, the elite and the masses, the privileged and the disprivileged, the free and the servile, the rich and the poor, the ruling class and the ruled, the educated and the uneducated, the productive and the unproductive (or leisure class) and, in Marxist formula, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. A dominant factor is also obviously present in such tripartite divisions as "upper," "middle," and "lower," or in the feudal distinctions of nobility, burgher, and peasant. One of the most interesting examples of a class system based on a single characteristic, in this instance detached from the other factors usually associated with class, is the reversal of the historical hierarchy by the Soviet state, in the order of the workers and peasants, professional groups, and traders.

It may be noted that in the simpler societies the various factors in the class complex cohere more closely, so that the system is more compact and more stratified at the same time; whereas in the mobile capitalistic societies of the modern world they tend to become dissociated, so that class demarcations are blurred. Under the latter conditions, wealth takes on a more determinative role, and wealth, though in degree associated with mode of living, cultural opportunity, occupational advantage, and political power, is of all attributes the most detachable from personality and from cultural attainment. Particularly in a democracy are the older bulwarks of a class system undermined, so that whatever cohesion that system still possesses depends mainly on the influence of wealth. The older determinants may still modify or limit it, but they can hardly prevail against it.

In America, for example, the descendants of the *Mayflower* or of the Fathers of the Constitution, the established families of New England or of the South, the Colonial Dames or the Daughters of the American Revolution, may assert counter claims of class distinction, but a study of even the "Social Register" shows with what limited success, particularly outside a few strongholds of old tradition, such as Boston or Richmond. Or a broader class distinction

³ For a detailed analysis of the social status of the farmer class see Sorokin and Zimmerman, *op. cit.*, Chap. III.

may be asserted in the name of the pride of race, such as that between the West European stocks and the "new immigration," between the Gentile and the Jew. But these barriers do not create clearly defined social classes, and some of them seem to be transitional lines, becoming less determinative in the degree in which cultural differences between groups are merged in the new environment. Only the racial barrier of color completely resists the triumphant claim of wealth to be at length the chief determinant of class, and this defeat is less decisive because of the general poverty of the colored people.

When wealth is an important class principle, especially in a capitalist system where it may be acquired by individual ingenuity or enterprise or cunning or by the turn of fortune's wheel, classes themselves are less fixed, less cohesive than under other conditions. This fact is seen in the contrast between our own and the feudal class system. Under the latter status was more rigid, being predetermined by birth. In medieval times a man was born to his estate in life, and the chance of a transition to another was small, though possible avenues of advance were provided by the army and the church; today his personal aptitudes, and more especially his aptitude for money-making, decide the degree of probability that he—and still more his children—will "rise in the world." Opportunity in this regard is still far more limited for the very poor, but it is never wholly closed. This relative fluidity of the modern class system is correlated with other features of it. In feudal days a different costume marked off the lower classes, different modes of living, of recreation, and so forth. Today all classes follow the same fashions and all view the same spectacles and entertainments, the difference lying in the expensiveness, and therefore in the relative advantage, of the location. Today the class system is a gradient; in feudal times it was a series of disconnected stages.

Caste as unchangeable status.—The feudal order approximated to a caste system. When status is wholly predetermined, so that men are born to their lot in life without hope of changing it, then class takes the extreme form of caste. This is the situation in Hindu society. "Every Hindu necessarily belongs to the caste of his parents, and in that caste he inevitably remains. No accumulation of wealth and no exercise of talents can alter his caste status; and marriage outside his caste is prohibited or severely discouraged."⁴ Caste is a complete barrier to the mobility of class. In principle it involves an

⁴ *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, 1930* (Cmd. 3568), Vol. I, Chap. IV.

absolute and permanent stratification of the community. The levels or strata are kept apart by the exclusion of the lower from the more intimate forms of social intercourse with the higher, and especially by the ban of intermarriage, by the observances of obeisance due from the lower to the higher, and by the reservation of honorable ceremonies, functions, and occupations to the higher while certain despised offices are relegated to the lower. In India, with its multitudinous caste compartments, the higher caste groups, at the top the Brahmin and next in order the Kshatrya and the Vaishya, are thought of as beings of different clay from the low caste group of the Sudras, while still further beyond these lie the "outcasts," the "untouchables," whose very presence is a defilement to the rest, who pollute food and water by their touch, and who in some regions may not even approach the neighborhood of the high-caste Hindu. The idea of defilement is common in every caste system and it reveals most clearly how caste prevents the common participation of the various groups in the communal life. Sometimes an outcast group is associated with one particular occupation, like the blacksmiths of the Masai tribes.⁵ A similar phenomenon appeared in the Middle Ages and has left traces even to our own day, in the relegation of moneylending and other financial operations to the Jews.

The rigid demarcation of caste could scarcely be maintained without communal disruption were it not for strong religious persuasions. It is only the hold of religious dogmatism over the mind, with its supernatural explanation of things otherwise unreasonable, with its doctrine of the elect and of the "pale," with its attribution of a mystic cleanness and uncleanness, with its instillation of reverence and awe, and with its overruling conception of the sacred and the profane, which could maintain a social equilibrium on the disjunctive principle of caste. We know little of the origins of caste. We may conjecture that it arose out of the subjection or enslavement incident to conquest and perhaps also out of the superposition of one endogamous community on another. But the power, prestige, and pride of race thus engendered could give rise to a caste system, with its social separation of those who are not set apart by clear racial signs, only as the resulting situation was rationalized and eternized by religious myth. As Max Weber observes, caste signifies the enhancement and transformation of social distance into a religious or, more strictly, a magical principle.⁶ One can reasonably call

⁵ Cf. Lowie, *The Origin of the State*, Chap. II, with quotation on the Masai from M. Merker, *Die Masai* (Berlin, 1907).

⁶ *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* (Tübingen, 1923), II, p. 44.

it a magical belief that makes the shadow of an "untouchable" or even his unseen presence in the vicinity a source of pollution, that forbids him to enter the same temples as the higher castes, and that attributes to the latter, as "twice-born men," a virtue and a sanctity entirely independent of any human standards of valuation.

CLASS ATTITUDES AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

Class sentiment versus community sentiment.—We turn to the inner aspect of class, the sentiment which inspires the relations of men towards the members of their own and other classes, establishing that social distance which is the essential feature of class distinction.⁷ Class sentiment, as was suggested in the last chapter, exhibits striking contrasts with community sentiment. If the latter admits no grades, the former is founded on the principle of hierarchy. The sentiment of class is above all a sentiment of disparity. It does indeed unite those who feel distinct from other classes, but it unites them primarily because they feel distinct. Above all, it unites the "superior" against the "inferior." It emanates from the belief in superiority, so that class division is really imposed on the lower by the higher classes. Hence class sentiment involves entirely different attitudes, with respect to one another, of the various groups within the hierarchical system. In so far as tradition rules, the attitude of the lower to the higher is one of respect and subservience, while the higher exhibits condescension and patronage to the lower.⁸ Since intermediate classes look both ways, class feeling under such conditions differs most markedly at the two ends of the social scale. If, on the other hand, tradition weakens and class struggle emerges, the attitudes of the opposing classes—one conservative and striving to maintain, the other radical and striving to overthrow an order—cease to be complementary and become as different as the social values for which they respectively strive. Class sentiment has thus no generic quality comparable with that of com-

⁷ As P. Sorokin points out (*Social Mobility* [New York, 1927], Chap. I), the concept of social distance as applied to class distinctions has nothing to do with personal liking or aversion. A "gentleman" and his valet may be very fond of one another, but they regard themselves as occupying different stations in life, and the difference controls their relationships. *Social distance* is the bar to free intercourse between individuals which arises from their belonging to groups rated as superior or inferior in status. It is hardly necessary to add that "superior" and "inferior" are here used with no implication of differences of character or intellect.

⁸ For a fuller list of upward looking and downward looking attitudes see Chapter II.

munity sentiment. Moreover, class sentiment and community sentiment operate to limit and restrain one another. The one divides those whom the other integrates. In less mobile societies communal tradition, religion, custom are so strong and pervasive that the dividing influences of class or caste cannot prevail against them. In more mobile societies the counteractive play of the two types of sentiment is particularly noticeable. For example, the competitive spirit of class expresses itself in the restlessness of fashion as against the stability of custom. This aspect of class sentiment will be more fully discussed when we come to deal with these phenomena.

The two main types of class sentiment.—Some kind or degree of class sentiment is practically universal in human society. The communist ideal of a "classless society" is by no means fully realized in communist Russia, where there remain different degrees of prestige attaching to occupation, party membership, and political position. There are class distinctions in Negro Harlem no less than in Park Avenue. There are class distinctions between the inmates of prisons. As one ex-convict saw it, "There is no more caste in the heart of India than in an American penitentiary. A bank burglar assumes an air with a house burglar, a house burglar sneers at a pickpocket, a pickpocket calls a forger 'a short-story writer.'"⁹

But while class sentiment is so pervasive, its range, character, and social implications are very different under different conditions. In particular, a distinction should be drawn between *corporate class-consciousness* and *competitive class feeling*. We think of class-consciousness as a sentiment uniting a whole group who occupy a similar social status, but there is a more personal form of class sentiment which frequently determines the conduct of individuals towards one another without involving on their part any express recognition of the whole groups to which they respectively belong. Class feeling in the latter sense is one thing, the feeling of class solidarity or corporate class-consciousness is quite another. When Mr. A blackballs Mr. B from membership in his club, he does not usually think of himself as thereby upholding the standards or the interests of a whole class of Mr. A's; when Mrs. A patronizes Mrs. B or refuses to call on her, she does not on that account feel her solidarity with a whole order of the "superiors" of Mrs. B. The response is immediate, specific, personalized. This quality of class sentiment is characteristic of the competitive system of modern

⁹ Jack Black, "Burglar Looks at Laws and Codes," *Harper's Magazine*, Vol. 160 (1930), 306-313.

society rather than of a caste-divided structure. In modern Western society, class solidarity, as we shall see, arises chiefly under the spur of strong economic incentives, and it is most apt to gain strength at the extreme ends of the economic scale, in the struggle to maintain or to destroy a predetermined status. It is "Society" on the one hand and the low-paid wage-earning groups on the other who most clearly exhibit class-consciousness in this sense.

The sentiment of class, in fact, takes a different range as well as quality according to the degree in which the element of caste is present. When a man's lot in life is fixed by anterior social conditions, he more readily identifies himself with the whole group of his fellows subject to the same conditions. If the mores of an authoritative religion hold sway, so that the members of the group accept the "duty," in the language of the English Book of Common Prayer, "to order themselves lowly and reverently to all their betters," then the class-consciousness of the subject class is a conservative influence. If the old mores break, as they do in the process of industrialization, then this class-consciousness becomes a powerful engine of social change. In either event the solidarity of class-consciousness depends on the sense of a sharp cleavage and of a barrier under existing conditions insurmountable. The situation is very different where there is "vertical mobility," more specifically, where the belief prevails, supported by instances, that a higher status may be individually acquired or that a present status may be lost. Such a situation breaks the solidarity at least of the socially subordinate classes. In North America particularly the man in overalls or the clerk has before his eyes the examples of those who from the same station have risen to social power and economic affluence, and the more ambitious and energetic members of these classes are buoyed by the prospects of a like success.¹⁰ Consequently they do not feel that permanence of station which creates solidarity and stimulates class organization. Class sentiment may be even stronger than among groups with rigidly determined status, but it now becomes localized. The class system is no longer tier above tier, but a continuous incline. Class struggle resolves itself into the ambitious striving of individuals and families to maintain their place and still more to "rise in the world." Appearances consequently count for more, since class is judged by external signs. The standards and

¹⁰ It is hardly possible to compare the degree of vertical mobility for different times and different countries. Sorokin, *op. cit.*, Chap. XVII, compiles some evidences of the greater divergence between the occupation of fathers and sons in Western societies, which however is an indication rather than an index of vertical mobility.

modes of living of the higher prestige groups are imitated by those below them. The phenomena so caustically described by Veblen in his *The Theory of the Leisure Class* are in evidence—the emulation, competition, display, and the “conspicuous consumption of valuable goods” which signalize a class order dominated by the principle of wealth.¹¹ As Veblen himself pointed out, somewhat similar phenomena may be observed in precapitalistic societies. The institution of the potlatch characteristic of certain Pacific Coast tribes offers a curious example. The potlatch is a distribution of gifts by which a man of substance acquires renown within the tribe. The recipients are under customary obligation to return the gift two-fold at some later date, and if they cannot they lose prestige. Often the potlatch takes the form of a lavish feast in which a man seeks to outbid his rivals. Sometimes this rivalry is manifested in the deliberate destruction of property. “A chief will burn blankets, a canoe, or break a copper, thus indicating his disregard of the amount of property destroyed.” And if this competitor cannot follow suit, “he is vanquished by his rival and his influence with his tribe is lost.”¹²

The Marxist philosophy of class.—This competitive spirit is so distinct from corporate class-consciousness that the two are fundamentally antagonistic. The former expresses in greater measure the individual or self-limited interest, the latter insists on the *common* interest of the class. The contrast is excellently illustrated by the position taken by Karl Marx and his followers in their endeavor to accentuate in the working classes the consciousness of their corporate unity. While they professed as their final goal the abolition of social classes altogether, their immediate objective was the solidarity and consequent organization of the whole class which they called the proletariat. In seeking it they not only subordinated those sentiments which unite classes, and above all the sentiment of nationality, they also minimized the distinctions that exist within each class. They insisted on the common status, common conditions, common interests, common subjection of one main class, and on its economic, social, and even cultural separation from the other main class, the bourgeoisie. To them the wage-earning class was essentially homogeneous, and the competitive struggle for position between its members

¹¹ Thorstein Veblen, *op. cit.* (New York, 1922), Chap. IV.

¹² F. Boas, *The Social Organization and the Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians* (Washington, 1897), pp. 353 ff. The copper is a copper plate of particular shape which has a conventional value, representing often a large number of blankets. Its sale takes place at festivals, and the value of a copper depends on the amount of property distributed at each festival at which it is sold.

was inimical alike to their general interest and to their solidarity. Hence the program summed up in the famous words of the *Communist Manifesto*: "proletarians of the world, unite."

But certainly in the countries of western civilization the Marxist dichotomy is too simple and sweeping to fit the facts of the class system. So broad a division and so sharp a cleavage is more applicable to a feudal order, such as that of prerevolutionary Russia, than to a complex industrialized society. The Marxist class philosophy became a historical factor of vast significance, the full outcome of which we cannot foresee, but it became so because it gave a vision and a policy to propertyless and often exploited industrial groups. In Russia, a country industrially undeveloped and lacking the "middle classes" of industrial and urban civilization, the chaos and disaffection created by a disastrous war and an incompetent autocracy gave to a small group of very remarkable men the opportunity to rebuild a whole vast society on Marxist principles, but even under these conditions it meant and still means the rigorous suppression of the spontaneous forces which in every social order generate major and minor class distinctions. Under the more complex conditions of western society the Marxist system reveals its inadequacy as an interpretation of the social fact. On the one hand there are many influences uniting the classes which this system sets in stark opposition to one another. On the other hand there are many variant and intermediate forms of class sentiment which cannot be fitted into the system.

The cultural resemblances of social classes vary greatly in extent and intensity according to the conditions. We saw that caste itself generally exists only on the basis of a common culture, especially in the form of a dominant religion. In the feudal world we can trace the expansion of common thought forms, such as the official Christian conception of marriage and the family, over all classes of society. In the modern world the facilities of communication greatly increase the cultural homogeneity of classes. This fact is indicated in a thousand ways. Even when certain cultural influences appear at first in the higher economic classes, such as the influences leading to the decline of the birth rate, they permeate rather quickly to the lower economic classes.¹³ As E. A. Ross points out, cultural influences radiate from the prestige groups until the whole society is leavened by them.¹⁴ The attempt therefore of the Marxist advo-

¹³ Cf. Chapter XXIII, page 436.

¹⁴ *Social Control* (New York, 1901), Chap. XXVI.

cates to distinguish a bourgeois from a proletarian culture is more in the nature of propagandism than of an objective interpretation.¹⁵

Moreover, the scheme ignores the class sentiment as well as the social importance of all those who are grouped together as the "middle classes." It is an unjustified simplification of the facts to group together, over against the "proletariat," the classes of officials, the professions, the civil servants, the shopkeepers, the farmers, the technicians, the "white-collar" groups, as though they exhibited either the solidarity or the mentality of a single great class. It is unjustifiable to think of them all as belonging with the large capitalists and financiers. If they are united, it is only in a negative position, as being generally antisocialistic, but this is hardly enough to constitute them a social class. They differ widely in their social stations and ambitions. Their economic interests are diverse and often conflicting. Marx, centering his interest in one class, is led to group all the rest of the population as an opposing class, ignoring the fact that they lack the like attributes and the common station which class designates. On the other hand, even his "proletariat" class exhibits in a complex society such divergence of class attitudes that its unity is doubtful. In America, for example, the class distinction between skilled and unskilled wage earners is so great as to frustrate the class solidarity which he sought to arouse. In many respects, as the history of the American Federation of Labor has shown, the social attitudes of skilled labor resemble those of the *petite bourgeoisie* more nearly than they do those of the lower economic categories of wage earners. The opposition of the small capitalists to the "big interests" is another indication that the Marxist classification was too simple and too propagandist. Marx believed in a "law of the accumulation of capital" which would reduce an ever-larger portion of the population to the proletariat class.¹⁶ In other words, he thought of the middle classes as a merely temporary obstacle to his system. But, although he proved right in predicting the tendency towards a greater concentration of the *control* of capital, his prediction regarding the dissipation of the middle classes has not in any degree been confirmed by the course of recent history. The evidences which we possess, in the form of income-tax returns, statistics as to the number of small investors, and so forth, resist any such conclusions.¹⁷

¹⁵ I have heard a Marxist exponent refer even to "bourgeois" astronomy.

¹⁶ *Capital*, I, Part VII, Chap. XXV.

¹⁷ Some Marxist writers do maintain that the middle class is in process of dissolution. Thus Lewis Corey (*The Crisis of the Middle Class* [New York, 1935], p. 15) claims that even in the United States the middle class is "struggling

CLASS AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

How the class system reflects the character of the community.—

The class system at any time reflects and also profoundly influences the whole life of a community. Its relation to the whole social structure is apparent if we contrast briefly the character which it assumes in various countries. Thus in the United States we find a lack of formal class distinctions, considerable class mobility, a relative absence of cultural barriers between classes, and, on the positive side, some degree of correlation between class lines and nationality or race distinctions and a high development of wealth prestige or plutocracy. In England, by contrast, we find still, in spite of the power of wealth on the one hand and of political democracy on the other, deep grooves of class superiority and inferiority, an established, if no longer unchallenged, aristocracy, supported by still prevalent traditions and traditional attitudes, as witnessed by the subservience of many groups towards their social "betters." In France, since the Revolution, we find the social dominance of a middle or bourgeois class, with surviving localized aristocracies. In Germany we find the abrupt though long-prepared transition from a feudal, military class structure, the collapse under military defeat of the social prestige of a landowning aristocracy, and the subsequent suppression, under middle-class leadership, of the proletarian class movement. In Russia, we find a class system unparalleled in the history of mankind, a system under which prestige and privilege belong to the proletarian, so that "the very word proletarian is the highest badge of honor in the land."¹⁸

This catalogue, showing the differences of class system corresponding to general differences in social structures, might be continued indefinitely, but we will conclude it with the remarkable contrast exhibited in this respect by India and China. In India we have a vast society deeply permeated by the immemorial tradition of caste, so that every aspect of life, religion, education, occupation, social intercourse, is governed by its rigid code of distances, even though at length the growth of nationalism is showing some signs of undermining it. In China, on the other hand, we have the contrary

for survival," and that it is now "composed overwhelmingly of propertyless elements whose interests are identified with the abolition of capitalistic property." But in our sense of the term there is no social class without class sentiment. The existence of a social class must depend not on anyone's judgment of the "real interests" of any group—on that, of course, opinions are bound to differ—but on the actual attitudes and interests (in our sense of the term) that they reveal.

¹⁸ M. Hindus, *Humanity Uprooted* (New York, 1929), Chap. XI.

spectacle of another vast society in which class distinctions play a very minor part—so overwhelming has been the value attached to the family as such that loyalty to this organization has outweighed other considerations in determining the respect which a man receives from his fellows.

How the class system affects the character of the community.—

The character of a class system, whether it be closed and rigid or open and mobile, whether it make birth or wealth or military prowess or occupation or cultural quality the main determinant of social distinction, has a profound influence on modes of living, on the ideals of the group, and on the whole process of social selection. It is obvious, for example, that a caste order discounts intrinsic merits and capacities and by denying opportunities for advancement to those who belong to the lower castes deprives itself of the potential contributions which might emanate from their ranks. We may reasonably infer that in so far as any society limits opportunity to privileged groups within it, that society is needlessly losing the aptitudes and talents which might otherwise be brought to light within the ranks of the unprivileged. The established fact that many more persons of personal distinction and high social achievement arise in the higher income groups in proportion to their numbers, while often used as an argument for the intrinsic superiority of those groups, might with at least as much logic be made an argument for the expansion of opportunity.¹⁹

A further serious penalty of a system which limits the evocation of intrinsic merit is that it establishes other than merit standards, and therefore false standards, in the privileged class. This penalty attaches not only to the caste system but also to the competitive plutocratic system. Under the latter not only is a condition peculiarly detachable from personal quality—the amount of one's wealth—made a ground of esteem, but also the keeping up of appearances becomes an end of life. "Good form," the conventions and shibboleths of the prestige group, is apt to assume an importance superior to character. The gain sought by the social climber is a purely relative one, so that the satisfaction of success is speedily dimmed by the new comparisons which each new step on the ladder brings into view. In the middle classes particularly "respectability" is apt to become a fetish. It becomes the measure, for example, of a "good marriage," and it sets standards in the choice of mates which ignore the primary qualifications of eugenic fitness as well as considerations of personal compatibility. A good

¹⁹ See Chapter IV, pp. 75-76.

illustration of the opposition between class standards and intrinsic qualifications is also presented by the system of appointment and promotion in the military and naval hierarchy. Army and navy officers, especially in countries with long-established traditions, are peculiarly apt to form something resembling a caste, in which ability is subordinated to considerations of status, so that there is little promotion from the ranks to the officer grades in times of peace. But the stern necessity created by warfare alters the situation, gives the man of military capacity some opportunity to rise to command, and reveals the initial weakness of a system which identified the officer with the "gentleman."

On the other hand, there is an argument on behalf of the social function of an upper class marked off by predetermined status. This type of class system has been defended as a means of protecting and elevating culture standards, of developing a mode of living which stimulates refinement and prevents the encroachment of vulgarity, and of evoking and providing a market for artistic and intellectual abilities. The wonderful flowering of the artistic life in fifth-century Athens and under the patronage of the Medici in fifteenth-century Florence is cited as evidence of this function. Sombart in his studies of modern capitalism shows how modern luxury and the arts that minister to it were the offspring of the courtly establishments of the Middle Ages.²⁰ It is true that if a dominant class is itself cultured it will promote those cultural expressions which are not out of accord with its interests. It will promote, for example, the arts of painting and of music and of architecture rather than that free intellectual activity which tends to question the social *status quo*. Moreover, the basis of a class system is the possession of power, not of culture, and there is no historical evidence that power and cultural attainment must go together. Against the instances cited must be set many other examples of upper classes which did little to promote the development of the arts. Patronage is a precarious stimulant of artistic endeavor. Even the music-loving aristocracies of Central Europe kept Mozart and Beethoven in poverty and allowed Schubert to die in destitution. Class power is a close neighbor of class intolerance, and a dominant caste is more apt to dictate cultural conditions than to permit their spontaneous development. In countries where the great masses are sunk in poverty a dominant caste will certainly maintain a luxury otherwise impossible, and thus give an incentive to the finer arts and crafts, though it may involve further depression of the standards

²⁰ W. Sombart, *Luxus und Capitalismus* (Munich, 1913), Chap. IV.

of living of the rest of the population. In countries enjoying a wider distribution of economic prosperity the social function attributed to ruling classes may be more freely performed by the special culture groups which a more complex society produces. As Catlin points out, these culture groups are not necessarily power groups. The same writer suggests that in the development of such groups, "as men become more fully conscious of themselves and more educated in their own gifts," the future of the world would seem to lie.²¹

The transformation of class systems.—The intimate relationship between the class system and the whole structure of a society may finally be shown by the fact that in the historical process the transformation of classes has accompanied all great revolutionary movements. The governing elements of a society have generally represented a dominant social class, what Pareto calls an *elite*. The conditions on which their dominance rested are subject to change, and their power is threatened and finally overthrown as new elements rise to power. Pareto maintains that the fall of *elites* is due to their decline in relative numbers and to their decay in quality. Whatever the explanation, "history," as Pareto puts it, "is a graveyard of aristocracies."²² Their fall is at least the sign of important changes in the social structure. In ancient Athens, for example, the reforms of Cleisthenes and of Solon, reducing the political control of the old families, were made in response to deep-seated economic and social changes. In ancient Rome the status of the patricians was gradually undermined in correspondence with the conditions of an empire which, as it grew in extent, profoundly changed the distribution of wealth and poverty. In eighteenth-century France the aristocracy of a luxurious court disregarded the growing unrest of a population driven by economic pressures to an insurgence that at length abruptly destroyed the old order. The conditions which transformed feudalism into our modern state-systems brought also, both as consequences and as causes of that transformation, the enfranchisement of the serf, the disintegration of old classes, the rise of the burghers, the greater importance of office and function as against predetermined status, and finally that new power of the capital-owning classes which overcame the aristocracy of land-ownership. The new status of the industrialist and the financier reflected the new social economy, a transformation

²¹ G. E. G. Catlin, *A Study of the Principles of Politics* (New York, 1930), Chap. VII.

²² Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society*, III, § 2053.

which broke up old traditions and old thought forms, and which affected every aspect of life—morals, religions, philosophies, no less than the modes of work and leisure.²³ It brought with it also the phenomenon of a class to which the new conditions of industrial employment gave a cohesion and a degree of solidarity and of definite organization hitherto lacking, a class whose discontent with the economic system has become the main incentive of its unity. This phenomenon may prove to be one of the most important factors in the further modification of the class system of western civilization.

In America the process of industrialization and the transformation of classes took a somewhat different form from the European. The period following the Civil War witnessed a vast and sudden access of industrialism, in which an agrarian economy with its farmers, traders, and small individual capitalists, yielded before a system of "big business" and centralized finance, with its dominating magnates of steel and oil, of mine and railroad. The old traditions, whether of New England Puritan or of Southern gentleman, whether of the hardy pioneer or the thrifty artisan extolled by Franklin, could not resist the tide which carried to power the political boss and the trust-builder. The old "middle-class" conceptions of democracy, of individualism, of Jeffersonian equality were undermined by the new concentration and distribution of economic power on the one hand, and on the other by the new heterogeneity of a population to which successive waves of immigration added workers of alien culture and lower standards of living.²⁴ The old traditions have not perished but they have lost vitality. And in the process the present competitive and confused class system, with its strongly plutocratic tendencies, came into being.

²³ For the history of this class transformation see, for example, K. Bücher, *Industrial Evolution* (tr. Wickett, New York, 1901).

²⁴ Interesting indications of the changes here summarized may be found, for example, in V. Parrington, *The Main Currents of American Thought*, especially Vol. III, *The Beginnings of Critical Realism in America* (New York, 1930).

X

THE HERD AND THE CROWD

THE HERD SPIRIT

Distinction of the herd from the crowd.—Many writers on the crowd do not distinguish it from the herd, but although the two have resemblances they differ in important respects. Strictly speaking, human societies are never herds, and when we apply the term to social manifestations we are really imputing to them attributes which we find more simply and more clearly present in the behavior of those ranging aggregations of animals properly named "herds." As Hocking remarks, the nearest approximation to a true herd in the modern world is that somewhat rare phenomenon of social disruption, the "aimless migration of refugees."¹ The herd is, for certain gregarious animals, a permanent mode of life. The herd spirit, present even in civilized societies, is also a relatively permanent factor. But the crowd is ephemeral. It is not a mode of life but an incident, an eruption, a disturbance of a normal mode of life. Possibly it is what we name the herd spirit which reveals itself in the sudden concerted action of the crowd, but if so it is under conditions which never occur in the normal life of the herd proper. We can understand the crowd only if we perceive it as an unorganized grouping occurring within, and in contrast with, a system of social organization. A brief description of the herd spirit will prepare us to see the difference and may serve as an approach to the distinctive character of the human crowd.

The herd spirit is that type of imitative cohesion which prompts men when they conform blindly to the traditions and beliefs and

¹ W. E. Hocking, *Man and the State* (New Haven, 1926), Chap. XVIII.

ways of the group, when they approve of things because they are accepted and disapprove simply because they are divergent from the established norms, when they are moved by the slogans, the stereotypes, the conventions, the "idols," of their tribe. The herd moves as one, and we exhibit the herd spirit when our conduct is determined by the question, What do others think and feel about this, what is the *correct* thing to do? The herd spirit leads men to follow the band or to "get on the band wagon." It leads them to flock to the winning side in political elections and generally in matters of opinion. It leads them to cast out of their society those who do not worship at their own shrines, including those who are more sensitive, more intelligent, more independent, than themselves. The herd spirit, in a word, identifies mores and morals, conformity and solidarity. All who differ from its opinions are "undermining" the social order, morality, the constitution, the church, or whatever the firmament be to which they cling against the menace of change. Writers on public opinion have frequently pointed out the extent to which its expressions are animated by the herd spirit.²

Some manifestations of the herd spirit.—The herd spirit, however, is witnessed not only in the blind resistance to change but also in the gregarious pursuit of some superficial novelty. It operates in the acceptance of fashions no less than of mores. There are certain accredited leaders who can set the direction for the herd. Or again there is an apparently simultaneous discovery by the group that some new thing is the vogue, the craze—some song, some password, some parlor game, or whatever it be. These "crazes" come and go, and while their origin may seem mysterious, their departure is not difficult to explain, since the novelty on which their appeal depends soon wears off. A more significant manifestation of the herd spirit is the emotional epidemic which sometimes sweeps through a country or even a wider culture area. These epidemics give vent to emotions which are inherent in the beliefs or superstitions of the culture and which are roused to intensity by some accident, crisis, or conjuncture. They have frequently taken religious forms, as evangelistic revivals, where they occur under the stimulation of some leader who is either fanatical himself or else has learned the art of breaking the dams of religious emotion in his audience. Such epidemics conform to the prevalent tendencies of the communities and periods in which they occur and are accentuated in the degree in which superstition is unchecked by science and

² See, for example, P. Odegard, *The American Public Mind* (New York, 1930).

intellectual discipline. The Middle Ages were characterized by the crusades, the persecutions of heretics, the wild obsessions of witchcraft, the flagellant manias (in which people went about whipping one another). But perhaps no epidemic of that epoch rivaled in its strange release of fears and breakdown of inhibitions the dancing delirium which began in Europe late in the fourteenth century; sometimes the ecstatic bacchante outbursts were inspired by visions of the heavenly host, sometimes they took the form of demoniacal possession, while in Italy the strange belief arose that these dances were the antidote to the deadly bite of the tarantula (a harmless spider) the fear of which became a general delusion.³ The herd terror of demons was prevalent in the centuries which followed, and no inhumanity, no torture, was too fiendish to be visited on those who were supposed to be possessed by evil spirits. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries a very different type of epidemic developed, expressive of a new social economy, the speculative contagions which were represented by the Dutch tulip mania, the South Sea Bubble, and the Mississippi Scheme. In modified forms, with the development of stock markets, these speculative fevers have recurred down to the present.

Like-interest and common-interest types of herd spirit.—Observe that the types of herd manifestations we have just been discussing are inspired mainly by self-regarding fears and hopes—individual fears of demons, hopes of individual salvation or of individual profits. They fall therefore in our category of like-interest social phenomena—conveyed by suggestion, under appropriate social conditions, to whole groups. From these we must next distinguish another very significant type of herd expression, through which is manifested the sense of common interest, the deep “instinct” of community. Any occasion which suddenly touches the sentiment of community is apt to stimulate an emotional impulse of an epidemic character. It is seen on a smaller scale in the fervor which seizes a group when their college or city team is victorious against a rival. It is displayed more broadly when a whole nation is aroused by a national triumph of some simple spectacular sort, or by a disaster, or by a supposed insult to its honor. The crisis of war, or the menace of war, is peculiarly apt to evoke this tense communicable emotion, which engulfs each individual so that his individuality is lost while his egoism is enlarged. “We” have won, “we” have been insulted—in this “we” he is emotionally absorbed, in this

³ For an account of this and other epidemics see B. Sidis, *The Psychology of Suggestion* (New York, 1911), Chap. XXVIII.

"we" his native egoism is exalted and liberated from social pressures because its goal is now identified with that of all the rest. It is an immense simplification of thought and feeling, a sudden resolution of the problem of his relation to society. That his individuality is lost in the process, that deliberation and reasoning are overwhelmed, do not concern him while the fever lasts. His pride, his itch for power and glory, his desire to love and to hate, are given an unwonted social justification. At the same time that he feels one with his fellows he is free to indulge the passions which society under normal conditions holds most in check. This double release is correspondingly powerful.

These various epidemics suggest the gregarious nature of human beings. In the herd, as Sidis points out, the sensitivity to common danger and the rapid communication of the sense of danger through the suggestible "subconscious" mind is a factor of safety. These tendencies in civilized life may be survivals from a remote past, ill-adapted as they often are to the conditions of modern society. They often give rise to the phenomenon of the crowd, but as we have seen they occur on a far broader scale.

THE CROWD

Definition.—The crowd is the most transitory and unstable of all social groups, yet it exhibits characteristics which not only are highly significant in themselves but also throw light on the very nature of the social bond. Consequently the study of the crowd has been a favorite meeting point of psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists. The crowd belongs to our category of unorganized groups. We mean by this not that the crowd exhibits no patterns, no characteristic modes, but that the units in it are not organized in relation to one another. It may be instigated into being, but it falls into no predetermined order. It may be led, but only whither its own impulses direct. It owes its peculiar qualities, as we shall see, to this fact that it arises only in the interstices of social organization.

The crowd proper we distinguish as a physically compact aggregation of human beings brought into direct, temporary, and unorganized contact one with another. It is quickly created and quickly dissolved. It is an unorganized manifestation occurring in a world of organization. There are of course myriads of casual meetings of friends, acquaintances, or strangers occurring at all times in every society, occurring on the street, on the house porch,

on the Pullman car, in the business office, and so forth. These unorganized meetings differ from crowds in that they are "face-to-face" meetings and that they are on a much smaller scale. Numbers are necessary to make a crowd, and the numbers are randomly contiguous. In the latter respect the crowd differs from the organized group, such as the assembly, public meeting, reception, and so on, where the participants fall into a predetermined order and are arranged according to some principle of selection. The borderline case is that of the group which casually gathers to listen to an orator in a park or public square. Here the organization into which the group falls is reduced to a minimum, that of a circle of listeners around the focus of a speaker. In the crowd mere conjuncture takes the place of any definite order controlling the relation of each to each.


Thus we might speak of the crowd which participates in some organized public demonstration or celebration, referring thereby to those who are merely aggregated in a mass during the occasion. If, instead of being aggregated, they fell into lines and formed a marching procession, then they would cease to be a mere crowd in our sense of the term, though the name would properly apply to the groups of people who from the sidewalks watched the procession march through the streets.

The like-interest and the common-interest crowd.—We can now distinguish two main types of crowd, corresponding to our two types of herd manifestation. Compare, for example, the crowd that gathers to watch a fire or an accident with the crowd that participates in a popular celebration, in a strike demonstration, in a riot or a lynching. The former is a like-interest crowd. It is brought together by the curiosity of individuals who happen to be in the vicinity. It has no common purpose. Each person could satisfy his curiosity much better if he were not incommoded by the presence of the others. There is no doubt an enhancement of the curiosity of each from the presence of numbers; there is the possible thrill of being in a crowd as well as the thrill of watching the fire. But the immediate object of each does not need the presence of the rest. There is a common external focus of interest but not a common interest. This character is still more obvious in crowds composed of persons seeking at the same time, and to the inconvenience of one another, to board some means of transportation, to enter a theater or a stadium, and so forth. The like-interest crowd can do nothing *as a crowd*. If it breaks out in protest against some inconvenience which it suffers, it is transformed into a common-interest

crowd and its nature is radically changed. If it decides, say, to put out the fire which it is watching or to render aid in some accident, it at once undergoes organization, falls into an order, and ceases to be a crowd at all.

From the sociological standpoint the common-interest crowd is far more significant. If all crowds arise in the interstices of organization, this type comes into being to do something for which the existing machinery does not provide. The occasion may be a sudden need, a crisis, a spontaneous outburst of group joy or hatred, a festival, the death of a hero. Crowds of this sort are not necessarily antagonistic to the established order. But there are also crowds which break through the trammels of organization. Sometimes they merely manifest a desire to escape the discipline, the pressure of regimentation, seeking release through some common spontaneous activity, as college youths are apt to do under some incitement such as the victory of their team. But sometimes they arise to protest against, to defeat, even to destroy order itself. A lynching crowd is an example, or again the crowds which have signalized all revolutionary movements. Such outbursts offer the most remarkable revelations of the inner nature of the crowd.

We may now classify crowds, for sociological purposes, as follows:



We should, of course, remember that crowds, like other social groupings, may exhibit a mixture or combination of like-interest and common-interest elements, but, because of their short-lived nature and the relative simplicity of their manifestations, it is generally easy to determine whether the like or the common interest predominates in them.

The crowd spirit.—Crowds differ greatly in spirit according to the character of the interest which pervades them. If it is a general or vague like interest, such as that of the crowds who promenade

the streets during intermissions of work or in the evening, most of the characteristics which are usually attributed to the crowd-phenomenon may be absent. Some occurrence may make the like interest of such a crowd more specific—a parade or an accident, for example—and at once an elemental curiosity gives the crowd a focus of attention and thus evolves its particular attributes. There is the jostling, the excitement, the loss of poise, the simplification of purpose. If the occurrence touches more nearly the vital concerns of the assembled persons, the peculiar quality of crowd sentiment and crowd conduct reaches a height. There is a sudden communication and cumulation of emotion, a loss of the sense of responsibility, a breakdown of inhibitions, abrupt and unconsidered movements, violence and impetuosity. Under such conditions the crowd overthrows the standards and the habits which the education and discipline of civilized life had built up in its members. It lives at a more primitive level. The mental organization which distinguishes the man from the child is in abeyance. How sudden and overwhelming this change from normal mentality may be the phenomenon of panic reveals. With appalling swiftness an orderly audience can, on an alarm of fire for instance, be transformed into a maddened crowd, heedless to every consideration beyond the blind impulse of flight. It is the stampede of the herd over again, but now demolishing all the reserves of reason and all the resistances of civilized habituation. This disastrous victory of primal instinct, in situations which demand the greatest resourcefulness of the trained reason, is what gives the crowd its peculiar and sinister fascination.

But the full significance of the crowd spirit is seen most clearly in the behavior of the common-interest crowd. Now the crowd senses its own solidarity. In the like-interest crowd the presence of the others at least partially interferes with the desire of each constituent—in the panic it is often fatal to these desires. But in the common-interest crowd the presence of the others supports the desire of each. Numbers give strength to the protest, to the celebration; numbers make possible the destructive fury, the storming of Bastilles. In all crowds the close physical contacts, the multitudinous swaying motions, the gestures, the murmurs or shouts, are conditions of a characteristic excitement. In the common-interest crowd there is a further condition, the “cause” which leads each to identify himself with all the rest. The others are with him, on his side. This participation brings an emotional release, a social sanction for individual irresponsibility. The sense of absorption is in-

tensified. The social impulse, released from the bonds of organization, runs wild.

Without organization, its emotion heightened while the capacity to reflect is lowered, the common-interest crowd can do nothing constructive. It may express tumultuous admiration of its heroes, it can cheer and wave its banners. But its impulse to action is most likely to find a destructive outlet. To destroy requires neither system nor deliberation. It is easy to cast stones, to trample a man down, to maim and kill. Perhaps too, under the conditions of crowd excitement, hatred and revenge are more easily stimulated than love and admiration, though Martin seems to go too far when he speaks of the crowd as always "a creature of hate."⁴ Certainly the crowd easily finds a victim or an enemy and is very open to suggestions of punishment or vengeance. This spirit of the crowd seems to communicate itself to the guardians of order who oppose its excess, so that they are frequently accused on such occasions of needless cruelty and violence. The mere suggestion of a victim not infrequently turns a peaceful crowd into a raging mob, offering a vent to the restless undirected energies let loose within it.⁵ And since in organized society the impulse to hate and to destroy is that which is most held in check, the release is all the more violent as well as the more congenial to the unreasoning and no longer restrained spirit of the crowd. Perhaps it is a similar release which accounts for the thrill aroused by rumors of war in some normally peaceful and otherwise reasonable persons.

Interpretations of crowd behavior.—Various attempts have been made to interpret the peculiarities of crowd behavior. Some writers hold that the removal of inhibitions which characterizes it brings into play not only the consciously repressed desires of men but also those hidden and unconscious desires which the discipline of normal life has buried. The suggestibility, the exaltation, the lack of self-consciousness, the egoistic expansion, which the members of the crowd exhibit, are phenomena susceptible of this kind of Freudian explanation. The "censor" within man is set aside, and the primitive or infantile nature, the dream life, comes to the surface.⁶ Others maintain that in the crowd, with the loss of individuality, a form of group-consciousness develops, a fusion of mind with mind, a sympathetic participation of each with each on the emo-

⁴ *The Behavior of Crowds* (New York, 1920), Chap. V.

⁵ By a mob is here meant simply a crowd in motion.

⁶ The basis of this theory, adopted for example by Martin, is to be found in Freud's *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, and in various other works of the psychoanalytic school.

tional level which is common to them all. The crowd becomes so attuned that it responds only to the appeals, the slogans, the ideas which are conformable to this de-individualized mentality.⁷ The Freudian explanation, it should be observed, does not need this postulate of a group-consciousness, nor does there seem any adequate reason for describing the rapport of mind to mind under the influence of crowd excitement as implying anything that could properly be termed a single controlling "collective mind" or "collective representation."⁸

Practically all theories of crowd behavior agree that the peculiar manifestations of the crowd are the expressions of impulses repressed or thwarted by the conditions and social controls of everyday life. The Freudian theory goes farther, assuming that it is not merely the thwarted conscious impulse that asserts itself but some deeper-lying elemental urge which is identified with the primal aspect of human nature. That it is necessary to make any such assumption is far from being established.

Evocation of the crowd spirit.—A study of the actual conditions under which the peculiar mentality of the crowd develops is illuminating. Always there is something which touches some strong elemental emotion. (In the common-interest crowd a blinding emotion suffuses the militant sense of solidarity.) In the panic it is the emotion which the threat to self-preservation evokes. In the crowd that makes a "run on the bank" and in the crowds that assemble in a stock-market crisis it is the sudden dread of impoverishment. In the harvest festivals and other dance celebrations of primitive peoples the emotions associated with sex are stimulated, as also in various "carnivals" among ourselves. Sex emotion seems also to be prominent in crowd phenomena which ostensibly arise from quite different motivations, such as certain types of religious "revival" or those lynching outbreaks which "uphold the honor of white womanhood." The fierce vindication of the established norms of sex relationship which characterizes both these types of crowd may be regarded as a mode in which repressed sex tendencies take their revenge.

Given the emotion-evoking occasions, various devices may be deliberately employed by leaders or "agitators" to enhance the crowd

⁷ A statement of this explanation is given in Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 893 ff.

⁸ On the subject of the "collective mind" see the author's *Community*, Book II, Chap. I. § 3. It is interesting that McDougall (*The Group Mind* [Cambridge, 1920], Chap. II) rejects the hypothesis of a group-consciousness while still adhering to the formula of a group-mind.

spirit. The skilful politician, the evangelist, the fiery "patriot," the advocate of class war, the tribal witch doctor, all use similar methods: on the one hand the tricks of mannerism, gesture, and voice which rivet attention on the speaker, and on the other the reiteration and cumulation of images and ideas which present reality in the colors of the dominant emotion. Some types of political leader, especially such as have come into positions of power or influence in times of stress, emergency, or crisis, depend peculiarly on their ability to sway crowds, to re-excite by various spectacular devices the crowd emotions that first raised them to prominence or place. The revivalist preacher depends also, in his own way, on his ability to arouse an intense crowd emotion in his hearers, and the techniques he uses, the modes in which he conveys vivid visions of hell and salvation to create the hectic crowd atmosphere he requires, are also instructive.⁹ The "spell" of the orator lies in this, that he enlists on the side of the prevalent state of feeling the reasoning power which previously was resistant and critical of it, but he usually achieves this end by dulling or, as it were, by hypnotizing the reasoning power itself. The crowd is persuaded by arguments that addressed to its individuals in isolation would fail to convince, and it is credulous of statements that in their normal mood its members would more cautiously scrutinize. The wildest rumors gain credence in a crowd in proportion as its excitement grows, and in turn they increase its excitement. A similar condition, apart from the physical crowd, occurs in herd manifestations in time of war. The crowd, like the nation in wartime, is so attuned that it accepts as truth every calumny cast at its enemies while convinced of the splendid righteousness of its own cause.

Aside from the factitious stimulation of emotion by the arts of the leader, there is a spontaneous accumulation of excitement within the crowd once assembled. There is what McDougall calls "sympathetic induction," the symptoms and expressions of emotion coming to each constituent as a mass influence and heightening the fever in each.¹⁰ As the mood of each grows into conformity with that of the others they all tend to exhibit simultaneous and rhythmic gestures.¹¹ The group sways and surges in unison. It is significant in this regard that primitive peoples often employ the reiterated monotonous beat of a drum or other percussion instru-

⁹ For an illustration see Kimball Young, *Social Psychology* (New York, 1930), pp. 516-517.

¹⁰ McDougall, *op. cit.*, Chap. II.

¹¹ Such rhythmic swaying movements of arms and bodies are frequently used on the stage to convey the effect of crowd emotion.

ment to evoke an orgiastic spirit. Similar devices are used in the more fervent displays of religious emotion which characterize the assemblies of the Shakers or the "Holy Rollers," and the "wakes" and "revivals" of Negro communities. These reveal in an extreme manner the hypnotic quality which Le Bon and others have attributed to the crowd. By the religious devotees, as of old by the followers of Orpheus or Dionysus, it is felt that "the Spirit" or "the God" has taken possession.

The crowd and the primitive sense of society.—The manifestations of crowd feeling deserve study not only because they reveal the significance of this transitory form of aggregation, but also because they throw light on other social phenomena. Some element of crowd contagion is often present in the more ordered assemblies of men, even though the fact of organization hinders its free expression and development. The audience that listens to a public address, the spectators who watch a game or other spectacle, the members who take part in a parade are all liable to the influence of the crowd spirit; and if anything occurs which suddenly arouses them above the normal pitch they may easily break altogether loose from the bonds of organization and for the moment become a mere crowd. Moreover, the study of the crowd illuminates the principle of solidarity itself. For the crowd exhibits the social impulses as it overflows the channels of custom and habit, and thereby exhibits the undifferentiated gregarious sense which in more limited, refined, and specialized forms animates our social contacts. In the crowd we return to the primitive feeling of society, at once simple and profound, wherein differences are submerged, where all act as one man. But it acts as no one man would act in his ordinary senses, for the crowd, waving its banner or shouting its slogan, is under a spell. It is back to the world of magic, where things happen unaccountably. Thus though it often means well, it can rarely act well. The very law of its being renders it unthinking in its love and ruthless in its hate.

In conclusion, the crowd offers a special opportunity for the emergence of the herd spirit. But that same spirit has other avenues of expression, apart from the physical crowd. These avenues of communication are increased by the technical facilities of communication. The press, for example, is often an agency for its transmission and development. It may suggest that a foreign people or an opposing political party or any group, religious, racial, economic, which can be distinguished in some simple way from the group to which it appeals, is essentially inferior, suspicious, evil,

designing. The herd emotion coheres around the "consciousness of kind" when the "kind" to which we belong is set in sharp contrast with some other. This primeval emotion, based on one simple distinction, refuses to make any other, for that would threaten its sway. Intelligence is the ability to make distinctions, and this ability is in abeyance. Hence the prejudicial quality of this undiscerning herd emotion in a modern society, where groups of all kinds are in necessary contact. Hence the peculiar danger of its manifestation in international relations, where it deludes peoples into destructive antagonisms though their interests are interdependent. Hence, finally, the need for that social education which calls on us to resist those herd emotions based on simple unreal dichotomies of good and evil by which our individual discernment is liable to be overthrown.

XI

THE FAMILY

SOCIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FAMILY

The family in general.—In our study of the social structure the family serves as a bridge between the community and the association. It satisfies this role in a twofold manner. In the historical process the family grouping has been transformed from a more or less self-contained and self-sustained unity into a definite and limited organization of its adult members, and especially of the original contracting parties. On the other hand, the family, even in the most differentiated societies, serves as a community for the lives born within it, gradually relinquishing this character as they grow towards adulthood. The family, more profoundly than any other organization, exists only as a process, and we can understand it only through a study of its changes, the changes it has undergone in the history of the race and the changes which occur within it in the life history of each individual example. In our treatment of the family we must therefore anticipate the subject of the last division of this work, where we take up the general theme of social change.

At the outset, in view not only of the varying forms which the family assumes but also of its varying degrees of attachment to some larger kin-group, the sib or clan, it is important to explain the sense in which we use the term "family." *The family is a group defined by a sex relationship sufficiently precise and enduring to provide for the procreation and upbringing of children.* It may include collateral or subsidiary relationships, but it is constituted by the living together of mates, forming with their offspring a distinctive unity. This unity has certain common characteristics every-

where in human society, of which the following five are particularly significant: (1) a mating relationship, (2) a form of marriage or other institutional arrangement in accordance with which the mating relation is established and maintained, (3) a system of nomenclature, involving also a mode of reckoning descent, (4) some economic provision shared by the members of the group but having especial reference to the economic needs associated with childbearing and child rearing, and generally (5) a common habitation, home, or household, which, however, may not be exclusive to the family group.

While these five conditions are so universal as to seem essential to the very nature of the family, they may be met in extremely different ways. Every possible variety of way is found somewhere in the map of human society. The mating relation may be life-long or of shorter duration. It may take the institutional form of monogamy, which may be strict or modified by subsidiary sex relationships, socially accepted or otherwise, or it may be polygamous, involving either polygyny or polyandry. Even a form of group marriage is sometimes found. It may be socially compulsory to marry within a group to which one belongs (endogamy) or else to marry into another group (exogamy). Different societies have differing prescriptions as to the prohibited degrees of relationship within which a man or woman may not marry. Descent may be reckoned through the male or through the female line (patrilineal or matrilineal). The husband may, in accordance with usage, join his wife's people or the wife may join her husband's, the residence in the former case being termed "matrilocal" and in the latter "patrilocal"; and there are even instances where there are annual alternations between the patrilocal and the matrilocal abodes.¹ The rights of the parties with respect to the ownership, control, use, and transmission of property take many forms. Various customs qualify the main distinctions here outlined, such as the admission of concubines in some forms of the patriarchal family or the practice of wife-lending in guest hospitality as found in American Indian and numerous other tribes. The varieties of the family are endless, and the range of its functions, no less than the mode in which it performs them, varies enormously.

Distinctive features of the family organization.—Of all the organizations, large or small, which society unfolds, none transcends the family in the intensity of its sociological significance. It influences the whole life of society in innumerable ways, and its

¹ R. F. Fortune, *The Sorcerers of Dobu* (New York, 1932).

changes, as we shall see, reverberate through the whole social structure. It is capable of endless variation and yet reveals a remarkable continuity and persistence through change. It is in many respects unlike any other association, having besides those already suggested the following distinctive features.

(1) It is the most nearly universal of all social forms. It is found in all societies, at all stages of social development, and exists far below the human level, among a myriad species of animal. Almost every human being is or has been a member of some family.

(2) It is based on a complex of the most profound impulses of our organic nature, those of mating, procreation, maternal devotion, and parental care, and is fortified in man by a highly significant and close-knit group of secondary emotions, from romantic love to the pride of race, from the affection of mates to the desire for the economic security of a home, from the jealousy of personal possession to the baffled yearning for perpetuity.

(3) It is the earliest social environment of all the higher forms of life, including man, and the profoundest formative influence of the awakening lives of which it is the source. In particular it molds the character of the social being by the impression both of organic and of mental habits.

(4) It is of necessity a group very limited in size, for it is defined by natural or biological conditions which it cannot transcend without losing its identity. Hence it is the smallest in scale of all the organizations that make up the social structure, and especially so in civilized society, where it is most completely detached from the kin-group.

(5) It is the nucleus of other social organizations. Frequently in the simpler societies, as well as in the more advanced types of patriarchal society, the whole social structure is built of family units. Only in the higher complex civilizations does the family cease to fulfill this function, but even in them the local community tends to remain a union of families. One of the first definitions ever given of a community made it "a union of families," and for the local community the definition, with some qualification, still holds today.²

(6) It makes more continuous and greater demands on its members than any other association is wont to do. In times of crisis men may work and fight and die for their country or their state, but they toil for their families all their lives. The family leads men—and women still more—to perform for others than themselves the most exacting tasks and to undertake the heaviest

² Aristotle, *Politics*. iii. 9, 1280 b.

responsibilities. We do not mean that the family makes its members to a high degree altruistic, nor, on the other hand, that these toils are undertaken as being a condition of the satisfactions that the family affords. The life of the family is too deeply rooted in primal impulses to be interpreted in this way, and is also too close to the fundamental need for society. These impulses lead men into the increasing responsibilities of the family and sustain them in the fulfillment of tasks which they did not foresee.

(7) It is peculiarly guarded both by social taboos and by legal regulations which rigidly prescribe its form. In the first place the marriage contract is more strictly defined than other contracts, the partners not being free to decide its terms nor to change them by mutual agreement. While the form of the marriage contract is very different in different types of society, in each there is a prevailing form jealously insisted upon. Among civilized people, though there are some partial exceptions to this rule, the family is the only association which the consenting parties may freely enter but may not, even by mutual consent, freely leave or dissolve.

(8) While the *institution* of the family is so permanent and universal, the family as an *association* is the most temporary and the most transitional of all important organizations within society. The contrast between these two aspects of the family is so significant, and throws so much light on many of the perplexing social problems that cluster about the family, that it demands our special attention.

The life-history of the individual family.—Each individual family is bound up and ends (if it lasts so long) with the life of the original partners. What we often speak of as an old-established family is really a succession of families bearing the same name and in some degree perpetuating the same stock. During this life history the family is recruited from within itself, and in this process the association undergoes the greatest, most inevitable, and most difficult transitions. It involves a continuous change alike in its interests and in its emotional foundations, a constant transformation in the relations of its members, old and new, to one another. So far as the original partners are concerned we can distinguish in the history of the normal family, among other stages not so clearly marked by external signs, the following four—the formative prenuptial stage, the nuptial stage before the arrival of offspring, the stage of child rearing, and the stage in which, the children no longer requiring parental care, the biological functions of the parents have been fulfilled. It is of course true that all families do not

pass through all these stages. Perhaps as many as one in five or six families are childless. Perhaps in as many as one out of five the progression is interrupted by death or separation or divorce before the final stage is reached.³ But these stages form an inevitable time-succession wherever the family endures and fulfills its primary social function. The length of each varies with the social conditions. Thus in modern civilized society the fourth and sometimes the second stage tend to be lengthened while the third stage tends to become a shorter span.

The first or preparatory stage is marked by an increasing intimacy of man and woman, an exploration or revelation by each of the personality of the other, or at least of those aspects of personality which a growing sex attraction emphasizes and heightens. This is generally the case even where economic or other social considerations are determinants of marriage, but it is particularly true where the sentiment of romantic love prevails. The second stage is the beginning of the family proper, the living together of mates, creating the environment of the home, evoking new experiences, initiating new attitudes of the partners towards society and of society towards the partnership, subtly establishing new habituations between the man and the woman. The third stage fulfills the family proper, linking the partners to one another by the vital link of their own children, the fruits of the sex union, introducing new sentiments which can fortify and in a measure replace the initial ones, bringing new interests and also growing responsibilities. The fourth stage comes with the liberation of the partners from these responsibilities, so that again, especially in these days of the limited family, new interests and new activities must take the place of old ones, more particularly for the wife on whom the heavier tasks of childbearing and child rearing had fallen. It would take volumes to describe the significant variations of human relationship which occur during this endlessly repeated process. In fact a very large part of modern literature is devoted to this subject, which in its detailed interest seems inexhaustible. The psychological adjustment of the members of the family to one another in the course of its inexorable changes creates perhaps the most important series of the numerous problems, personal and social, engendered by an association which affects so intimately and in such incalculable ways, which more than any other engrosses, expresses, and circumscribes, the

³ For statistical evidence see W. F. Ogburn, "The Family and Its Functions," in *Recent Social Trends*, Chap. XIII, pp. 689-691.

personality of man. Men and women are generically like, unlike, and complementary in divers respects.⁴ Thus the stage is set by nature for the innumerable complex situations, so rich in possibilities of harmony and disharmony, which, according to their circumstances and their individual characters, unfold for the members of the family partnership from its initiation to its close.

EARLY FORMS OF THE FAMILY

The theory of primeval sex-communism.—It seems established that so far back as we can penetrate into the conditions of the primitive human world we nowhere find a group in which some form of the family does not exist. Always we discover some form of mating, some degree of social regulation over sex relationships. It is, in fact, hard to conceive any order of society, and especially of primitive society, in which such regulation could be entirely absent. Some authors have put forward the theory that the "original state of mankind" was one of sexual promiscuity.⁵ But that doctrine has been weakened by the weight of anthropological evidence.⁶ The advocates of the theory adduced such evidences as the survival among primitive peoples of customs assumed to point back to a state of promiscuity, such as sex license at festivals, exchange of wives, the offering of wives as a form of hospitality; the *classificatory system* of relationship according to which all the members of a senior age-group are indiscriminately called "fathers" or "mothers," of a coeval age-group "brothers" and "sisters," while the children of that group are all "sons" and "daughters," and so on; and the ignorance of paternity which some anthropologists testify to exist among the Central Australians, the Trobriand Islanders, and other groups.⁷ But these evidences are precarious and cannot outweigh the fact that even in the most primitive societies known the family is thoroughly established. The classificatory system may be explained as a conventional device for social purposes, particularly the regulation of exogamy. Thus a man will distinguish his actual wife by

⁴ See, for example, Havelock Ellis, *Man and Woman* (new ed., New York, 1929).

⁵ So L. H. Morgan, *Ancient Society* (New York, 1907); and among recent writers R. Briffault, *The Mothers* (New York, 1927).

⁶ R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society* (New York, 1920), and B. Malinowski, *Sex and Repression in Savage Society* (New York, 1927), may be cited among many other authorities.

⁷ Cf. E. S. Hartland, *Primitive Paternity* (London, 1909); B. Malinowski, *The Father in Primitive Psychology* (New York, 1927).

some term signifying "own" while still applying the equivalent of "wife" to all the women from whom it is permissible for him to choose a wife, in contrast to those women, his "sisters," with whom marriage is prohibited under the rules of exogamy. This naming device is perfectly intelligible without any assumption of a prior promiscuity. The ignorance of paternity is still a debated subject, since it is not impossible that the assumed ignorance may be a social convention, and if it is genuine there remains the point that the family actually exists in a very definite form among the peoples which reveal it. Finally, periodic license is not incompatible with some forms of marriage system nor is there any necessity to assume that it is a survival. It is true that there are many primitive peoples among which practical promiscuity exists prior to mating, but always there is a mating or marriage system and often its rigorous regulation stands in sharp contrast to the premating license.

Was there an original form of family?—Students of primitive society have frequently raised the question, Which was the original form of the family, the type of which the others are derivatives? They have thought that an answer to this question would throw light not only on the evolution of the family but also on its essential character and its roots in human nature. It may be that the question is unanswerable, perhaps that it is wrongly put, but in view of the importance of the whole subject we shall consider some recent attempts to answer it.

The family has been held to have arisen as a specific form in consequence of some particular trait or "instinct" of human nature. The assumption that any deep-rooted social arrangement is the expression of some one particular attribute of humanity is a very dubious one and is very apt to introduce an undue simplification into the problem of origins. In his *History of Human Marriage* Westermarck supported the theory of Darwin that the family took shape from the operation of male possessiveness and jealousy, the dominant male claiming monopolistic rights and guarding them by force until they were secured by custom. Hence he regarded pair-marriage as the normal form which the jealous assertion of property rights took and traced the origin of monogamous marriage back to the subhuman world, maintaining that it prevails among the higher apes. While the traits to which Westermarck points have certainly been important factors, any theory which lays exclusive stress upon them is inadequate. This has been shown by Briffault among others, in his severe and well-documented criticism of

Westermarck's position.⁸ He illustrates abundantly the prevalence of matrilineal and matrilineal institutions throughout primitive society and the fact that in various primitive communities women hold a social position equal to and sometimes superior to that of men.⁹ He points to the ignorance of the fact of paternity exhibited by some primitive peoples. He shows the absence of jealousy and the absence of the love sentiment, from which it often springs, under primitive social conditions, maintaining that these and other feelings, such as sexual modesty and the esteem for chastity, are not aboriginal but acquired in the course of social development. He points out that in certain respects the relations of the sexes characteristic of civilized society are reversed in primitive society, in such matters as coquetry, personal adornment for sex attraction, and so forth. Thus "the American squaw is a drab peahen by the side of her gorgeously decorated male, decked in all the glory of feathers and war paint."¹⁰ He concludes that the family arose out of the insistent need of the mother for the economic and social protection of herself and her children, that in following the profoundest instincts of her nature she won out against the more casual and merely sexual interest of the male and thus brought the family into being. Consequently it is part of his argument that the earliest form of the family was matriarchal and that only with the development of higher agriculture and the concomitant economic dominance of men did the patriarchal type succeed it.

Again we must acknowledge the importance of the facts to which Briffault points and the weight of the argument based on the insistence of maternal need and maternal instinct. But as an explanation of origins it is open to the same objection as that of Westermarck: that it lays too exclusive stress on a single factor in a complex situation. The idea that this factor was the original determinant of the family, and that mankind has passed from a system of "mother-right" to one of "father-right," is by no means established and is in fact discomfited by the variety of conflicting evidences. For example, some of the most primitive groups have patrilineal institutions, such as the Central Australians and the Philippine Negritos, while some highly developed groups, including two of the most advanced societies among the American Indians,

⁸ R. Briffault, *The Mothers*, especially II, Chap. XIII. See also Westermarck's reply, in his article "On Primitive Marriage," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 41 (1936), 565-584.

⁹ Briffault, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 316 ff.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, II, Chap. XV.

the Iroquois and the Pueblo, are matrilineal.¹¹ Nor is there any clear correlation between matrilineal institutions and a high social status of women, as Lowie has pointed out in his *Primitive Society*.¹² Briffault has rightly emphasized a factor which has often been neglected, but it would nevertheless seem to be only one of the converging factors of which the family is a resultant.

The form of the family everywhere due to a combination of variant conditions.—While it is not possible here to elaborate the argument, we may state the general conclusion which in our judgment is indicated by the evidence. The family has no origin in the sense that there ever existed a stage of human life from which the family was absent or another stage in which it came into being. The family has no one origin, in the sense that it is explained by any single trait or attribute of human nature. The family has no one original form, in the sense of a specific primal type of which all the others are later varieties. A complex of human desires and conscious needs, finding somewhat different expression in different environments, everywhere gave birth to some form of family system. Of the conditions on which the institutions of the family have depended and still depend, the following are of universal importance.

There is, in the first place, the sex instinct, seeking to establish a basis for its satisfaction, to find some safeguard against the precariousness of unlimited competition, revealing various degrees of sensitiveness and discrimination, gradually attaching to itself certain secondary sentiments, and thereby creating customs which define its expression and limit its range. There is, in the second place, the reproductive or philoprogenitive urge, strongly manifested in the mother but reinforced in the male by such social considerations as the pride of race, the desire to transmit property or a name to his descendants, the desire to have offspring to work with or for him and to support his old age, and so forth. Even apart from such considerations the consequences of the sexual act create a problem of which the obvious solution is the family. There is, in the third place, the economic need or group of needs which in the complementary life of man and woman combine with the biological factors to create a system of sex relationships. Beyond the functions directly dependent on sex there are economic functions which the woman fulfills in relation to the man and to the family group, just as there are economic functions which the man similarly undertakes.

These three factors are the chief variables from the particular

¹¹ Cf. W. H. R. Rivers, *Social Organization* (New York, 1924), Chap. V.

¹² *Op. cit.*, Chap. VIII.

combination of which the forms of the family arise, while beyond them lies a fourth factor of broader range, namely, the socio-economic conditions of the group to which the mating pair belongs. Even if we call the sexual and the reproductive impulses by the name of instincts it does not follow that they have uniform, unvarying manifestations. Moreover the biological conditions under which they operate, such as the "natural" proportions of the sexes, are not themselves constant, and they are further modified by social practices, such as infanticide and war. Still more variable are the economic conditions with which they are associated. It is obvious, for example, that the life of the hunter or the nomad gives the woman different functions and consequently a different status from that allotted to her in an agricultural economy. It is also obvious that her position is affected by such other conditions as the presence in the community of inferior or slave classes, the warlike or pacific character of the group, the vicissitudes of conflict and conquest, the contact of peoples and the mingling of traditions, and so forth. Customs and institutions controlling sex relationships are socially created and are certainly not the sheer expression of original "instincts." Anthropologists have shown that many of the sentiments of sex, involving taboos and inhibitions, grew out of the interpretation which primitive man gave to his experiences in the business of living, in his perennial task of accommodating his desires to his necessities.

The matriarchal and the patriarchal types.—Among the various forms of the family so created we can distinguish two broad types, the patriarchal and the so-called matriarchal. We do not mean that all early forms of the family represented one or other of these types. Even in primitive society we find varieties that resemble the unitary detached families of modern days. But it is characteristic of primitive family systems that they generally follow one or the other pattern or some combination of the two.

Strictly defined, the matriarchate means a form of family in which the headship belongs to the wife or mother. There are grave doubts whether such a system has ever existed in primitive society. It is true that Briffault, reasserting the older view of Bachofen, offers evidences that women, especially the old women, were sometimes dominant in primitive groups, such as the Eskimos, the Iroquois Indians, and various African tribes.¹³ But these instances are certainly exceptions to the rule, and the fact that women appear as queens or rulers no more establishes the claim than the instance of

¹³ *The Mothers*, I, pp. 316 ff.

Queen Elizabeth proves that a matriarchate existed in the England of the sixteenth century. The term "matriarchal family" is more loosely applied to the system under which status, name, and sometimes inheritance are transmitted through the female line. The chief characteristics of this type are:

- (1) Descent is traced through the mother, not the father;
- (2) Authority within the family group belongs primarily not to the husband but to some male representative of the wife's kin. Usually, as in the Malay Islands and among the Omaha Indians, the mother's eldest brother has authority over the children; sometimes the mother's father, as among the Labrador Indians.
- (3) The matriarchal system tends to weld the kin-group together but to make the family itself less cohesive. It is usually associated with the principle of exogamy, the tribe being divided into separate intermarrying groups.

The matriarchal family so understood prevails in many parts of the earth. Since under this system the husband has a less important role, some authors connect it with an original ignorance of the physiological fact of paternity. Malinowski gives evidences to show that among the Trobriand Islanders the curious view prevails that although a virgin cannot conceive, yet pregnancy is caused by the entry of "spirits."¹⁴ At the same time the matrilineal system is found among peoples who are perfectly aware of the fact of paternity, and it is only a guess that it goes back to an earlier stage in which that fact was unknown.¹⁵

In main contrast to the matriarchal stands the patriarchal family. As the latter characterized not only the greater civilizations of antiquity but also the feudal civilization from which our own has evolved, it demands more detailed consideration. The growth of property, the development of agriculture, the concentration of authority, and the specialization of function, which characterize the more advanced societies, were more in harmony with the patriarchal principle, and may in many cases have led to its victory over the matriarchal. Moreover, the patriarchal principle permitted the family to serve as a compact unit of society. Here there is no division of functions between the father and some relative by marriage, such as the matriarchal principle involved. Under the patriarchal principle a society generally takes the form of a system of exogamous groups; under the matriarchal, it becomes a system of family units consolidated into larger kin-groups. It should be

¹⁴ *The Father in Primitive Psychology*, Chap. IV.

¹⁵ E. S. Hartland, *Primitive Paternity*, I, Chap. IV.

understood that the patriarchal and the matriarchal types are not the only alternatives. Sometimes, even among primitive peoples, we find the patrilineal system without patriarchal authority, as among the Bedouin tribes described by Robertson Smith in *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*.¹⁶ The patriarchal family itself assumes a variety of forms, but it is a type realized in various degrees throughout the history of civilization. Under the patriarchate the family is a closely knit inclusive system in which all authority belongs to the paternal side. The family is the social unit in the widest sense. Sometimes it is part of a "joint-family," the whole forming one household. Among the Kabyle, for example, the individual family households are ranged round a common courtyard with a single entrance, they use a common well and have property in common, and the whole group is subject in certain respects to the patriarchal authority of the grandfather or the eldest male.¹⁷

With the inclusive functions of the patriarchal family go the inclusive powers of its head. He presides over the religious rites of the household, he is the guardian of the "family gods," of the sacred hearth; and where, as in China, the ancestors of the family are themselves the object of religious devotion, the entire maintenance of the traditional religion is under the charge of the paterfamilias. In China, woman was subject to the three successive obediences prescribed in Li Ki, the ancient Chinese book of the law, first to her father and mother, next to her husband, and last, if a widow, to her son. In the patriarchal system the head of a household is also a representative of the state, and the political council is composed of the fathers, the *patres*. Our language testifies to this fact, for the word "senate" means the meeting of the old men and we still speak of the "city fathers." The power of the patriarch over his children, even when grown up, was often almost unlimited. In ancient Palestine he could sell his daughter into servitude.¹⁸ In ancient Rome the *patria potestas* meant the power of life and death. The position of the wife was one of complete social subordination. She could not own property in her own right, she had in fact no standing before the law over against her husband. Among the Jews, as among the Romans of earlier republican times, she could be divorced on certain grounds at the will of her husband, though of course she had no reciprocal right. It is significant that in the most

¹⁶ Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia* (London, 1903), Chap. IV.

¹⁷ R. Maunier, *La Construction Collective de la Maison en Kabylie* (Paris, 1926).

¹⁸ Exodus: 21, 7.

highly cultured communities in which the patriarchate flourished women took practically no share in public life and received no general education aside from training in the arts of the household. At Athens the wife and the daughters were secluded in the "women's apartments" and not expected to go out-of-doors except with the husband's permission. In fact the only women who possessed any freedom were the hetairai or "companions"—who were frequently foreigners and as such were not subject to the moral restrictions of the patriarchal system. These conditions broke down in the later period of classical civilization through influences similar to those which, as we shall see, dissolved within our own civilization the patriarchal regime.

FROM THE PATRIARCHAL TO THE MODERN FAMILY

Patriarchal attitudes in the eighteenth century.—In our western civilization the patriarchal family, descending from the feudal age, has succumbed to the onset of new economic forces. Many features of it survived into the nineteenth century, and traces of it still remain. In eighteenth-century England scarcely any career or any public position was open to women—unless they were queens. A woman had few property rights, beyond a dower which went to her at her husband's death. On her marriage her property vested in her husband, and even such earnings as she might acquire by her own labors belonged to her husband. At law she was treated as a "minor" or a "ward." The family was still an economic unit owned and managed by the husband. In the households of poor and rich alike the women co-operated in economic tasks that have now almost everywhere been transferred to other agencies. In America the same conditions generally prevailed. The law of colonial days enforced the principle that it was the duty of women to serve and obey their husbands. While in the South the position of women was rather higher, owing to their scarcity in the earlier settlements and owing to the relegation of household work to the slaves, in Puritan New England the rigor of the Mosaic law was reaffirmed. The codes of Connecticut and Massachusetts contained enactments which recalled the *patria potestas* of Rome or the stern judgment of Palestine, a statute of Connecticut even going so far as to decree death for the "stubborn and rebellious son."¹⁹ The elders of the church, as in the Geneva of Calvin, exercised a formidable inquisition over the life

¹⁹ Quoted in W. Goodsell, *Problems of the Family* (New York, 1928), Chap. V.

of the family, and the penalty of adultery might be death. While no doubt a study of the letter of the law may lead to an exaggeration of the severity of the prevailing mores, it is still indicative of the general temper of the age. There were significant mitigations of that severity long before the end of the eighteenth century, and New England in particular sought to protect the wife against ill-usage by the husband, but patriarchal rule, with its subordination of women, still flourished until the nineteenth century felt the impact of the new economic forces which the eighteenth had brought to birth.

With changes in the social structure go changes in social attitudes. Nothing illustrates better the remarkable transformation which since the end of the eighteenth century the family has undergone than the contrast between the attitudes towards the place of women in society current then and now. In the year 1791 Mary Wollstonecraft published her manifesto entitled *A Vindication of the Right of Woman*, a work regarded at that time as bold or even dangerous, though to us its most extreme demands are accepted commonplaces. It was the time when the scientist Erasmus Darwin could still sum up the patriarchal attitude in these characteristic words:

The female character should possess the mild and retiring virtues rather than the bold and dazzling ones; great eminence in almost everything is sometimes injurious to a young lady; whose temper and disposition should appear to be pliant rather than robust; to be ready to take impressions rather than to be decidedly marked, as great apparent strength of character, however excellent, is liable to alarm both her own and the other sex, and to create admiration rather than affection.²⁰

Mary Wollstonecraft demanded that women be given a broader education for the business of life. Her argument was in part directed against the views of Rousseau, who in his treatise on education, *Émile*, wrote that "the education of women should always be relative to that of men," for they "are specially made to please men." That this conclusion should have satisfied the great radical theorist of the eighteenth century is itself a revelation of the change which the following century was to accomplish. •

The crumbling of the patriarchal foundations.—But while these patriarchal attitudes still flourished at the end of the eighteenth century in Western Europe and in America, the foundations of the

²⁰ Quoted in W. Goodsell, *A History of the Family as a Social and Educational Institution* (New York, 1927), Chap. IX.

system to which they adhered had long before begun to crumble. On the one hand the economic conditions which tended to focalize work and authority within the household were giving place to others which broke down the toilsome and inadequate self-sufficiency of the individual family. On the other hand the cultural conditions grew less in harmony with the attitudes and the prerogatives of the patriarchal system.

Let us consider the latter first. The authoritarian mores of feudalism and the religious conceptions that accompanied them were congenial with the close-knit hierarchical unity of the patriarchate. The dynastic order penetrated down from the king to the householder. The insistence of the church on family discipline, its conception of the nature and purpose of marriage, its doctrine of the subordinate place of women, as seen, for example, in the use of the word "obey" in the marriage service, its glorification of chastity, and its utter condemnation of all sex relations outside of marriage, all worked strongly in the same direction. At the same time the feudal-militarist principle, with its designation of the clergy, the landowners, and the warriors as the three honorific occupations, placed the life and the service of women in a much inferior category to that of men.

The decline of these authoritarian mores, alike in religion and in politics, undermined the cultural foundations of the feudal-patriarchal family. The family lost some of its control over its members. The more democratic trends were detaching citizenship from family connections and at the same time making it a right no longer exclusive to the established or "patrician" families.²¹ The changing state curbed the domination of the paterfamilias over his wife and children and appointed its own courts to decide issues over which the head of the family had once been supreme. The right to vote, which at first belonged to a man in virtue of his being a propertied householder, became by degrees an individual right. The religious functions of the family diminished. The idea that the family was of divine ordinance and its laws divinely appointed became less prevalent. Words which had given a religious connotation to familial loyalty or obedience—like the word "pious"—changed their meaning. The choice of the marriage partners of the children came to be less determined by the head of the family or by family considerations. In the eighteenth century there became manifest the attitude which created the main theme of the popular novel—the conception of individualized romantic love as the great adventure of life cul-

²¹ See the author's *The Modern State*, Chap. I.

minating in marriage. By romantic love we understand an engrossing emotional attachment between a man and a woman, exclusive and individualized, transcending at need all sorts of obstacles, involving some kind of idealization, and enveloping the sex relationship in an aura of tender sentiment for the personality of the loved one. In its idealizing quality and in its tendency to ignore or sublimate the sexual aspect it resembles the older chivalry; in its concentration upon an exclusive object of devotion and particularly in its implication that marriage is the adventurous goal of the attachment it is far apart from that principle.

These cultural changes were associated with economic changes and received at length a vast impetus from the eighteenth-century inventions which substituted the power machine for the manual tool. More and more, as the development and the application of the new techniques advanced, they stripped the family of its economic functions and in so doing profoundly affected the whole character and the social significance of the family. They increasingly took both the work and the workers out of the home. Above all, they drew ever larger numbers of women into workshops and factories and offices. They broke down the age-old doctrine—"man for the field and woman for the hearth." They gave wives and daughters some earning power independent of the jurisdiction of husbands and fathers. For the first time in history the work of women began to be specialized like that of men instead of being devoted to the promiscuous tasks of the household. And at the same time the results of industrial discovery began to penetrate within the home, not only in the substitution of bought for homemade commodities but also in the application of laborsaving devices. The net consequence was the gradual reduction of the amount of energy and time involved in the economic tasks of the family, in the business of homekeeping.

These processes are still going on before our eyes. The transference of women from domestic to "gainful" employments has advanced rapidly since the beginning of the twentieth century. It was of course peculiarly marked during the war years, but the 1920 census showed that in the United States 23 per cent of all married women were so employed and almost 40 per cent of all young women between the ages of 17 and 24. In the depression year 1930 42.4 per cent of women in the age-group from 20 to 24 were recorded as gainfully employed. The very large proportion of young women drawn temporarily into industry is significant for a variety of reasons. It shows that economic occupation is rather a condition

of than an alternative to marriage and family life. It shows also that the woman's relation to the family is, as in some respects it must always remain, different from that of the man, and that the difference places her at a competitive disadvantage in the economic field. Economic change has deeply affected the form and character of the family, but it does not affect the basic biological facts and the social needs which create the essential functions of the family. We may in fact look upon these changes as an aspect of the great evolutionary process of society, later to be discussed, in which its organizations have become specialized to perform more limited and more exclusive functions. In this process the family has been gradually stripped of functions irrelevant to its peculiar character as a system of more or less enduring social relationships based on the fact of sex. Let us see how these changes have affected the mode in which the family is today fulfilling what we here call its essential functions.

Changes in the social function of the family.—We shall limit ourselves for the present to the consideration of one primary function, the perpetuation of the race, understanding thereby not merely the procreation of children but also the early nurture of the home, the initial adjustments to the world in which they must live. The chief changes which have more recently occurred in this regard are the following. (1) Various social organizations have been developed to aid the family in the fulfillment of its function. These include the maternity hospital, the baby clinic, the crèche, the kindergarten, and other preschool agencies. Here the problem to be met has been twofold. On the one hand there is the situation of the mother whose economic work lies outside the home and who can neither leave her children behind nor bring them with her to factory or office. On the other hand there is the more general problem of bringing to the home the benefits of modern hygiene, sanitation, and preventive medicine, and the techniques of child welfare. (2) Various systems of economic aid from public or private funds have been devised in order that the family, no longer upheld by the larger kin-group, may be able to fulfill its function in the competitive life of a large-scale society. Public aid is tending here to take the place of the assistance given by child welfare and other philanthropic associations. There are three main forms in which this public aid is provided in modern states. One is the system of mothers' pensions, developed in New Zealand, Denmark, Canada, and most of the states of the Union. Another is the similar provision made in countries which have national systems of social insurance, as in Germany, Austria, Great

Britain, and other European countries. The third is the system of "family allowances," characteristic of France, under which, through an industrial pooling system encouraged by the State, additional wage payments are made to workers in proportion to the number of the children whom they have to support.²² We should note that none of these policies aim to take away from the family its primary function but on the contrary seek to make it more capable of performing it efficiently. Even in Soviet Russia, where the system of day nurseries for the children of factory workers has been much developed, the idea of the substitution of a public institution for the private family has been wholly rejected. (3) The third change we have to mention is of a very different order from the other two and has a more profound significance for the future of the family. It is the decreasing rate of procreation, the lessening of the fertility of marriage.

Since the seventies of the nineteenth century the birth rate has been falling in the countries of Western civilization. The decline has been more marked and more rapid in some countries than in others, but they have all, sooner or later, revealed it. It has been more conspicuous in some classes than in others, being greatest for the most prosperous economic groups, for the more highly educated groups, for city-dwellers, and for those occupational groups in which the largest percentage of married women are "gainfully employed," but it is exhibited so widely throughout the population as to be a phenomenon of our civilization itself. In a later chapter we shall dwell on the great evolutionary significance of this phenomenon.²³ Here we are merely concerned to point out that this change has not involved the substitution for the family of any other agency to undertake its primary task, but that on the contrary it has been accompanied by a tendency for the reduction of the percentage of births "outside the family." Moreover, the decline of the birth rate has been associated with a decline of the death rate, and especially of the infant death rate. In so far, at least, as the two processes have been concomitant they represent a vital economy of a new and profoundly important character, diminishing the waste and sacrifice of human life, health, energy, and efficiency in the family's task of maintaining the generations of men. This result is in harmony with the working of those other processes of change which, as we have shown, have brought about a diminution of the expenditure of

²² For a summary account of these methods see J. H. Richardson's article on "Family Allowances," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*,

²³ Chapter XXIII.

energy by the members of the family in the sheer task of its maintenance. The resulting social economy means the liberation of the members, especially the women members, of the family for other activities. No doubt this new liberty, like every other, creates new problems which society must seek to solve.

Changes in the structure of the family.—Along with these changes in the functions of the family have gone changes in its form, institutional changes affecting the marriage contract and the relation of the members to one another. In the first place the contract is entered into more autonomously by the contracting parties. People are less subject to parental control and other forms of social pressure in respect of whom and when they shall marry. The social pressure is lightened particularly for women, on whom it weighed most heavily. The term "old maid" has fallen into relative disuse and has lost much of its old connotation of contempt. Women have attained a new legal status and more recently a new political status, in which there is little or no discrimination between their position and that of men. What is even more important, they have attained a degree of economic independence, in the more prosperous classes as property owners, in the general population as actual or potential wage earners or professional workers. They are still far from possessing, on the whole, an equal economic status to that of men. There are minor sex disabilities which stand in the way, and above all the heavier claims on women of the life of the family increase their competitive disadvantage before as well as after marriage. Nevertheless the movement has been towards equality and there are still great possibilities of its advance, whether under a capitalistic or under a more collectivistic regime. The degree of economic independence already achieved has had significant results. In old days the young woman had no alternatives beyond an early marriage or continued dependence upon and subjection to the parental home. Now she can earn her own living and thus gain a sense of immediate independence which affects her whole attitude, gives her more power to choose when and whom she shall marry and even to decide in terms of her own life whether she shall marry or not. There are relatively few women who regard an economic occupation as a permanent alternative to marriage, but the fact that it is a temporary alternative is enough greatly to alter a situation which was bound up with her economic helplessness.

The new situation is revealed by many signs. To begin with, the character of the marriage contract has altered, more perhaps in fact than in form. The traditional marriage ceremony in Western civil-

ization was based on the principle of male dominance and female obedience. The wife promised to "obey," but even where this word remains in the ritual of the marriage ceremony it is obsolescent, for the most part a meaningless relic of the past. In this connection we may mention also the general decline of ecclesiastical control over marriage. Marriage has become essentially a civil contract though it is often attended by religious rites. It is true that in New England, in early colonial days, the civil character of the marriage contract was insisted upon, but this was due, as in other Calvinistic communities of that age, to the struggle of nonconformist religion against an established church and did not prevent a strong religious determination of the whole system of marriage. This control is now greatly relaxed. For a considerable portion of the population religious rites, when not omitted altogether, assume a secondary importance, and in any event they are not necessary for the validity of marriage in the eyes of the law. There are exceptions to the tendency, as in present-day Italy, but on the whole, the authority of the church over the conditions of marriage, including also the conditions under which it may be dissolved, has markedly declined. This is a factor of great importance for the understanding of the present situation. For the church has always been much concerned with marriage and with sex, and the influence of the Christian church in particular, reinforced by the explicit teaching of St. Paul (see I Cor. 7), was towards sexual asceticism on the theory that sex itself was "impure," a theory easily associated with the subjection of women.

Not only economic and religious changes but the whole process of modern civilization within which they fall has worked towards giving women a new position in society and especially in their relations to men. The reduction of the functions of the family, the lightening of the tasks of the home, bringing more leisure to large numbers of women, the shortening of the period of childbearing or the lengthening of the interval between the arrival of successive children, these and other conditions presently to be discussed have transformed the family into a new kind of partnership and created new and most interesting problems for the family of the present and of the future.

Increasing frequency of divorce.—One evidence of the freer or less authoritarian character of marriage is found in the increasing frequency of divorce. In many primitive communities custom permitted the husband to divorce the wife on stated grounds—it might be for witchcraft or even for bad cooking—though the wife much

more rarely had a similar privilege. Among the ancient Hebrews the husband could likewise give his wife a "bill of divorcement," and the *patria potestas* of the Romans of the earlier republican times included also this right, while the later Roman law extended it rather liberally to the wife. But the patriarchal family of Christendom rested on social and religious beliefs and was bound up with economic conditions which made divorce a rare phenomenon when it was admitted at all, and so it is only recently that the question of divorce has become one of serious practical importance. Although there has been a general increase in the divorce rate, it varies remarkably for different countries. The extreme disparity is seen if we compare two countries that until recently were closely bound within the same system of traditions, England and the United States. In England, in 1928, the total number of divorces granted ("decrees *nisi* made absolute") was 4018, and this figure represented such an increase over previous years that many English newspapers referred to it as a "national scandal." In the United States for the same year the total number of divorces granted was 195,939. Other countries exhibit figures falling between these extremes. Thus the rate is relatively low for Norway, Sweden, and Belgium, being for the year 1932 respectively 32.8, 38.5 and 30.8 per hundred thousand of the total population. It is higher for Germany, France, Austria, and Switzerland, with 64.8, 51.8, 94, and 74.1 respectively. Nearest to the United States come Japan and Soviet Russia, Japan has in recent times exhibited a relatively high divorce rate, and Soviet Russia has at times competed with the United States for the headship on the list.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of these figures is that the frequency of divorce does not conform to the degree of industrial and urban growth, and thus it presents a different problem of interpretation from that involved in most of the changes we have so far been considering. The divergence is seen still more clearly when we compare the rates for various regions of the United States. The divorce rate is lowest in the Middle Atlantic states, next in order being the South Atlantic states and New England; the East South Central and West North Central states occupy an intermediate position, with the East North Central states a little higher; while the Mountain, West South Central, and Pacific states, in ascending order, head the list.²⁴ Why should the West be so much more prolific

²⁴ A clear analysis of American divorce statistics is given by Professor Ogburn in E. R. Groves and W. F. Ogburn, *American Marriage and Family Relationships* (New York, 1928), Chaps. XXII-XXIII.

in divorces than the East? Why should rather sparsely settled states like Oregon and Wyoming have rates of 175 and 261 divorces respectively per 100,000 of the population while Pennsylvania has only 60 and New York 38?²⁵

Interpretation of the differences in divorce rates.—Many of the explanations offered seem inadequate. Religious differences, such as the proportion of Catholics, are no doubt involved, but some non-Catholic countries, like England, have a very low rate. Racial differences complicate the problem, but the rate is distinctly higher for native whites than for foreign-born whites, so that it is essentially an indigenous development. Differences in state laws afford secondary explanations—obviously they explain why South Carolina has no divorces and why Nevada, as the haven of divorce seekers, has more divorces than marriages. About 20 per cent of divorces over a fairly long period have been granted in states other than those in which the parties were married, but this proportion is related fairly closely to the general mobility of population, so that one student of the subject concludes that migratory divorces are only about 3 per cent of the total number.²⁶ Moreover, the laws themselves presumably reflect in some degree the temper of the different communities, and in any event they cannot explain the fact that divorces throughout the whole country have increased nearly 500 per cent since 1880, especially as the tendency has been rather towards greater stringency in legislation since that date.²⁷ The inadequacy of the legal explanation is further revealed when we look at the situation in other lands.

In general, there are three broad legal attitudes towards divorce. There is the attitude somewhat cryptically expressed in the saying "whom God hath joined let no man put asunder," as this is interpreted by the Catholic Church (though it permits itself on occasion to discover grounds for nullification). This principle is written into the law of Fascist Italy and is found in its most extreme form in the law of South Carolina. There is the attitude that marriage is normally indissoluble but that divorce is permissible on the suit of either partner when certain grave offenses are committed by the other. This attitude is the basis of the laws of many European countries and of all English-speaking countries except the Irish Free State, which inclines to the Catholic attitude. Lastly, there is the attitude that, with certain safeguards, marriage should be regarded as any other contractual partnership and should be terminable by

²⁵ Figures for the year 1932.

²⁶ A. Cahen, *Statistical Analysis of American Divorce* (New York, 1932).

²⁷ See J. P. Lichtenberger, *Divorce* (New York, 1931), p. 137.

mutual consent. It is in one respect the exact counterpart of the second attitude. In the United States or in England if both parties want a divorce or contrive together to get it, they thereby commit the crime of collusion. Whereas in Norway, Sweden and Denmark, and a few other countries of Europe as well as in China and in Japan, the mutual consent of the two partners is a valid and sufficient ground. (In Soviet Russia marriage is terminable on the demand of either party.) But here we see the danger of a legalistic interpretation of divorce, for under the free system of the Scandinavian countries or of China the rate is relatively low, and vastly lower than in the United States.

The whole subject of the causation of divorce requires far more study than it has so far received. In the absence of such investigation we can merely hazard the following suggestions to explain why its increase does not conform to the main trends of the changing family, why it is most prevalent in the United States, and why as we proceed westward in the United States we encounter higher rates. Divorce appears most prevalent in the modern world wherever the entrance of women into the economic life is associated with an abrupt break in old traditions, as in Russia and Japan, or with a general individualistic trend in which old traditions lose their hold, as in the United States. The family has been the rallying point for the sense of social continuity, with its perpetuation of the name as well as of the race. The same home sheltered its successive generations. European studies of the family generally lay far more stress on this aspect than do American studies.²⁸ The mobility of life so characteristic of the United States, and particularly of the West, has weakened this sense of continuity. It weakens also the external pressure of public opinion. It is well recognized by students of society that physical mobility, such as the tendency to move from one residence to another within a city, is apt to release individuals from group control. That it has its influence on family life is brought out by such a study as that of Professor Mowrer, in which he gives evidence that within the city of Chicago there is a "close relationship between family disorganization and mobility."²⁹

Under these circumstances difficulties and grievances which in other countries such as England or France would be adjusted or tolerated are consequently sufficient to disrupt the family. Two other

²⁸ Contrast, for example, the space devoted to this subject in the English text, *The Family*, by Helen Bosanquet (London, 1915), with the omission or sparing reference to it in American texts.

²⁹ "Family Disorganization and Mobility," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. 23.

factors may have contributed in the United States to this result. One is the legacy of puritanism with its insistence that any infidelity is destructive of the marriage partnership. The other is the growth of the idea that romantic love is the only proper foundation of marriage. This is a modern development which was alien to the spirit of the patriarchal family. It is in harmony with the character of our present-day civilization, as is evidenced by the great stress laid upon it in the modern novel and drama. If, as some observers maintain, "in America the romantic view of marriage has been taken more seriously than anywhere else," it might help to explain the prevalence of divorce.³⁰ For a sentiment so individualized, so responsive to the happy conjuncture of the harmony of moods in a changeful world, is more calculated to heighten the quality of living than to be the basis of a permanent institution.

Evolutionary aspects.—Leaving for later consideration the problem of divorce we may observe that the other important changes dealt with in this section have all a decidedly evolutionary character. The family in the course of modern history has parted with a great many functions which were not essential to its nature. These functions have been taken over by other social agencies which in turn have become specialized to perform them, and which perform them with more economy and with greater efficiency. The workshop and the office can fulfill their economic tasks in a complex world more effectively than the family ever could. The school can provide many kinds of education which the home could never provide. The hospital can offer medical service which the family has neither the skill nor the equipment to maintain for itself. And so with a large number of other agencies. In the cities many traditional tasks of the household, such as laundrying, preserving, and baking, and in some measure even cooking and cleaning, are becoming specialized. The process may advance still further. Some critics of the day are pointing out how uneconomical it is to have a hundred householders in the same block all tending their individual furnaces—which they no longer do in apartment houses—or to have a hundred housewives all paring potatoes or darning socks when one expert could do it for the lot—and no doubt it is, always provided the housewives can find some job in which they too can specialize. But whatever further changes take place, the process we have described is, as we shall see in the last division of this book, the way of social evolution.

Main functions of the modern family.—So at last we are brought face to face with the question, What are the essential func-

³⁰ Bertrand Russell, *Marriage and Morals* (New York, 1929). Chap. VI.

tions of the family? In other words, what are the functions which it is peculiarly fitted to perform and which give it its justification in a world of specialized agencies and institutions? The sex partnership of the family has a different basis and has different purposes and different consequences from those of any other partnership. Its social claims and social responsibilities are correspondingly different. The process in which irrelevant functions have been stripped from the family has also made clear its essential nature. The peculiar claim of the family is not that it alone fulfills any one function; it is that it alone provides a way of combining and harmonizing certain closely related functions. The functions for which it provides this common basis are at the minimum three in number:

- (1) The perpetuation of the race—this is the broader social aspect, but from the point of view of the partners in marriage it includes the satisfaction of philoprogenitive desires, involving not only procreation but also the care and nurture of the young.
- (2) The more stable satisfaction of the sex instinct.
- (3) The provision of the home, with its combination of material, cultural, and affectional satisfactions.

In a successful family, and in it alone, these functions are so united that each of them reinforces and enriches the satisfaction of the others. Sex becomes not a detached phenomenon but part of a larger experience of comradeship in work and in life. And the nurture of children is given the setting of the home which, as much experience seems to show, is a far more favorable environment for them than that of the state nursery or other public or private institution. In our modern society the family, denuded of its ancient socio-economic functions, stands (or falls) on its claim to harmonize those needs and satisfactions we have just described.

In conclusion, we should observe that the evolution of the family has meant more than the process which has in the main limited it to certain specific functions; there has also been in some degree an evolution of these functions themselves, and it is obviously in respect of these alone that any further evolution can take place. The shedding of irrelevant functions prepares the way for the development of relevant ones. Let us consider from this standpoint each of the three above-mentioned aspects.

(1) The task of race perpetuation is today as much the function of the family as it ever was. In fact, it is more exclusively a function of the family than it has been in most periods of history, since the number of "illegitimate" births has greatly fallen in most

civilized communities. Moreover, that task is, on the whole, being much better fulfilled by the family than ever in the past, in the sense that more skill and intelligence are devoted to the care of the newborn and the young child. The objective witness to this fact is the marked decline of the infant death rate and the greater control over infantile diseases. It is true that in the achievement of this result other agencies have come to the aid of the family, but the responsibility for calling in their aid still belongs largely with the family. On the whole, with the increasing knowledge of child hygiene and the increasing study of child education, the duties devolving on parents have increased also. In general, though much remains to be done, the importance and complexity of the problem of the upbringing of children, of fitting them not only to survive within but to adapt themselves to the conditions of modern society, are becoming more fully realized. The only offset to this advance is that through the practice of birth control married people are enabled as never before to avoid the responsibility of having a family. Like all beneficent forms of human control this also is liable to abuse, and it is always possible that the tendency might proceed so far as to strike at the very existence of society. But such prophetic fears may well be vain, since mankind usually learns to adapt to the general necessities of its continued existence the powers which its own ingenuity has devised.

(2) The satisfaction of the sex instinct is a second function of the family. The degree in which the partnership of marriage suffices to satisfy this instinct is, when we think in terms of human experience and not of ethical dictates, highly variable and subject to perplexing differences of temperament and of the union of temperaments which marriage involves. Moreover, the satisfaction involved may vary from the mere release of physical appetite to the profound sense of total renewal in mutual love. It holds so many aspects that dogmatic and sweeping assertions on the subject, so common in sociological literature, are peculiarly futile. But this much seems clear: in contrast with the patriarchal family the modern family is built on a more intimate sense of personal relationship. The choice involved in marriage is more free, and thus personal qualities, and personal attraction of the man for the woman, as well as of the woman for the man, count for more. This personal basis for marriage, while it has the danger already pointed out, cannot but affect the degree in which normally, so long as that basis lasts, the satisfaction of the sex instinct is attained within the family. Inevitably, when the economic bonds of the family were weakened under the

onset of industrialism, the demand that it should satisfy within it the personal life of the partners grew stronger. The family was thus called upon to fulfill a more difficult task but one which arises out of its very nature. This task has been partly aided, but also much complicated, by the modern practice of birth control. This practice has introduced *within the family* the distinction between the sexual and the reproductive functions. In the unlimited patriarchal family the two were necessarily combined. The independent satisfaction of sexual desire was commonly associated with extramarital practices, such as concubinage and prostitution. Whereas the limited family of the present permits a greater reconciliation within it of the two functions. This however is but one of the many social consequences of the development of birth control. It must be remembered that the use of contraceptives removes one of the most important determinants of the mores relating to sex in our society, the fear of pregnancy as a result of intercourse between the unmarried. With this powerful incentive in large measure removed, it is to be expected—and signs are already evident—that these mores themselves will for large groups be subject to change.³¹

(3) The third function of the family is the provision of the satisfactions of the home. At all times, for men as well as for women, the desire for a home, an abiding place personally created, a congenial "hearth," the shelter or focus of life's activities within a close and enduring companionship has been a powerful incentive to marriage. It is true that in all complex civilizations there are other agencies, such as, in our own, the club and the hotel, which in part compete with the family in offering these satisfactions. But the family provides them in a more intimate form and in that setting of the conjoint life of man and woman and of parents and children with which they are so naturally associated and so readily combined. In this respect also it may be maintained that the change from the patriarchal to the modern family has liberated its potentialities for the fulfillment of its peculiar functions. For the patriarchal family the household was both workshop and home, and the aspect of the workshop, within which the wife was often devoted to the drudgery of incessant labor in addition to the continual bearing of children, was not conducive to the finer quality of the home. If the home has lost some of its former unity because other agencies compete with it there is the corresponding gain that it has become more liberated from conditions, both of drudgery and of male dominance, which

³¹ Cf., for example, W. Lippmann, *A Preface to Morals* (New York, 1929), Chap. XIV.

prevented it from being, in the full sense, a home. Now that the members of the family pursue their economic tasks outside its walls, now that they go beyond them for various forms of recreation and leisure-time activities as well, the demands which they make on the home are different but not less essential, in some aspects narrower but more exclusively directed to those satisfactions which spring from its very constitution.

The position of the family at the present day is both a result and a stage of the great evolutionary process we have been tracing. It is only in the light of that process that we can attempt to understand, as we shall now seek to do, its present character and some of the social problems which it creates.

THE FAMILY OF TODAY

The relative instability of the modern family.—Throughout the whole range of Western civilization the patriarchal family system has dissolved. In the earlier part of the nineteenth century Le Play could point the contrast between the evolving family of Western Europe and the rigid patriarchy of Russia and Eastern Europe.³² But the latter also has crumbled before the onset of the new forces. The patriarchal family was upheld by authority, buttressed by the religious and the political traditions conformable to an agricultural economy. The authority has departed, the traditions have been eclipsed, and the old economy has been undermined or revolutionized. The modern family has emerged, itself no doubt transitional but in its stage presenting problems of profound interest and social import.

Since the time of Le Play it has been customary to contrast the stability of the patriarchal family with the instability of its modern successor. Undoubtedly that contrast exists. The patriarchal system was so deeply embedded in the social structure of feudal times that the voluntary dissolution of the individual family was rarely thought of and was rarely possible. For the woman particularly there was no refuge outside the family except the nunnery. The contrast between then and now is largely a contrast between social status and social mobility. Social status was essentially the status of the family, and the identification of the two was confirmed by such legal-economic principles as primogeniture and entail and, for the poorer classes, the family-inherited craft or the rights of the peasant family in the land it cultivated. For these

³² P. G. F. Le Play, *Les Ouvriers Européens* (Tours, 1877-1879), II, *init.*

reasons and others already mentioned the family faced the world as a unit, toiled and enjoyed and suffered as a unit. Today the economic division of labor and the concomitant increase of specific social agencies have greatly diminished the range of direct family partnership in the various interests of life, whether in work or in play. The process is still going on before our eyes. Thus the authors of *Middletown* observe that in the city of their study "accompanying this incipient decline in home parties is the almost total disappearance of whole-family parties before the specialized parties for each age group and the self-sufficient social system of the high school."³³ The members of the family, children as well as parents, establish more individual contacts with the world outside the home. The family in the urban areas is a less inclusive system of social relationships than perhaps it ever has been before. This fact has made possible the instability which is charged against it.

Two main causes.—Let us then examine this modern instability of the family, as it is revealed by the frequency of divorce, separation, desertion, and other evidences of disharmony or lack of cohesion which come to light particularly in the courts. The degree of instability thus revealed varies very greatly. Within the United States it is low or scarcely perceptible in some areas of the South and very high in some Pacific Coast areas. In England it is still low compared with many European countries. But on the whole the evidences referred to have become increasing. Our survey of the evolution of the family has prepared us to discover two main causes. It was pointed out in the first section that the individual family passes through more drastic psychological transitions than any other grouping. In the patriarchal family the adjustment of the partners to one another through the tensions and crises of these transitions was imposed, if not otherwise attained, by economic necessity and social pressure. Today the necessity and the pressure are lessened, and the family, no longer strongly if rudely cemented by extraneous functions, has to surmount in its own strength the psychological tests of its own cohesion. These tests are intensified by the second great cause affecting the stability of the family. The family has become not only a more limited union but one which depends on the harmony of two wills, no longer on the dominance of one. The im-

³³ Lynd, *op. cit.*, Chap. XIX. The authors add the following illustration: "Almost unknown to-day is such a list of guests as appeared frequently in the papers of the nineties:

'Among the many present at the surprise party were Grandma Walker, Mrs. C. P—— and family, S. C—— and family, John W—— and family, Isaac B—— and family, James W—— and family and S. H—— and family. . . .'

portance in this regard of the greater personal and social independence of women is very great. It has developed new attitudes which stand in marked contrast to those engendered by the patriarchal regime. It was only at the close of the eighteenth century that the first important manifesto against the social subservience of women, Mary Wollstonecraft's *Vindication of the Rights of Women* (1791), was published, making claims which at that time were regarded by many with abhorrence but which now are commonplace. The prevalent spirit of that closing age might be summed up in the words of its greatest radical, Rousseau, when he declared that "women are specially made to please men." No doubt the acceptance of this doctrine made for a more stable family. In every relationship a union dependent on two wills—a real partnership, in fact—is apt to be less "stable" than an autocracy of one, and this is peculiarly true of the intensely personal and subtly changeful relationship of sex. The unity is more experimental, more variable, and more liable to disturbance.

The two causes we have mentioned obviously go hand in hand. The less inclusive and the less onerous the tasks which the family performs as a unit, the more possible it becomes for the members to develop and express their personalities, each in relation to the other. Economic conditions in the past made of the family, for the most part, a forced union so far as the woman was concerned. For the great majority of women their condition of at least partial economic dependence is a determining factor in their attitude towards the family. But this dependence is more relative, more mitigated, than it formerly was, and for the more prosperous classes it practically does not exist. It is very possible that the process which has brought about this change may advance further. In that event the problem of instability will become more urgent.

The need for perspective in the study of family instability.—Before we deal with this problem we must observe that this instability is not a phenomenon which can be detached (and perhaps evaluated) apart from the whole complex of conditions in which it occurs. The contrast between the patriarchal and the modern family is not simply or mainly a contrast between stability and instability. It is also a contrast between a more coercive and a freer union. It is not a contrast between a type of family which presented no social problems and one which presents many. It is a contrast of different ideals, different advantages and disadvantages. While the sex life of our age reveals a grave array of problems and maladjustments it also provides an approach towards the solution of some of the

most serious problems which the patriarchal system either created or could not solve. Its attitude towards sex is more intelligent and clear-eyed, less clouded by those taboos and dogmas and fears which forbid any rational endeavor to adjust social systems to human needs. Perhaps the greatest of all the gains springing from this new attitude is the dispersal of the unclean superstition of the uncleanness of sex, the atavism of ancient priestly hatred of life. But the new situation has brought with it more measurable gains. The rigor of the patriarchal system has generally had for its concomitant that institution which brought peculiar degradation to an economically defenseless class of women—prostitution with its train of sexual disease. And this at least can be said for the freer sex-relations of the present age, that where they exist prostitution is diminishing. Its legacy of disease still remains and is in fact guarded by another inheritance of the former order, the refusal to apply here the medical knowledge of prevention which has practically abolished all other forms of contagious disease from the world of civilization. The more open-minded attitude towards the facts of sex has still this victory to gain over those who look on disease, no matter though it affects the innocent as well, no matter though it attacks the vitality of the race itself, as a punishment for "sin." Another concomitant of the patriarchal family has been its lack of consideration for the unmarried woman, reaching its extreme in the social repulsion of the unmarried mother. The latter attitude might be socially justified in so far as its basis was solicitude for the parental care of children, but the treatment of the "bastard" child, still attested by the fact that the mortality rate for illegitimate children in the cities of the United States is nearly four times as great as for other children, is hard to reconcile with that interpretation.³⁴ The practice of birth control which is one of the cardinal facts within the modern family, is affecting also, and is likely to affect more greatly, the rate of illegitimacy. We may expect it likewise to affect the resort to abortion which, made more perilous because practiced under the ban of the criminal code, has nevertheless been far more common than is usually realized.

One extremely significant aspect of the situation which has brought with it the instability of the family is the manner in which it reconciles the old opposition between individuation and perpetuation. These were the terms in which Herbert Spencer presented the

³⁴ See Ruth Reed, *The Modern Family* (New York, 1929), Chap. XV. For the statistics of illegitimacy see J. K. Folsom, *The Family* (New York, 1934), pp. 244-246.

conflict between the fulfillment of the individual life and the maintenance of the species. As he pointed out, the costs of reproduction are heavier when the birth rate and the death rate are high and they fall when the birth rate and the death rate fall together. The evolution of the modern family has brought close to its limit a process which is operative throughout the whole course of organic evolution. In the lowest forms of life the excess of reproduction over survival is enormous. It diminishes as we mount the scale of evolution, and it is least in the societies of civilized man. A point has now been reached such that in countries with a low death rate an average of between two and three children per marriage is sufficient to maintain the level of population.³⁵ Although there are problems connected with this development which we shall examine later, it is hard to exaggerate the gain in social economy, the reduction of the waste and the suffering of human life, and the emancipation of the personality of women which it represents. The life of woman is no longer exhausted in the toils of child-bearing, suckling, and the inadequate care of numerous offspring, with its attendant mortality, with the perpetual poverty which accompanied it. The responsibility and devotion of the family in the upbringing of children is more fully compensated by the satisfactions which they add to the life of the parents. Thus the demands of sex and the demands of procreation are both more fully harmonized with the whole complex of interests and needs which make up the existence of civilized man.

Is the family breaking down?—This is the larger situation within which the instability of the family occurs. The family no longer is the inclusive focus of the interests of its members. The common interest of the members is defined by its more limited functions. Their self-limited interests attach them in a larger measure to organizations, economic and other, outside the home. It is sometimes thought that the development of this situation means the breakdown or even the disappearance of the family altogether. The present evidences give little support to this prediction. We have seen that the tendency is for the frequency of marriage to rise rather than to fall. We have shown that the frequency of divorce, though increasing, is not strongly correlated with the trend of our industrial and urban civilization. We have shown also that the reproductive function is being more exclusively fulfilled within the family than before. In respect of its most essential social function no other agency is taking the place of the family, and as the fulfillment of

³⁵ Cf. Havelock Ellis, "The Family," in *Whither Mankind* (ed. Beard, New York, 1930). See also the author's *Community*, Book III, Chap. VI, Sec. I.

this function is the first condition of the survival of society, it seems very unlikely, apart from a complete revolution of the present mores, that the family will disappear. Within the life of the family are found the chief motives for offspring and the chief compensations for the responsibilities they entail. Even if the taboo on the illegitimate child were removed, the increasing knowledge of methods of birth control would tend to make its advent more rare. This fact might well furnish an argument for the breaking of that taboo, but nevertheless the woman with strong maternal desires would still have important inducements to seek their satisfaction through marriage if at all possible.

New problems and new mores.—The modern family is no longer the old universal partnership. Its functions, its tasks, and its interests have become more delimited than were those of the patriarchal family. In this process many new problems of interfamily relationships, as between husband and wife and as between parents and children, have come, if not to being, at least to light. The instability we have been discussing arises from the rapid transitions which, as we have seen, inevitably characterize family relationships but which are no longer disguised by the conditions, economic and cultural, that sustained the unity of the patriarchal family. Many books on the modern family devote at least half their space to the problems of the family. Underlying these specific problems there seems to be one general problem, that of the development of new mores to meet the challenge of the new conditions. This would involve, for example, the recognition which is already more apparent in some countries of Europe (such as the Scandinavian countries or France) than in North America, that every disturbance of the marital relation is not a reasonable ground for the dissolution of the family. The family exists for other purposes than the mere satisfaction of sexual desires and in no stage of civilization has the monogamous family been able to persuade men to seek that satisfaction always within its bounds. What Müller-Lyer calls "sexual neophily" characterizes at least a considerable portion of mankind. Certain conditions which suppressed it, such as strong religious beliefs or social fears, have lost some of their power. This is a situation which must be admitted and faced if the family is not to suffer disorganization. How it should be met is a difficult problem, for which no hard and fast prescription can be offered. The adjustment to one another of two personalities admits of endless variations in individual cases. The point here made is simply that divorce is no solution of a

problem which society must somehow solve, how to retain within the changing order the essential functions and services of the family.

The problem itself is in part due to the rather exclusive stress put upon romantic love as the true bond of marriage. The flowering of this sentiment is one of the great experiences of life. It involves an integration of sex with the whole personality of the individual. Nevertheless by itself it cannot normally sustain the family through the changes which it inevitably undergoes. In the course of time it has to be supplemented in part, and in part replaced, by other sentiments. The relation of lovers to one another is one thing, the relation of parents to children is another, and from the standpoint of society at large the latter is the more important relationship. The prevalent literature of romantic love and perhaps most of all the screen presentation of it are concerned almost exclusively with the initial stages of the family and inculcate the idea that the later stages are merely a continuation of these into the future. These simplifications are seriously misleading and constitute a false preparation for the life of the family. Thus romance turns into illusion and the marriage partners embark on experiences which might enrich their lives in new ways but for which they are unprepared and often totally untrained. They stumble, for example, against differences in the emotional nature of man and woman and against biologically determined differences in their parental responsibilities which the glow of romantic love tends to conceal. In old days social conditions and economic pressure made it imperative for the family to hold together in spite of such difficulties. In our day it must depend far more on its intrinsic strength. Hence the importance of an education which is based on facts and not on illusions. Hence the importance of a new set of mores which is adapted to the conditions of the age and which therefore represents the discipline of knowledge. This education should include not only an adequate knowledge of the facts of sex, but also an understanding of the role of the family in society. It is, for example, a fact of great social significance, however we interpret it, that there is considerably less crime, less insanity, and less pauperism exhibited by the married than by the unmarried population, and that for men, though not for women, the death rate for the age-groups from 30 to 50 years is in the United States more than twice as great for the unmarried as for the married.³⁶ If, as is strongly suggested, the marital condition itself is an important factor in the causation of these differences, it would

³⁶ Groves and Ogburn, *op. cit.*, Chap. X.

indicate that, beyond its direct services, the family is one of the conditions of social solidarity and social strength.

THE FAMILY AND THE STATE

How the state controls the family.—One peculiarity of the marriage partnership is that the state exercises over it a more stringent control than it generally exercises over any other partnership or association. It does not leave the form of the contract to the will of the members. They cannot prescribe for themselves its conditions or its duration. It fixes a minimum age of marriage. It determines degrees of relationship within which people must not marry. It treats certain violations of the contract (bigamy, for example) as criminal offenses. It defines the economic and other responsibilities of the husband towards his wife and of the parents towards the children. It treats the property of the partners as, in some degree, not individual but family possessions, limiting in the name of the family the freedom of bequest. These regulations vary considerably in different states of this country but everywhere the state is an important determinant of the form and character of the family. When, for example, the French government after the Revolution prescribed, with certain limitations, the equal division of the patrimony among the children of the family, abrogating thereby such old customs as primogeniture, it accelerated the breakup of the joint family and gave an impetus to the process of family limitation.³⁷

The rationale of state control.—On what grounds does the state control the family so much more rigorously than other associations? One answer at least is evident. The family performs one function of extreme importance to society, the function of race perpetuation. The union brings new lives into being and therefore involves responsibilities utterly unlike and more profound than those of any other voluntary relationship. Because of this fact the marriage contract, though the most intimate of all contracts, is not simply the personal concern of the contracting parties. The state, as the agent of society, is also deeply interested. The ground we have mentioned, the relation of marriage to procreation, is sufficient, and alone sufficient, to justify a peculiar control of the state over the family. The state has in fact regulated the family on other grounds of much more doubtful validity. It has exercised control on religious grounds which modern political theory regards as beyond its com-

³⁷ Cf. Helen Bosanquet, *The Family*, Chap. V.

petence.³⁸ Nor does it justify the coercion of the state to claim—even if the claim could be established—that it is for the good of the partners themselves that they should remain, against their will, in the “bonds of matrimony.” That is a claim which social experience and education, not political compulsion, should ratify. In his suggestive book, *The Social Good*, Professor E. J. Urwick puts forward the argument that married persons cannot derive the ultimate satisfaction of marriage, “the consciousness of a permanent and unbreakable friendship,” unless marriage itself is made a normally unbreakable contract.³⁹ But such an argument cannot without grave danger be made a ground of legal coercion. It is not simply that the claim may be attacked on psychological principles, though the fact that there are relatively few divorces under the mutual consent system of Norway and Sweden reveals its weakness. It might also be claimed, on the other hand, that enforcement in matters where personality is intimately concerned is often a means of destroying the good it would enforce. But there is a broader objection. History shows how perilous it is to force people to do or endure things for what others believe to be their good. If the state says, addressing its adult citizens, “you must do this because a majority thinks it good for you,” it is asserting a principle which would justify any tyranny, over morals, over religion, even over opinion. It is a quite different affair when the state says, “you must do this because if you fail others will suffer a definite hurt.” Hence we conclude that the protection of child life, the safeguarding of its future citizens, affords the only clear ground on which the state can reasonably claim to regulate marriage beyond all other contracts.

If this principle is accepted it leads to important conclusions regarding the policy of the state. It would follow, for example, that the state has no particular concern with childless marriages, which in fact are the most fruitful of divorce. It has very little concern with the period of marriage after it has fulfilled its primary function, when the children no longer need the special guardianship of the family. If the welfare of the race is its chief interest, it should seek to protect most those children, including illegitimate children, who most need its aid. Generally, it should regulate marriage just in so far as by that regulation it can serve the cause of the young and the helpless. If a condition arises under which a marriage fails to realize its primary social purpose, it should not, on moralistic grounds, insist on its maintenance unless it has good

³⁸ See the author's *The Modern State*, Chap. V, § 1.

³⁹ *The Social Good* (London, 1927), Chap. VII.

reason to believe, in each particular case, that its continuance is demanded by the interest of the children of the marriage. Where the failure is deep-seated, where the probability is that, on account of extreme or long-established incompatibility of the partners or because of cruelty, insanity, venereal disease, or other serious evil, the marriage is actually harmful to the welfare of the children or of the race, the duty of the state is rather to dissolve the partnership than blindly to insist that it be maintained. No other environment has proved as favorable for the upbringing of children as the home which the parents create, if that home is even relatively harmonious; but if the home is utterly inharmonious or positively harmful, the state cannot by compulsion end the trouble, and it must seek to protect the children in some other way. The future of the family does not depend on state coercion but on human experience of its benefits, in the last resort on the recognition of its superiority, as a means of satisfying certain human needs, over any alternative system.

The general trend of state policy.—On the whole, the trend of state policy has been in the direction we have indicated.⁴⁰ Social experience shows that there are some matters which it is competent to control and others over which its control fails. As social conditions change the character of its control must correspondingly change. The state, for example, has tried to make adultery a crime, but even where such a law remains on the statute book its enforcement has proved so impracticable or inexpedient that the law is generally a dead letter. The state has tried to prohibit the knowledge of birth control but, with consequences which it did not foresee, has succeeded only in keeping it from the very poor and the very ignorant. On the whole, the traditional policy of the state, now gradually breaking down, has been aimed at the preservation of the *status quo ante*. But no social institution can stand eternally remote from change in a changing age. And no institution can or should stand in its own sanctity, immune from the process of experiment. Force cannot in a complex society prevent experiment, though force may pervert it. That there is much actual experimentation in sex relationships is beyond dispute. The advocates of what is named "companionate marriage" propose that the state give its official seal to one form of experiment, but such action is also, on our principle, beyond the competence of the state. Since the arrangement in question does not contemplate offspring, there seems no strong reason

⁴⁰ A conspectus of laws regulating the family will be found in Sophonisba P. Breckenridge, *The Family and the State* (Chicago, 1934).

why the state should either recognize it or, directly or indirectly, prevent it. It is rather a question of *social* approval or disapproval, according to the standards of different groups. It is meant to solve, without hypocrisy and without disguise, certain undoubted problems of sex life under the conditions of modern society—to make possible an honorable sex relationship for those who are not in an economic position to establish a family or to institute a period of trial and adjustment before the partners are committed to the bonds and parental responsibilities of marriage proper. As such, it has advantages and disadvantages. Its chief disadvantage, that instead of being a preparation for marriage it might tend to reduce the social significance of that institution and the sense of social responsibility which it demands, would be increased by legal recognition. We see no reason here to make an exception to the general principle which is becoming in some other respects accepted by the modern state, that its right to control marriage fundamentally rests upon the fact that marriage is the avenue to the life of the family, to the procreation of children, whose welfare, being the welfare of the race, must always remain a primary consideration of the state.

Co-operative function of the state.—We have spoken so far only of the regulative or coercive function of the state, but it should be recognized that the state has another and more constructive function, that of bringing positive aid and support to the family. The state can, apart from compulsion, uphold the family in many ways. This is in large measure a modern and a growing task for the state, and one in the fulfillment of which, instead of opposing the processes of social change, it is endeavoring to make fruitful application of them. In modern society the welfare of the child requires the provision of manifold services which the state can stimulate or supply, which above all it can make available to those families which through poverty are unable to supply them for themselves or through ignorance are unaware of the need for them. The equipment of the child to take his place in society, the equipment of mind and body through appropriate training in an environment made healthy, is an immense task the nature and extent of which are gradually being recognized. Without the aid of the state the vast social heritage cannot be made available to the majority of families. In a previous section we referred to another new task of the state, the financial support of parenthood under modern competitive conditions. A further task, which is still very experimental and rather poorly developed, is the institution of juvenile courts, child welfare clinics, and other agencies to meet those maladjustments of child life which

arise under the conditions of modern society and which the family fails to overcome.⁴¹ An interesting experiment of another kind is the court of domestic relations which is found in various cities. Such a court, if presided over by persons of wide social experience and understanding who offer friendly counsel instead of laying down compulsory law, can frequently prevent a temporary discord from leading to permanent disruption. This too is an entirely different service from the traditional coercive function of the state.

Regulative function of the state.—There remains nevertheless, if the state is to fulfill its function as already defined, a place for coercive control. The prevention of controllable conditions which are clearly inimical to the welfare of the race becomes a definite obligation of the state. For example, in the United States the statutory minimum age of marriage for girls ranges, with one exception, between twelve and sixteen years, there being still twelve states which retain the lower of these limits.⁴² There is sufficiently clear evidence of a physiological nature that these minima are set too low. Again, the state still sanctions marriages which, on account of some grave and deep-seated taint, hereditary or acquired, in either partner are beyond doubt dysgenic. It is the duty of the state to discourage and if possible to prevent such marriages. This is attempted under the well-known Wisconsin law, which requires medical certification for marriage, especially to prevent the mating of those affected with venereal disease. The law in question has not proved an entire success, partly because inadequate provision was made under it for the medical services which it involves, partly because its demands can be evaded in various ways.⁴³ But there can be no objection in principle to a law of this kind, though experience shows that it can achieve its end only if backed up by social education. It should, however, be pointed out that if the state is in earnest in its attempt to combat venereal disease, it must not only permit but encourage the application of medical knowledge for prophylaxis as well as for treatment. Another aspect of the danger of confusing moral and medical problems is seen in the law of Idaho which permits the sterilization of "mental defectives, epileptics, habitual criminals, moral degenerates, and sex perverts." Only with respect to the first of these classes is there reasonable biological evidence to justify compulsion in the name of the welfare of the race. As Bertrand

⁴¹ An illuminating account of this subject is contained in *The Child in America*, by W. I. and D. S. Thomas (New York, 1928), Part II.

⁴² See Mary E. Richmond and F. S. Hall, *Child Marriages* (New York, 1925). The figures quoted above are for the year 1928.

⁴³ See F. S. Hall, *Medical Certification for Marriage* (New York, 1925).

Russell observes, "the law of Idaho would have justified the sterilization of Socrates, Plato, Julius Caesar, and St. Paul." ⁴⁴ A law of Oklahoma provided for the sterilization of third-term criminals! Compulsion cannot, without serious risk, do more than obviate the more extreme social dangers. Beyond that, it is necessary to rely on social education. It is important to remember that marriage itself is the most significant of all forms of social selection. It is a form of selection which has become intensely personal, but that fact makes it all the more important that the younger generation should receive a training for parenthood and be taught the responsibilities of marriage. By its policy the state, if it avoids the dangers of propagandism, can lead the way.

⁴⁴ *Marriage and Morals*, Chap. XVIII.

XII

THE PRIMARY GROUP AND THE LARGE-SCALE ASSOCIATION

THE PRIMARY GROUP

The primary group as the nucleus of all social organization.—The simplest, the first, the most universal of all forms of association is that in which a small number of persons meet “face-to-face” for companionship, mutual aid, the discussion of some question that concerns them all, or the discovery and execution of some common policy.¹ The face-to-face group is the nucleus of all organization, remaining, in a modified form, within the most complex systems. It is, as it were, the unit cell of the social structure. It is the group which, in the form of the family, initiates us into the secrets of society. It is the group through which, as comrades and playmates, we first give creative expression to our social impulses. It is the breeding ground of our mores, the nurse of our loyalties. It is the first and always remains the chief focus of our social satisfactions. It is the group in which we really can reveal our social nature.

In primitive society, and still often among ourselves, the primary group is found as a free-functioning unit. Examples of this type are the play group, the group of friends, the gossip group, the partnership, the local brotherhood, the study group, the gang, the tribal council. From this free form we may distinguish groups

¹ The expression, *face-to-face group*, is taken from Cooley. See on this subject particularly his *Social Organization* (New York, 1909), Chaps. III and IV. Since we are here dealing with organized groups, we are using the term in a more restricted sense than Cooley did. We do not, for example, include the neighborhood, which belongs to our category of community; we do include the play group, which is a simple form of association.

which are part of a larger organization. These may be loosely affiliated, such as those clubs, recreational groups, teams, and so on, whose members are connected with some business firm, church, college, or other large-scale organization. Or they may be functioning units of the larger whole, such as a committee, departmental organization, college class. But the nature of the face-to-face group is revealed most adequately in the detached form where the members freely come together, not as representatives or delegates constituted, defined, and limited to allotted tasks by a predetermined interest, but spontaneously and apart from executive direction. A group which of its own initiative comes together for debate or study or conference meets this requirement more fully than, say, the class that assembles in a college lecture room. In the former instance the group principle is more directly and convincingly revealed, and the group process more untrammelled. Our attention therefore will be directed first to the primary group, the unicellular association.

How the primary group affects the character and quality of our interests.—Let us take our independent study group as an illustration. Why does such a group come together? What do its members gain from association which they could not achieve by isolated study? Certain external advantages are sometimes an inducement. For example, the group as a whole can afford to hire a teacher which each member might not be able to hire for himself. But obviously there are other advantages of a different sort. The presence of the others is, within limits, a stimulus to each. Most pursuits are enhanced, more keenly appreciated, more ardently followed, when they are shared by a congenial group. This is one reason why the true university can never be, as one sage claimed, a "collection of books." Association affects alike the nature of our interests and the manner in which we pursue them.

Association changes the quality of our interests. We see them as they appear to others, from new angles. Through participation the interest gains a new objectivity. We see it through the eyes of others and thus it is in some measure freed from irrelevant personal implications. It is defined more closely for each of us, for being now both mine and yours it must have a common meaning for us. Before we can effectively pursue it together we must learn to perceive it together. Each seeing it from his own viewpoint seeks to convey that aspect to his associates. Thus the character of the interest is enlarged and enriched, as each contributes something different to the understanding of it. Our study group, for example, soon discovers that the problem it is discussing holds unexpected poten-

tialities which gradually come to light as the play of different minds is directed upon it.

But the same illustration shows us also that there are decided limits to this process of definition, concentration, and enrichment of interests. In the first place effective participation is possible only for quite limited numbers. There is always a point, though varying for different kinds of groups, at which increase of numbers means dispersion instead of concentration, dilution instead of reinforcement of the common interest. In the second place the members must be not only congenial but also on approximate levels of experience and understanding. Each must have something to contribute, to give as well as to take, or his presence encumbers the group. There is thus a level on which every group must dwell, and he who is too far above it, while he may teach, no less than he who is too far below it, though he can learn, disturbs the true process of group participation already described. Here we see also the necessity for the third proviso, that if the group is to achieve the best results compatible with the quality of its members, these must come together in a participant co-operative spirit. In other words, the constitutive interest of the group must be dominant in their minds. The interest must be stronger than the self-assertive impulses which are exhibited in the attempt to impress others, in the rejection of open-mindedness, in the love of argument for its own sake, in the obstinate reiteration of one's own opinions, in short, in all those tricks and devices which distinguish eristic and oratory from the process of co-operative thinking. And we must always remember that the result of association is relative to the purpose of association. If people meet in order to confirm each other's prejudices, they will probably succeed in doing precisely that. If they meet to study a subject together, they will, on the other hand, enlarge their vision and reduce their prejudices.

The fulfillment of these conditions is in certain ways promoted by the ease and extent of communication which modern society provides. The freedom of association and the improved means of communication make possible more selective and more specialized groupings. Groups dependent merely on locality or neighborhood tend to give place to groups brought together from a wider area on the basis of a common interest. People devoted to, say, modern music or ancient philosophy or international affairs or mystic cults or butterfly-hunting or any of a myriad of human interests come together, not from the same street—unless the street itself is highly

selective—but from the whole area of a city and its borders. The passing of neighborhood life brings at least this compensation.

Under the conditions just described, the nature of any interest becomes focused and enriched in the group process. And now we can add a further reason for this result. Not only does the presence of others contribute directly to the interpretation of the common interest which each acquires, it contributes also indirectly, since through association each acquires a stimulation, a heightening of the emotional significance of the interest. "As iron sharpeneth iron, so doth a man the countenance of his friend." Each is spurred on in his pursuit by the fact that others are pursuing with him. When his own energy and devotion flag, for there is ebb and flow in all human endeavor, he is sustained by the energy and devotion of his fellows. It is partly the evocation of the competitive spirit, but it goes deeper than that. The interest, by being shared, acquires a new significance, a new emphasis, a new valuation. It has a breadth of support which it formerly lacked. The interest is thus maintained for the group more nearly at one level of intensity than would be possible for the isolated individual. That it is generally a higher level is seen in the fact that people are ready to pursue interests in association which they would find too arduous or too uninspiring to pursue in isolation. A study group again offers an illustration. People not infrequently get together to study a language or to work on some problem because in the group there is a stimulus that overcomes the inertia or the sense of difficulty which otherwise might prevent them from undertaking a task of this kind. To take another illustration, there are people who find gymnastic exercises too tedious to practice by themselves but yet are ready to practice them in company. It may be said that this is because another interest, that of companionship, is added, but the latter is reflected in the enhanced value of the pursuit itself.

The sustaining power of companionship witnesses to the inherently social nature of man. Another aspect of it is the fact that men can endure in company hardships and privations and perils that would be utterly insufferable in isolation. Side by side, sustained by the sense of a common lot and a common cause, they will face the horrors of the trenches in warfare, they will live cheerfully through the winter darkness of the Arctic wastes, they will engage in unrelenting and drearily monotonous toils. The primary group does more than sustain this interest or that; it sustains the interest of living itself.

How the primary group affects the pursuit of our interests.—Not only the character of an interest, but also the method of its pursuit, is changed by association. In the face-to-face group we have the clearest illustration of simple or direct co-operation, where men do the same thing together, in contrast with complex or indirect co-operation, where men do different things interdependently, in other words, specialize. Direct co-operation is as characteristic of the face-to-face group as specialization is of the large-scale association. The members of a group discussing the same problem make different contributions, but they do not have separate functions; all participate in the same *process*. In complex co-operation, the so-called division of labor, all contribute to the same result, but not in the same process. On the other hand, the face-to-face group, though it admits of subsidiary and preparatory division of labor, is essentially a mode of sharing a common experience. A play group involves a certain division of "labor," but the pitcher, the batter, and the fielders must all *play* together if they play at all. The members of a study group may undertake separate tasks in preparation for the activity of the group, but they must bring their results into a common process at the point where the group activity begins. They cannot, if they are engaged, say, in learning a foreign tongue, so specialize that one learns the nouns, another the adjectives, a third the irregular verbs, and so forth. In short, the group is a unity in the performance of its function. Being thus united in the process, and not merely in the product, the face-to-face group has a peculiar social significance. It serves a function which no other kind of organization can fulfill, a function additional to, and in the last resort more necessary than, the increment of economy, convenience, and efficacy which comes from co-operation. It satisfies most fully the essential need of man for society.

How the primary group arrives at decisions.—We have said that the process of the face-to-face group is a sharing or communicating of experience. How then is experience shared? How from being mine or yours does it become ours? We shall examine but one aspect, though a crucial one, of this intricate and searching question. How does a group achieve a consensus, a harmony, with respect to the differences of opinion which appear within it? To what extent are the differences which the members bring to the group harmonized within it? If we assume that the degree in which consensus is attained is a measure of the degree in which experience is shared, here would be a test question for the reality of the social process within the primary group. Let us then examine it.

We should first observe that all groups do not need to seek consensus. There are some which can function as well, perhaps better, when the members do not agree on the issues raised by the group. A debating society is an obvious example, but the statement holds also, in degree, for a group of neighborly gossips or for a discussion group. The salt of friendly difference gives to such groups their savor. But all policy-determining groups are compelled by their function to reach a group decision. It is clear that this decision may be arrived at in various ways and may represent various degrees or levels of agreement. The minimum of group participation is found where the decision comes from the dominance of authority, involving no more than the acquiescence or assent of the subordinate members. In this case the potential contributions of these members to the process of decision are wholly or largely suppressed. Or again the decision may represent a compromise, in which, while the agreement is formally unanimous, the contending parties yield some portion of their respective claims or waive in part their differing opinions in order that a unified policy, giving all some measure of what they desire, may be carried through. This type of decision is distinct from the authoritarian one, both in the mode and in the content. The differences of the members here affect the decision, but the process is one of bargaining, of give and take, and therefore they remain unreconciled. A third type of decision is expressed through voting. This differs from the former two in that there is not even formal unanimity in the registration of policy. It is determination by majority (whether of persons, of voting shares, or other units). The differences of the members remain in stark opposition. The necessary basis of agreement is not found on the level of the issue determined by voting but lies further back, perhaps merely in willingness of the members to abide by the result of the poll.

No one of the three types of determination just described is the expression of a complete harmony within the group. No one reveals the group as a unity with one mind and one will. If then we conceive of a group as potentially such a unity we must seek for a further type of decision, in which the differences of the members are neither suppressed nor compromised but instead harmonized or synthesized, transmuted, without loss but rather with gain, into a group idea or group policy. Some writers put this principle forward as expressing the only effective and finally desirable type of agreement. Its relation to the others can be most briefly presented if we classify them as follows:

<i>Basis</i>	TYPES OF GROUP AGREEMENT		
	<i>Process</i>	<i>Nature of Decision</i>	<i>Treatment of Differences</i>
I. Authority	Acquiescence and assent	Formal unanimity	Suppressed or held in abeyance
II. Compromise	Give and take	Formal unanimity	Registered in the result but not reconciled
III. Enumeration	Inconclusive discussion	Majority determination	Registered in the process but not in the result
IV. Integration	Conclusive discussion	Real unanimity	Expressed in the process and conserved in the result

The last of our types raises a question of peculiar importance for our understanding of that social nature which finds its home within the group. Should we regard it as an ideal type to which the reality of group agreement never fully attains, or is it as verifiable in experience as any of the others? Does the character of our interests on the one hand or the character of our minds on the other admit of this comprehensive integration? Is it, in short, a dream or an actuality? The exponents of the principle reject the first three types as contrary to the spirit of group participation. The group idea, says Miss Follett, is not compromise, for "just in so far as people think that the basis of working together is compromise, just so far they do not understand the first principles of working together." Nor is it the majority idea. Nor is it the consensus derived from the persuasion of some by others, for "we have no more right to get our own way by persuading people than by bullying or bribing them." The group idea is a "composite idea," evolved through the free admission of difference. In fact "the only use for my difference is to join it with other differences." So we begin with individual thinking and we end with "joint thinking."² The differences are not lost in the result, they are "integrated." There results from the process "a mutual appreciation and conservation of *all* the values which all the groups to the conflict hold as vitally significant."³

Now integration so understood may be regarded either as an ethical ideal or as a social-psychological process. If taken under the former aspect, we do not claim that it expresses the actuality of

² The above quotations are taken from M. P. Follett, *The New State* (New York, 1926). For other writers of this school see Notes on Further Reading (Appendix).

³ Quotation from a bulletin of The Inquiry (New York City), an organization specifically devoted to the promulgation of this principle.

group life. It is not, as such, a principle we can demonstrate. All we could demonstrate would be the consequences which follow from its acceptance, as revealed in such approximations to its realization as we can find. We might claim on such grounds, as do its exponents, that its acceptance would create a new harmony of society, a new joy of co-operative living. We might claim that it is a principle of peculiar importance in the complex societies of our age, where people of very diverse types must get along together and to do so must overcome the prejudices of class, religion, and race. We might claim that it has a special appeal in a democratic society, where the ground of authoritarian decision is undermined so that another basis of solidarity must be found.

But an ideal can be realized only as it is brought into relation to the experience of living. We must therefore consider integration in its other aspect, as a social-psychological process. We must then ask how far, under what conditions, with what limitations, does it actually occur? We must observe that when scientists meet to discuss a problem, their primary aim is truth, not harmony. In so far as they are scientists it must be so. People in all kinds of groups have interests other than the attainment of this comprehensive harmony. Moreover, the demand of open-mindedness does not imply that we should hold every belief as merely provisional. If all the evidences we honestly discover point that way for us, we should lack character not to hold to it, not to try to persuade others of its truth, not to prefer difference to an agreement which did not accept it. The integrationists at times demand a degree of plasticity which is not attainable and which, it might well be claimed, is not even desirable—for sometimes it is the higher loyalty that a man stand firmly on his conviction, that he stand, if need be, *Athanasius contra mundum*. Even unanimity is no criterion of truth, of rightness.

It may in conclusion be suggested that the principle we have been examining combines and even confuses two quite different forms of unity which are better kept apart.⁴ We should distinguish between subjective harmony and objective harmony, between harmony of attitudes and harmony of ideas. There is a social unity within which people feel at one though their opinions still differ. Integration, as we have been discussing it, demands a unity on the intellectual level. We come together thinking differently and end thinking alike. We evolve a composite idea in which all the different

⁴ Precisely the same criticism applies to Rousseau's concept of the "general will," from which the principle of integration is historically derived. See my *Modern State* (Oxford, 1926), pp. 444 ff.

viewpoints of the members are harmonized—as though the group itself became a mind with an idea of its own—and the result is “a way of joint action which will appeal to everyone concerned,” because it comprehends the desires of all. But we have seen that this program makes excessive demands on human nature, and that there are many differences which, psychologically, are not amenable to such integration. We might add that the history of the various attempts to secure unanimity on this level, down to our present-day jury systems, reveals the impossibility of the demand. It is more reasonable to seek the harmony of the group spirit than of the group idea. In the sense of community with our fellows we can find those sympathetic relations in which differences cease to divide, in which they stimulate and evoke our individuality while forming no bar to the pursuit of interests in common.

FROM THE PRIMARY GROUP TO THE GREAT ASSOCIATION

The genesis and growth of large-scale organization.—Where life is simple, as in a primitive community or in a frontier settlement, or where for any reason the area of effective communication is small, as in the highly civilized cities of ancient Greece, the face-to-face group suffices for most purposes. But where society expands, another kind of association grows necessary, the large-scale association with its impersonal relationships and its specialization of functions. Interests become differentiated. The service of experts is required. Techniques are elaborated, and the average member has neither the time nor the energy nor the skill to attend to them. The new range of the interest demands a complex organization. It is no longer localized and no longer controllable by the local group. The members are too numerous and too scattered to conduct their business through personal relationships. Specially selected persons must act on behalf of the whole, a hierarchy of officials arises, and the executive or controlling group becomes distinct from the mass of the members. In these multicellular organizations, with their various departments, face-to-face groups remain in a modified form, as directorates, as committees, and so forth, but their character and function have changed. Their members have become agents, delegates, leaders; they have become authorities or experts. As for the lay members, they are now reduced to a more passive role, and while their relationships to one another and to the whole may become more complicated, they are, for the most part, less engrossing.

Everything is more formal, more mechanically regulated. There is concentration of direction as well as division of labor. Thus in the large-scale association, the average member occupies both a passive and an active role, and the two are not always easy to reconcile. As in the state he is both citizen and subject, so in degree he is in every great association. The passive role bulks more largely the greater the association grows, and thus the members are apt to feel that its elaborate machinery lies wholly outside themselves, beyond the area of their control. This feeling exists particularly among the members of the great state, but perhaps even more among the shareholders of the great economic corporations.

Some sociologists have taken the position that with the growth of civilization the primary group gradually loses its character and binding strength. The primary group is an expression of communal relations, and these, it is held, are in large measure superseded by more superficial relations. This, for example, is the view of F. Tönnies in his book *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*.⁵ Certainly the increase and the functional dominance of the less intimate and less personal relationships are characteristic of every more advanced civilization. But whether the communal life that flowed into primary group relations actually declines and degenerates is a more debatable question. Possibly it expresses itself in other ways and attaches itself to other and larger unities, such as that of the nation.

Distinctions between the primary group and the large-scale association.—In the preceding paragraph we have suggested three main distinctions between the primary group and the large-scale association. In the first place, as the scale increases, indirect co-operation dominates over direct. In the small group the members work together, listen together, play together, worship together, discuss together, decide together. In the large organization it is only the objective, no longer also the process, that binds the members together. One works for the other, not with him; they do different tasks towards a common product; they have not only different functions but different powers, different degrees of participation, different rights and obligations. Consequently, in the second place, the transition from the small to the large association involves a movement from status to contract. In a famous sentence Maine characterized this movement as the direction of "progressive societies."⁶ If we substitute the word *complex* for *progressive*, the statement can scarcely be challenged. It is of the very nature of the larger

⁵ This pioneer study was published at Leipzig in 1887.

⁶ Sir Henry Maine, *Ancient Law* (London, 1907).

organization that the duties and functions of the various members must be defined, made specific, and thus explicitly or implicitly contractual. The working of a complex system cannot be entrusted to the spontaneous adjustments which occur in the face-to-face group. Another aspect of the same principle is the substitution of formal for informal regulation. Every large-scale organization becomes an administrative mechanism. Not only is its structure intricate in itself but it must be fitted into a complex social order. This adjustment demands formal rules, a formal authority with designated powers, a precise delimitation of interests and benefits, a clear-cut division of labor in which the function of each is specified in relation to the functions of all the rest. Hence also, in the third place, there is a substitution of impersonal for personal relationships. The face-to-face group depends upon the congeniality of the members. The large association puts other requirements first. The face-to-face group demands a social qualification for membership because it must satisfy—or otherwise must balk—the need of its members for sociality. The large association is detached from this interest and therefore generally makes no such demand. It is an agency and as such is more indifferent to the personal qualities of its members, provided they contribute to the associational interest. This is a main reason why, in a complex society, the members are more liberated or more detached from group control over their intimate life, though at the same time they are subject to a system of meticulous regulation proceeding from sources felt to be remote from themselves.

The organization of authority in the two types.—Consequently, in the large association, the world-old problem of liberty and authority presents a new aspect. If the forms of control are less intimate, less indefinite, perhaps less arbitrary, they are also less spontaneous, less visible, less personal. In the small group, as in the patriarchal family, for example, a custom-sustained authority expresses itself in commands; in the large association a constitutional authority operates through formal regulations or laws. Each kind has its menace as well as its necessity. The menace of the first kind lies in the omnipresence of personal authority, from which, when it is harsh or overbearing, the subordinated individuals cannot hide any aspect of their lives. The menace of the second kind arises particularly from the separation of the authority from the subject of it, so that its inner working is hidden from him. Explicit standing rules are necessary in every complex organization. Without them it could not achieve its peculiar services of order, efficiency, and economy. But

there is the danger that an established order may stand in the way of that flexibility which responds both to changing situations and to individual needs. The official is apt to prefer the routine, the uniformity of the smooth-running machine. It saves energy and trouble for himself. Vested interests that are opposed to adaptive changes grow within the organization. The power of the official lies in his enforcement of rules, and the urge of power persuades him that they should be rigorous. The rules thus tend to grow sacrosanct in his mind, and the permanence of the institutions through which he acts impresses a like sentiment in the minds of the lay members. In short, the danger of elaborate organization is that it tends to grow stereotyped. This tendency is so prevalent that it scarcely needs illustration, but peculiarly striking examples are afforded by the history of those cultural associations which began as liberating movements. In the sphere of religion the history of the Christian churches reveals the constant tendency of organization to stereotype a system in defiance of its initial principle. The living faith hardens into a dogmatic scheme, the vision becomes a system of rigid formulas, until a new prophet arises and fuses them in the emotional intensity of a new vision.

The federative principle in large-scale organization.—Faced with this problem of retaining liberty while securing order and efficiency, of making authority an agent instead of an exploiter, large-scale associations have experimented with two principles of organization. One we may call the "federative principle." It seeks to build up an order on the basis of local or regional units, possessed of as much autonomy as is compatible with the ends of the association. In the political sphere it appears in the contrast between a federal and a unitary government, and also in the devolution of authority to municipalities, counties, and other administrative areas. In so far as it means that local interests are determined locally, it is a workable and salutary principle. Its range, however, is limited by the fact that in a complex society few interests remain purely local, though they retain peculiar local aspects. What is needed, therefore, is the adjustment of the local to the wider interest, a balance of centralization and of decentralization. In a pioneer economy people drew water by handpumps from wells sunk on their respective properties; in a metropolitan area they depend on an elaborate common system by which their water supply is derived from an area covering fifty or a hundred miles or more. This is a simple example of a process which signalizes the growth of civilization. The interests of a

locality cease to be localized and insofar local representation must be substituted for local control.

What applies to particular interests applies also to the complex of interests formerly characteristic of a neighborhood. A good illustration is offered by the problem of "community centers" and settlement houses in an expanding community. With the delocalization of many interests the locality becomes less and less a neighborhood, and the functions of such organizations as the settlement house must change accordingly. In other words, they too must specialize to succeed, must serve diversified interests in particular ways, generally seeking from a less limited area those who share these interests. "Greenwich House," writes the director of one of these organizations, "is a neighborhood house. But what is a neighborhood nowadays? With rapid transit, with city-wide policies, with the rapid change in population, with new standards of living, the neighborhood has become not so much a separate self-enclosed entity as a sample cross section of the city's life."⁷

A cross section is no longer a unit and can no longer be organized as such. The attempt to integrate the social life of an area through a community center when the interests of the inhabitants are no longer centered within the area can hardly be expected to succeed, and experiments in this direction have generally failed. It is reasonable to hold that the small group is necessary to mediate between the individual and the large association. "In various ways," writes Professor Dewey, "and on diverse subjects there have been growing up small groups devoted to securing a clearing house of facts and ideas by conjoint discussion with a view to attaining a common mind, that might be put into effective action. It may well be that the historian of the future will find that one of the most significant features of present social life is manifest in the rapidity with which the word 'group' has come into general use, and will discover that the pooling of experiences by groups in order to reach genuinely co-operative decision and action is their characteristic that reaches furthest."⁸ But such groups are likely to be special-interest groups in a local setting rather than neighborhood groups in the old significance of that term.

It may further be pointed out that the degree of effective localization varies with the nature of the interest. The general principle

⁷ Mary K. Simkhovitch, *Report on Greenwich House* (1929).

⁸ Introduction to A. D. Sheffield, *Training for Group Experience* (Inquiry Bulletin, New York, 1929). Similar claims are made in various other works such as M. P. Follett, *The New State*, and Seba Eldridge, *The New Citizenship* (New York, 1929).

which emerges is that cultural organizations can be more fully localized than those which pursue civilizational interests. A college, for example, must be in essentials localized. A fellowship organization, such as that of the Rotary Club, must be composed of local groups. A church, no matter how highly centralized with respect to its government, depends for its life on the local assembling of its members. The reason is that the cultural interest must be directly or personally communicated.⁹ Technical advances may change the size of the local unit. The radio, for example, makes the local musical assembly the home instead of the concert hall. But no technical advances can substitute, for cultural purposes, the central organization for the local unit. A central organization can make treaties or tariffs or currency regulations for a whole country—or for a whole civilization. There are universal aspects of order and efficiency which are best provided by a highly centralized control. But culture belongs to another kind of reality. The agency can here never be a substitute for the direct activity of the participant members. Any central organization in this sphere is meaningless apart from the unit groups. Consequently the federative principle has greater play.

It might be similarly shown that, in the sphere of civilization, the local unit has a more important role the more personal the service which the organization renders. An automobile plant or a steel factory can from one center provide effective service for a whole country. A retail store has a much narrower range, and therefore a combination of units takes the form, not of a single central plant, but of a chain-store system. The less standardized the service the more the local unit resists absorption. Thus at the end of the scale the luxury shop, the fashionable tailoring, dressmaking, or millinery establishment flourishes as a purely local concern. The same principle may be illustrated from the political organization. We can do without local legislatures, but we cannot do without local courts.

The principle of official responsibility.—All the great associations must achieve some equilibrium of centralization and decentralization, varying in accordance with the nature of their functions. Since some of the most important organizations, those which supply the more uniform or standardized services, such as insurance or electricity or political order, lend themselves to a high degree of centralization, we must resort to some other principle than the federative in the attempt to solve the problem of control, to save

⁹ The significance of this point is brought out more fully in the discussion of culture and civilization, pages 272-281.

efficiency while resisting domination. Here is where our second principle, that of responsibility, enters in. It is of peculiar importance with respect to the most powerful and comprehensive of all organizations, the state, especially as a state in which the principle of responsibility is assured can thereby prevent the undue encroachments of other organizations. It is the essential principle of the democratic state, though its full realization is beset by many difficulties. In so far as it is achieved, arbitrary authority, authority acting in its own right, yields to functional authority. In other words, it turns governments into public agencies and officials into delegates or representatives, acting on behalf of and subject to the control of those whom they govern. The earlier champions of democracy too readily concluded that in our complex and heterogeneous societies this end could be achieved merely by the mechanics of popular election, but we have realized through experience that it is possible only in so far as a people is enlightened and public-spirited. The business of government, like all other large-scale business, needs the service of experts. The people in general cannot understand its intricacies nor adjudge the qualities requisite for the conduct of this business. The relics of direct popular administration, such as the jury system, are cumbrous and perhaps moribund. But experience also shows us that a politically intelligent people can establish and maintain a system of government which on the whole is subservient to the wishes of the majority. In spite of the practical difficulties and problems involved, the principle of responsibility is formally and to a considerable extent substantially attained in many modern states, and is liable to be overthrown only in time of grave crisis.

The principle of automatic control.—Outside the two main principles we have mentioned there is another influence—we shall call it “the principle of automatic control”—which tends to keep the great organizations in some measure flexible and subject to the interests of those whom they serve. It has less application to the compulsive organization of the state or to monopolistic corporations, but it powerfully affects such organizations as are fully competitive. A department store, for example, is not maintained just to serve the public, but unless it does serve the public as they want to be served, it will cease to exist. Likewise any association the members of which are free to leave it at will is bound to consult continuously the wishes of those members. A club which was not responsive to the majority of its members would suffer a decline. So would a trade-union or a church or any of the numerous free organizations of a

complex society. The efficacy of this principle in modern societies has increased with respect to cultural organizations, since these have been so largely liberated from the compulsions of a politico-religious authority, but it has serious limitations in the economic sphere, owing to the growth of vast combinations restricting the play of competition.

Large-scale associations cannot fulfill the role of primary groups.—In conclusion we may point out that the increase of large-scale associations does not and cannot involve the substitution of these for the face-to-face groups. The latter renders one essential service which the former can never satisfy—the satisfaction of the primal need for society itself. This satisfaction demands the personal participative union, within which no matter what other services it may render, the deeply embedded need of man for the sustaining presence of his fellows is liberated and fulfilled. Even under the most auspicious conditions the specialized order and routine of the great association involve some degree of impersonal constraint, against which the human spirit is apt to chafe and from which it seeks refuge in the more spontaneous grouping. Perhaps that is why there are so many clubs and coteries—and so many “joiners”—in our large-scale civilization. If in this process of civilization the old face-to-face groups, those of family and kin and church and neighborhood group, are less inclusive and less absorbing, men seem impelled to devise others through which they seek to save, against the pressure of organization, the insistent impulse towards free personal relationships.

Our world of large-scale organizations is inevitably a mechanized impersonal world. Within it each man has his specialized function, his delimited calling. His work confines him within the routines and techniques of a smaller and smaller portion of the social order within which he lives. For the greater that order the smaller is the part which a man's work directly reveals to him. The engrossment in this limited task, imposed in the first instance by economic necessity, is often thought of as a peril to the realization of the fuller life of man, of his essential humanity. Doubtless the danger exists, and it is probably impossible to balance gain and loss. But specialism is only one aspect of this greater order, and the same conditions which impose it bring also certain means of possible deliverance from its perils—vastly greater intercommunication, a much extended period of general education in which the foundations of a broader culture may be laid, and new potentialities of leisure which, wisely directed, may liberate the mind from the dominance of the narrow task.

XIII

ASSOCIATIONS AND INTERESTS

INTERESTS AS THE BASIS OF ORGANIZATION

How associations come into being.—We have seen that the association establishes a specific and limited relationship between its members. We become members by virtue of particular attributes or qualifications, corresponding to the particular objects for which it is organized. We profess a faith or cultivate an art or pursue some kind of knowledge or run some kind of business, and find it desirable or advantageous to join with others in so doing. It is thus that practically all associations arise. As pointed out in Chapter II, it is in terms of interests rather than of attitudes that we can explain the formation and maintenance of associations. Attitudes encourage or discourage, but they do not create organizations. Associations come into being as means or modes of attaining interests. An association is likely to be formed wherever people recognize a like, complementary, or common interest sufficiently enduring and sufficiently distinct to be capable of more effective promotion through collective action, provided their differences outside the field of this interest are not so strong as to prevent the partial agreement involved in its formation. It is obvious that a heterogeneous specialized community affords more opportunity for the creation of organized groups than a simple or primitive community. The former is more able to distinguish particular interests from the general one and the very fact of specialization makes necessary the organization of these particular interests. The constant changes which occur in a specialized community precipitate conditions favorable to the emergence of new groups. Nothing is more characteristic of

modern societies than the multiplicity of organizations which they contain.

The role of leadership in the formation of associations.—The recognition of an interest which can be promoted by organization is not of itself sufficient to bring an association into being. There are inertias, prejudices, and problems of ways and means still to be overcome. Here is where the service of leadership is most manifest. Usually it is the initiative, enthusiasm, and energy of one or a small number which prepare the ground. The leaders, whether from sheer devotion to the cause or from the sense of incidental advantages to themselves in the form of place or power or prestige or economic gain—usually no doubt from a combination of these motives—accentuate the advantage of organization and seek to establish attitudes in the potential members favorable to its formation. Often some precipitant, some crisis or conjuncture of events, stimulates the leaders themselves to action. The psychology of leadership in the formation and development of groups is an interesting theme which we cannot here pursue. The tasks of the leader in the nascent stage are to create or intensify the consciousness of the need for the new organization, or, in other words, the sense of the interest around which it is organized, to instill confidence in themselves and thus in the efficiency of the organization they propose, and to harness this heightened sense of need to the practical necessities of financial or other co-operation on the part of the members. In order to organize an interest, it must first be presented in a certain detachment from others, and then, *in its organized form*, it must be brought into harmony with the complex of interests of the members.

The nature of the interest to be organized determines the specific task of leadership. The latter is obviously different where the interest is of an economic nature from what it is when a cultural interest is in question. It is different where the interest is general and vague and where the interest possesses an intimate and limited appeal. Let us take one example. For multitudes the promotion of international peace is an interest, though an indefinite one. A peace organization arises and at once gives it some definition, offering a practical goal, a specific way of focusing and furthering the interest. The particular obstacles which in this instance the leaders must overcome in the potential members are the sense of remoteness from the controlling factors in the situation and thus of the futility of the nascent organization, the danger of cleavages over policy which a project so general and so "ideal" is apt to engender, and the resistance of traditions which associate the advocacy of peace with

a lack of patriotism, with something dysphemistically named "pacifism." This last barrier exemplifies a problem which often arises in the promotion of cultural organizations. The generality of men are reluctant or unable to observe likenesses or unlikenesses which disturb their social attitudes, which break what Lippmann has named their "stereotypes," confounding their established complacencies regarding social values and unsettling that sense of unity and difference which confirms limited solidarities and "social distances." A "pacifist" is such a stereotype to many, belonging to the same order as the stereotypes which represent the Catholic to the Protestant and *vice-versa*, the Jew to the Gentile, and so forth. A new organization which evokes these stereotypes, such as the Ku Klux Klan, is likely to grow more rapidly, though its foundations may be less secure, than one which opposes them.

The evocation of appropriate leadership is subject to certain difficulties, varying with the nature of the interest to be organized. Where economic like interests are the main consideration, there is likely to be a strong competitive struggle for leadership, and then a certain process of selection, making on the whole for the emergence of leaders with the appropriate qualities, takes place. Here the chief danger is that the leader will give preference, in guiding the organization, to economic interests of his own which are not in harmony with the economic interests of the group as a whole. Where common interests are the object of organization, there is a further series of difficulties. The leader, as leader, has like interests which may prove too strong for his sincere service of the common cause. This tendency has been emphasized by Robert Michels in his book, *Political Parties*, in which he offers many illustrations from the life history of political leaders and labor leaders.¹ Another obstacle to effective leadership in the case of common interests of the more idealistic type is that control tends not infrequently to fall into the hands of narrow-minded enthusiasts who because of their zeal are most ready to undertake the onerous tasks of leadership while they are often least conscious of its problems. With respect to political leadership the heavy responsibilities and often the sacrifices it involves act as a deterrent to some qualified candidates and thus leave the field more free for those who seek aggrandizement or power or personal gain.

How like and common interests are interwoven in associations.—Since interests are determinant of the form and character of associations we shall proceed to classify associations in terms of inter-

¹ Eng. tr., New York, 1915.

ests. First, however, we must classify interests themselves. In the next section we shall classify them with respect to their intrinsic character or content. Here we are concerned simply with the modes of relationships which the interests of *different* individuals exhibit. In accordance with the usage established in Chapter II, we shall speak of like interest when two or more persons severally or distributively pursue a like object, each for himself, and of common interest when two or more persons seek a goal or objective which is one and indivisible for them all, which unites them with one another in a quest that cannot be resolved merely into an aggregate of individual quests.²

An association may be formed primarily to promote either a like interest or a common interest of the members. An economic association is generally based on like interest. Its main function is usually to provide wages or salaries or profits or dividends for those who belong to it. A cultural association is generally organized around a common interest, though this does not imply that the common interest contains the main motive which inspires the adherence or devotion of its members, but only that apart from the common interest it could not come into existence or be maintained. Moreover, in spite of this initial difference between these two types of association, it is an essential truth that, once in being, nearly all organized groups represent, for at least some of its members, both a like and a common interest. This double character of the interest which an association sustains is so important for the understanding of the social structure that we must illustrate and explain it more fully.

Let us take first a college society, a team, say, or a fraternity. Obviously the members get an individual or private satisfaction through belonging to it. Membership in the team, for example, satisfies their like interests of recreation and physical exercise, perhaps brings some distinction with it; it also satisfies the like and the complementary interest of companionship. But it has a further interest for its members. They want the team to succeed not simply because it redounds to their credit as individuals. They want it to succeed also for the credit of the team or for the credit of the college. Their individual interests merge in this inclusive interest. If a player does badly he is still gratified that the team wins; if he shines, he is still distressed that the team loses. Each has in degree the sense of the whole. Each shares a common interest.

² For a fuller classification of these modes of relationship between interests see the author's *Community*, Book II, Chap. II.

Or take once more a family group. Again it satisfies certain like and complementary interests of the members. But the family itself is normally an interest to each, a common interest. Each has some concern for the well-being of the others, not merely because their well-being is a means to his own, but because also he cares directly for his family. When one of the family distinguishes himself, the gratification of the others cannot be resolved merely into a sense of reflected glory. When one member disgraces himself the others are downcast not simply because it affects their own reputations or because it makes the family a less desirable or less efficient agency for the fulfillment of their self-centered interests. The family itself is an interest to each, so that like interest and common interest are for each inextricably combined. In the pride and sorrow which the members share, in their attachment to common traditions and common achievements, in their struggles and sacrifices for the welfare of the whole, in their memory of its past and their hope for its future, they reveal in varying degrees that social solidarity which marks the presence of a common interest. If this fact be challenged, it is enough to adduce in proof the anxiety of members of the family to provide for others in a future beyond their own lives. This sense of responsibility for others can arise only in the presence of a common interest.

Finally, let us take an instance in which the initial dominance of like interests is manifest, as in a business firm. It is established to provide dividends or profits, but if it endures it tends to mean something more in the lives of the partners or directors. This does not mean merely that in addition to profits they find it the source of power or personal prestige. It is likely to appear in their eyes as a co-operative enterprise, perhaps also as a service to the community. They find some satisfaction in its success, in its tradition, in its institutions, apart from their personal advantage. They will spend money, not wholly for its advertising value, in erecting a beautiful building, a model factory, a temple-like bank. A common interest has developed out of a like interest.³

³ The existence of this common interest, as defined, is sometimes denied because of a psychological confusion. It is inferred that because we get satisfaction out of something we do it in order to get this sense of satisfaction and that therefore the interest is self-centered. This psychological hedonism, as has often been pointed out, is unsound. One would not in fact get the sense of satisfaction in question unless the thing from the achievement of which or the group from the well-being of which our satisfaction springs were the direct object of our desire.

We should at the same time observe that like and common interests are not

Why all associations endeavor to cultivate a common interest.—

We shall fail to appreciate the social significance of the association unless we realize that it is held together by the twofold interest of its members in it, by the subtly interwoven bonds of like and common interest. When an association of the economic order brings like interests into co-operative harmony it is at the same time supplementing the like interest by a common interest and thus enlarging the sphere of common interest. In this way, within the limits of membership, each association sends a taproot down to the deep sources of society. The more enduring the association the stronger this taproot is likely to grow. Within every association there arises also the conflict of dividing interests, of the competitive desires for place and power. These are normally kept within limits because the existence of the association itself becomes a primary condition on which their satisfaction depends. In other words, the like interests must be accommodated to the common interest. It is worth observing that every organized group, seeking its own preservation or expansion, endeavors in various ways to cultivate the common interest. For example, it devises symbols of its unity and keeps them before the attention of its members. There is a multitude of ways in which the common interest is emphasized—slogans, appellations of brotherhood, emblems, flags, festivals, parades, processions, initiation rites, rallies, intergroup competitions, and so on, all designed to evoke or sustain the *esprit de corps* of the members, to make them feel their solidarity. The student will find it worth while to compare the various ways in which different associations, according to their kind, trade-unions, business firms, churches, schools and colleges, Rotary Clubs, mystic brotherhoods, political parties, make appeal directly or indirectly, through symbols or through exhortations, to the common interest.

ASSOCIATIONS CLASSIFIED BY INTERESTS

Associations in a complex society.—In a complex society associations tend to be specialized so that each stands for a particular type of interest or interest-complex. In primitive society, where there is less division of labor and where change is slower, there are few to be identified respectively with selfish and unselfish interests. Such ethical terms are misleading and irrelevant in a psychological analysis.

Finally, confusion arises because we do not distinguish adequately between an interest and a motivation (see Chapter II). The group as a whole remains a common interest no matter what motives we may discover in the minds of those who entertain it.

associations and they are more inclusive. They are communal or semicommunal in the range of their interest. A newly developed interest does not create, as with us, a new association, but is incorporated in the general body of interests pursued by the existing organization. Thus in primitive life associations lack the specific limited functional character which our own possess. They take such forms as age-groups, kin-groups, sex-groups, groups for the performance of communal rites and ceremonies, secret societies, rather than the economic or professional or political or cultural varieties familiar to ourselves. This contrast will be shown more fully when we come to the subject of social evolution. Meantime, it may suffice to note that the functional differentiation of modern organized groups makes it possible for us to classify them according to the characteristic interests they severally pursue.

Some problems of classification: (1) The professed interest not always the determinant interest.—Certain cautions should, however, be kept in mind when we seek after this fashion to classify associations. One is that the ostensible interest is not always determinant. The professed or formulated aims of an association do not necessarily reveal the full or even the true character of the object which it chiefly seeks. But at least a part of this difficulty disappears when we take as the basis of classification the immediate field of interest rather than the remote objectives or purposes, when in particular we avoid the confusion of interests and motivations. It would indeed be a hazardous task to classify associations in terms of professed objectives or ulterior aims. For one thing, a disparity not infrequently arises because the association, passing through historical changes, clings traditionally to older formulations—as religious bodies are particularly apt to do—or because the leaders idealize its aims, in the desire to broaden its appeal, to strengthen its public position, to secure funds, and so forth. Such idealization is seen not only in the platforms of political parties but also in the pronouncements of many other organizations. Often an organization will stress the more altruistic of the objects which lie within the field of its interest. A department store will proclaim that it exists to serve the community. A professional organization will emphasize the necessity of rigid qualifications for membership on the ground that the service of the public must be safeguarded while it is more or less silent on the competitive advantage thereby gained.

(2) Professed interest modified by variant conditions.—We should also observe that we are far from expressing the distinctive character of any individual association when we have placed it in

its interest category. The character of an individual association is often very subtle, and it is only in the light of a considerable study of its activities that its true nature and proper distinctiveness can be found. Moreover, in every case the interest it pursues is colored or modified by the character of the constituents and the character of the community in which it functions. There are elements in the nature of many organizations which are not brought into the focus of consciousness by the members or even by the leaders. For example, an organization which has gradually abandoned a traditional basis of solidarity may gropingly move in a new direction and gain a new kind of solidarity, related to but different from that which its leaders believe and certainly state that it possesses. This situation is illustrated in the history of certain semireligious organizations such as the Y.M.C.A. and the Y.W.C.A. Shall we classify them as religious or recreational or generally educational or in a broad sense as social clubs? What element is focal or dominant in the interest-complex? For reasons just suggested it is hard to answer. The Y.M.C.A. or the Y.W.C.A. is a characteristic association, a certain "kind" of association with its own social "flavor." But it is a different kind in a rural area and in, say, a metropolitan area. In each region it has responded to certain social exigencies, seeking in the face of competing social agencies still to represent something, something in some way different from the rest, for when an organization loses its specific identity it loses its reason for existence in our much-organized society.

Another problem of classification, arising out of the changing relation of associations to interests, is revealed in the struggle to survive of those which have fulfilled their original *raison d'être*. Organizations too are tenacious of life. They refuse to die when their day is past. They seek new interests, a justification of their life in a continuing purpose beyond the one that is dead. The will to live centers in the officials of the organization. A political association comes into being to achieve some piece of legislation. It is attained, and the association lingers on. Thus a league for the enfranchisement of women turns into a party organization when women are enfranchised. An ancient guild is rendered obsolete by industrial change. Yet it survives as an "honorable company," to perpetuate ancient ceremonies at annual dinners. Once an economic organization, it has passed over into another category.

(3) *The main interest sometimes hard to determine.*—A more important obstacle to a satisfactory classification is presented by those organizations which stand for a variety of different interests

in such a way that it is hard to designate any one as dominant. Shall we classify a denominational college as a religious organization? Sometimes religion is the primary interest, sometimes merely the historical matrix. Shall we assign an organization for workers' education as economic or as cultural? It may exist to train trade-union leaders or to inculcate the principles of Marx or to provide a general education—and it may combine all these interests in one. Shall we call a businessmen's club an association for social intercourse or an economic association? One aspect may be dominant at one time, the other at another. These are examples of the difficulty which frequently occurs when we seek to place associations in the categories described below.

(4) *Some important interests do not create specific associations.*—The last-mentioned difficulty leads up to our final caution. We are making interests the basis of our classification, but the correspondence of interest and association is not, even in our specialized society, a simple one. There are some strong interests, such as the interest of power and of distinction, which do not normally create specific associations but ramify through associations of every kind. The dynastic state might be termed a "power-organization," but the quest of power in some form invades every political system, underlies the interest of wealth which is the direct object of economic association, and in fact is found wherever organization of any kind exists. We might call certain kinds of club "prestige-organizations," but as the interest of prestige is fostered no less in many other kinds of association, and particularly as men do not pursue prestige except through the medium of other interests, such an attribution would only confuse our classification. Again, the interest of companionship or of social intercourse is so pervasive that it is in some degree satisfied by every association and thus it is often dubious whether or not it is the main determinant. We take the club as the type-form association corresponding to this interest, but social intercourse is not the focus of all bodies called clubs and on the other hand there are various groups ostensibly established for other objects, from library associations to spelling bees, from charity leagues to sewing meetings, which are sustained mainly by this interest. The main interest of a group cannot be inferred from the name we apply to it. A gang, for example, may be little more than a boys' brotherhood, or it may be essentially an economic organization, exploiting a neighborhood by illegal means for economic ends.

Explanation of the classification that follows.—Turning now to our actual classification, we first divide associations into unspecialized and specialized, according as they stand for the total interests of a group or class or, on the other hand, represent either a particular interest or a particular mode of pursuing interests. We include the state among specialized associations, because in spite of the vast range of its interests it works through the particular agencies of law and government. As has been pointed out, unspecialized associations are less characteristic of modern society—and less effective within it—than specialized associations. The latter are classified in terms of the distinction between primary and secondary interests. By the latter we mean those interests which *by their very nature* are means to other interests. The significance of this division will appear in our next chapter, when we bring out the distinction between *civilization*, as the sphere of secondary interests, and *culture*, as the sphere of primary interests.⁴ Here a preliminary word of explanation may suffice.

It is true that any object we seek can become the very goal of our search, so that we look for no utility beyond it. We may seek wealth merely to possess it and not for its ulterior services; we may construct mechanisms, perhaps even social organizations, because we enjoy doing so and not because they will aid us to achieve other objects. Nevertheless the economic system would not exist but for the interests which underlie it, and mechanisms would be idle and soon forgotten toys but for the necessity which makes them our instruments. We divide these secondary or utilitarian interests into three classes, the economic, the political, and the technological. Another large group of interests, the educational, may perhaps be placed as intermediate between secondary and primary, since they are both utilitarian and cultural. It may be held that all genuine education, elementary or higher, technical or "liberal," is, in its degree, at the same time essentially an equipment for living and a mode of the fulfillment of life. Set over against the secondary interests are the cultural interests, the objects which we pursue apart from external pressure or necessity. Here again it is true that they may serve us merely as means, but their utilitarian service is incidental to the fact that we, or some of us, pursue them for their own sakes, because, that is, they bring us some direct satisfaction.

⁴ The classification of interests in this section is based on the same principle, though differently treated, as that given in the author's *Community*, Book II, Chap. II.

GENERAL CLASSIFICATION OF INTERESTS AND ASSOCIATIONS

<i>Interests</i>	<i>Associations</i>
A. UNSPECIALIZED	Class and caste organizations Tribal and quasi-political organizations of simpler societies Age-groups The patriarchal family Perhaps also such organizations as vigilante groups, civic welfare associations, etc.
B. SPECIALIZED	
I. <i>Secondary</i>	
(a) Economic interests	Type form: <i>The business</i> Industrial, financial, and agricultural organizations Occupational and professional associations ⁵ Protective and insurance societies Charity and philanthropic societies ⁶ Gangs, etc.
(b) Political interests	Type form: <i>The state</i> Municipal and other territorial divisions of the state Parties, lobbies, propagandist groups
(c) Technological interests	Associations for technical research, and for the solution of practical problems of many kinds ⁷
II. <i>Intermediate</i>	
Educational interests	Type form: <i>The school</i> Colleges, universities, study groups, reformatories, etc.
III. <i>Primary</i>	
(a) Social intercourse	Type form: <i>The club</i> Various organizations ostensibly for the pursuit of other interests
(b) Health and recreation	Hospitals, clinics, etc. Associations for sports, games, dancing, gymnastic and other exercises, for diversions and amusements ⁸
(c) Sex and reproduction	Type form: <i>The family</i>
(d) Religion	Type form: <i>The church</i> Religious propagandist associations Monasteries, etc. ⁹
(e) Aesthetic interests, art, music, literature, etc.	Corresponding associations
(f) Science and philosophy	Learned societies

⁵ These combine economic and technological interest; where the latter are dominant the associations fall in I (c).

⁶ The economic interest is usually, though by no means always, the focus of these associations. The fact that it is the economic welfare of others than the members which is sought does not affect the classification.

⁷ The technological interest is generally subordinate to the economic, i.e., it is a means to a means. Hence it is usually pursued through subagencies of the economic order. Sometimes it is organized under political auspices, through such divisions as a department of agriculture, bureau of standards, etc.

⁸ The interests of health and of recreation may of course be entirely dissociated. The interest of recreation is, on the other hand, often associated with the aesthetic interests, so that various associations could be classified under III (b) or under III (e).

⁹ The monastery is a quasi-community, but if religion is the main determinant of its activities as well as the basis of organization, we can retain it under III (d).

Other modes of classification in terms of interests.—The foregoing classification is meant to serve as an introduction to the study of the social structure. Our task in this study is to reveal the distinctive types of association which enter into the social structure—distinctive with respect to the kinds of social relationship which they

ASSOCIATIONS CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO THE DURABILITY OF THE INTEREST

<i>Interests</i>	<i>Associations</i>
(a) Interests realizable once for all—definite temporary objectives	Associations for the achievement of a specific reform, reconstruction, etc., political or other (e.g., antislavery); for a celebration, erection of a memorial, etc., for an emergency such as a flood, economic crisis, war
(b) Interests peculiar to a definite number of original or potential members—the “broken plate” situation ¹⁰	Groups composed of the members of a school or college class or year, of army veterans, of the survivors of a shipwreck, etc.
(c) Interests limited to age-periods of a relatively short range	School and college teams, debating societies, etc.; boy scouts, junior leagues, etc.—associations continuous as individual structures but with rapidly successive memberships
(d) Interests limited by the tenure or life-span of some original or present members	Partnerships of various kinds; groups of friends; the family—permanent as a social system embodied in successive individual associations ¹¹
(e) Interests unlimited by a time-span	The corporation; most large-scale organizations, state, church, occupational associations, scientific associations, etc.—associations individually continuous through the recruitment and incorporation of new members

¹⁰ The reference here is to a famous illustration given by Simmel (*Soziologie* [Munich, 1923], p. 60). A group of industrialists were seated at a banquet when a plate was dropped and shattered into fragments. It was observed that the number of pieces corresponded to the number of those present. Each received one fragment, and the group agreed that at the death of any member his fragment was to be returned, the plate being thus gradually pieced together until the last surviving member fitted in the last fragment and shattered again the whole plate.

¹¹ The larger patriarchal family or the “joint family” does not fall within this class, but the modern individual family does. We speak of the family in another sense, as when we say that a person is a member of an “old” family, but in this sense the family is not an association.

Observe particularly the difference between the groups under (b) and under (d). The interest which creates an association under (b) is unique, peculiar to the members, and dies with the association. It has therefore little significance for the social structure. The interest under (d) is universal in its appeal and particularizes itself in a multitude of individual associations. The interest under (b) is in fact the social bond itself, whereas the interest under (d) is the perennial source of the social bond.

exhibit—and at the same time to show their place and function in the society, their relation to one another and to the whole. While the specific nature of the interest is the main clue to the character of the corresponding association, as set out in the table on page 262, there are other ways of classifying interests that throw further light on the relation between them and associations. Thus the direct social interest in persons is the distinguishing feature of primary groups, whereas the interest in the impersonal means and ends of living characterizes the large-scale association. Again, we can distinguish interests according to their degree of duration in the life history of their members. In accordance with this attribute associations within the same field may be transient, rapidly successive, or permanent. They may be permanent as established *forms* of social organization like the family, though the individual instances are mortal, or they may be long-lived, potentially immortal, as individual structures, like the corporation. In the table on page 263 we neglect the interest-types in order to classify associations in terms of the distinction just mentioned.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS WITHIN ASSOCIATIONS

Types of interest-conflict within associations.—The interest for which an association stands is the primary ground of its unity, the basis of its particular cohesion. This unity is reinforced by other bonds, by the shared tradition and prestige of the association or the associates, by the sustenance of the general need of society which it may provide, by the incidental life habits which it supports, by the other common interests which the members share in whole or in part. But at the same time there are forces generated or revealed within the association which cause tensions and strains in its solidarity. There are conflicts in the field of the particular interest and there are conflicts arising from oppositions between that interest and the other interests of the members. Like the greater communal types of cohesion, that of the association is imperfect, unstable, representing, while it endures, the victory of integrative over disintegrative elements. A study of the conflicts and harmonies of interest which appear within the life of an association might be in fact a preparation for the study of that greater unstable equilibrium which is society itself.

Type One: Conflicts within the interest-complex.—We select for brief discussion three main types of conflict which occur persistently

in the history of associations. The first arises from the lack of harmony between the objectives which fall within the interest-complex. An obvious illustration is frequently presented within professional or occupational associations. The economic interest, the maintenance or enhancement of the emoluments of the service they render, is not at all points reconciled with the professional interest proper, the quality and extent of the service. The medical profession offers a peculiarly interesting situation. If it could achieve its professional ideal, it would thereby reduce to a minimum the need for its therapeutic service while enlarging greatly its preventive service. The former is mainly private practice, the latter is largely socialized, provided through clinics, hospitals, state departments, public and semipublic institutions of various kinds. Here a dilemma is apt to arise not only because private practice is more in accord with the traditions of the profession but also because it tends, under prevailing conditions, to be more remunerative. If economic interest alone determined the policy of a professional organization, whether medical or other, we would have simply a conflict between the associational interest and the public interest. But the medical association, like other professional groups, is concerned with the efficacy of the service which it represents.¹² Hence there arises a conflict of interests within the association itself, in the attempt to work out a policy which will reconcile or adjust the economic interest and the professional ideal. It would be easy to show that similar problems of the adjustment of interests arise within bar associations, educational associations, business firms, trade-unions, and other bodies. The conflict is seen very clearly also in political groups. It is only in extreme exploitative organizations, such as that centering round a political boss, that the economic interest entirely drives out the professional interest, that of the standard of service—and when this happens the organization becomes in that respect simply and solely an enemy of society.

¹² Sometimes conditions occur under which a professional organization may practically disregard the professional interest proper. Thus the authors of a report on British professional associations (Supplement to the *New Statesman* [London], April 28th, 1917), stated that the civil service associations "all fail as yet to give any but the slightest attention to the development of their particular branch of technique or the improvement of their own vocational training." In the same report it is suggested that the difficulty of reconciling economic and cultural interests explains the break-away of scientific associations from general professional associations—as seen in the formation of the sections of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, of the Chemical Society, the Historical Society, the Philosophical Society, and so forth.

Type Two: Conflicts between relevant and irrelevant interests.—The second type of conflict arises where the specific interest of the association demands a course of action which is opposed to some other interests not relevant to the association as such but also entertained by some members of the group. A highly qualified Negro, let us say, seeks admission to a university. He possesses the requisite qualifications, for racial difference is no bar to scholarship. But other considerations which have nothing to do with the express purpose of the association enter in and create within the association a conflict concerning policy. In one form or another such conflicts are constantly occurring. Outside interests prevent the association from pursuing with single-mindedness its proper objectives. Group prejudices modify the devotion of the association to its avowed objective. Individual jealousies and predilections thwart the interest which is the *raison d'être* of the organization. Thus confusion and disharmony appear within its councils.

We may include in the same general category the conflict which arises owing to the fact that the interests of the officials or leaders are not identical with those of the other members. The officials are anxious to enhance their authority, though this may lead to policies detrimental to the general interest. Or they have an economic interest which is at variance with the interest, economic or other, of the group. The degree of maladjustment varies not only with the personalities involved, but also with the nature of the interest. A particularly significant illustration is furnished by groups founded on principles of equality. It has been maintained that because leaders, as soon as they acquire power, are driven by the logic of their position to antidemocratic attitudes, no democratic or socialist organization can ever translate its principles into effective practice.¹³ The argument may be too sweeping, but the numerous instances adduced by the proponent of this "iron law of oligarchy" sufficiently illustrate the serious conflicts and confusions created by the dilemma of leadership.

Type Three: Conflicts between alternative policies in the pursuit of interests.—A third source of conflict is found in the constant necessity of the new adaptation of means to ends. By the end we understand the provisional basis of agreement regarding the interest of the association, which has to be translated into action by means of a policy. A group meets to decide a course of action in a given situation. The group-interest has already been defined and redefined by past decisions, has been canalized in the series of adjustments

¹³ Michels, *op. cit.*

which the group has undergone. But the new occasion demands more than a routine following of the channel. Being different, it demands a fresh decision, a new expression of policy. The members meet on the assumption that all are agreed regarding the end—the problem is the appropriate means. A business must decide how to deal with a new competitive threat. A club must raise funds to meet a deficit. A church must decide how to act in face of a declining membership. A settlement house must adapt itself to a changing neighborhood. The agreement on ends is implicit, taken for granted, but the agreement on means must be explicit. The necessity for it is a touchstone to evoke the differences of temperament and viewpoint within the group. Shall the club raise the necessary funds by an extension of membership or by a levy on its present members? Shall the church popularize its regular services or undertake additional social activities? Shall the settlement house go further afield to find its old clientele or shall it modify its program to meet the needs of the newcomers? The more conservative members answer one way, the less conservative another. The interplay of divergent personal factors is in reality very complex. Normally the sense of solidarity prevails, an adjustment is reached, and a policy framed, but in the process acute differences may emerge.

Where the association stands for a broad cultural interest or one strongly charged with emotional elements there is greater danger that difference will lead to schism. A main reason is that differences on matters of policy are apt to extend down into differences regarding the implicit end which the policy is meant to serve. The interest of a business firm is relatively simple. The end to which its policy must be adapted is accepted and understood without dispute. But it is otherwise with the interest of a church, of an artist group, or perhaps of a political party. Dissension over means may here reveal the inadequacy of the more basic agreement over ends. The end itself, at some level, is brought into the arena of conflict, and thus the solidarity of the organization may be shaken. When a church faces a declining membership it may be forced to raise the further question concerning its proper mission. When the business faces declining sales, its endeavor to restore profits raises no ulterior question regarding the appropriate definition of its quest. Such considerations help to explain the tendency to schism exhibited by churches which do not adhere strongly to authoritative interpretations, by left-wing parties generally, by artistic and other bodies united around some cultural creed.

XIV

FUNCTIONAL SYSTEMS

THE INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEX

Functional systems in the social structure.—We have now described the different constituents of the social structure—the nuclei of community, the divisions of class, the numerous forms of organization that range from the family to the state. But we should not attain any adequate conception of society if we thought of it as simply a composite of the various constituents. We should not understand the character of the unity or degree of unity it possesses even if we fully allowed for the unifying role of the state and of the inclusive community of the nation. We have so far been analyzing the social order into its elements. We have enumerated, classified, and defined these elements; we have sought to expose the *anatomy* of society; but just as an organism is built into functional systems that are not simply its specific organs, so a society has within it various relatively integrated structures that are not to be identified with its specific associations. The structure of a modern society is an elaborate one, more elaborate than we generally realize, and it is harder to conceive than the structure of a physical or biological unity, because the social framework is invisible and intangible. We all *experience* the fact that there is a social order. We perceive its results and point to the evidences that indicate its changes; but the order itself is not of the kind that directly meets the eye or the ear. On that account it is all the more important that the student should try to *understand* it.

At this point the student should turn to the table on page 144. He ought now to be familiar with the various classifications pre-

sented in the table and with the principles upon which it is constructed. But he will note that one category of the schema has not so far been referred to, the *fundamental systems* included under B III. Without these our conspectus would be quite incomplete. We saw in the last chapter how interests are focused in associations, but the functional coherence of interests is not fully brought out by the study of specific associations. Interests create social formations beyond or outside the range of individual associations. They cohere in two ways which the classification on page 262 fails to represent. (1) For purposes of classification we have distinguished such formally specialized interests as the economic and the political, and the technological and the economic; or taking a wider range, the political and the religious, and the economic and the sexual. But such interests, though formally distinct, may be closely interwoven. The economic and the political are inevitably bound together; the religious and the political cohere under certain conditions. These unifications are revealed in the structural systems we shall speak of as *institutional complexes*. (2) The major divisions of interests as given in the classification are represented by no associations of corresponding range. There is no association broad enough to incorporate all primary interests or all secondary interests. But each of these genera of human interests has characteristic features of its own, present in all the species of the genus. Consequently these species also constitute coherent systems, the great orders of human experience. These orders, corresponding respectively to primary and to secondary interests, we shall distinguish as the *order of culture* and the *order of civilization*. It should be observed that the patterns which these orders exhibit are not strictly *social* patterns, that the adjustments and the processes which they undergo are not properly to be called social relationships and social processes. But the patterns, relationships, and processes that each of these orders reveal, both within itself and in relation to the antithetical order, are of vast importance for the understanding of social relationships and social unities and, as we shall see in Part Four, are essential determinants of social change.

Definition of institutional complex.—If a perfectly static society were conceivable, it would be one in which all the constituent elements were completely co-ordinated into a single unified scheme. But in actual life with its incessant change, and particularly under the conditions of a complex society, there is and there can be no such perfect co-ordination. In any large-scale society there are, however, some particular areas within which a high degree of integration

is attained. Where this occurs, various factors are interadjusted by institutional arrangements so that they function harmoniously towards the same ends. Contrast, for example, the situation in which church and state form a unified system of social control with that in which the church is relatively separate from and independent of the state. In the former case we have an institutional complex. Again, there is always a fairly close interadjustment between political institutions and the dominant economic institutions, since the character of the one in large measure depends on the character of the other. Here therefore we have also an institutional complex. In short we have an institutional complex wherever diverse organized interests are institutionally co-ordinated into a unified functional system.

The economic-political complex.—Not one or two types of interest, but often many, are combined in an institutional complex. Let us take *capitalism*, or, more strictly, capitalistic organization, as an example. Capitalism is not a single phenomenon or a mere cluster of economic phenomena. It is not merely a set of economic relationships between the owners or managers of producers' goods and those they hire to operate them, not merely a system in which corporate control and private enterprise determine the conditions of production; it is at the same time, and inevitably, also a political phenomenon supported by congenial mores and cultural valuations. Capitalism could not exist unless maintained by the appropriate political and legal institutions; since in the first instance a system involving private property, free contractual relationships, monetary and banking facilities congenial to capitalistic enterprise, corporate rights and powers, and so forth, depends throughout on legal establishment. The specifically economic conditions, the profits system, the wage system, the combination of competition and partial monopoly, the marketing system, and all the rest, are the counterpart of specifically political conditions. And both sets of conditions depend in turn on appropriate mores, such as beliefs concerning the value and social role of competitive struggle, of the private inheritance of wealth, of individualistic acquisition, of the superiority of a "free" to a "planned" economy, and of the incentives to effort which arise from the prospect of private gain.

In this category of interadjusted factors of capitalism we have not included the technological conditions of which in a sense capitalism is the product. Without the development of the means of communication, without considerable division of labor or specialization, without the mechanisms of production, without large-scale

markets, capitalism as we understand it here could not have developed. These technological factors, however, are detachable from the institutional complex of capitalism. They enter also into alternative institutional complexes, particularly that of socialism, whereas the factors we have mentioned above are necessary coherent elements of the capitalism complex. Again, capitalism, like all institutional complexes, is historically associated with a variety of other conditions, such as monarchical, republican, or dictatorial forms of government, which are not essential to its existence though they may be components of larger complexes of a looser or more temporary character.

Other types of institutional complex.—We see then that institutional complexes may be more or less inclusive and may vary in magnitude and in the degree of interadjustment between their elements. When, for example, a country changes its constitution or form of government, the change is never confined to its political institutions. Corresponding changes occur or have previously been occurring in economic relationships, in the class structure, in the dominant ways of thinking. Democratic or fascist or communist systems are alike institutional complexes. A democratic order is not intelligible merely as a particular way of choosing a government and of making laws. It cannot function except as part of a more inclusive system, supported by congenial mores. It cannot function—more exactly, it cannot exist—if dominant economic powers prevent the free expression of opinion. It cannot function if, say, a highly organized hierarchical religion prescribes the manner of life of the community. Similarly a dictatorship or a form of class government must rest on a congenial social order, or if it has seized power in an order based on other principles, it must, to be effective, contrive, by persuasion or by force, to change that order into conformity with its own character. Every political system, in short, is always part of an institutional complex of greater or less range, just as we have seen that every economic system must be.

Complexes of this kind are found everywhere, since the social reality is not broken up into compartments corresponding to the distinctions between interests or to the respective subjects of the various social sciences. As we shall see later, different types of institutional complex characterize different stages of social evolution. The institutional nexus between cultural institutions (expressive of primary interests) and utilitarian institutions (expressive of secondary interests) is particularly significant in this respect. For example, the eighteenth-century herald of revolution, Jean

Jacques Rousseau, vehemently opposed the dissolution of the political-religious complex and declared that to "separate the religious from the political system" was to "destroy the unity of the state and to cause the intestine divisions which have never ceased to agitate Christian nations."¹ In this he was at one with the conservatives who denounced him, such as the English orator Edmund Burke. But the trend since his time has on the whole been to the breakup of this complex. In a modern society the complex of political and economic institutions is as well established as ever, though the mode of co-ordination may be different. But the relations between cultural and utilitarian institutions is far more variable and generally less intimate. The reasons for this will appear in the following section of this chapter.

CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION

What we mean by civilization.—Pursuing our classification of interests into primary and secondary, we discover two great areas of human experience and of human activity, those we have named respectively "culture" and "civilization." All the things that man does, all the things he creates—all his artifacts—fall predominantly into one order or the other. Take, for example, a typewriter. We observe at once that it belongs to the same order as a printing press, a lathe, a factory, a locomotive, a bank, a currency system. These things are all *utilitarian*. They are conceived, devised, and operated as means to ends. We do not normally want any of them for the satisfaction their existence brings to us; we want them because we can secure certain satisfactions by using them as means. They are useful as equipment, as apparatus. They all belong to the realm of civilization. By civilization, then, we mean the whole mechanism and organization which man has devised in his endeavor to control the conditions of his life. It would include not only our systems of social organization but also our techniques and our material instruments. It would include alike the ballot box and the telephone, the Interstate Commerce Commission and the railroads, our laws as well as our schools, and our banking systems as well as our banks.

What we mean by culture.—Just as the typewriter belongs to one great order, so the novel which may be written by its aid falls into another. It is in an important respect akin to a picture, a poem, a drama, a movie film, a game, a philosophy, a creed, a cathedral.

¹ *Social Contract*, Book IV, Chap. VIII.

All these things we bring into existence because we want them as such, because it is their function to give us directly, not merely as intermediaries, something that we crave after or think we need. They all represent ways in which we express ourselves. They respond to a necessity within us, not to an outer necessity. They belong to the realm of culture. This is the realm of values, of styles, of emotional attachments, of intellectual adventures. Culture then is the antithesis of civilization. It is the expression of our nature in our modes of living and of thinking, in our everyday intercourse, in art, in literature, in religion, in recreation and enjoyment. While, as we shall see, many objects possess both a civilizational and a cultural element, we can often decide the question of their classification by asking: Do we want these things themselves or do we merely use them in order to attain some other thing we want? Do they exist because of some outer necessity or because we seek them as such? Often we make a virtue of necessity and impress on utilitarian objects a cultural quality, as when we build banks to rival temples, but if these objects would not exist at all for the *direct* satisfaction they yield us we may classify them as within the category of civilization. On the other hand many objects combine both elements so inextricably, for example our clothing and our homes, that we must be content simply to distinguish the two aspects of the service they render.²

Some contrasts between the two orders.—(1) Civilization, or the utilitarian order, is subject to the criterion of efficiency. When comparing the products and processes of civilization we can with confidence impute superiority and inferiority. Since they are means to ends, their degree of efficiency can readily be estimated and, provided the end is clearly postulated, can in fact be measured. The only difficulty lies in our judgment of the value of the ends which they serve, either in themselves or relatively to other ends. No one disputes the superiority of the tractor over the hand plow

² The anthropologist uses the term "culture" in a different and very inclusive sense. Thus, for example, A. Goldenweiser makes it inclusive of "our attitudes, beliefs, and ideas, our judgments and values; our institutions, political and legal, religious and economic; our ethical codes and codes of etiquette; our books and machines, our sciences, philosophies and philosophers—all of these things and many other things and beings, both in themselves and in their multiform inter-relations." (*Early Civilization* [New York, 1926], p. 15.) For sociological purposes the more limited usage of the text seems more serviceable, especially as it is close to the older and ordinary use of the term. The distinction drawn in the text is akin to that made by Alfred Weber in his study, "Prinzipielles zur Kulturosoziologie," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, Vol. 47 (1921). It is developed also in the author's *Modern State*, Chap. X, and in his article, "The Historical Pattern of Social Change," *Journal of Social Philosophy*, Vol. 2 (1936), 35-54.

or of the modern currency and credit system over primitive barter. No one disputes the superiority of the machine gun over the tomahawk, though here the question arises of the wisdom or folly which employs the superior engine of destruction. We dispute concerning "scientific management" and labor unions and trusts and socialistic policies, not so much because we cannot measure the efficiency of these means towards the achievement of particular ends but because we differ regarding the relative value of these ends in the total scheme of life. It is always the cultural aspect which raises the ultimate unarbitrable problem of values. And so with the greater achievements of culture. We have no universal measuring rod by which to assess them. Different ages and different groups vary in their judgments. At best we content ourselves with the slowly gathered wisdom of a succession of "authorities," knowing that this also is precarious. If Shaw claims that he is a better dramatist than Shakespeare, no one can prove—or disprove—his claim; we can only disagree—or agree—with it. Progress, in the absolute sense, which means cultural progress, remains a matter of faith, of the congruity between the facts as we know them and the particular conceptions we entertain as to what is ultimately worth while. And no matter what standards we accept we find an ebb and flow, a lack of certitude in the movement of culture which stands in marked contrast to the victorious march of civilization.

(2) Civilization not only marches, it marches always, provided there is no catastrophic break of social continuity, in the same direction. An achievement of civilization is generally exploited and improved, going on from strength to strength, until it is superseded or rendered obsolete by some new invention. It is true that in past ages some achievements of civilization have again been lost. Men forgot the arts which raised the pyramids of Egypt and which constructed the roads and aqueducts of the Romans. But these losses occurred through catastrophic changes which blotted out the records of civilization. With the widening of the areas of civilization and with superior methods of recording discoveries, any utilitarian or technical gain becomes a permanent possession within the social heritage and the condition of further gains. It is otherwise with cultural achievements. They do not lead assuredly to higher or improved ones. Since man first invented the automobile, it has continuously improved. Our means of transportation grow constantly more swift and more efficient. They are vastly superior to those which the ancient Greeks employed. But can we say the same of our dramas and our sculptures, our conversation and our recreation?

Here certitude fails us. There are no automobiles today so comparatively inefficient as the first vehicles of Henry Ford—his work and that of other inventors inevitably prepared the way for better ones. But our plays are not necessarily better today because of the achievements of Shakespeare. There is no “march” of culture. It is subject to retrogression as well as to advance. Its past does not assure its future.

(3) The transmission of culture within a society follows a different principle from that which determines the transmission of civilization. Culture is communicated only to the like-minded. No one without the quality of the artist can appreciate art, nor without the ear of the musician can one enjoy music. Civilization in general makes no such demand. We can enjoy its products without sharing the capacity which creates them. Moreover, the process of creation itself is different. Lesser minds improve the work of the great inventors, but lesser poets do not improve on Shakespeare. The product of the artist is more revelatory of his personality than is that of the technician, just as the quality of a people is peculiarly expressed in its culture rather than in its civilization. What we acquire of the culture of the present or of the past depends on what we are. We do not inherit it as we inherit civilization. We acquire it selectively, as individuals and as groups. We inherit those aspects of it of which we are ourselves worthy. A new generation cannot enjoy the greater cultural achievements of the past unless they win it afresh for themselves. But the greatest achievements of the civilization around us can be ours to use and to enjoy without any special effort, without any particular qualification on our part. Again, culture, being the immediate expression of the human spirit, can advance only if that spirit is capable of finer efforts, has itself something more to express. Civilization is the vehicle of culture; its improvement is no guarantee of finer quality in that which it conveys. The radio can carry our words to the ends of the earth, but the words need be no wiser on that account.

(4) The transference of cultural elements from one area of society to another likewise differs in significant respects from the transference or “borrowing” of utilitarian elements. Given adequate means of communication, any improvement in the apparatus of life will quickly spread. In fact with the modern development of communications a single system of civilization is already encompassing nearly all the earth. Even the savage is ready to discard his bow and spear and to adopt the rifle. The power machine displaces the hand tool wherever men have the means to acquire it. The corporate

form of industry encroaches everywhere on older forms as irresistibly as the factory displaces the domestic system of production. We have pointed out that these techniques are readily comparable and the relative superiority of one over the other is easily adjudged. Civilization has its objective tests so that it is a simple matter to decide that one mode of hygiene or one method of road building is preferable to another. The advance of civilization is seriously resisted only when the older form is closely associated with the culture of a people. For a people will not freely abandon its culture for another, since to do so would be to sacrifice its intrinsic quality. Even when one civilization covers the globe great cultural differences, modified as they become under such conditions, will endure, just as they endure today among the industrialized peoples. It is true that cultural "borrowing" occurs, but it is selective and seemingly wayward, dependent on a degree of affinity, of like-mindedness, in the borrowers and always colored or even distorted by their personality.

The history of religious conversion and proselytism affords sufficient evidences of this selective process. The Geneva of Calvin and the Scotland of Knox and the Massachusetts of Cotton Mather were receptive of certain strains in the multiform tradition of Christianity, selecting ascetic, authoritarian, patriarchal, eschatological elements within it and translating them into a system which they identified with Christianity itself, just as other peoples and other times selected and transmuted other elements to form their creeds. It may also be noted that this selective "borrowing" is not limited to recent or contemporaneous contributions to the stock of culture. In this also it differs from the process by which civilization spreads. Culture elements may be adopted as readily from the past as from the present, from any epoch of the past no less than from the present hour. Cultural affinity may revert to the legends of Greece or of the German forests, to the art of tenth-century China or of pre-Raphaelite Florence, to the meditations of Job or of Marcus Aurelius. Its range of selection runs from the newest culture-fashion to the myths that linger from the dawn of history.

In the light of these distinctions it is obvious that the expansion of a civilization follows different principles from those which determine cultural development. Where communications admit, the former tends to proceed more rapidly, more simply, less selectively, always spreading outwards from the foci of technological and economic advance. The products of civilization are conveyed over every trade route, and they prepare the way for the techniques and systems

which created them. People trade with one another before they understand one another. The expansion of civilization has perils on that very account. For the interdependence of peoples within a common civilization outstrips the formation of those cultural attitudes necessary for its maintenance. This peril was glaringly exposed in the Great War. The spread of civilization makes certain cultural readjustments imperative.

Some relationships of the two orders: (1) as seen in particular products and processes.—Here as elsewhere the distinctions we discover in things are not necessarily distinctions *between* things. A particular product or process may be predominantly utilitarian or predominantly cultural, but it usually has both cultural and utilitarian aspects. We are not referring here to the obvious fact that the *same* object may be cultural for one person and utilitarian for another. We are considering rather the fact that any particular object may have embodied in it something of both aspects. More specifically, *the objects that fall mainly in the category of civilization have generally and in different degrees a cultural aspect*, while on the other hand *the objects that fall mainly in the category of culture have invariably a technological or utilitarian medium*.

Let us consider first the products and processes of civilization. Men are seldom content with the purely utilitarian aspect of the instruments they use, they want the utility embellished. They want style in an automobile as well as performance or comfort. The degree in which a cultural character is superadded to the mere utility varies with the nature of the object and with the social conditions. It is a general rule that what the economists term "consumers' goods" are more "embellished" than "producers' goods." The steam shovel, for example, is less stylized than the automobile. Another interesting point is that the longer an object of civilization endures, the more likely it is to acquire a cultural aspect. When the instruments of production tend to grow rapidly obsolete and to be replaced by more efficient or at least newer types, they are likely to assume more purely utilitarian forms. The culture of the community has not time to express itself in them. But in more static primitive communities the tool is more than a tool, it is the bearer of tradition, a symbol of culture, on which accordingly the craftsman lavishes his art. Under these conditions the techniques of production as well as the products have a ceremonial, symbolic, in general, a cultural, quality. When the savage builds a canoe, the technique is associated throughout with a ritual expressive of the folkways. Some relics of

this blending of technique and culture remain among ourselves, as in the ceremony of laying a foundation stone or of launching a ship.

What applies to the concrete instruments of civilization applies still more obviously to institutions and organizations. A constitution or a code of laws is not simply a means of government. At the same time it expresses the spirit of a people and as such tends to be endowed with a cultural value apart from its utility. It tends to be treasured for its own sake as the embodiment of tradition. This merging of the cultural with the utilitarian creates a resistance to change. The engineer, dominated by the idea of efficiency, never admires the mechanism of the past or the present so much that it impedes his search for improvements, nor in turn is he impeded by the attachment of his fellow men to antique designs. But men are more apt to admire the social agencies of the political or the economic order, the work of their forefathers hallowed by time, in such a way that they refuse to exercise upon them their own constructive powers or to consider objectively the advantages and disadvantages of proposed changes.

Consider next the products and processes that are dominantly cultural. All the phenomena that we classify as cultural expressions depend on some technical medium and technical process. The expression is limited and modified by technical requirements, whether the medium be language or paint or stone or gesture or other external sign. That is why, for example, it is harder to translate a poem than a treatise on engineering into a foreign language. It is impossible really to reproduce the former, to give in another medium the entire significance of the original blending of meaningful sounds and rhythms. Every artist has a constant struggle to master his medium. When we try to communicate to others some experience we have had or some scene we have witnessed, we find ourselves forever hampered by the difficulties of expression even in the most familiar of all media, our own language. We may mean what we say, but it is vastly harder to say what we mean. In a court of law we swear to tell the whole truth, but no one, with the best will in the world, can do so, can present to others a whole situation precisely as he has experienced it. The greater the artist the more he succeeds in making the medium express his thoughts or his purposes. This problem of the technical medium applies not only to the fine arts but also to the art of living, to the pursuit of the everyday satisfactions which are the cultural expressions of the majority of men. These also must be sought and attained under the conditions and the limitations set by the civilization in which we live,

Some relationships of the two orders: (2) viewed as functional systems.—We must now think of the whole apparatus of civilization as a system of interdependent devices and instruments, so as to examine some of its broader relations to the cultural life. Obviously the two are interactive, so that changes initiated in either operate to induce changes in the other. This consideration will prove of great importance in our later study of social change. But here we shall confine ourselves to some general relationships inherent in the very character of the two orders. Let us again make the order of civilization our starting point. How does it condition the cultural life?

From what has already been said it is apparent that civilization is at every stage (a) a vehicle of culture, (b) a factor determining the degree in which cultural expression and activity, of whatever kind, is released or limited, and (c) an environment of culture to which in some degree culture adapts itself. (a) The first aspect has already been partially dwelt on. Here we should add that cultural modes are responsive to the stage of technological development. Thus the form as well as the range of appeal of the literary art has been greatly affected by the development of printing. For example, apart from that development we would not have the lengthy novels that are popular today nor the spread of the habit of reading throughout the population. It is obvious in particular that the evolution of the means of communication has had a profound impact on the modes of expression which are so essential to cultural activity. In this sense, as well as in that already mentioned, civilization is the vehicle of culture.

(b) But many of the devices of civilization are of minor importance as direct vehicles of our culture—our elaborate mechanisms of production, for example. These mechanisms are more capable of serving our culture indirectly, as a means of exploiting nature and thus of liberating energies which otherwise would be used up in the necessities of mere living. If the whole day were consumed in the struggle to satisfy organic necessities, to secure food and warmth and shelter and protection, then there would be little opportunity for cultural development. The advance of technology has made possible in increasing measure the liberation of energies that otherwise must be devoted to these ends. The degree and the manner in which these liberated energies are utilized may themselves be a criterion of our culture. The elaborate apparatus does not inevitably raise its standard or its quality. Under certain conditions it may even prove an obstacle. The engrossment of

energies in the expansion of civilization when conditions are favorable to it may be prejudicial to culture, and this charge is often brought against periods of great mechanical advance such as the United States has experienced in conjunction with a rapidly growing population. The quantitative growth of civilization may check the qualitative growth of culture. It may be claimed, on the other hand, that some peoples have a greater genius for the building up of civilization than for the achievement of culture, a comparison which receives some support from the examples of Greece and Rome and which for these peoples was in fact admitted and proclaimed by the greatest of Roman poets. Other peoples, he said proudly, referring chiefly to the Greeks, may excel us in such arts as the making of figures in bronze and the carving of marble, or in oratory or in astronomy, but the business of the Roman is the practical art of government.³

Another important aspect of relationship is here suggested. The art of government is an art of control, and in controlling it constantly exercises power over at least some range of cultural expression. Some forms of government, inspired by the particular cultural valuations of the holders of power, even seek to dominate the whole cultural life. More generally, all possession or organization of utilitarian means, whether economic, technological, or political, places power in the hands of a hierarchy of control, which thereby exercises directly or indirectly a strong influence over cultural activities, limiting or suppressing some and supporting, providing for, and encouraging others.

(c) Civilization does more than provide channels and outlets for culture. The relation between the mind and the environment cannot be summed up in that external way. The instruments we use are the creatures of our desires, but they evoke, modify, and deflect our desires in turn. Mechanisms devised as mere utilities affect our lives, our thoughts, our aims and hopes and fears, in ways entirely beyond our foreknowledge. Our civilization, as it were, takes revenge upon us. Like the work of Frankenstein, it cannot be wholly controlled by its creators. The machine age has stimulated new habits and enjoyments, new philosophies and ethics, as well as new methods of production and means of locomotion. The telescope re-

³ *Excudent alii spirantia mollius aera.*

(credo equidem), vivos ducent de marmore vultus,
orabunt causas melius caelique meatus
describent radio et surgentia sidera dicent,
tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento.

—Virgil *Aen.* vi, 847-851.

vises our ideas of the universe, the microscope our ideas about the nature of life, and thus more subtly they influence our religions and our conduct. The power-mechanism, inexorably fulfilling immutable if newly discovered laws, instills new conceptions of the nature of authority. If in ancient Egypt or Judaea the wonders of electrical energy had been revealed, the peoples of these lands would also have had a different "revelation" of God which might well have affected the course of history. In the eras of slower change the influence of civilization on culture was less observed, but in our own age, with its rapid technological development, the fact has become a commonplace, though, as we shall see later, the precise nature and limits of that influence are exceedingly hard to diagnose.

Finally, let us look on the other side, the way in which the cultural order affects our civilization. Culture is the realm of final valuations, and human beings must interpret the whole world, including their own devices, techniques, and power, in the light of their valuations. Every people and every age has its characteristic ways of looking at things, its characteristic attitudes, no matter what diversity there may be among them, its own thought-forms and philosophies. The powers it uses and the manner in which it uses them, the inventions it develops and the directions in which they are applied, the means it amasses and the modes of their exploitation, cannot escape altogether from the influence of the creeds and the standards and the styles of the age. We see this more clearly when we survey past stages of civilization, and it is only because we are so wrapped in our own valuations that we find it more difficult to perceive it in the movements of our own age. Moreover, it is in the light of our culture that we conceive all the *unities* to which we belong, the unity of people and nation, of family and social class, of an international order, of civilization itself; and every application of means to sustain or advance these various unities is inspired by our culture. In the culture live the valuations that create group loyalties and group unities, that narrow or widen the range of community, and that organize the means and powers of society to the service of all common ends.

XV

THE GREAT ASSOCIATIONS: POLITICAL

THE STATE AS A FORM OF ASSOCIATION

The sociological approach to the state.—It should be evident from the argument of the last two chapters that we can classify the great associations of modern society according as they are primarily utilitarian or primarily cultural. For example economic organizations belong obviously to the former category and religious organizations to the latter. Sometimes there may be doubt as to the category in which we should place a particular association, and certain thinkers would claim that the state is no less a cultural than a utilitarian organization. While not denying that the state has an important cultural role, we think it is more appropriately conceived as a part, and indeed a major part, of the apparatus of civilization. The reasons for this view should be apparent in what follows.

The state is the subject of the science of government, or political science. Our concern as sociologists is not with constitutions and forms of government, nor with the modes in which states fulfill their various functions. In this chapter we are seeking to discern the character of the state as a distinctive form of association, to discover its sociological type, so to speak, and thereafter to show its typical relationships to the other parts of the social system. We shall proceed in a similar way in the two succeeding chapters. The great associations have brought into being their own distinctive sciences. Sociology can neither be inclusive of the subject matter of these sciences nor be a substitute for them. To offer a smattering of them would be foolish. But the great associations exhibit significant differences of type, and they are interwrought in the whole structure of a

society. For these reasons they are of profound interest to the sociologist.

In all the more complex societies the organizations of the political and economic order become the comprehensive framework of the social structure. They ramify everywhere, creating an ever wider and ever more intricate scheme of relationships. They link land with land over all the earth, often outstripping in their advance the associations of the cultural order. They link the savage to the civilized man. They ignore in large measure differences of creed or nationality or color. This condition arises out of the peculiar character of political and economic interests. We have already classified them as "secondary interests," constituting, as it were, neutral means to which all other interests of men are related and through which all other interests may be pursued. Consequently, given the technological basis of communication, they are capable of unlimited expansion. Together they constitute the great mechanism which men must use to obtain the objects of their desire. In their development they establish great forms of social order which both liberate and limit the expression of all our primary interests.

The state and the community.—We pointed out in Chapter I that the state itself is a form of association. Since this conception is of cardinal importance for the understanding of its nature we must here return to it. When we call the state an association we mean that it is a specific organization of society. We distinguish it thereby from the country or the nation on the one hand, from the unity of the social structure on the other. The confusion is still a prevalent one. It is encouraged by language, since we use the same terms, *the United States, England, Germany*, and so forth, to denote both the country and its people or the state and its government. We say "the United States makes a treaty"—and here we mean the state—or we say "the United States has a standard of living"—and here we mean the people. It is fostered by the tradition of old theories which regarded the state, contrary to definite evidences, as a *universal* partnership. It is a mistaken inference from the fact that the state does actually control or regulate a great part of our social activities and relationships and that it is *constitutionally* competent to control a still greater part. It is consequently maintained that if the state lets other aspects of social life alone "it is none the less dealing with them—it only lets them alone in a certain way and on certain terms."¹ But even if we accepted this position it does not

¹ Quotation from a letter to the author by the late Professor Bosanquet, who asserted this point of view in his work, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*.

follow that the regulator is to be identified with that which is regulated. Moreover, there are, as we have seen, various social codes which are distinct from and only in small part controlled by the code of the state. And there are many associations to which we belong which are in no sense merely divisions or branches of the great association of the state. As social beings, we are more than merely citizens of a state. We enter into many relationships, we carry on many social activities, not as members of a state, not as citizens, but as social beings, as friends or lovers, as members of families, of churches, of clubs or other groups. The real problem, that of the relation of the state to the inclusive community, is only obscured if we begin by identifying the two. Most modern constitutions set limits to the things the state can do. Generally, for example, it forbids the state to require the profession of any religion of its citizens or to discriminate between citizens with respect to their religion. We say it forbids the state and not simply the government. For it proclaims—or rather the people proclaim through it—that laws of a certain nature shall not be passed and that certain liberties shall not be abrogated, and to this end it usually provides that a mere majority shall not suffice to alter these constitutional guarantees. Whatever practical difficulties may arise from such provisions they surely bear witness to the intention of “the people” or the community to set limits to the place and power of the state itself.

The state then is an essential part, but never the whole, of the social structure. It is best conceived of as an agency of the community with very broad and important functions, but nevertheless limited. It does not, and cannot, take the place of other agencies; these have their own functions, which they alone are fitted to perform. The family has its place, the church has its place, and so forth. How far the state *should* regulate other associations is a question admitting vast experimentation; how far the state *can* take over the functions of certain associations, particularly of the economic order, is another question of great significance. But under no conditions which we can conceive of, and certainly under no conditions which exist anywhere in the civilized world, is the state all-sufficing. If the communistic state, for example, absorbs into itself nearly the whole system of economic organization, it leaves the family more unrestricted than do most capitalistic states. It is true that in recent times a form of state has arisen which claims to be totalitarian, and professes to “co-ordinate” and to control *all* the interests of its citizens. But the claim, in so far as valid, has been realized only by

the forceful suppression of those interests and those groups that could not or would not be "co-ordinated." Moreover, in no instance has the end been wholly achieved. Even in the extreme instance, that of Nazi Germany, "in the Church, and in the Church alone, the Nazi dictatorship has found an insuperable obstacle to its absolutistic pretensions."² The state can effectively supervise only the external aspects of life. Beyond all else, it cannot under any conditions be a substitute for those cultural organizations which express the variant beliefs, opinions, interests, and ideals of the diversified groups of a modern society.

The peculiar nature of the state.—The reason for this limitation, historically revealed through many a painful struggle and most of all in the great conflicts of church and state, depends on the peculiar nature of the state. The state is an organization with special attributes, special instruments, special powers. What primarily distinguishes it from all other associations is its instrument of political law. This kind of law differs from all other social laws in two ways, first, that there is attached to it the peculiar sanction of socialized and unconditional compulsion, second—a corollary from the first—that it applies without exception to everyone within a geographical area. In these respects the legal code has an advantage over all other codes, but it must pay a price for it. Because it applies to everyone, it can apply only where uniformity of control is felt to be desirable by those who uphold the state—it cannot apply to matters where its members claim the right to differ from one another. Because its sanction is force, its power of appeal is limited. Other associations, to which men freely belong, can on that very ground use means of persuasion with greater efficacy than can the state. They appeal to the free will which is automatically secured by voluntary membership. The state can appeal to its citizens and above all can control powerful engines of propagandism to influence them, but always behind the appeal there is the threat of compulsion. In other associations the malcontents have the alternative of leaving; if grave differences arise within them, the association itself can dissolve or split. But obviously these alternatives are for practical purposes ruled out in the case of the state. In earlier stages of civilization a group which disapproved the policy of the state might, with hardship and peril, secede and establish a new one, as did the Roman plebeians or the Pilgrim Fathers, but in the modern world this recourse is practically impossible. The state has thus a compulsive

² F. L. Schuman, *The Nazi Dictatorship* (2nd ed., New York, 1936), p. 385.

aspect which very definitely limits its control over the spirit of its people.

It follows that there are certain things which the state can do well, others it can do less well than the free associations, and others which it cannot do at all. What actions fall in these various categories depends in part on the particular conditions of individual states. The functions of the state vary greatly at different stages of its history. Sometimes the state has been mainly an exploitative power, controlling the rest of the population in the interest of a dominant class. As the basis of citizenship broadened, it assumed to a larger extent protective functions, and these must always remain an important aspect of its task. In quite recent times another aspect has begun to assume significance, that of the state as a positive agency of social welfare. Thus in some countries of Europe we see old strongholds, the seats of a former exploitative nobility, turned into employment offices and health insurance bureaus. The three aspects of the state exist together, with varying emphasis, in present-day democracy. Thus we are introduced to our next question, that of the functions of the state in modern society.

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE IN A COMPLEX SOCIETY

The limits to the functions of the state.—Perennial controversy rages around the functions of the state. They are the issues of party warfare. They vary from state to state, from period to period, even from year to year. The capitalistic and the communistic state seem at opposite poles in their solutions of the question. The liberal state and the fascist state give contradictory answers. The totalitarian state would usurp all functions. One is tempted to think that the functions of the state are whatever functions the controlling power within any state cares to assume. And this view is supported by the traditional doctrine of state sovereignty. "The sovereign," said a characteristic exponent of this tradition, "has the complete disposal of the life, rights, and duties of the individual."³ The sovereign, said the jurist Blackstone, is "a supreme, irresistible, uncontrollable authority." But in reality, whatever the legal or constitutional form may be, the state has limits to what it can do. It is limited by the instruments and means which it must use. It is limited also by the resistance offered to political action by the mores of the community.

³ Cornewall Lewis, *The Use and Abuse of Political Terms* (Oxford, 1898), Chap. V.

And it is limited by the existence, in any complex society, of other organizations which exercise functions of their own. Practically everyone agrees that there are social functions which the state alone can perform, that there are others which it is more qualified to perform than any other association, that there are others for which it is less qualified, and finally that there are functions which the state is wholly incapable of performing. There are wide divergences of opinion concerning the items that fall in these various categories, but if we examine the categories themselves in the light of the practice of modern states we shall discover that there is nevertheless a substantial amount of agreement.

Let us take these categories in order, premising that there is no way of determining what the functions of the state are or what they should be other than the test of experience. In other words, the business of the state is to do what it is capable of doing well, provided the citizens of the state want it done. Men differ regarding what the state can do well as they differ regarding what needs doing at all. But social experience has already laid down certain broad lines of the state. Social experience led the state to take over, for example, the administration of justice and the provision of elementary education, and political experience has confirmed the state in the exercise of these functions. As new social situations arise they create new problems regarding the functions of the state. Thus the development of international finance, of industrial monopoly, of inventions such as the radio, and so on, raises constantly new problems of state regulation. Above all, the vast economic and technological changes associated with capitalistic methods of production and distribution have created profound and still largely unsolved political issues. Different states attempt to meet them in very different ways. The soviet state presents the extreme instance of centralized political control over the whole area of economic activity. It accepts the principle of the unified planning of a country's economic development. Other states, though animated by social philosophies of an entirely opposite character, have assumed considerable control over economic policies, as did mercantilist France and as does Fascist Italy. Here remains the greatest of all political problems, still in the region of controversy and experiment. The success or failure of these experiments will no doubt help to determine still further the main functions of the state, though these must always be subject to variation in accordance with the social and economic development of different communities and the traditions and attitudes which prevail within them.

Functions peculiar to the state.—First then, there are social functions which the state alone can perform. The state alone can establish an effective and basic order in a complex society. The state can maintain such an order because of the peculiar attributes which we saw that it and it alone possesses. On the one hand its law is binding on *all* who live within an entire geographical area; on the other hand it possesses the ultimate right of enforcement. The establishment and maintenance of a universal order is thus an essential function of the state, its function *par excellence*. The state alone can make rules of universal application. It alone can guarantee facilities which shall be equally available to all the members of a community. It alone can establish rights and obligations which admit of no exemptions. It alone can establish conditions of equal opportunity. It alone can ensure the universal validity of units and standards of measurement, weight, quality, and value. It alone can set up minimum standards requisite for decent living with the assurance that none shall be allowed to fall below them. It alone can define the areas and limits of subordinate powers. It alone can co-ordinate within one great social framework the various organizations of a society. The state, in short, is the guarantor and the guardian of the public order.

The immensity of this service, at least in every complex society, is hard to realize. A momentary glimpse of it is provided in the rare crisis of revolution when all legal safeguards are in abeyance and the machinery of society is paralyzed. In a simple society community-guarded custom suffices to maintain order; in a complex society order is impossible apart from the state. For here it is necessary to prevent not only the encroachment of individual on individual but also the encroachment of group on group. And these groups in the complex society are not only very diverse but vary endlessly in their range and in their power. But for the restraining influence of the state the social and economic conflict between them would lead to chaos. But for this influence ruthless organizations would exercise an intolerable tyranny broken only by equally ruthless uprisings against them. Even within the order of the state, where government is corrupt or ineffective, lawless organizations sometimes emerge. The so-called racket in our present American cities is an example. Moreover, the state is necessary not only to prevent the usurpations of power but also to maintain the vast and elaborate contractual system which a modern society requires. Unless this system is guaranteed under the civil code the business of the community would be utterly disrupted. Order is the first requirement of the diverse spe-

cialized interdependent activity of modern man, and this order the state alone can maintain.

But the state cannot be content with the mere establishment of order. The order maintained by a tyranny or by a slave state or by an empire differs vastly from the order of a "free" or democratic state. Order is always based on some principle, and the state is vitally concerned with the broad social policy of which a given order is the expression. Order may rest on privilege and status, or it may be guided by the ideal of equal opportunity. It may be designed to keep the weak in subjection to the strong or to prevent the strong from encroachment on the weak. Some principle of *justice* is inevitably involved, and the attainment of justice is a far more difficult and more controversial function than the attainment of order. It is obviously not secured by the simple "rule of law" which makes everyone equally subject to its dictates, which, as Anatole France remarked, "in its majestic equality forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep in the streets and to beg bread."⁴ One of the fundamentals of any order is a system of property rights, and since such rights are not given by "nature" they must be determined by authority. Justice, in the old phrase, is "to give every man his own" (*suum cuique tribuere*), but how to decide what a man's own may be is an ever-perplexing problem. The old individualistic notion, translated into modern economic terms in the "labor theory of value," that men gain legitimate titles to goods in terms of the toil they expend in transforming them from their natural state, becomes meaningless in the world of economic and social interdependence. Yet the state cannot fulfill its clear and inevitable function of maintaining order without involving itself in the further and infinitely harder task of securing justice. And in the last resort, so far as this end can be achieved it can be achieved only through the instrumentality of the state. Alone possessing jurisdiction over all the members of a community, it alone can represent the interests common to all of them as against the interests which divide them.

Functions for which the state is well adapted.—We turn next to those functions which the state, in virtue of the means at its command, is more fitted to perform than any other organization. In this category comes the conservation of natural resources. Against the competitive interests which seek immediate economic gain the state can uphold the interest of the whole and the interest of the future. Reluctantly and often belatedly the state has had to

⁴ On this subject cf. G. E. G. Catlin, *A Study of the Principles of Politics* (New York, 1930), Chap. VII, in which the above quotation is applied.

intervene to prevent the wasteful consumption of the community's resources, its forests, its fisheries, its wild life, its irreplaceable mineral assets. The squandering of the oil resources in various lands, and particularly in the United States, offers one of the most recent as well as one of the most remarkable instances of the need for the state with respect to the safeguarding of the economic basis of society against reckless individualistic exploitation. And if the state is needed to control the social dangers of competition it is also needed to check the domination of private monopoly. Wherever particular interests manifestly infringe the common interest, the state is called upon to uphold the latter, though often the political pressure exerted by those particular interests prevent or even pervert its function. It is not possible within our limits to specify the magnitude and the variety of this task. Only recently has the state come at all to realize its significance. All so-called social legislation, the establishment by law of various forms of industrial protection and insurance, may be regarded as coming within this category.

The conservation and the development of the personal, no less than of the economic, resources of the community devolves in large measure on the state. Included in this function is the general provision of education. Every civilized state has found that this essential service cannot be left to private agencies, that to be at all adequate for the needs of the future as well as of the present the endowment and control of general education must be publicly established. Only thus can standards be maintained for the community as a whole, and the more glaring inequalities of opportunity, which more than anything else stand in the way of the discovery, evocation, and utilization of human potentialities, be substantially reduced.

As we have said, there is no *a priori* limit to what the state can do for the service of the community. In so far as, with its vast and comprehensive organization, it can support and stimulate other agencies providing noncontroversial services, there seems no reason why it should not do so if its aid is not out of proportion to the cost. The case for such support is particularly strong with respect to those cultural services, of which education itself is an example, which do not yield an immediate economic return proportionate to their cost. How far the state can and should go in this direction must depend on the cultural values of the community, but the more enlightened it becomes the more the state can contribute to the development of science, to the encouragement of art, and in general to the economic equipment of those services which yield to mankind

the more enduring and less competitive satisfactions. Together with such functions we may include that of the provision of the means and opportunities for the study of the greater and more urgent questions of social policy and for the collection, as in the census, of statistical and other information bearing on the welfare of the people. Other agencies can perform these tasks in part, but none so efficiently and on so great a scale and with such authority as can the state.

Functions for which the state is ill adapted.—We pass thirdly to those social functions in the performance of which the state is at a disadvantage as compared with other agencies. These again must vary with the conditions, but in all societies there are limits to what the state can effectively do. The multitude of diverse associations in an advanced civilization witnesses to those particular needs and selective purposes which the state cannot adequately satisfy. The state is the agency of the *whole* community. There are more intensive, more specialized, and more limited interests which unite groups within it. There are divergent and conflicting interests which properly create their own associations. There are experimental objectives which are far better pursued by the smaller interested groups. There are also interests which unite men on a great scale, but not as members of the state. To this order belong the broader cultural interests, including the religious. The state is not well adapted, in the light of its nature as already described, to sponsor the more intimate or more personal interests, those which admit a variety of spontaneous and variant expressions. Voluntary associations have a flexibility, an initiative, a capacity for experiment, a liberation from the heavier responsibility of taking risks that the state rarely, if ever, possesses. They can thus foster, in ways not permissible to the state, the nascent interests of groups, and encourage enterprise, social and economic, at the growing points of a society. Even the role of arbiter is here not within the competence of the state. It is not qualified to decide the merits of artistic, literary, scientific endeavor or to arbitrate, say, religious controversies.

Functions which the state is incapable of performing.—There is a thin border line between the things which the state is ill qualified to do and those which it cannot do at all. Can the state control people's opinions? Given a sufficient support, it can prevent non-conformist groups from expressing their opinion overtly. But it is not thereby meeting opinion on its own ground, it is using the alien instrument of compulsion. An opinion claims truth, and force is

entirely irrelevant to this claim. Often the suppression of belief has been worse than futile; sometimes it has given a secret strength to the persecuted belief, but at all times it has prevented belief from meeting the only true test, that of frank examination and discussion.⁵ Can the state control people's morality? It can, given sufficient support, control the external aspects of conduct, but if morality means a set of attitudes towards our fellows and towards life in general, again we have entered a sphere in which mere enforcement is foolish or futile and in which the appeal to the feelings of men comes with greater efficacy from the free associations which, if they claim authority at all, claim it on grounds to which the compulsive state cannot aspire. The history of the state's attempt to control religion is one of the longest and most tragic chapters in the record of man's stupidity, but at least it has revealed this lesson to those who can read and understand, that there are in human nature certain resistances to compulsion which it is beyond the power of tyranny to destroy. Again, when a German minister of education, addressing the universities of the country, declares that science has to be "National Socialist science" and "a specific accomplishment of the national spirit," he is trying in the name of the state to make of science something that is contrary to its very being and that the scientific spirit can never accept.⁶ Nor is it only the deeper, more spiritual impulses which resist this control. There are, as we have seen, codes regulative of conduct which are largely independent of the legal code. Custom sets limits to law, and no less does the seemingly superficial code of fashion. In the latter sphere men—and women still more—accept dictation from the prestige-owning arbiters of dress which they would violently reject from the government of the state.⁷ In short, the more intimate details of conduct as well as the more deeply cultural traits claim a freedom from compulsion which places them largely outside the region of state control. The trends of culture, of the arts and the sciences, may be affected by the activity of the state, but they owe their vitality and their direc-

⁵ The excellent argument of Mill on this point, in Chapter III of the essay *On Liberty*, still holds good. For a fuller discussion see H. Laski, *Liberty in the Modern State* (New York, 1930).

⁶ Address of Dr. Bernard Rust, as quoted in *The New York Times*, November 8, 1936.

⁷ A government may sometimes, though rarely, prescribe a particular material or type of dress on economic or other national grounds, as Frederick William of Prussia prescribed the wearing of cotton clothes. The Turkish government could proscribe the wearing of the fez and the veil, but these were the insignia of a discarded civilization. In neither of these instances was fashion involved.

tion to forces inherent in the community and beyond the capacity of the state to determine.

THE STATE AND THE GREATER SOCIETY

The relations of states with one another.—We have so far considered the functions of the state within the area of its proper jurisdiction or within its own frontiers. But the range of society extends far beyond the borders of any state. It is and becomes increasingly international. No single state in the modern world is coterminous with the area of a civilization. Economic and cultural relationships are gradually encompassing the earth. Within its own frontiers the state establishes the foundations of order and of social development. But modern civilization demands an international order, and though states have by treaties and conventions aided in the building of such an order, in another aspect they have presented a constant menace to it, and thus to their own internal security. Within its borders the state is endowed with force, and this force is the assurance of order, is adjusted to the functions which it serves, and in large measure is safeguarded by the constitutional devices which have made its exercise subject to the control of the community. Beyond its borders the force of the state has an entirely different meaning. It is a mode of settling disputes between states, and once loosed it becomes an engine of destruction, without safeguards and without responsibilities. Consequently we face the paradox that the state is, nationally, the great instrument of social security, but internationally, the greatest menace to that security.

This situation, growing ever more aggravated as the range and intensity of social and economic interdependence increases, has led to various expedients and programs aiming at the establishment of international security. Among such expedients we may perhaps include alliances of states intended to secure a balance—or rather supremacy—of power such as would deter other states from making war on them. This equivocal method has never for very long been successful. In more recent times many treaties have been signed by various states—a movement in which the United States took a prominent part—for the peaceful settlement of their disputes. This movement may be said to have culminated in the Pact of Paris. The establishment of the League of Nations and of the Permanent Court of International Justice represents a further step in the creation of an international system. But so far none of these plans has

eliminated the menace of war. All the great states are still burdened by heavy expenditures on the means of war.

Obstacles to an international order.—Various obstacles have stood in the way of a more adequate international system, among them the rival efforts of the greater powers to gain possession or control of the economic resources of the less civilized portions of the earth. Another obstacle has been the nationalistic attitude which thinks of states as inclusive economic entities, so that the interests of each are set in opposition to those of the others. Fostered as this attitude is by the interests which immediately profit by it, it is out of harmony with the realities of economic interdependence. A famine or a boycott in India, a revolution in China, a bank failure in Austria, a depression in the United States, a new tariff system or a devaluation of currency in any important country affects the economic well-being of the whole civilized world. National policies based on a misunderstanding of this interdependence recoil on the peoples who promote them. National sentiments based on ignorance of this interdependence hurt the causes to which they are devoted. There are conflicts of interests between groups large and small, including groups as large as the nation itself, but wherever interdependence exists there is also an underlying harmony of interests, the condition of a common interest to be realized. The use of political force for settling these differences destroys the common interest which is more fundamental than the conflicting interests. There is a gross discrepancy here between political means and economic ends.⁸

Beyond all the other obstacles there lies, however, the traditional right of states to settle their disputes by force, a right supported by the principle that each sovereign state is the sole final arbiter of its own claims. Around this right cling sentiments both noble and ignoble, high devotions and unscrupulous interests. The greatest problem of modern statesmanship is how to conserve the values of the state, alike the devotions which it inspires and the services which it renders, while nevertheless finding a way to safeguard that international order without which our whole civilization is imperiled. How this may be achieved is a question which is beyond our purpose here. But it is not unreasonable to think that, given a sufficiently clear and widespread realization of its necessity, its achievement is then made practicable. The final obstacle is the emotional

⁸ On this subject cf. Norman Angell, *Foundations of International Polity* (London, 1914); H. N. Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold* (London, 1918); F. Delaisi, *Political Myths and Economic Realities* (New York, 1927).

attitude—the suspicion, prejudice, and fear—which does not apprehend the needs of the civilization we have created.

War between great states an uncontrollable instrument of policy.
—The right of the state to make or declare war is the immediate issue. There were times when other organizations than the state engaged in war, when families and clans carried on murderous feuds, when feudal barons possessed the right of “private wars,” when trading companies extended their operations by force of arms, when individuals fought socially sanctioned duels. All these “rights” have been abolished in most states. It was necessary for the state to abolish them in the name of order and of justice. Now only the state itself claims this right over against other states, and the same necessity for its abolition applies with even greater cogency against this last reservation of uncontrolled force.

For the sociological argument against this claim of right by the state is that here there is no congruity between force and function, between means and ends. To serve social ends, power should not only be responsible power, it should also be limited in correspondence with the ends it serves. Since no ends are absolute or unlimited, no exercise of power should be. The right of war-making assumes that no other ends of life, no other human interests, weigh anything in the balance against political ends and political interests. War is an instrument of policy, the *ultima ratio regum*, the “barrister of crowns.” But it is an instrument utterly disproportionate in its effects to the social significance of the policy which sets it in motion, unloosing utterly incalculable processes of destruction such that the initial “cause” of the war is likely to be entirely forgotten in the issues which the struggle itself creates. The picture presented by the Great War is one of the unleashing of such monstrous forces that its initial motivations were submerged in a blind struggle first for domination and then for national survival.

If however we conceive the state as an agency of the community, limited by and related to other agencies, if we appreciate the fact that citizenship is not the whole office or duty of man, we are led to see that the power of the state, as an instrument of external policy, must be limited no less than its internal power is already limited and controlled by the consensus of the community. A greater consensus, extending beyond national bounds, is needed to secure this limitation. Only so can the extraordinary disparity between power and function, in an age when science has revealed a technique of destruction beyond the imagination of any earlier age, be reduced within the bounds of reason.

This disparity has in truth become so overwhelming that it is inspiring stronger antiwar social forces than existed in past times. Man is far from being a completely "rational" animal, but nevertheless all his institutions are ways he has devised of achieving some end or satisfying some need. From this point of view war as an institution has broken down. It is doubtful whether, under the new conditions of warfare, there is necessary even a "moral equivalent" for it.⁹ For war in its present technical development offers no liberation of those qualities which the social restraints of peace may hold in leash. War is a process more mechanized than the working life of peace. It presents a cataclysm and not a solution. The traditional language of glory and high enterprise becomes meaningless in the presence of the monstrous regimentation, broken by fits of nerve-destroying fever, which it imposes. It subjects the fighters to an intense accumulation of horrors and whole nations to vast miseries. From its inferno no reward can arise which is not insignificant beside its devastation. It ruins the victor as well as the vanquished, if indeed these appellations retain any meaning in their reciprocal demolition of the gains of an interdependent civilization. No high policy seems a recompense for the destruction of the manhood of a whole generation, for the culture-disrupting falsehoods and hatreds without which it cannot be waged, for the jeopardy of civilization itself. If man is not wholly rational, he is not wholly irrational. Perhaps at no time did the actual experience of war generate in those who came into most direct contact with it, the common soldier, the ravaged peasant, the women and children over whom it swept, that mythology of glory which its captains and its kings entertained and which its historians pictured. Perhaps the footsoldiers of Menelaus and of Hector never could say that they too had

drunk delight of battle with their peers
Far on the ringing plains of windy Troy.

But assuredly in no earlier age were the fighters and the peoples exposed to so incessant an impact of mechanical horror as the Great War brought, nor was any previous war followed by so sheer and far-reaching a revelation of its true nature. The significant literature of the Great War—not the memoirs of generals and statesmen but the novels and plays—is in this respect unlike that

⁹ Consider in this connection the argument of William James in "The Moral Equivalent of War," *International Association Pamphlets*, No. 27 (New York, 1910).

bred by previous wars, and may point to a new orientation of man towards an institution which has not grown obsolete in fact but which has proved to be tragically incongruous with the changed conditions of human life.

XVI

THE GREAT ASSOCIATIONS: ECONOMIC

THE DISTINCTIVE CHARACTER OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION

In what sense economic and political organization fall within the same category.—The relation of the political to the economic system constitutes the most urgent, important, and controversial problem of modern social organization. We have seen that the two are so closely interdependent as to create everywhere institutional complexes. At the same time each has its own distinctive principle and above all its own distinctive method. The manner in which they are combined and the range within which either method is accepted and given priority over the other are most significant characteristics of any social structure.

By contrast with the varieties of cultural associations economic and political associations fall within the same broad category of social structures. It might be said of them that organization constitutes their very being. They are in effect sheer means to ends realized through but not within the association, whereas the ends of cultural associations are realized in large measure within them, directly in the very process of communication which they establish. But economic and political associations satisfy our social needs indirectly by the products they yield. They are agencies of control, of power, means of attaining certain products of organization—order, wealth, and so forth. The social participation they offer is purely incidental, accessory. It is not the specific social needs of fellowship, of communication, which bring them into being. They are essentially external to the inner social life, though of course every

organization that men create is utilized in some measure to satisfy their social impulses. But these associations are rather conditions of the social life than aspects of it. As such they are of profound social significance, but their significance, as we shall see more fully in the next chapter, has a very different quality.

Since both economic and political associations are concerned with universal means to human purposes, means which may be applied to many varied and divergent ends, they are capable of great expansion. Apart from cultural resistances, there is no reason why they should not form a great, closely interwoven network covering the whole earth. The logic of order sets this consummation before the political system, and the logic of economy works to the same end with respect to the economic system. The broad trend of civilization is in this direction. It has freer range in the expansion of the economic structure, while in the political structure it is retarded by the identification of the state with the cultural unity of the nation. But the necessities of order and the extension of cultural likeness through the development of communications are bringing influences to bear which make towards the transcendence of the national state as the ultimate range of free political organization.

Moreover, as we have also seen, the economic and the political systems are in large part different means of attaining the same ends. In a socialist state many objectives are sought by political methods which in the capitalist state are sought by economic methods. In no community is it possible to draw a hard-and-fast line between the functions of the two systems. Wages and working conditions, for example, are in part determined by economic agencies, and in part by political regulation. Industrial disputes may be settled by trade agreements or by the action of governments. The credit system depends on arrangements in which governments co-operate with public, semipublic, or private banks. Within the economic order men seek by means of private savings to provide against the contingencies of life, unemployment, sickness, accident, old age. Within the political order the same result is sought by social legislation. Even in waging war the state must resort to economic weapons, and under modern conditions it is upon these that victory or defeat seems finally to depend.¹ The economic and the political order interlock at myriad points, even in the most individualistic society, and the old *laissez-faire* idea, that each can "mind its own business" without interference by the other, is an outworn illusion. *The distinction between the economic and the*

¹ Cf. Delaisi, *op. cit.*, Chap. XV.

political organization is not so much a distinction between spheres of activity as between methods of action. It is only a confusion to suppose that economic interests are or can be the exclusive concern of what we name economic associations. In some degree they are interests of every form of association. But the difference is that what we specifically name economic associations are primarily devoted to the acquisition of wealth, to money-making or at least the provision of the means of living, without reference to the uses to which these means are subsequently applied. The economic means is their end-result; the disposal of these means lies beyond their interest.

The economic method.—The method which associations so constituted pursue we may term the "economic method." It stands in significant contrast to the political method, and an analysis of the difference will serve as an introduction to the study of the nature of economic association.

The economic method is devoted to the exclusive or private control or possession of wealth. In the economic association men seek wealth in conjunction, but ultimately in order to gain individual control or possession. In the process of acquiring wealth, first the association and then its individual members alienate or appropriate means for exclusive use. The political method, on the other hand, socializes or communizes wealth. Having done so, the state may, of course, return this wealth to the economic system by a process of redistribution, but in so far as the state retains it, it assumes a public character. When, for example, the state establishes a national park, or the municipality a hospital or school, it withdraws these possessions from the processes of the economic system. They become subject to a new and very different kind of regulation. Socialized or communized goods are removed from the sphere of exchange and of the regulating economic forces of supply and demand. In so far as they are communized they arouse no longer the competitive economic interest, any more than do the winds and the clouds.

The economic method differs therefore from the political in that its principle is ultimately distributive. Political action, no matter what private interests may underlie it, is at least ostensibly in the name of, and for the sake of, the common welfare. It is therefore, as I have pointed out elsewhere, uncentered within the area of a whole community, whereas economic action is multicentered.² No matter how far the integration of economic associations advances

² *The Modern State*, Chap. IX.

through amalgamations, trusts, cartels, and other unions, the economic system, by its very nature, remains an arena of competing forces. But the political method is anticompetitive and assumes a complete unification of interest. It may be mistaken or perverted, and even when it does seek the common well-being it may be opposed or thwarted by dissentient economic forces, but at least it preserves the form of unity, the conception of the whole, and thus its intervention is, and always has been, necessary to preserve that unity against the disruptive and partial interests of the economic arena.

The economic association as a specific type of organization.—Since the economic association as such is indifferent to the uses of the means which it seeks, it reaches its developed form only when these means themselves are entirely detachable from any particular uses. When this stage is reached, as under modern systems of currency and credit, the economic method becomes more clearly differentiated from the political method. Its results are expressed in abstract units of exchange. A dollar is a convertible good, and a good only because convertible, convertible at the will of its possessor into any one of innumerable specific goods. The economic method is the pursuit through an elaborate mechanism of production, distribution, and exchange of this free kind of buying power. It is the detachment of this power from specific embodiments in forms of property which has made it so formidable and so pervasive. This situation is an aspect of modern capitalism. In old days, for example, landownership was never a purely economic category. It had a special social status and a definite political significance. Land was not bought and sold freely in the market place. It was too closely bound up with sentiments and traditions and privileges to be a mere "economic good." It was the inheritance of a family, with all the personal and social attachments consequent thereon. In the process of industrialization it has lost this earlier significance and become, for the most part, a form of capital. Labor itself has undergone a similar and no less momentous revolution. It is now, under capitalism, a free contractual good; in other words, it is bought and sold, with certain limitations, on economic terms agreed upon between the buyers and the sellers. It has passed from a condition of status to one of contract. The laborer is no longer attached to the land nor is his work and pay determined by the local traditions of an ancient craft. He offers his labor power in the open market, by the hour or by the "piece." He seeks, through combination with his fellows, to affect in his favor the conditions of labor

supply, and that is because his labor is now an economic category, so that his wages, and his employment or lack of employment, are immediately determined by the prevailing conditions of supply and demand.

These illustrations may serve to show how the economic method has grown distinct from the political method. In a capitalistic society economic power, with its peculiar detachment from social objectives, with its consequent lack of direct responsibility for social consequences, and with its vast power entrenched in the new forms of economic organization, offers a formidable challenge to political power. On this account political power, with its emphasis on unity and its claim on behalf of the common welfare, has in turn been compelled to extend its range, seeking at the least to mitigate certain of the more obvious dangers arising from the inequalities of economic power, and at the most, in the instance of Soviet Russia, to destroy that power altogether.

THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Growth of the economic system.—Following our distinction of the economic from the political method we define as economic associations those which primarily pursue the former. The purely economic association would then be one whose interest is limited to the acquisition and control of wealth, without reference to the ends to which the acquired wealth is devoted. The members of the association, of course, seek this acquisition or control for various ends. They may be animated by private motives or by considerations of public service, but the purely economic association as such is constituted without reference to the different and often incompatible goals which its members pursue. The association is the common meeting ground of diverse aims, because the means to them, with which alone it is directly concerned, are common means. In a narrow sense the economic association is one directed by the profit motive, but in a broader sense it includes as participants and beneficiaries the workers no less than the shareholders and officials. The growth of this pure type of economic organization is a feature of modern specialized society. Its growth has depended particularly on two other developments. One is the establishment of free markets, so that the organization provides its particular goods and services indifferently to known and unknown clients, so that therefore it provides these goods and services in anticipation of and not merely in response to demand. The economic association which thus

works "for the market" is detached from the personal considerations which limit the economic motive and the economic method under the simpler conditions where men work for their immediate neighbors in response to specific demand. Obviously the wider or less localized the market the greater can be the detachment or "purity" of the economic method. The wider market means at the same time greater specialization and an opportunity for production on a larger scale, both conditions operating to free the economic method from ulterior social interests.

The other development is that of the principle of incorporation. While associations of all kinds now assume a corporate character, this principle has peculiar significance with respect to the economic association. Incorporation gives to an association a specific legal "personality." It defines and limits the functions of the association and the liabilities of its members. Incorporation turns the association into an agency, acting through appointed officials, such that ownership of capital is distinguished clearly from management. Many of the owners, the shareholders, become passive recipients of dividends, just as the bondholders become passive recipients of interest. Their concern thus becomes limited to the efficiency of the association as a producer of economic gains for themselves. The process by which these are produced is hidden from them. In turn the chief responsibility of the directors and management is to ensure due returns for the owners. Thus again the economic method is liberated from extraneous considerations. Moreover, through the principle of incorporation the amount of capitalization and the number of shareholders are capable of indefinite expansion. The "billion dollar company" becomes feasible and with it the vast enhancement of the economic power of the directorate. This process in turn accentuates the separation of the financial from the industrial administration, of the pecuniary interest from the technological interest. This is the distinction which Veblen stressed when he contrasted the "instinct of workmanship" and the drive for profits.³ Incorporation as it expands tends to give dominance to the financial interest, the detached economic interest. Its main concern is with the balance sheet, the surplus of profits over costs. It thinks in terms of *values* rather than of goods, and *values* are mathematical entities, subject to the abstract process of division and multiplication, and capable of many kinds of manipulation. Finally, incorporation conveys a kind of impersonal immortality. The corporation, unlike

³ In *The Theory of the Leisure Class, The Instinct of Workmanship* (New York, 1922), and other studies.

the partnership, is not limited by the life of its existing members. Before the development of this principle, such immortality belonged only to associations like the state and the church, and perhaps to a few chartered trading or banking companies. Now it is set up everywhere in the flux of the economic life and serves to entrench more deeply within the community the power of economic association.⁴

Economic interest and social function.—At the same time the liberation of the economic method reveals the more clearly that antithesis between group interest and social function which, existing everywhere within society, is peculiarly accentuated in the relation of the economic association to the whole social system. The specific *interest* of the economic association is the acquisition of wealth for its members. Its specific *function* is to make shoes or houses or steel rails or credit instruments for the community. The assumption that the interest and the function are reconciled through some pre-established harmony belongs to an individualistic creed which is neither proven nor any longer generally acceptable. It was possible for Adam Smith to accept it because of his belief in the beneficent equalizing power of competition. Competition, in his thought, made economic reward correspond to social function by leveling undue advantages, by destroying, because of the eagerness of competitors to seize each opportunity for gain, the increment that is not earned by service.⁵ We need not discuss the adequacy of this argument, since the condition he postulated, the free competition of equal individuals, is so totally remote from the reality of the world of unequal economic associations. In this world the guarantees that reward will correspond to service are wholly inadequate, for reasons which every student of economics understands. There is no assurance that in pursuing to the utmost the enrichment of its members the economic association is therefore fulfilling most effectively its function of economic service.

It is true that there are certain checks on any excessive divergence of the two. Demand is not so clear-sighted as the classical economists presumed. The public is exposed to the representations of salesmanship and is untrained to discriminate quality with respect to the myriads of specialized commodities. There are few agencies whose function it is to guide the consumer and many which seek to persuade him. Even the co-operative consumers' associations,

⁴ See, for example, Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* (New York, 1932), Books I and IV.

⁵ Cf., for example, *The Wealth of Nations*, Book I, Chap. X, *init.*

which have reached such high development in various countries, are, on the whole, designed rather to make the consumer a participant in the profits of trading than to direct him with respect to the quality and serviceableness of his purchases. But within limits, and especially as regards standardized products, some judgment of the value of goods and service is effective. What is harder to determine is the relation of costs and prices, and this is particularly important where the good is produced under monopoly or semi-monopoly conditions, such as apply to public utilities. Here there is no safeguard against a gross discrepancy between service and return, except in so far as a vigilant scrutiny and regulation is maintained by constituted authority.

Tensions within the economic system.—The maladjustment of the specific economic interest and the broader social interest constitutes only one of the tensions to which economic organization is subject. As was pointed out in the preceding section, the economic system is always an arena of contending forces. This condition is inherent in the very nature of the economic method. For it rests on two premises, competition and bargaining. Competition is the simultaneous offer of like or of alternative economic services to the same potential purchaser. Bargaining is the process by which the antithetical interests of supply and demand, of buyer and seller, are finally adjusted. The relation to one another of the manufacturers of the same goods or of substitute goods is a competitive one; the relation of the producer of raw materials to the producer of manufactured goods, of wholesaler to retailer, of retailer to consumer, of employer to employee, of lender to borrower, is a bargaining relationship. The two types, though often confused, are entirely distinct. Competitors do not need one another—they seek to oust one another. Bargainers offer complementary, not competitive services. Each stands to gain from the transaction, because each wants what the other offers. Bargaining is the process which ends in the act of exchange. Exchange is reciprocal giving and taking, and the giving is the price of the taking. Price is at once cost and reward of service, so that always the antithesis of economic interests is found in every transaction.

The increase in the scale of economic organization creates larger areas from which the tensions of competition and of bargaining are in part or in whole removed, but these tensions still exist, sometimes in a more acute form, between the larger economic units thus created. For the competition of individual producers there is substituted the competition of large-scale businesses. Instead of the in-

dividual bargaining of employer and workman there appears the collective bargaining of the associations of capital and of labor. In fact, the bitter conflicts involved in the bargaining process between organizations of capital and labor reveal the profoundest and most universal of all the tensions which beset capitalistic society. On the other hand the competitive conflict is mitigated by organizations of capital and of labor respectively. In the larger areas created by price agreements or by agreements allotting the proportionate production of the various units (through "cartels") or the respective market-territories of the units (as in certain types of "combine"), some forms of competition are removed while others remain active. In the relatively rare instances where monopoly is nearly complete, competition—though not bargaining—loses significance, but thereby other tensions are set up, for now the demand of the consumers for protection makes some form of political regulation inevitable.

The economic system as an automatic regulator.—The economic system therefore presents itself as an intricate combination of conflict and interdependence between its units large and small. It is definitely a system, in spite of these conflicts, because even competitive units are subject to common conditions, to certain rules of the game set up either by themselves or by economic tradition or by political authority. It is a system also because there are forces operative within it as well as without it which reveal a potential common interest, however little recognized or organized, of the whole. The most obvious signs of this potential common interest are the fluctuations of the economic cycle, involving varying levels of prosperity and of adversity over the widest areas. It is a system because, with the development of banking and credit systems, a decision taken by any strategic group has swift repercussions near and far. "A simple rise in the New York bank rate, if it be sudden and steep, may threaten disaster to every struggling industry the world over, bring privation to millions of workers' homes, and change the pulse of life itself."⁶ It is a system because there is an *automatic* readjustment of part to part throughout its whole fabric whenever the conditions anywhere change, when the demand for any product rises, when the wage rates of any group fall, when fashions change, when a new law is passed, when a bad harvest occurs. Finally, it is a system because this pervasive interdependence inevitably creates foci of regulation, some within the system, such as central banks, some without it, such as direct government control, some limited by national bounds, some attaining an international

⁶ H. N. Brailsford, *Olives of Endless Age* (New York, 1928), Chap. XI.

character. The slowly ripening experience thereby gained, together with the increasing recognition of the world-wide nexus of economic cause and effect, is an augury pointing towards a vaster future organization.

Inadequacy of automatic regulation.—We have seen that the economic order, unlike the political, reveals itself in automatic adjustments, effected through the price system. But these automatic adjustments are in part, from the point of view of the lives subjected to them, maladjustments. The more complex the system is, the more obvious and the more serious become these maladjustments. They are seen in the gross disparities of poverty and of wealth, of power and of helplessness, in the wasteful exploitation of resources, in monopolistic advantage and in the competitive disadvantage of those whose services or goods are in too free supply, in the excessive production of some types of commodity, as compared with others, in the overexpansion of plants in relation to the demand for their products, and perhaps above all in the persistence of unemployment as well as in those recurrent crises when unemployment becomes acute. The specific description of these economic maladjustments and of the conditions determining them belongs to the study of economics. What we are here concerned to point out is that they are evidence of the automatic working of the economic system and that, because of their vital bearing on the well-being of the community, they form a challenge to the constructive abilities of men which, in so far as it is accepted, may lead—as in degree it has already led—to a greater unification of control within the economic order itself.

OCCUPATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS⁷

Two types of occupational organization.—In the preceding section we distinguished the pure type of economic association. In so designating it we do not imply that its actual pursuit of wealth is not tempered or qualified by any social considerations, but we do imply that its interest, as an association, does not include any social objectives beyond the stage of wealth acquisition and control. Since the economic interest is to some extent involved in practically all association and since many types of association resort to some extent to the economic method, we find all degrees of approximation

⁷ Part of this section is reprinted, with a few variations, from my article, "The Social Significance of Professional Ethics," *Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 101 (1922), 5-11.

to the pure type. The way in which the economic interest combines with others is one of the most intricate and significant aspects of social organization. The occupational associations with which we are here concerned exhibit important differences in this respect.

Occupational associations have grown numerous and powerful with the functional specialization and interdependence of modern society. We may distinguish broadly two types which they present. The trade-union and the various organizations of manufacturers and businessmen exemplify one type. The organizations of professional groups, doctors, lawyers, clergymen, engineers, and so forth, constitute the other. The difference is that the latter organizations, though they stand also for specific economic interests, regard themselves as existing to promote a *definite* social function that lies outside of economic considerations. In this respect they are perhaps nearer to the medieval guilds than to the typical business association of the modern world. The difference between the two types of association is greater or less according to the conditions. Thus in modern capitalistic society the trade-union and in a different way the manufacturers' association are organized for economic struggle and their objectives are determined mainly by this fact. The trade-union, for example, has generally for its professed objective the strengthening of the economic welfare and the improvement of the working conditions of its members, through negotiations with employers, collective bargaining, strikes, participation in political movements, the establishment of the "closed shop," and other devices. With the growth of mechanization in industry it has been moving away from the craft basis and tending towards the form of the industrial union in which the various crafts are combined. In so far as this tendency develops there is a greater contrast between the trade-union type of organization and that which characterizes the professions.

The functional aspect of professional organization.—In professional associations, on the other hand, the functional concept is explicitly recognized and formulated in specific codes. They assume an obligation and an oath of service. "A profession," says the ethical code of the American Medical Association, "has for its prime object the service it can render to humanity; reward or financial gain should be a subordinate consideration," and again it proclaims that the principles laid down for the guidance of the profession "are primarily for the good of the public." Similar statements are contained in the codes of the other distinctively organized professions. "The profession," says the code of the Canadian legal

profession, "is a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere money-getting occupation." Such professions as teaching, the ministry, the civil service, and social work by their very nature imply like conceptions of responsibility. They imply that while the profession is of necessity a means of livelihood or of financial reward, the devoted service which it inspires is motivated by other considerations.

The more nearly an association approximates the pure economic type the less does it present the aspect of a profession. Moreover, in the world of business there is a further obstacle in the cleavage of interest between capital and labor, employer and employee. This internal strife reveals a fundamental conflict of acquisitive interests within the business world and not only accentuates that interest in both parties to the struggle but makes it impossible for the intrinsic "professional" interest to prevail. The professions are in general saved from this conflict. Within the profession there is not, as a rule, the situation where one group habitually employs for gain another group whose function, economic interest, and social position are entirely distinct from its own.

The problem of the reconciliation of interests in professional organization.—Once that position is attained the problem of occupational conduct takes a new form. It was stated clearly long enough ago by Plato in the *Republic*. Each "art," he pointed out, has a special good or service. "Medicine, for example, gives us health; navigation, safety at sea, and so on. . . . Medicine is not the art—or profession—of receiving pay because a man takes fees while he is engaged in healing. . . . The pay is not derived by the several 'artists' from their respective 'arts.' But the truth is, that while the 'art' of medicine gives health, and the 'art' of the builder builds a house, another 'art' attends them which is the 'art' of pay."⁸ The ethical problem of the profession, then, is to reconcile the two "arts," or, more generally, to fulfill as completely as possible the primary service for which it stands while securing the legitimate economic interest of its members. It is the attempt to effect this reconciliation, to find the due place of the intrinsic and of the extrinsic interest, which gives a profound social significance to professional codes of ethics.

Nevertheless, as was pointed out in Chapter XIII, this reconciliation of the economic interest with professional function is no easy task. We may distinguish, apart from the economic interest, three others which are operative in various degrees in professional

⁸ *Op cit.*, I, 346 (Jowett's translation).

associations. Most closely allied with the economic interest is that in the authority and the prestige of the group. It generally seeks exclusive privileges, such as the right to limit the entrance to the profession, to exclude from membership those who fall below certain professional standards or do not accept the professional "etiquette," to exclude from the practice of the profession all who are not registered as members of the association and do not possess certain qualifications represented by diplomas, degrees, or other distinctions. These demands, made in the name of the functional requirements of the profession, obviously have also an economic importance, as giving control over the conditions of service and a degree of monopoly to the association itself. Closely bound with this in turn is the technical interest, directed to the art and craft of the profession, to the maintenance and enhancement of its efficiency, to the quest for new and better methods and processes, and to the development of the sciences which underlie its techniques. Finally, we may include a definitely cultural interest.

To illustrate, in the profession of teaching the technical interest in the system of imparting knowledge is one thing, and the cultural interest in the knowledge imparted quite another. The distinction is clear also in the spheres of the sciences and of the fine arts where the interest in truth or beauty may be discerned from the interest in the technique of investigation or of expression. In other professions it may be harder to identify the cultural as distinct from the technical interest, but if we interpret the concept *culture* widely enough to include such aspects as the beauty of workmanship, it may be maintained that the cultural interest belongs to every profession and is in fact one of the criteria by which to determine whether or not a given occupation is to be classed as a profession.

Interwoven as are these strands of interest, nevertheless they are subject to the pulls of opposing forces. Thus better technique may at points be antagonistic to economic advantage. The lawyer may lose a source of profits by the introduction of a simpler and more efficient system of conveyancing. The architect, working on a percentage basis, may find his pecuniary advantage at variance with his professional duty to secure the best service for the least cost. Again, the limitation of membership may be based on the sense of vested right or traditional prestige and may involve irrelevant exclusion, apart from the fitness of the excluded to carry on the professional function. The refusal to admit women to the practice of certain professions, though no longer so prevalent, is an illustration. Likewise, opposition may arise between the economic and the cultural

interest. The teacher and the preacher may suffer loss from a whole-hearted devotion to the spirit of truth as they conceive it. The artist, the playwright, the author, may have to choose between the ideals of their art and the more lucrative devices of popularity. Finally, the technical and the cultural interest may work apart. Routine methods and processes may dominate the professional mind to the obscuration of the ends which they should serve. A notable statement of this opposition is given in the valuable investigation into professional organization in England which was published in two supplements of the *New Statesman* (April 21 and 28, 1917). The investigation points to "the undisguised contempt in which both solicitors and barristers, notably those who have attained success in their profession and control its organization, hold, and have always held, not only all scholarship or academic learning of a professional kind, but also any theoretic or philosophical or scientific treatment of law."

The main problem which these cases illustrate is once more that of the reconciliation of group interest and social function. The professions generally seek to lay down the lines of reconciliation by the establishment of special codes. Some codes distinguish elaborately between the various types of obligation incumbent on the members of the profession. The lawyer, for example, is declared to have specific duties to his client, to the public, to the court or to the law, to his professional brethren and to himself. It would occupy too much space to consider the interactions, harmonies, and potential conflicts of such various duties. Perhaps the least satisfactory reconciliation is that relating the interest of the client to the interest of the public, not merely in the consideration of the particular cases as they arise but still more in the adaptation of the service to the needs of the public as a whole as distinct from those of the individual clients. Thus the medical profession has incurred to many minds a serious liability, in spite of the development of its service to actual patients, by its failure for so long to apply the preventive side of medicine, in particular to suggest ways and means for the prevention of the needless loss of life and health and happiness caused by the general medical ignorance and helplessness of the poor.⁹

⁹ See on this point page 265. Perhaps the most striking example of the failure to develop preventive medicine is the situation in respect of venereal disease. "It may well be," says the *Statistical Bulletin* (November, 1936) of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, "that if all deaths due to syphilis were reported as such, the annual total in the United States would be in the neighborhood of 100,000. Moreover, it has been estimated that about 7,000,000 persons in this country have

Social function and professional bias.—The difficulty of harmonizing group interest and social function is increased by the general and by the specific bias which a profession, like every other group, exhibits. The general bias may be seen in such attempts to maintain a vested interest as may be found in the undue restriction of entrants to the profession—undue when determined by such professionally irrelevant considerations as high fees and expensive licenses; in the resistance to specialization, whether of tasks or of men, the former corresponding to the resistance to “dilution” in the trade-union field;¹⁰ in the insistence on a too-narrow orthodoxy, which would debar from professional practice men trained in a different school; in the unnecessary multiplication of tasks, of which a flagrant example is the English severance of barrister and solicitor. Another aspect of the general bias is found in the shuffling of responsibility under the cloak of the code. This is most marked in the public services, particularly the civil service and the army and navy—and incidentally it may be noted that the problem of professional ethics is aggravated when the profession as a whole is in the employ of the state. “An official,” says M. Faguet in one of his ruthless criticisms of officialdom (*The Dread of Responsibility*), “is a man whose first and almost only duty is to have no will of his own.”

This last instance brings us near to what we have called the specific bias of the profession. Each profession has a limited field, a special environment, a group mentality. Each profession tends to leave its distinctive stamp upon a man. The group environment creates a group bias. The man of law develops respect for property at the risk of his respect for personal rights. The teacher is apt to make his teaching an over-narrow discipline. The priest is apt to underestimate the costs of the maintenance of sanctity. The diplo-

syphilis at any given time; that one out of every ten adults will be infected by syphilis at some time during his or her life; and that the annual number of new cases receiving medical care each year is about a half million. . . . This great wastage could be much reduced, if knowledge of prophylaxis and treatment now generally available were more widely used . . . In Stockholm, for example, in 1919 there were about 44 new cases of syphilis per 10,000 population. In that year a broad antivenereal program was put into effect, and at present the rate is about two new cases per 10,000 population.”

Much evidence on the vast amount of preventable ill-health and disease due to the medical resourcelessness of the poor is contained in the various reports of the Committee on the Cost of Medical Care. See particularly the *Final Report* (Chicago, 1932), Chap. I.

¹⁰ “Dilution” is a term applied sometimes to the practice of allowing less skilled workers or helpers to do certain tasks of a simple or routine nature which fall within the field of operation of the more skilled workers.

mat may overvalue good form and neglect the penalty of exclusiveness. The civil servant may make a fetish of the principle of seniority, and the soldier may interpret morality as mere *esprit de corps*.

But the bias of the occupational group is subject to a process of correction which is not operative to control the bias of class and other nonfunctional unities. For it is organized in terms of a specific service which its members fulfill, not to themselves but to the community. It must therefore be responsive to the demands of the community. The social function, in the name of which the association exists, is itself capable of continuous development and thus resists the stereotyping of group attitudes around group interests. The great growth of occupational associations is one aspect of social differentiation. We have seen that professional associations represent a unity of service which is not attained in the sphere of business, where dividing interests, and above all those of capital and of labor, are separately organized. Professional associations therefore embody the fullest present attainment of the principle of functional organization, the principle which seeks to modify economic interest by subordinating it, where the two conflict, to social function. Their increase is therefore part of a movement whereby the fulfillment of function appears as a definite social force, not only above the sheer drive of economic interest, but also in part-substitution for the principle of nonfunctional organization, for the tradition of birth and race and even of nation. In this process the activity of service becomes a basis of social organization, as distinct from the passivity of status.

XVII

THE GREAT ASSOCIATIONS: CULTURAL

SOME DISTINCTIVE ASPECTS OF CULTURAL ORGANIZATION

A preliminary question.—The reader who has followed the argument of the preceding chapters may still have some doubts regarding the classification of associations as respectively cultural and utilitarian. Do not all associations organize means for the pursuit of ends? In so far as they are concerned with means are they not utilitarian; in so far as they promote ends are they not cultural? Is not the state concerned with security and more broadly with social well-being and are these not cultural goals? Do not men enter into economic associations in order to attain as far as possible the good things of life, and are these not also cultural goals? And on the other hand if men join together to promote an art or a faith or for the sake of social intercourse, is not the organization thus created still utilitarian, still a device or a technique directed to ends lying beyond the organization? Admitting then that there is a distinction between culture and utility (or civilization), have we yet any right to classify *associations* as representative of one rather than of the other? While the answer to these questions is implicit in our previous discussion, we can make it more explicit by bringing out some of the distinctive aspects of the organizations we call specifically cultural, with respect to which they stand in contrast to the more definitely utilitarian associations. For our purpose two differences between them are specially significant.

(1) *The mode of participation.*—A cultural association is either itself a primary group or else a union of primary groups linked

together by a central organization. Unless the members meet as primary groups the objective of the cultural association cannot be realized. What, for example, would a church be if its members did not come together for worship and for sustenance in their faith? The central organization might still function, but the church, as a living association, would exist no more. The church is a fellowship, no matter what further organization may be involved. Everywhere the cultural association leads back to the primary focus, the club, the theater, the concert hall, the discussion group, the play group, the family. From that focus it draws not only its vitality but also its meaning. Thus the cultural and the social elements are fused in the cultural association. This condition is not necessary for the functioning of the utilitarian system. A member can derive all the benefits accruing from an economic association apart from his personal contacts with it. If he is a shareholder of a corporation, his interest, as shareholder, is in the dividends it pays. If he is a member of a mutual insurance company, his interest is in the protection it gives him, and not in anything that accrues from the personal experience of belonging. Even as a member of the state, a man does not attend political meetings, when he attends at all, because he receives the benefits of the state by his presence there, but because he wants by his presence to assure certain benefits that come to him in other ways. In the cultural association the end is achieved, at least in part, in the *process* of meeting with others; in the utilitarian association it is the *product* that is directly significant. The organization of civilization is in this sense more impersonal than that of culture.

(2) *The liberty of alternatives.*—Cultural associations built on variant or conflicting principles and pursuing different and even contrary ends can exist side by side in a way which markedly distinguishes them from utilitarian associations. There is nothing in the logic of organization to prevent a variety of religious associations, professing quite different tenets, from existing together within the same community. Each can worship in its own way without thereby preventing the others from worshipping in their ways. And so with the numerous organizations of culture, representing diverse modes of thinking and living, diverse modes of creative activity, diverse modes of social intercourse, diverse modes of recreation. In short, cultural types are in themselves and apart from external compulsion not subject to the necessity of a uniform system. But while there may be many religious systems in the same social area, there can be only one political system. There may, of course, be a variety of

political organizations interested in determining which political system shall prevail, but that is a quite different matter. The different religious cults in a community cannot be conceived as agencies seeking to determine what the next single religion of the community is going to be. Again, there can be only one monetary system in any social area. Nor can competing manufacturers pay widely different wages in the same city nor competing storekeepers sell their goods at widely different prices without directly prejudicing some of their numbers and causing some of them to go out of business. There are a great many requirements of the economic system which must be uniform for all concerned (whether the uniformity is achieved by competition or regulation) unless the system is to turn into chaos. And as we have seen, in the technological field the criterion of efficiency so applies that one system of techniques always prevails. In short, in the utilitarian order the liberty of alternatives that marks the cultural order is not practicable.

Corollary regarding the organization of culture.—An important corollary follows from the fact that culture is not subject to the logical necessity of uniformity characteristic of civilization. Cultural activity attains its ends more fully when it is free to organize itself in associations that are not dependent on the organization of the political-economic complex. Otherwise the variety and freedom of direction in which culture manifests itself are checked. The spontaneity of cultural expression—and we have seen that the being of culture is expression—is stifled. Thus the liberation of cultural association from the control of the political-economic organization is a very significant aspect of social evolution. In so far as this advances it means that the conditions of co-ordination and uniformity appropriate to the utilitarian order are not imposed inappropriately on the cultural order. It means that moral, religious, and aesthetic impulses are not bound hand and foot by alien restrictions. It means, for example, that men can be citizens of the same state and still belong to different churches, cherish different values, and pursue different ideals. This is a principle that in the Western world was born only after enormous travail, and though it is formally recognized in the constitutions of some modern states, it is still far from being fully established. Sometimes the claim for the co-ordination or regimentation of culture has come from the state itself, sometimes from dominant economic powers, and sometimes from a cultural organization identifying itself with a political order, as did the medieval church at certain times. The most recent large-scale attempt to “co-ordinate” the cultural life within the political

system is that of the totalitarian state. But such co-ordination is uncongenial to the creative principle of culture and can be maintained only by sheer enforcement and the repression of that principle.

THE CHURCH AS A TYPE OF CULTURAL ASSOCIATION

The church postulates a twofold relationship, suprasocial and social.—In view of the great variety of cultural associations in modern society it is not possible within our limits to deal with the different sociological types they present and the manifold revelations of social behavior which a study of them would reveal. We shall here confine ourselves to that form of cultural association which has had the most remarkable historic continuity and which in the nearer past has been a preponderant influence over our cultural life. The part played by the church in the evolution of modern society will be discussed at a later stage. Here we are concerned to bring out the distinctive features of the church as a form of association.

The character of the church, as a religious association, is in one fundamental respect different from that of every other type. For religion implies an attitude of man, not primarily to his fellow man, but to some power beyond his range, a power regarded by every monotheistic religion as supreme. Consequently the church seeks to establish a form of communication or rapport with an invisible and superior being. Thus it postulates a suprasocial form of relationship which within the religious assembly prescribes the social relations of the members. The church is a form of association in which men enter into relations with one another ostensibly determined by a prior relationship to a nonhuman being or beings, whether a universal spirit, a local god, a ghost, a dead ancestor, even a stick or stone regarded as imbued with supernatural might. Here lies the difference between religion and magic, closely interwoven as the two have been. For magic is a system of manipulation of the unknown. It is pseudo science, based on a false conception of causality, assuming a control over powers not understood, by means the relation of which to these powers is not subjected to the test of objective exploration. But religion seeks to enter into communication with the higher powers. Its modes of communication, such as worship, intercession, prayer, and hymn, do not imply control. Magic involves no social relationship. Religion involves generally twofold communion,

that of man with a nonhuman power and a derivative communion of man with man.

The bearing of this fact on the sociological character of the church.—This twofold relationship throws light on various other attributes of the church as a form of association. In the religious assembly there is a restraint on the more familiar and more intimate aspects of behavior. The sense of a higher presence induces in the faithful a reverential attitude which limits their relations to their fellows. The distinction between the "sacred" and the "profane" or "secular" holds sway and introduces an appropriate set of inhibitions, while it may, in certain moments of religious exaltation or ecstasy, dissolve others. These attitudes find expression in characteristic ceremonies and rituals.¹ Every occasion of a solemn character is apt to be celebrated through such devices, which create regular and prescribed channels for the orientation and limitation of social intercourse.

Moreover, since the being or power to which the religious attitude is directed cannot be known by the normal modes of perception or by the procedures of scientific investigation, the church becomes in a peculiar way the exponent and repository of a lore. More than other cultural associations it depends on continuity of doctrine. It generally assumes an original revelation, set forth in inspired writings but requiring the interpretation of the leaders in the faith. Consequently a church has usually a strong authoritarian character. If it has endured long, its authority is rooted in the past and is strongly impregnated with the tradition of interpretation. Hence its teaching is essentially deductive. It lays stress on orthodoxy, on the true faith delivered once for all. Its doctrinal problems are problems of exegesis, and since it claims, in its more dogmatic forms, to be "the pillar and foundation of all truth," it seeks the truth through an authoritative interpretation of the inspired word. This orthodoxy is further impressed on the faithful by the supernatural sanctions which it usually associates with the acceptance and rejection of belief. To the social taboos on nonconformist conduct the church adds the formidable taboos based on rewards and punishments in an afterlife.

We are discussing here the nature of the church, not of religion. The church takes a religious faith, often at first inchoate and flexible, and gives it a systematic form. The free expression of the religious sense is canalized in creeds and formulas and edicts and glosses. Such appears to be the history of all the greater faiths.

¹ On the nature of ceremony and ritual see Chap. XVIII, pages 338-339.

We can follow, for example, the process by which Christianity, in its first manifestation so antiformalist, became institutionalized as a closed system of thought forms, acquiring, through church councils such as that of Nicaea, a precise, dogmatic character. Official interpretation creates a canon of conformity, and this canon is repressive of all new interpretations. It becomes "the will of God," and as such tends to be a profoundly conservative influence on all social thinking. Revelation stands in the way of revaluation. No doubt the trend of civilization in subtle and often unrealized ways affects churchly doctrines and the religious life, but, especially in the days before modern science undermined the basis of many religious dogmas, the claim of supernatural authority has been one of the most powerful of all controls and one most resistant to the spontaneous social expression of the conceptions corresponding to a changing social order. It has been said that "modern social theory, like modern political theory, develops only when society is given a naturalistic instead of a religious interpretation, and a capital fact which presides at the birth of both is a change in the conception held of the nature and functions of a church."²

The consequent problem of adjustment to the changing situation.—Numerous illustrations could be offered of the resistance of religious organizations to the social adjustments which new inventions or new conditions seemed to demand. Because of the traditional nature of religious formulations, often derived from a source remote in time, in national character, and in evolutionary stage, the authority of the church has constantly sought to retain practices and conceptions which were growing alien to the changed character of the surrounding culture. Scarcely any new illumination of man's life and destiny or any new means of controlling it, from the knowledge of the starry heavens to that of human evolution, from the establishment of republicanism to the emancipation of women, from anesthetics to birth control, but has been condemned or proscribed in the name of religion. The retention of Sabbatarian laws in various countries is a good example of the way in which the authority of the church has clung to prescriptions emanating from the radically different conditions of life under which the code was originally formed. The "day of rest" naturally took, under the conditions of life among an ancient pastoral people like the Jews of Palestine, a form which might be ill adapted to the circumstances of life in a mechanized age and in a modern city.

² R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (New York, 1926), Chap. I.

It is true that traditions resistant to new needs cohere around all established institutions, economic or political as well as religious. But the institutions of the church have generally claimed a unique finality. The church, dealing with ultimates, has regarded its own truth as ultimate, as absolute instead of relative to time and place and the process of knowledge, as sacrosanct and eternal. Consequently it has set up a dichotomy of the sacred and the secular, of the supernatural and the natural. Thus it proclaims a prior standard by which social institutions of the "natural" order are to be judged and to which they should be subjected. The church, in Catholic theory, is a "perfect society of supernatural universal character."³ The predetermined order which it assumes makes it more difficult for the social experience generated within the religious group to find expression through a readjustment of its own institutions or of the institutions over which it exercises control. For example, a system of caste is usually supported, as in India, by religious dogmas, and thus exercises a dominance over the mind which prevents the free criticism of its social values and the transition to a more flexible order which changing conditions within and beyond the society would otherwise promote.

Nevertheless in times of social ferment the pressure of authoritarian religious prescription is liable to be broken in various ways. In our present age, when large numbers owe no serious allegiance to a church, the ease with which members can withdraw from its communion reduces the internal stresses which characterized those ages when a church affiliation was socially or even politically obligatory. Under the latter conditions insurgent religious movement created schism within the established church and led to the formation of a variety of sects each claiming to possess the true interpretation of the same original faith. Hence arose two social phenomena peculiarly associated with the history of religion, persecution or attempted suppression of the "heretic," and proselytism or the attempted conversion of those who espouse other beliefs. A church is rarely exclusive with respect to membership—it is rather in keeping with its spirit that it should bring the whole world into its single fold. But the days when this ideal seemed feasible are past, and the claim of universality, so influential in certain historical stages and so markedly in contrast with the exclusive spirit of most other associations, is submerged by the multiplicity of sects, the tendency in our times for new religions rather than for new sects to arise,

³ Cf. the papal encyclical of January 11th, 1930, on the Christian Education of Youth.

and the withdrawal of large numbers from all church connections. The decline of dogma in some of the more "protestant" forms of religion has led, on the other hand, to a movement for their unification.

Interests which the church satisfies: (a) by its suprasocial orientation.—The peculiar sociological character of the church is more fully seen if we turn to consider the interests which it satisfies. The suprasocial orientation of religion is, of course, the expression of certain human impulses. In more primitive forms religion may reveal the desire to appease the formidable powers which seem to beset the life and determine the lot and fate of men. But this desire may be regarded as the germ of a more inclusive impulse, the essentially religious yearning for cosmic security, for an adjustment of the individual being towards the universe as he is able to conceive it. The core of this religious principle is expressed in the famous words of St. Augustine: "Our heart is restless till it finds rest in Thee." It is the esoteric way of escape from those fears and negations and frustrations which surmount ordinary human contrivance. As these change with changing experience, so does, at length, religion. The church stabilizes and, as we have seen, in part checks this process, setting up explicit formulations of the conditions under which the individual can achieve the sense of cosmic unity. It propounds, for example, a schematic doctrine of an afterlife in response to the yearning for immortality. It develops a formula for the expiation of sin or guilt in response to the feeling of imperfection, frailty, or wrongdoing. In short, it elaborates a compensatory thought-system designed to assure those adjustments of the emotional nature of man towards the order of the universe which seem to be contradicted or at least unattainable on the level of everyday experience.

Interests which the church satisfies: (b) as a focus of human fellowship.—But while this is the principle which distinguishes the church from other cultural associations it is one which is too nearly related to the social interests and pressures of the group to find a pure or simple embodiment in social organization. Religion, so understood, could scarcely be expected to emancipate itself from more immediate concerns. Alike its compensations and its penalties were rooted in the mores of the group, past or present. The distinction of the religious and the moral is still a hard one even for the reflective mind. So the church was inevitably a strong agent of social control, the more powerful because of its absolutist claims and the consequent passivity of its lay membership. Being conserva-

tive by the instinct of its being, it was a potent instrument of social submission, and as such was consciously or unconsciously exploited by the dominant forces in the community. The consequent confusion of its aims, and particularly the difficulty of its relationship to the powers of the state, will be considered in a later chapter.

Moreover, the church lives in the assembling of its members in local units of fellowship. Hence for its members and others it is a social rallying point, furnishing in many rural communities the chief occasion for the regular meeting of the folk. Under such conditions the church is less a specific association than a communal institution. It is the focus for the celebration and symbolization of the great occasions and crises of life, a cultural center of the life of the community. It conducts and controls many social activities, political, educational, charitable, recreational. In the more complex society other agencies take over, in part at least, these functions. Hence the church has had to face a problem similar to that which has confronted the family, that of finding its place and role within a more specialized system. With the decline in the hold of dogmatic religion, especially in the large cities, this problem has created for the church a peculiar dilemma. Its traditional basis becomes uncongenial to a social life which has in other respects abandoned old traditions, and yet it is exceedingly hard for a church to reformulate its basis without losing its distinctive character or with any assurance of thereby fulfilling some function which is not more definitely fulfilled by other organizations.⁴

The manner in which churches have served as a rallying point for cultural interests is well revealed by the strength which they possess among groups which feel their cultural unity but lack adequate political means for its expression. The cultural cohesion of the Jewish people has been in great measure expressed through the synagogue, rabbinical rituals, and religious commemorations. In Catholic Ireland in its struggle for independence the church played an important part. In French Quebec, incorporated within a political area dominated by English traditions, the church has retained an authority which it has lost in France. In other countries, such as Poland, where two peoples of different religions and different traditions are associated, religious affiliations have retained a greater social significance. It has often been observed also that immigrant groups in the United States cling to their traditional church with

⁴ Cf. H. Paul Douglass, *The Church in the Changing City* (New York, 1927), and E. C. Lindeman, *The Church in the Changing Community* (published by The Community Church of New York, 1929).

an added intensity because of their cultural isolation. On the other hand, the militant freethinking of the Czech population is an expression of nationalist opposition to Austrian Catholicism.⁵ The church has thus played historically a double role: claiming universality it has preached the brotherhood of man, but it has also embodied and perpetuated in its different forms the social traditions of diverse and often conflicting groups.

⁵ For fuller illustration of these points see H. A. Miller, *Races, Nations, and Classes* (Philadelphia, 1924).

BOOK TWO
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

PART TWO
SUSTAINING FORCES

FOREWORD

We have now learned to think of society as an invisible structure, a system of organizations cohering into some more or less unified order. While the order itself is unstable and changeful, it has a definite character at every stage, and many of its major elements, such as the family, the state, and the church have shown great persistence of type through change. How then is this fabric of institutions and associations maintained and regulated? How does it endure as a co-ordinated system? What are the forces that bind the structure together? At a later stage we shall study the forces that make for instability and change; here we are concerned with the conservative forces that make for cohesion and stability.

We enter here a region where sociology and psychology meet. For these regulative principles are of a universal character, and they seem to be as constitutive of human mentality as they are of human society. At the same time the codes and other agencies of control with which we shall deal do not wholly express or invariably regulate the strivings and the thoughts of men. So we are brought face to face with the question of the adjustment of these principles to the variant individual situations which they never fully envisage. The consideration of this question will prepare the way for the study of those antithetical principles which instigate social change.

XVIII

THE MORES AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

SOCIAL CODES

The nature of social law.—The social structure we have been studying is a complex order of human relationships. No order, even the most changeful, exists except as the expression of law. Everything abides in accordance with the law of its being. Society is distinct from physical reality in that the laws which sustain it are, at least in part, *prescriptive* or *normative*. Unlike the laws of nature, they can be disobeyed and they can be changed. They have not the inexorable character of natural laws. It is true that they have their roots in human nature, in man's organic being, in the human need and the abiding consciousness of society, in the likeness or conformity to type that characterizes man and therefore his behavior. But the rules themselves are subject to change, since the needs and desires of men are never constant but always seek and find new forms of expression. The regulative principles of society are standards set up by a group for the control of the conduct of its members, in relation to one another and to the group as a whole. This does not mean that they are merely *imposed* on men, either by their rulers or leaders or by their own past. They are not like the laws that a master makes for a slave or an empire for a subjugated people. For the most part they are the ways in which the group as a whole has accommodated itself to the necessities and to the amenities of social life, as recognized at its own level of intelligence, education, and opportunity. For the most part they are inherited from the past just in so far as the group in gen-

eral accepts the inheritance and they are changed in the present as the group grows conscious of the need for change.

Social regulations differ from natural laws in another respect. They carry with them a sense of obligation. They are addressed to the heart and to the will of those they govern. They constantly run counter to the inclinations of individual members. They reveal the solidarity of the group, but the solidarity is never complete. At every moment the self-centered interest of individuals runs counter to the general interest, and that of the small group to some demands of the larger which includes it. The social norms of conduct are often too restrictive for the enterprising, too narrow for creative minds, too altruistic for the self-seeking. On the other hand, some of the regulations are framed in the interest of dominant groups or classes and are resisted by other groups. The prescriptions of the social codes are never all equally accepted or equally obeyed.

Codes and sanctions.—Social regulations fall into certain systems or codes. The most explicit of these is the legal code, but underneath it, and in large measure sustaining it, lie codes of a different order, such as the codes of custom and the codes of religion. All these codes are alike in the respect that their prescriptions are subject to violation, and therefore they are all guarded by special provisions, or *sanctions*, calculated to counteract the tendency to disobedience. This is no less true, as Malinowski has pointed out, of primitive custom-ruled peoples than of civilized ones.¹ In no situation is there unswerving automatic obedience. In every instance the group sustains the code by the exercise of some degree of pressure on the individual violator.

The term "sanction" may be applied to the specific reward attached to conformity, but it more generally and more properly refers to the specific penalty attached by society to the violation of the code. Sometimes the sanction is the denial of privileges or the cancellation of rights; sometimes it is the imposition of a fine, or, in the case of the legal code, the loss of liberty or even of life. Each type of code has its own form of sanction. It is important, however, to distinguish between the sanction of the code and the ground of obedience. The sanction is one ground of obedience, but it is only one of several. Often it is not even the main ground. The members of a medical or legal association do not conform to their respective professional codes merely because otherwise they would be "struck off the register." The members of a club do not obey

¹ B. Malinowski, *Crime and Custom in Savage Society* (New York, 1926), Part I.

its rules lest they be expelled from it. Nor do people generally obey the legal code just because they are afraid of the policeman. People obey the code also because they think it right to do so, because they have become habituated to it so that obedience is the line of least resistance, because they wish to stand well with their fellows, because it serves their interests, because they want to set an example to others, and so forth. Motives are always manifold and mixed and hard to disentangle. They vary endlessly from person to person, from situation to situation. Sanctions, on the contrary, are definite and relatively simple. Motives are always individualized, sanctions are social. In our discussions of the regulative principles of society this distinction must be kept in mind. We shall classify these principles with respect to their sanctions for reasons which this distinction renders obvious, but we must always remember that, in the complicated play of motives which underlies human conduct, the sanction is not so much an explanation of conduct as a reinforcement of those promptings to conformity which otherwise would be overborne by the strength of opposing tendencies in an individual situation.

The diversity of social codes and sanctions.—Every community as well as every type of association imposes rules on its members. In a civilized community these rules are of more diverse kinds and their sanctions are more differentiated. The rules of a club, for example, are sanctioned by the loss of membership or some privileges of membership or by a fine imposed for violation as a condition of retaining membership or by the loss of esteem or status within the club. These, in fact, are the general sanctions of all "voluntary" organizations, though sometimes the rules of the organization are linked up to sanctions of a more absolute nature. The workman who disobeys the regulations of the factory may lose not only his position but his livelihood. The believer who offends against the code of his church may suffer excommunication involving for him the loss of spiritual consolations and perhaps the sense of the displeasure of the deity. The doctor or lawyer who seriously violates the professional code of his calling may lose the right to practice, though in such instances the additional sanction of the legal code is necessary. Communal codes have less specific, but often no less important, sanctions. The rule of custom is sanctioned only by some degree of social displeasure or ostracism, but this, in its extremest forms, is one of the most powerful sanctions that exist. The rule of fashion is guarded by a milder form of the same sanction, the sense of superiority or contempt which is felt

towards those who do not conform to the code. A very effective safeguard of fashion and generally of convention is the ridicule bestowed on the violator, what the French sociologist R. Maunier² calls the "satiric sanction," since the fear of being laughed at is deeply rooted in the heart of social man. The moral code is in an ambiguous situation as regards sanction, but only because the term "morals," or "moral laws," is used confusedly in two different senses. Sometimes it means those rules of conduct which are held by the group or community to be right and proper and which they impose on aberrant members by various degrees of the same sanctions which are the guardians of customs in general. In this sense morals are simply those customs the violation of which is regarded in the community as definitely wrong—in a word, they are what we have learned to call "mores." In the stricter sense the moral code is that body of rules which the individual "conscience" upholds as constituting right or good conduct, and here there appears, sometimes in harmony with, and sometimes in opposition to, the social sanction, an inner and personal sanction, the feeling of guilt entailed by violation.

It is true that for most of our daily occasions mores are nearly synonymous with morals. What we regularly do in conformity with usage—or what usage prescribes even when we disobey it—is the proper thing to do, it feels morally right. If we live in a group where early rising is the rule, then early rising is *ipso facto* a virtue. But the crucial instances are those in which the individual feels a moral obligation contrary to the prescriptions of the group. Then we must distinguish the moral code in its strict sense from the social code in question. Moral codes vary from person to person, but the mores characterize the group or the community.

Finally there is one code, and in civilized countries one only, which has the ultimate sanction of physical enforcement, of unconditional fine, imprisonment, or death. This is the legal code of the state. In a quite limited sense the code of the family may be upheld, with respect to the more juvenile offenders against it, by some exercise of force, and similarly the code of the school. In some countries also there remain vestiges of the right by which the church through its own courts administered and executed its own law. But in modern states these qualified rights, where they exist at all, exist only by the tolerance and permission of the state, within the limits and under the conditions which the state imposes. In the last resort only the law of the state owns the sanction of force, and

² *Introduction à la Sociologie*, Chap. II.

in this sense, in the ancient words applied to it by the philosopher Hobbes, "there is no power on earth which can be compared with it."

Codes in primitive and civilized society.—The number and variety of the social codes correspond to the complexity of the society. The code of the state maintains the general framework of social order, but it is supplemented by many other codes of a more flexible nature. There are, for example, many varieties of economic code, from the definite rules of a workshop or of a trade-union to the vaguer codes of business ethics. There are codes of professional etiquette and of professional honor. There are codes even of the violators of codes, the rules of the gang, for example, or the "honor among thieves." And all these have their own sanctions. The sanction is, as it were, the antithesis of the advantage that accrues from obedience to the code. This advantage may be in many instances a more direct stimulant of obedience than the sanction. But by focusing attention on the sanction we shall understand more clearly the distinction of code from code and the process by which they have grown distinct.

In primitive society these distinctions were not developed. There were no legal codes, no religious codes, no economic codes, formally set apart one from another, independently instituted and sanctioned, under the guardianship of separate organizations, and generally distinguished from the code of the customary law, the norms of the kinship group. Still less were the distinctions we draw within these various codes, such as that between civil and criminal law, developed. This truth has been pointed out by nearly all students of early society, and has been particularly insisted upon by such writers as Maine and Durkheim. More recently it has been in part challenged by Dr. Malinowski, in his *Crime and Custom in Savage Society*. He shows that savages make distinctions between certain fundamental rules dealing with life, property, and the essential structure of kinship, which he calls legal or juridical, and religious rules, ceremonial rules, or the code of manners. He maintains that these "legal" rules have sanctions entirely different from those which govern the craftsmanship of the native, or the observance of festivals, or the conduct of magical rites. But one or two of his own illustrations will show that the main contrast we are drawing between primitive and civilized peoples is not affected by this argument, significant and valuable as it is in other respects. There are, of course, varying degrees of importance attached to the several prescriptions of any code, and this holds of the code of custom. But

the fact that, within the customary code of a primitive community, "some rules stand out from the rest in that they are felt and regarded as the obligations of one person and the rightful claims of others" and that they are sanctioned by the loss of reciprocal services which the failure to implement them involves, does not entitle us to call such rules "legal" in the modern differentiated sense of the term. The loss of return services and the social disesteem attendant on the shirker of socially recognized obligations is different from the specialized sanction of the law, the fine or penalty visited upon the violator by a definite organ of society, the court of law. It is misleading also to describe as "legal mechanisms" the magical protection of property by charms or formulas which are supposed to bring automatic hurt to the thief. These are primitive *equivalents* of our legal institutions. Among the Trobriand Islanders, according to Malinowski, two of the most important of these "legal mechanisms" are sorcery and suicide. A man who breaks an important rule of exogamy is publicly insulted by an injured rival and throws himself, after the native custom, from the top of a cocoanut palm, which leads to a quarrel between his clansmen and those of his rival.³ Here the essential characteristics which distinguish law, as we understand it, from custom are lacking. The punishment is self-inflicted. It is not even commanded by the powers that be, like the suicides common in the reign of Nero, nor does there seem to have been any authority which would have taken action if the self-slayer had not followed the tribal custom. Moreover, the fact that the last words of the suicide call upon his clansmen to take revenge shows how far we still are from the developed forms of political law.

The distinctions of codes and sanctions of which we have been speaking arose in the great process of social evolution. They had already made some advance, as Dr. Malinowski has shown, among such groups as the Trobriand Islanders. Even among ourselves the differentiation, as we shall see later, is still far from being complete. In our world today the ability to draw in practice some of the finer of these distinctions is a sign of more advanced culture. The socially intelligent person in our complex society of manifold and overlapping codes makes distinctions as to the kind and degree of obligation that they severally possess for him which would have been quite impossible in the primitive world.

³ B. Malinowski, *op. cit.*, Part II, Chap. I.

HOW THE MORES ARE PERPETUATED

Loyalties and indoctrinations.—No social order could long endure if it depended merely on the sanctions of the codes. Unless the codes were rooted in the human nature of the groups over whom they hold sway they would soon prove unavailing. This we shall see more fully when we turn, in the next section, to consider the question of coercion and the social order. Behind the sanctions and behind the more superficial considerations that may persuade men to conformity there are loyalties and convictions. While these loyalties and convictions are in the last resort the manifestation of the inborn sociality of human beings, they show an extreme range of variation for different groups or for different circumstances. The particular loyalties and faiths of men are clearly not inborn, but the result of their social conditioning. They are not like the instinct-bound codes of bees or of ants. No more convincing evidence of this fact can be found than the remarkable diversity of the group-codes controlling sex relationships. The most powerful impulse of sex, which we have every reason to assume to be basically alike in the native endowment of different social groups, is nevertheless subjected to the most variant and even the most contradictory codes, each seeming natural to the groups adhering to it though it may be quite abhorrent to others. The ancient Greek traveler and historian, Herodotus, reflecting on the way different peoples disposed of their dead and on the abhorrence each showed for the practices of the others, summed the matter up by saying that "custom is the king of men."⁴

What concerns us here is to explain why there are such variations in the loyalties and convictions, and consequently in the codes, of different peoples. We are considering particularly the manner in which the mores are sustained through all their variations from time to time and from place to place. Obviously there are certain molding forces always at work in every society. First we shall distinguish the two great processes of *indoctrination* and *habituation*, and then we shall point to some particular concomitants or adjuncts that reinforce them.

Social indoctrination.—Under all conditions social indoctrination, the inculcation of modes of thought and patterns of belief, is surely the most powerful of all regulative influences. One need

⁴ Herodotus *Histories*. iii, Chap. 38. Herodotus remarked that "if it were proposed to all nations to choose which of all customs seemed best to them, each would, after examination made, place its own first."

think only of the incessant inculcation of "right" modes of conduct made on the child from infancy by parents and by teachers and by comrades. In this formative period the physiological and mental aspects of habit, the ways of acting and the ways of thinking, are most thoroughly and intimately unified. A child may resist the specific commands of his elders, but he cannot resist the system from which they emanate. He knows no other with which to compare it—it fills his whole horizon. It is conveyed in the very language he learns and hears, with its idioms and emotionally charged expressions, so that he cannot speak or think except in the accents of the group approval or disapproval.

Much of this indoctrination occurs within the circle of the family, but the larger group loyalties are inculcated by more highly organized means. The church has recognized from of old the great importance of early training in its precepts and beliefs and for a long time, until the state began to take over this office, was the principal agent in the formal education of the young. There is still, in some countries, a struggle between church and state as to which shall be the dominant influence in youthful education. For education, especially in the earlier stages, is in large part indoctrination. This fact is very evident whenever some crisis or emergency brings to power the proponents of a new or different social order. They realize quickly that the order they are establishing cannot take root and endure unless by persistent education and propaganda they can mold the minds of the people to the desired pattern of loyalty and conviction. Often they try to repress all unfavorable opinions so that the minds of the people, like those of young children, shall be subject to no contrary influences. And they take particular care that the children themselves are thoroughly indoctrinated. The schoolbooks are rewritten, the curriculum remodeled, and the teachers selected to this end. Special organizations outside the school are created to enlist the imagination of the young through corporate activities, such as those of the "Young Communists" in Russia, the "Hitler Youth" in Germany, and the "Balilla" and "Avanguardisti" in Italy. Mussolini, when announcing an enlarged program of training for fascist youth, from eight years of age to twenty-one, explained that he wanted to "make their souls into sharp daggers" and that the program was "designed to interest boys in military life by means of frequent contacts with the armed forces of the nation, whose glories and traditions will be taught to them."⁵

⁵ Mussolini's announcement of September 18, 1934, as quoted in *The New York Times*, September 19, 1934.

Habitation.—Closely allied to indoctrination is *habitation*. While indoctrination imposes opinions and beliefs by the direct method of communication and instruction, habituation is the process in which people unconsciously adapt their ways of thought to the social conditions under which they live. Men take the cast of their surroundings. Apart from what they are expressly taught to believe, they frame ideas of right and wrong in accordance with the use and wont of everyday life. What is familiar often appears both inevitable and good; what is unfamiliar seems often alien or evil. Native impulses are canalized along lines determined by routine. Once habits are formed they tend to breed or to confirm corresponding thoughts. Thus habituation comes to the aid of indoctrination. It works continuously and subtly until belief and opinion become registered in the brain and the blood. The reason for this we shall see more fully when we deal with the nature of habit.

Through indoctrination and habituation the sense of solidarity is attached to a particular social order and the codes that regulate it. This attachment is strengthened by various special factors associated with these two great interwoven processes. Of the personal factors the most significant is leadership; of the impersonal, ritual and symbolism are most important.

Leadership and authority.—We draw a distinction here between authority and personal leadership.⁶ By authority we mean the power attached to office, involving the respect, the submission, or the reverence accorded to those who represent the office or are invested with its rights. By leadership we mean the power to persuade or to direct men that comes from personal qualities apart from office. The two types of control are often in various degrees combined. Authority inheres in those who represent or embody the codes, such as the local clergyman in the older country community, or in those who possess rank or status or any prestige derived from position or wealth; but it is always enhanced if qualities of leadership go along with the prerogatives of station or office. Not infrequently a forceful personal leader consolidates his power by attaining the aegis of office. But the two *sources* of power are themselves distinct.

⁶ Simmel distinguishes three types of authority, according as the attitude of submission is directed towards a person or towards a group (majority) or towards an impersonal principle (ideal)—see his *Soziologie*, pp. 141 ff. or Spykman's *Social Theory of Georg Simmel* (Chicago, 1925), pp. 97-108. Some other writers, such as H. Krabbe in his *Modern Idea of the State* (tr. G. H. Sabine and W. J. Shepard [New York, 1922]), contrast the authority of the personal sovereign and the authority of the impersonal law. We are here speaking of authority only as vested in or focused in a person.

A policeman represents authority, not leadership. So does a judge, and so does a king, in so far as his power depends on the reverence attached to his position. A leader, on the other hand, may be an insurgent against the established order.

Authority takes a multitude of forms and inheres in all organization. In its crudest and least socialized forms it rests merely on the power of enforcement. This is the authority of the master over the slave, of the despot over the subject, of the magistrate over the criminal—and, we may add, frequently that of the employer over the employee, though the enforcement belongs to a different order. Here authority may depend solely on the sanction which it controls. But nearly all forms of authority involve more than this, an attitude of responsiveness and of deference, an admission of subordination on the part of the subject which in turn helps to create as well as to justify the authority itself. The grounds of this voluntary subordination are diverse. Acceptance of authority may be the tribute paid to age or to wealth. It may be based mainly on the mere recognition that authority is necessary if the tasks of the everyday life are to be effectively performed or the greater order to which our lives are bound is to endure.

Take but degree away, untune that string,
And hark, what discord follows!

It reflects the respect for order or station or class, conveyed to the holder or representative of it. Authority may appear as the personal embodiment of position, just as the majesty of kingship is personalized in a king, apart from whatever attributes of his own he may possess. Tradition and religion may weave a spell about the person who upholds the order to which they belong. More self-interested motives also play their part, and submission is fostered by the anticipation of the rewards which the authority can bestow on his friends and followers.

Personal leadership, on the other hand, depends on the prowess, reputation, skill, oratory, or other attributes of the leader. He may be on the side of established authority or he may be opposed to it, seeking to create a new type of authority. He may stand for a definite policy or set of principles or he may be an opportunist, like a Tammany leader or the leaders of political parties in certain politically undeveloped countries where parties are named after the leaders they follow and not after the principles they profess. He may be blindly followed, or he may depend on his power to rally men to the banner of some cause. He may be little more than the

delegate or simply the mouthpiece of some interest-group, though at this point leadership is near the vanishing point. Leadership in some degree and form is present wherever men assemble. The German sociologist Simmel calls the relation between leaders and followers the most important of all social relationships.⁷ When the leader acts within the established system he adds to authority a new appeal; he interprets it afresh and gives it new vitality. And when an established system breaks it is always because a leader organizes the forces of dissatisfaction and gives them unity and direction.

Ritual and ceremony.—We turn next to certain impersonal influences that bind men to the mores. *Ritual* and *ceremony* are particularly important as adjuncts of every established order. By ritual we mean a formal rhythmic procedure controlling a succession of acts directed to the same end, a procedure repeated without variation on the appropriate occasions, and distinguished from mere habit or routine in that it is accompanied by a peculiar sense of rightness and inevitability.⁸ To deviate from it in any way, no matter what the circumstances, is felt to be wrong or undesirable, not on utilitarian grounds, but because deviation breaks the rhythm, disturbing the emotional response, the solemn and often mystical rapport between the person and the occasion. Ritual may be merely personal or it may have a social character. It may, for example, be associated with the act of dressing in the morning or with the act of public worship. But it is most powerful when the propriety of the procedure is socially established. Ritual invests an occasion with importance or solemnity and thus combats the process by which often repeated acts become tedious or commonplace. Hence its peculiar place in religious usage, and in such public and private celebrations as are thought to demand an attitude of special dignity or reverence. Ritual is seen at its best in a church service, in judicial proceedings, at court functions. Hence also its frequent use to maintain a level of dignity in social assemblies, such as lodges, fraternities, clubs, where, without it, the normal familiarity of the members with one another would dissipate the importance they wish to attach to certain occasions. The inviolable rhythm of ritual evokes its own emotional response, and because each successive act is predetermined and known in advance, each tends to evoke the emotional

⁷ *Op. cit.* On this subject see F. Znaniecki, *Social Actions*, pp. 182 ff.

⁸ Some definitions of ritual seem too narrow to cover the usual acceptance of the term. We cannot, for example, agree with W. G. Sumner and A. G. Keller (*Science of Society*, II, § 279 and IV, § 279) that it is mostly a propitiatory device associated with ghost fear, nor do they adequately distinguish between ritual and magic.

quality of the whole procedure. To the outsider who does not share the interest or the belief of the participating group, ritual is apt on that very account to appear ridiculous, because he feels no adequate justification for the solemnity or exaltation which it demands.

Ritual, so understood, is the core of ceremony. In fact, it may without much difficulty be identified with ceremony. But perhaps it is better to regard ceremony as a more comprehensive genus within which ritual falls. Ceremony then means any established procedure of a formal and dignified nature designed to mark and impress the importance of an event or occasion. It does not necessarily imply the rhythmic precision and undeviating repetition of ritual, though ritual is the distinctive element of most ceremonies. From of old, ceremony has been recognized as a powerful means of sustaining the social order. Ceremony is "the bond that holds the multitude together; and if the bond be removed, these multitudes fall into confusion."⁹ Ceremony proclaims the elevation and fixity of the social order, establishing distance and priority lest familiarity breed criticism and lack of respect, while its ritual works more subtly on the feelings of men, inculcating reverential attitudes towards the principles which it embodies. Ceremony is the dignified garb with which social functions are invested. It has therefore more influence on the unreflecting than on the critically minded, and thus in an age of criticism it is liable to lose its hold. The critic, discerning the disparity between the ceremonial appearance and the underlying reality, is apt to declare that "society is founded upon cloth."¹⁰ But profounder speculation distinguishes between the hollow ceremony that seeks to conceal the fraud or pretence within it and the ceremony which gives a necessarily symbolic and external form to our social valuations.

Why ritual and ceremony should play so important a role is an intriguing question of social psychology. A few suggestions may be offered. In the first place the formal procedure invests an occasion

⁹ Sacred books of the East, *Li Ki*, Book VIII, § I, quoted by Ross, *Social Control*, Chap. XIX.

¹⁰ Thomas Carlyle, *Sartor Resartus*, Chaps. VIII and IX. Cf. the passage: "Often in my atrabilious moods, when I read of pompous ceremonials, Frankfort Coronations, Royal Drawing-rooms, Levees, Couches: and how the ushers and macers and pursuivants are all in waiting; how Duke this is presented by Archduke that, and Colonel A by General B, and innumerable Bishops, Admirals, and miscellaneous Functionaries are advancing gallantly to the Anointed Presence; and I strive, in my remote privacy, to form a clear picture of that solemnity,—the Clothes fly-off the whole dramatic corps; and Dukes, Grandees, Bishops, Generals, Anointed Presence itself, every mother's son of them, stand straddling there, not a shirt on them; and I know not whether to laugh or to weep."

or an event with an impersonal dignity or solemnity, unmarred by the intrusion of the particular and limiting individuality of the performers. This contrast is often noticeable in religious ceremonies when the ritual ends and the voice of the preacher begins. Again, in the constantly repeated ritual the effortless association of ideas instills a sense of rightness as well as of inevitability. The rhythm of the procedure attunes the mind emotionally to the corresponding ideas. Ritual and ceremony impress without explaining, without reasoning. They convey a feeling of larger realities, of faiths, of unities, of social establishments, which can never be fully experienced or wholly comprehended by individuals. "The church," "the state," "the law," are distant abstractions, but the rites of the church, the coronation of the king, the investiture of the president, the forms of the court of law, the orderly procession, seem to bring near to men, even to embody the essence of, these invisible things.

Symbols and society.—A symbol is a representation of a meaning or a value, an external sign or gesture which by association conveys an idea or stimulates a feeling. All communication, whether through language or otherwise, makes use of symbols. Society could scarce exist without them. The unity of a group, like all its cultural values, must find symbolic expression. In primitive society the identification of the symbol and the thing symbolized is often so complete that the symbol becomes a *totem* and is regarded as an objective embodiment, no mere representation, of the spirit or solidarity of the group. The totem, whether eagle or bull or serpent or whatever it be, *means* the group, thus giving concrete identification to its invisible unity. The symbol is at once a definite focus of interest, a means of communication, and a common ground of understanding. The flag is a symbol of the nation, a visible emblem which is the same for all its members. It has different significance for the educated and the ignorant, for the lover of peace and the militarist, but it is a common rallying point for all who accept it. This is a peculiar property of the cultural symbol, that it admits of variant interpretations and yet excites in many minds a like devotion.

This fact helps to explain the role of symbolism in the more mystical forms of religion. Their rituals are saturated with symbolism, and the symbols, because their meaning depends essentially on acquired associations, can often be freely reinterpreted to suit the changing demands of the age. This is probably one reason why the Roman Catholic religion, with its strongly ritualistic character,

does not disrupt into sects as do the Protestant faiths, and why the Catholic, faced with the questionings of modern science, is apt to become a "modernist" rather than an "unbeliever."¹¹ Ritual and symbolism together bring strong reinforcement to the established codes. Many symbols are, in fact, "morale symbols."¹² They suggest and convey the inarticulate sense of group unity. This is the main function of the symbols employed in rites of initiation; in the rituals of lodges and fraternal orders and trade-unions; in the badges, ornaments, pins, keys, tokens, pennants, gestures, formulas, and other signs which convey to the "brethren" the sense of exclusive membership in a mystical unity. And it is an important part of the business of leadership to make effective use of these tokens, to interpret or reinterpret them, and thus to rally the members in a stronger cohesion and devotion to the common cause of the group.

The social role of the symbol is far more profound than is usually recognized. We have touched above on only one of its many aspects. As we have said, society depends on communication, and communication is made possible by symbols. The symbols become part of the social heritage and the particular symbols of each social group acquire a character of their own so that they define and limit the modes of social expression. There is besides a more subtle way in which symbols enter into social relationships. Just as the group creates a totem or an image symbolic of its unity, so the individual creates a kind of symbol or representative picture of himself with which to face the world of his fellows. He forms an invisible image, a mental projection of himself, of what he stands for in the eyes of others or of what stands for him in the eyes of others. He carries this symbolic self into his social relationships and at the same time it arises out of them. It differs from the ordinary symbol in that it is not an external sign; instead it is a mental externalization of the self. But the further consideration of its nature involves some difficult questions of social psychology into which we cannot enter here.

COERCION AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

Forms of coercion.—In the last section we dealt with certain conditions that support and consolidate every social system, helping to make men responsive and devoted to it. These conditions were

¹¹ Cf. the article on "Ritual the Conserver," by L. S. Cressman, in the *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 35 (1930), 564-572.

¹² This is well brought out by Grace Coyle, *The Social Process in Organized Groups* (New York, 1930), Chap. VII.

seen to be the more potent determinants of the loyalties and convictions without which the social codes, no matter how sanctioned, could not endure. What part then do the sanctions themselves play? They bring pressure to bear on men apart from their loyalties and convictions. In the last resort, in the form of law, the pressure becomes direct enforcement. In every society there exist many degrees and forms of coercion. Whenever men act, or refrain from acting, in a manner different from that which they themselves have chosen or would choose in a given situation, because others deliberately limit the range of their choice either directly, through present control over it, or indirectly, through the threat of consequences, they may be said to be under coercion. There are therefore as many forms of coercion as there are forms of power. Whoever makes conditions the failure to fulfill which is visited by a penalty is exercising coercion, whether it be an employer with the power to dismiss or a group of workmen with the power to strike, whether it be a church with the power to excommunicate or a club with the power to deny its privileges, whether it be even a husband or a wife with the power to make things unpleasant for his or her partner. But beyond all these there is an absolute form of coercion, the exercise of physical force to control or prevent action. This is compulsion in its purest unconditional form, and in civilized communities it is vested, as a *right*, solely in the state. It is force so understood which alone we shall examine here, seeking to point out the nature and the limits of its social effectiveness and function, but what is said of it will hold true of the other forms of coercion, in the degree in which, under whatever disguise, they constrain the will and the act of those subject to them.

The function of socialized force.—The function of force in the social order exhibits curious variations. It is prominent in some primitive communities, among warlike tribes, but practically non-existent in others, such as the Trobriand Islanders described by Malinowski.¹³ In the primitive world it seems to increase as we pass from the simple to the more complex and highly organized groups, if we may judge from the presence among these peoples of social ranks or castes.¹⁴ Yet we would be wrong to infer that its role necessarily increases with the degree of social organization, for the vast complex democracies of the modern world are less force-controlled than the simpler feudal economies out of which they arose.

¹³ *Op. cit.*

¹⁴ Cf. L. T. Hobhouse, G. C. Wheeler, and M. Ginsberg, *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples* (London, 1915), Chap. IV, § 2.

It is obvious that the governmental force is more in evidence in times and under conditions of social crisis, and sometimes it retains a tyrannical form as an aftermath of such crises, as in the dictatorships of Soviet Russia and of Fascist Italy. It is obvious also that it is a more effective instrument of social control over uneducated and acquiescent propulations than over those which have been brought up in an atmosphere of liberty and of criticism.

Physical force cannot, as the anarchists claim, be abolished altogether from the social system, if for no other reason than that there must always exist some socialized force to restrain the antisocial manifestations of force itself, whether exerted by individuals or by organized groups. It is necessary to restrain within limits the self-interest, the greed, the lawlessness, the intolerance, that is ever ready to assert its will over others. It is necessary for the maintenance and definition of any system of rights and obligations in a complex society. No rule is secure if the heedless or the unscrupulous or the dissident can transgress it with impunity. It is necessary to settle the disputes that arise eternally among men and that, were there no appeal to a force-invested authority, would issue in the violence of individuals or groups against one another. It is necessary also to curb the encroachment of stronger organizations over weaker ones, or of organizations, such as the economic, over those who are otherwise at the mercy of the powers they wield. There are certain fundamental forms of order and of security which can be maintained only under laws which all must obey. The real service of force is as a safeguard of this order. Force alone cannot protect this order, but without this force as an ally of its other safeguards it could never be secure. Without force universal law is in danger of being dethroned, though force alone can never keep law on its throne. Essential as are the services of socialized force they have also very decided limits, and even within these limits force is normally effective because it is conjoined with profounder expressions of the human will.

The limits of the social efficacy of enforcement.—The nature of these limits appears when we examine the peculiar character of physical enforcement. In the first place, the intervention of force substitutes a mechanical for a social relationship. In so far as force is employed it is the denial of the possibility of co-operation. It treats the human being as though he were merely a physical object. So far as it reaches it admits no expression of human impulses on the part of those against whom it is wielded. It is the end of mutuality and consequently it narrows also to a minimum the ex-

pression of the nature of those who wield it. In the second place, its exercise, wherever there is a practicable alternative, is a wasteful operation, for it checks all the ordinary processes of life, all the give and take of common living: and the more it is used the more does it breed resistance, thus necessitating still more enforcement. Consequently any system that depends mainly on force is in a precarious position, for in the tides of chance and change this resistance is apt to find some opportunity to overthrow it.

Illustrations of the limits of the efficacy of organized force.—

The limits of the efficacy of force are best revealed if we consider its operation in those regions where men have placed most reliance upon it. "If you wish peace prepare for war," is an old aphorism which states have faithfully followed to the present day, in spite of the countless historical evidences that in international relations preparation for war has begotten war. In the light of this experience it would seem expedient to abandon the paradox and accept the more logical alternative, "If you wish peace prepare for peace." One essential difference between the two methods is that war is "prepared for" nationally, while peace requires an international preparation. The reason for the failure of the older method, in so far as peace and security have been its object, is very obvious, depending as it does on another of the peculiar characteristics of force. Force is effective in so far as there is no opposing force, in other words in so far as it is centralized and monopolized. If the United States were forty-eight independent states there would be a vastly greater display of force within its area than there is today, and the greater force would be vastly less effective. Where force is least obtrusive, least in evidence, it is always most successful. It may be said that there is force behind the police who regulate traffic, but they scarcely need to use it. If it were necessary to have machine guns at the intersections it would show that traffic control was highly precarious. The greater the show of force the greater the instability. So long as the nations "prepare for" peace by the display of force, international peace must remain insecure.

Let us turn to another region where reliance on force alone is shown by experience to have been unjustified. It is a well-worn doctrine that the laws of the state are obeyed mainly because of the force behind them; that they would be vain formulas, in the language of Hobbes, "without the terror of some Power, to cause them to be observed." The doctrine is valid only if it is qualified by the acknowledgment that there are other and broader grounds of law-abidingness than submission to force or fear of punishment.

If the will to obey is undermined in the people as a whole, no enforcement, as many a revolution has shown, can long prevail. The remedy of more enforcement, of Draconian penalties, has not under these circumstances stood the test of time, as the history of criminal law reveals. There is also much historical evidence that no law can be enforced if a very large *minority* is permanently and bitterly opposed to it.

Lastly, let us examine the role of force not as a deterrent of lawbreaking but as a punishment of the lawbreaker. If, as criminologists everywhere agree, the fear of punishment is a very inadequate preventive of crime, what of the fact of punishment as a method of treatment of the criminal? Until very recent times it was generally taken for granted that the sheer discipline of enforcement, often taking the form of harsh or cruel treatment, was sufficient. The principle of punishment was confused by atavistic ideas of retribution, revenge, and expiation, whereas it would surely seem that the only proper consideration of the state in inflicting punishment is the well-being of society, as that well-being is affected by the manner in which the criminal, himself a member of the community, is treated by it. Certainly, as this principle has grown more clear, the reliance on force alone has been rendered more and more dubious. Mere force, being the mechanical treatment of human beings, seems very ill adapted to be a means of reform and thus, in the long run, of the prevention of crime. Many instances could be cited where it proved to have the opposite effect. Moreover it is a peculiarly inflexible mode of treatment. As one keen student of the subject has aptly observed, the judge has been with respect to the offender in a somewhat analogous position to that of a physician who could dispense to his patients, no matter what their trouble, only one or another of three drugs, say quinine, nux vomica, and strychnine.¹⁵ So the court, in dealing with the endlessly variant cases which came before it, could mete out only fine, imprisonment, or death. Whether the offender were juvenile or adult, man or woman, weak-minded or strong-minded, passionate or calculating, sensitive or insensitive; whether the offense were motivated by despair or repression or poverty or by sheer ill will or greed; whatever its antecedents, whatever the context of the crime or the environment of the criminal; the court could do nothing but prescribe some measure of its violent "drugs." The growing movement for a more

¹⁵ This statement is paraphrased from an address delivered to the Social Science Research Council, at Hanover, N. H., August 26, 1927, by Dr. William A. White of the Government Hospital, Washington, D. C.

scientific administration of justice and a more understanding treatment of the various types of offender—of which the introduction of reformatories, institutions for first offenders, psychopathic hospitals, industrial schools and farm colonies, parole systems, juvenile courts, is just a beginning—witnesses to the breaking down of one of the last and most terrible strongholds of the faith in sheer unadulterated force.

Some inferences.—We have sought to show that mere force is necessary as the guarantee of political law, but that even where this necessity exists, its service is best rendered under conditions which admit the minimum of its exercise and display. We have seen that a relationship determined by force is the very antithesis of a social relationship, and that therefore its function can go no further than to preserve social relationships against antisocial tendencies. Where a common rule is deemed necessary or advantageous for the common good, some degree of compulsion is involved, but the compulsion is always a cost which must be reckoned in deciding whether the common rule is necessary or advantageous. Society does not need common rules for everything. Fortunately, for the more intimate or personal aspects of conduct it scarcely needs common rules at all. People cannot run factories or banks as they please, because if they did so, they would place other people directly at their mercy; but they can hold different religions, express different opinions, cherish different tastes without preventing others from exercising the same prerogatives. In the light of what has already been said regarding the interaction of individuality and society we can now add that compulsion is dangerous and usually harmful when applied to matters with respect to which the pursuit by each of his own way does not directly interfere with the equal opportunity of the rest to pursue *their* own ways. This broad conclusion does not solve many of the practical problems regarding the intervention of society, but it is useful as a limiting principle. It offers a justification of the more fundamental liberties, above all the liberty of thought and of its expression. This is a liberty which all can equally possess within a social order. The one reasonable exception would be where men used this liberty to advocate or to demand the suppression of the like liberty of other men. Since this liberty is vastly more important for the fulfillment of individuality, as Mill and many others have shown,¹⁶ than those external liberties which some cannot exercise except at the expense of others, we see here once again the fundamental harmony of individuality and society. The presence

¹⁶ See, for example, J. S. Mill, *Essay on Liberty*, Chap. III.

of compulsion, if limited to the service we have already described, is quite compatible with this principle, since force, so limited, assures more numerous or more fundamental liberties than it restricts.

When pushed beyond these limits force strikes at the social bond itself. For it then divides man from man, turning co-operation into slavery and making it harder for the group to feel its community, to share a common loyalty so that each, in thinking of the rest, can say "we" instead of "I." When governments, inspired by one of the greatest dividing influences in human history, dogmatic religion, excluded "heretics" from social or political rights, they did not heal the "heresy" but they cleft society asunder. When they ceased to take cognizance of religious differences, they made possible a degree of national solidarity unrealized before. "The historical experience of the nineteenth century," says one of the finest exponents of the subject, "shows that freedom has the force of a bond, capable of holding men together in associations the more lasting and fertile according as they are more spontaneous in their origin and autonomous in their choice of ends."¹⁷

Finally, when pushed beyond these limits force strikes at the creative principle which gives vitality and renewal to society. Different types of personality have different points of resistance to social pressure and the demand for conformity. There is much biographical evidence to show that such pressure is felt most keenly and most quickly resisted by the creative spirits among a people, its artists and its prophets. There is much historical evidence to show, from the days of Socrates or of Christ to the time of the Great War and its subsequent dictatorships, that it is on such creative spirits that force, when given free rein, most heavily descends. Unfortunately, it is hard for the common man, but impossible for the tyrant, to distinguish between the creative and the criminal mind. Only when force is limited so that it becomes the servant of fundamental liberties can those who bear the greatest gifts for society be free to offer them. Only then can the *potential* harmony of individuality and society be most fully achieved.

SOCIAL CONTROL IN UTOPIAN COMMUNITIES

Why Utopian communities need special agencies of control.—The conservative forces described in the preceding sections are illustrated in a remarkable way by those communities which follow

¹⁷ G. De Ruggiero, *History of European Liberalism* (Eng. tr., London, 1927), p. 353.

a distinctive and peculiar mode of life, such as separates them sharply from the greater communities which envelop them. For convenience of reference we shall speak of these small-scale experimental groups that establish separate colonies for the pursuit of their own ideals as *Utopian communities*.¹⁸ These communities have to defend their mores against the contagion of the mores of the outer world. One of the characters in *The Blithewood Romance*, by Hawthorne, an account of the well-known case of the Brook Farm experiment, puts the point as follows: "I very soon became sensible that, as regards society at large, we stood in a position of new hostility, rather than new brotherhood. . . . Constituting so pitiful a minority as now, we were inevitably estranged from the rest of mankind in pretty fair proportion with the strictness of our mutual bond among ourselves." In order to maintain at once their separation and their solidarity they must resist in an unusually drastic manner the forces of change, whether arising from within or assailing the group from without. Such communities accordingly exhibit a very high development of the agencies of social control. The situation is exemplified by the various communistic societies which exist or have existed in the United States, generally on the basis of a religious creed or of some special "revelation" vouchsafed to the founders.

Certain of these communities have been the object of sociological study. In 1875 a survey of those flourishing at that time was published by C. Nordhoff, in his book entitled *Communistic Societies of the United States*. Supplemented by later studies of particular groups, this survey enables us to compare the principles exhibited by a considerable variety of these "utopias," and to arrive at certain conclusions touching the conditions under which an intensive and exclusive solidarity is maintained in the face of unusual difficulties.¹⁹

Each of these communities upheld a set of mores sharply divergent from those of the surrounding culture. All of them were in greater or less degree communistic and held in check various human propensities which are allowed freer scope in noncommunistic so-

¹⁸ When Sir Thomas More wrote his *Utopia* he meant by this title to suggest that the community he described existed only in imagination, just as Samuel Butler did when he wrote *Erewhon* (or "Nowhere"); but we are using the word here to refer to actual communities.

¹⁹ More recent studies are F. A. Bushee, "Communistic Societies of the United States," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 20 (1905), 625-664; W. A. Hinds, *American Communities and Co-operative Societies* (Chicago, 1908); E. S. Wooster, *Communities of the Present and Past* (Newllano, La., 1924).

cieties. Consequently each of them deliberately instituted a peculiar system of controls designed to inculcate in the growing generation the habits of work, of thought, and of life which were in harmony with its social order. These local communities were in a different position from that of a large communistic system such as Soviet Russia, but it will be observed that some of their principles can be found also in this vastly greater experiment. While they differed from one another in many respects, they employed similar social devices to maintain solidarity.

Characteristic features: (1) isolation and self-sufficiency.—Of these devices the following seem most significant. First, they generally sought to assure their cultural integrity by geographical isolation. They were mostly agricultural communities, essentially self-sufficient, and thus could in large measure insulate themselves from the rest of the world. If the expansion of neighboring communities threatened their peace, they were apt to move further away. The very name of one of these communities, the Separatists, indicates a tendency common to them all. The group known as the Perfectionists, who settled at Oneida, N. Y., were a partial exception to this principle. Being an industrial community, they could not cut themselves off as completely as the others. It is important to notice that though these communities sought to live by themselves, remote from contacts, they were never so remote that malcontents, those who strongly rebelled against the system, could not leave and join the world outside, thus removing from among the group a source of disaffection.

(2) Special indoctrination.—Again, each of these communities took special educational measures to inculcate in its members, and especially in the younger generation, the principles to which they were attached. Their social discipline was thorough and rigorous. Though communistic—or perhaps because they were communistic—they were under strict leadership, whether of an individual or of an oligarchy of elders. Each community thought of itself as having “the one right way of life,” or as being a “peculiar people” in some sense set apart from the world. For example, the Amana community, a group which migrated from Germany to Iowa, named itself the “congregation of true inspiration.” Some thought of themselves as “the chosen of the Lord”; others as the sole possessors of the truth. There was a strong social pressure towards uniformity of belief and of conduct, manners and modes of living in general, including such externals as dress and habitation. This uniformity was strengthened by the custom of doing things to-

gether, of coming together not merely for worship and inspiration but also for meals and other daily occasions. Since the communities were small, everyone was under the eye of his neighbors and the tendency to heterodoxy in any respect was at once detected and discouraged. Among the Perfectionists, who differed in so many respects from the others, an institution entitled "criticism" was set up for this purpose. Members of the community offered themselves at regular Sunday sessions for the criticism of their brethren, and on such occasions their deficiencies of character and of conduct were dealt with very faithfully and publicly.²⁰

(3) *Religious sanctions*.—Furthermore, the sense of social exclusiveness was in practically all instances supported by strong religious sanctions. The religious bond was generally of an exclusive character. They held in common a faith which was not shared by the world outside. Sometimes it was strengthened by the memory of persecution. It was moreover a faith which required a strict orthodoxy. It is very doubtful whether the unswerving obedience which these communities required of their members could have been maintained apart from the fixity of the religious sanction. One of the communities investigated by Nordhoff, the Icarians, who migrated from France to Illinois, professed no religion, but he describes it as "the least prosperous of all the communities I have visited." The community split in two in a relatively short time. One of the divisions soon dispersed, and the other, which settled in Iowa, was quite unsuccessful in maintaining its scanty numbers. Nordhoff remarks that communism itself was a religion for these people, but without strong leadership it proved not enough.

(4) *Control of sex relationships*.—All these communities found it necessary to take very special precautions for the control of sex relationships. Here lay perhaps the greatest peril to their communistic systems. Unless sex relationships were rigidly controlled, a spirit of individualism would enter through the jealousies and divergent interests which the impulse of sex stimulated. Moreover, the family itself, with its exclusive possessions, presented a constant menace to the communistic solidarity. A recent study of another communistic society, the Hutterites, points out that within this group "the family becomes the point of invasion of capitalism into communism."²¹ The resistance to community controls over the intimate life of the members is generated within and inspired by the family. Consequently we find that various and sometimes curi-

²⁰ Nordhoff, *op. cit.* (New York, 1875), pp. 289-293.

²¹ L. E. Deets, *The Hutterische Communities* (not yet published).

ous precautions were taken. Some communities discouraged anything that suggested the appeal of sex. Fashion was generally tabooed. Dress was simple, generally some kind of uniform. "In Amana and also among the Shakers the intention seems to be to provide a style (for the women) which shall conceal their beauty and make them less attractive to male eyes. . . . At Oneida the short dress, with trousers, and the clipped locks, though convenient, are certainly ugly." ²² Some of the societies, like the Rappists and the Shakers, were celibate. The latter lived together in small communes instead of in families. The men and women met under carefully prescribed conditions, and did not even eat together. The Amana community, though noncelibate, exercised great care "to keep the sexes apart. On Sunday afternoons the boys are permitted to walk in the fields; and so are the girls, but these must go in another direction." When, in spite of these precautions, a marriage takes place, "it is treated with a degree of solemnity which is calculated to make it a day of terror rather than of unmitigated delight." ²³

Even the community which seemed a sheer contradiction of this rigid principle of sex control, the Perfectionists, was in reality seeking in an opposite way to avoid the danger which sex presents to communistic solidarity. For this remarkable group, with its practical promiscuity, sought to discourage in every way they could the "exclusive and idolatrous attachment" of two mates for each other. It is not difficult to see why the Perfectionists regarded this attachment as "selfish love," inasmuch as it formed a rallying point for interests which were not in accord with that entire abolition of exclusive possessions on which the community was built.

Conclusions.—To all these communities the assertion of individuality appeared as "self-seeking" or "selfishness." For them all the social bond assumed an inflexible authoritarian character. All divergence was dangerous to their unity. The conditions which generally sustained this unity were religious enthusiasm, strong leadership, simplicity of life, and a relative poverty which made hard work the rule. But when one or more of these conditions failed, centrifugal forces began to operate effectively, dissensions and cleavages developed, and the end of the order was in sight. The high mortality of these societies and their inability to adapt themselves to changing conditions show the one-sidedness of their systems. They achieved socialization at the cost of individualization, and we have already seen that some harmony of these principles is a primary condition of every enduring social order.

²² Nordhoff, *op. cit.*, p. 398.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 56. See also Hinds, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-60.

XIX

THE MAJOR SOCIAL CODES

RELIGION AND MORALS

Purpose of the chapter.—In the more complex societies, as we have seen, social life is regulated not by a single unified code but by a variety of codes with different content, sanction, and appeal. Every social organization has its own code, from the state with its great compulsive system of law and order to the smallest local club. Other codes are upheld not by organizations but by the community. Finally, there is one code, that of morals, which in the last resort is sustained by the individual himself. How the member of a society finds his relation to these various and sometimes clashing codes will be the subject of our next chapter. How the codes are or should be distinguished one from another is the theme of the present one. For that reason we shall consider side by side those codes which are most liable to be confused or which are so interdependent or so intimately related that the distinction between them is of particular significance.

The distinction of the religious from the moral code.—Religion and morals are very closely interwoven. If we are to draw a proper distinction between them it must be in terms of the authority and sanction attached to their respective prescriptions rather than in terms of the contents of the codes themselves. Religion prescribes rules of conduct, and in so doing tends to identify these with moral obligations. On the other hand, some ethical cults, such as positivism, claim to be also religions. There are again what we may call "substitute-religions," where the emotional attitudes characteristic of religious observance are associated with nonreligious or even

antireligious elements, as in certain expressions of communism or some other "social gospel." A clear distinction is necessary, especially as those who profess no religion have, nonetheless, their own moral codes. Religion, as we understand the term, implies a relationship not merely between man and man but also between man and some higher power. Hence it normally invokes a sanction which may be called suprasocial, whether it be primitive ghost fear or the present "wrath of God" or the penalties of an afterlife "where the worm dieth not and the fire is not quenched" or merely, in the more refined forms of religion, the sense of being "out of tune with the infinite" when its supposed laws are disobeyed.

We may also name as part of a religious code any ordinance which emanates from an authority accepted on religious grounds as the interpreter of a creed or the "vicegerent of God." Religion of course prescribes also the relation of man to man, but in so far as the sanction of this prescription is thought of in the above-mentioned terms, its code is religious rather than strictly moral. It envisages "God's purpose" for man as distinct from man's own purposes, and generally regards the church as an agency for the fulfillment of this "divine end." But a code cannot strictly be called "moral" except in so far as the sanction comes from the apprehension of evil social results directly accruing from the conduct which the code forbids. Here we have the distinction between the religious idea of "sin" and the moral idea of "wrong." The two ideas are naturally blended or associated in the religious mind, but we cannot understand the difference between religion and morals unless we distinguish them. The one may still remain as the support of the other, and some writers, such as Benjamin Kidd in his *Social Evolution*, assume that a moral code cannot endure without the support of religion. Other thinkers, like Spencer or Huxley or Bouglé, maintain that a moral code can never become pure and wholly responsive to the needs of a changing society unless it grows dissociated from the special sanctions of religion.¹ It is significant, by the way, that both these schools of thought characterize the moral sanction, in contrast to the religious, as a "rational" one.

All social norms, however derived, whether they be the reputed revelation of the Gods or the inherited wisdom of the past or the ordinance of the present, reveal the ideas prevailing in the group concerning the social relations and modes of living which they hold desirable. The chief difference between religious norms and all

¹ Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, III, Chap. XIV; Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics*; C. Bouglé, *The Evolution of Values* (tr. Sellars, New York, 1926), p. 145.

others, including the strictly moral codes, is that the former are addressed indirectly or mediately to the social situation. The code inhering in a religious creed expresses an orientation of conduct and attitude towards a reality conceived of as transcending human life and human aims, and seeks to establish social relationships in which human purposes are linked up with, and frequently subordinated to, the assumed will of superhuman powers regarded as benign or demonic or even as indifferent to humanity—in its higher forms to the “will of God,” to an ideal power postulated as either supreme within or as struggling for realization in the universe itself. Since man, especially in prescientific ages and circles, has been free to conceive such powers according to his fancies and his fears, in his ignorance and misinterpretation of the phenomena of nature, his religious codes could scarcely be a true reflection of his social needs. They often perverted social relationships and admitted or inspired conduct detrimental to social interests, the proscription of useful foods, human sacrifice, religious prostitution, maiming initiation rites, stultifying superstitions. They became powerful engines of control to maintain the interests of the established order against the processes of change, as, to take a modern instance, the Greek Orthodox Church became a bulwark of the tyranny of the Russian Czars. Yet in the interpretation and promulgation of religious codes the social ideas of the group inevitably found a place, and a partial accommodation was made to social needs, though the interest of the interpreters, the medicine men or the priests, tended to check the process. In any event the reconciliation of religious code and social need could never be complete so long as the code was based on dogmatically false conceptions of reality, of the laws of nature to which human nature is inextricably bound.

Religious norms and moral norms are interwoven; precepts incorporated in a religious code, as in the Ten Commandments, may be inspired more by social than by religious considerations since in the formative stage of interpretation it is easy to make the “word of the Lord” the expression of a sense of social need. But the formal distinction between the two types of precept remains. A code is religious—no matter whether its precepts are concerned with the relation of man to God, as in the first four commandments, or with the relation of man to man, as in the last six—when its source is presented as divine authority and its sanction is supernatural or is the penalty exacted in the name of religion by the “vicegerent of God.” A code is moral when it promulgates standards of conduct

which directly derive their sufficient justification from the human sense of good and evil.

The question of priority.—There has been much discussion as to which of the two codes was the primordial one and as to which of them was derived from the other. Some have held, like Fustel de Coulanges in *La Cité Antique* and like August Comte in his account of the evolution of mankind from theological to moral or “positivist” conceptions, that religion was the matrix of morals. Others have taken the view, like Ferdinand Tönnies in his little book on the mores (*Die Sitte*) and like Émile Durkheim in his study of primitive religion, that religion arose as a projection or sanctification of social or moral ideas.² Tönnies held that the mores of the group became gradually reinforced by the religious sanction, gaining through tradition and the authority of the elders that aura of reverence and awe which led on the one hand to the worship of ancestors and on the other to the suprasocial sanction of the established ways. Durkheim regarded religious ideas as arising out of social situations and the religious life as “the concentrated expression of the whole collective life.”

The distinction between religion and morals has arisen in the course of social evolution. As we shall see later, we cannot say that either the religious or the moral code came first. Religion incorporates elements derived from social and moral reflection, and the latter in turn has been greatly influenced by religious conceptions. The distinction of these elements was concealed in the primitive outlook upon life, even as it is partially concealed in the outlook of the simpler and less educated minds among ourselves. Herbert Spencer thought that the earliest forms of religion contained no moral element, pointing out that they were intended to propitiate evil rather than good spirits and that they were characterized by cruel and atrocious observances.³ But this fact, if it be a fact, does not prove his point, since a moral code too may be misguided and may make what seems to us atrocious demands. The morals of a primitive tribe are no more the morals of Spencer than its religion is his religion. It would be more true to say that primitive religions contained—though in solution, as it were—other than moral elements.

² *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (tr. Swain, London, 1915). “Religion is something eminently social. Religious representations are collective realities; the rites are a manner of acting which take rise in the midst of the assembled groups and which are destined to excite, maintain or recreate certain mental states in these groups.”

³ Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, III, p. 152.

Conflicts between religion and morals.—Ever since moral and religious codes have been distinguished by the human mind they have had a great influence on each other. Moral codes, with such prescriptions as the duty of humility, of obedience and respect for elders, have prepared the way for the perpetuation of religious beliefs. Religious codes have strongly reinforced with their supernatural sanctions the prevailing morals of the group. But the equilibrium of their joint control over conduct has been subject to many strains. The religious code, as the more conservative of the two, has come into frequent conflict with the moral discernments responsive to changing social needs, and as the more authoritarian it has menaced the autonomy of judgment which is the prime condition of an enlightened adult morality. The more conservative religions have resisted the fresh moral insights and the social applications derived from advancing science. They have opposed, for example, the quest for the truth concerning human origins, the first employment of anæsthetics for the alleviation of pain, the admission of divorce where marriage was a living death because of the insanity or cruelty of either partner, and the practice of birth control. This rupture between religion and morals has been partly disguised, and often partly healed, by the consequent transformations of religion itself and the appearance of new religious creeds in response to moral demands. In general terms, religion seeks to confirm established moralities, and new moralities seek to modify religion. In the long run, and particularly in modern societies where the divisions of religion itself prevent any one form from dominating the mores and where the sense of definite and dread types of supernatural sanction has dwindled, the social consciousness brings both religion and morals into relative harmony with social needs. One acute writer on the subject, Max Weber in his *Sociology of Religion*, has developed a theory previously suggested by various novelists and historians, that the ethics of Calvinism, in contrast to the religious teachings of the preceding age, was not only in conformity with, but an essential preparation for, the growth of capitalism, insisting as it did on those virtues of thrift, discipline, personal responsibility, self-help, and unrelenting toil which were congenial to the capitalist spirit.⁴

⁴ Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, Vol. I, Chap. I. (tr. T. Parsons, under the title, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* [New York, 1930]). L. Brentano (*Die Anfänge des modernen Kapitalismus* [Munich, 1916]), and R. H. Tawney (*Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* [New York, 1926]) criticize Weber's argument as being one-sided in its imputation of causes, but this does not affect its importance as bringing out the close relationship

When religion is strongly dogmatic there is a serious problem with respect to the reconciliation of the religious and the more changeable moral code. Social welfare, when not made subordinate, is viewed in the light of a suprasocial principle. The conflict is clearly seen in the distinction between "faith" and "works"—adherence to a creed and social conduct respectively—and in the Protestant controversy as to their relative importance; and it is worth remembering that the religious problem is their relative importance in the "sight of God." Another instructive indication is "the system of concessions, tolerances, mitigations and reprieves which the Catholic Church with its official supernatural morality has devised for the multitude," thereby seeking to adjust the rigor of the religious code to the common temper of the age.⁵ This practice has an interesting analogy in the treatment of the supernatural sanction among primitive peoples, as disclosed by Malinowski. Among the Trobriand Islanders there is a system of magic which, if duly applied, protects the trespasser against magic.⁶ Here, incidentally, we see one contrast between religion and magic, for magic seeks merely, by a kind of occult mechanics, to manipulate or control the higher powers, not, like religion, to obey them or worship them or enter into communion with them.

A progressive solution of the conflict is found in so far as religion comes to transcend the egoisms of tribe and nation and, purified by science of its stubborn misinterpretations of reality, grows world-conscious or cosmos-conscious. Under these conditions it loses the fierce compulsive power which unites the faithful in strong social bonds against the infidel, and sends a nation forth to conquest with the promise, *In hoc signo vinces*—"under this sign thou shalt conquer." It becomes instead the emotional integrating sense of the whole, whose range of immensity and power is beyond our understanding, so that we can only *feel* our communion with it and dimly divine our mite of individual purposeful life as a moment in its eternal being. Then it no longer divides people from people, and within a people the orthodox from those who "go awhoring after strange gods"; it loses that final intolerance which only the exclusive visionary possession of an unreasoned faith can

between a religious and an economic and social development. H. M. Robertson, *Aspects of the Rise of Economic Individualism* (Cambridge, 1933), attacks Weber on historical grounds, but see T. Parsons' reply in the *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 43 (1935), 688-696.

⁵ Quoted from the Introduction to Dewey's *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, 1922).

⁶ *Crime and Custom in Savage Society*, Part II, Chap. I.

inspire. Religion, growing world-conscious, may well sustain the nearer sense of our community with one another and thus fall into consistency with a purely moral code. But it can no longer dictate an authoritative morality, since thus sublimated it is no longer capable of defining moral precepts for the particular occasions of life. No longer do most men expect a church, as in the Middle Ages, to lay down precise rules touching the morality of monopoly and usury; and if this limitation is true of the more conservative religions in the modern world, it is still more true of the wider faiths. If in this way morality has lost an anchorage, though one that moored it too fixedly to the past, at least there is the compensation that a freer morality, springing from the consciousness and sheer experience of social good and evil, has become possible, and that, for those thus enlightened, one of the ancient and obdurate clashes between authority and human nature is at an end.

CUSTOM AND LAW

The specific character of law.—We pointed out in Chapter XVII the peculiar quality of the law which the state upholds, the law which alone in a modern society has behind it the authority of unconditional enforcement. We saw that all social codes have some attribute of authority, as revealed in the sanctions which guard them, but that the sanction of the legal code is in this respect unique. This fact enables us to draw a clear line between legal rules and the rules of other associations. The rules of other associations are conditional on membership, and the failure to obey them involves only the loss of membership or of some of the rights or privileges which attach to membership. The legal rules are coercive in a wider sense, their sanction cannot be evaded by the sacrifice of membership.⁷ Law, a term which throughout this section we shall use to mean the code upheld by the state, is thus a guardian of society itself. There need never be any confusion between the kind of rules which rest on the authority of the state and those which are maintained by clubs and colleges and churches and economic corporations.

Law is the body of rules which are recognized, interpreted, and applied to particular situations by the courts of the state. It derives from various sources, including custom, but it becomes law when the state, which means in the last resort the courts, is prepared to enforce it as a rule binding on citizens and residents within its jurisdiction. Inadequate definitions of law often create confusion on this

⁷ See the author's *The Modern State*, Introduction and Chap. VIII.

subject. Law is not simply that which the legislature enacts, or statute law. Law is not an ethical rule, "prescribing what is right and forbidding what is wrong." Law is not any kind of rule which society in some way or other compels individuals to obey. Not only anthropologists but also jurists sometimes fail to observe this distinction. They see that certain social codes served in other stages and types of society the same function which is now fulfilled by law and accordingly they want to define law in such a way as to include these codes. Thus F. Pollock points out that legal enforcement is a relatively modern phenomenon.⁸ "If we look away from such elaborated systems as those of the later Roman Empire and of modern Western governments, we see that not only law but law with a great deal of formality, has existed before the state had any adequate means of compelling its observance—and indeed before there was any regular process of enforcement at all." What this fact really means is that law under such conditions was not fully differentiated from customary and ethical codes, but we can define anything only as it appears when it is sufficiently differentiated to reveal its distinctive nature.

The specific character of custom.—Custom too has its own distinctive nature. Whereas law is often *made*, and is always *applied*, by a definite power, custom is a group procedure that has gradually emerged, without express enactment, without any constituted authority to declare it, to apply it, to safeguard it. Custom is sustained by the common acceptance of it. No constituted authority prescribes the raising of the hat to ladies or tipping in restaurants or fireworks on the Fourth of July. Customs are the most spontaneous, the most native to the community, of all social rules. They are so intimate that, until we reflect on it, we never realize how they attend nearly every occasion of our lives, how our actions, from morning till night, from youth to age, are custom-regulated. In all sorts of ways, through chance, trial and error, experience, particular modes of procedure are devised, are followed and imitated, and unobtrusively are accepted into the social mores.

When and why custom must be supplemented by law.—Under simple or primitive social conditions there is little need for a legal code. Custom serves well enough to regulate the conduct of life. The primitive group is a "face-to-face" group, every man is a neighbor of all the rest. No one escapes beyond the range of group opinion and group control. Seldom does any novel situation arise for which custom cannot provide. With the weight of tradition

⁸ *First Book of Jurisprudence* (London, 1923), Chap. I.

behind it custom ordains every occasion, assigns to each his rights and duties, adjusts the claims and interests of each to those of the rest. But the further we pass from primitive conditions the more necessary it becomes to supplement the rule of custom by other social codes and especially by law. There are several reasons for this fact. Custom, lacking an agency of authoritative jurisdiction in cases of dispute or transgression, frequently must leave to the injured party the right to vindicate his claims against another. Custom allows him to retaliate, to take vengeance or retribution. But such retaliation and the feuds which it engenders cause more serious disturbance to the interests of the rest of the community when in the more developed society these interests grow more complex and interdependent.⁹ Moreover, custom cannot quickly adapt itself to changing conditions. Its authority diminishes in the complex society where impersonal relations take the place of personal ones and where individuals are further removed from the direct control of the group as a whole. Custom is a clear guide only where the old ways can be utilized to meet the new situation. When new techniques confound the old ways, as for example in the change to a money economy in England in the sixteenth century, another authority and another kind of code is demanded, a code which does not slowly evolve but one which is made expressly for the situation. Thus again the "rule of the road" was formerly a custom, but with the coming of the automobile new conditions arose which required the establishment of traffic laws. Furthermore, in the complex society different groups have different customs, and so where a single rule is found convenient or desirable, it is necessary to resort to law. Finally, custom is most effective when there is no strong organization of social power, whether for military or economic exploitation. Such an organization makes its own rules, thrusting custom aside. Custom has poor means of defense against the conflicts that arise within a power system. Alike those who dispute for power and those who are subject to it call for an arbiter, a judge. And the judge, even though he begins as an interpreter of custom, ends as a maker of law. This is the story of the great code makers of the ancient world, such as Moses, Hammurabi, and Solon.

The same conditions which explain the birth of law help to explain its growth into the voluminous codes of modern states. The body of law is always being increased and modified to meet new general situations or new problems of application to special cases.

⁹ See J. Dickinson, "Social Order and Political Authority," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 23 (1929), 324 ff.

This is done partly by direct legislation, partly by judicial interpretation. Modern industrial developments have occasioned enormous additions to the code. Another factor which has added to the bulk of law is the assertiveness of authority which, once established, is urged both by the drive of power and the pressure of interests to more and more regulation. Gradually, and chiefly through conflict, modern states have been compelled to learn that there are some matters which law is not qualified to control, that it cannot be in general a substitute for custom or, for morality, that it cannot, without defeating the values it would preserve, prescribe religious or other forms of belief. Law can command only external observance and therefore, where the value of an act depends mainly on the spirit in which it is performed, it is not a proper subject for legal control. Law is an instrument of government and the nature of the instrument assigns its capacities and its limitations. The great functions of law may perhaps be summed up as being (1) the maintenance of a fundamental order within which men shall find security and the common conditions of opportunity, and (2) the adjustment of those conflicts of interests between individuals or groups which they cannot settle for themselves or in settling which they encroach on the interests of others. Within the territory so marked out there remain debatable areas, for example certain regions of economic struggle where an acceptable legal code is not yet developed, but it is obvious that in our modern societies the range of legal settlement is, and must be, very large indeed.

Clashes of law and custom.—When a particular law attacks any widespread custom of a community, it has to depend very largely on the precarious sanction of force. But the custom that is attacked has one element of superiority in that it is obeyed more spontaneously. It does not seem to come to us from without, curtly demanding our obedience. It does not appear to us, as law without its aid tends to do, as involving a control over our desires either for the sake of others or in the name of authority. Therefore a law which attacks a widespread custom, even though a majority support it, both lacks a ground of support which is essential to its effective operation and creates a force of resistance which endangers its authority. If the law in question is not aided by social conditions favorable to the growth of a supporting custom it cannot succeed. An illustration is the Sunday observance law of certain states and localities, which is out of accord with the customs of the present. The Volstead Act attacked the widespread and old-established custom of drinking intoxicating liquors, a custom particularly bound

up with many social occasions; and in the end the old custom triumphed over it. Certainly a law cannot succeed if it is opposed by strongly resistant and deep-seated customary attitudes. The nullification of the Fourteenth Amendment seems the inevitable result, under existing conditions, of the customary attitude of white to colored people not only in the South but in large measure throughout the United States. The judicial "interpretations" of that amendment, distinguishing, for example, between "differential" and "discriminative" treatment, are mainly subterfuges intended to validate the customs which the amendment denied. Nor can it be otherwise unless the attitudes in question undergo a change which law by itself is powerless to induce.

The fact that custom establishes a social order of its own is often forgotten in discussions of the clash of custom and law. It is an unfortunate situation when law and custom are opposed and men prefer to follow custom rather than obey the law, but the alternatives presented to them in such a situation are not properly expressed as law-abidingness and anarchy. At the point of conflict they must choose between two codes. Both make strong claims on their allegiance and, though law has a formal superiority, both are necessary for the maintenance of society. The problem of the individual, compelled to choose between the prescriptions of opposing codes, will come before us in a later section.

Interdependence of law and custom.—In the historical process law and custom have grown distinct, but they remain in important respects interdependent. We have to remember that customs grow up spontaneously, gradually come into being, whereas laws are created, emerging at the moment of legislation or of judicial recognition. Thus around law itself customs gather. Laws which are generally approved initiate attitudes as well as procedures out of which new customs evolve, and these in turn become a support of the laws. In fact, unless such customs arise to strengthen laws, the latter retain a precarious hold on the community.

Custom not only, under normal conditions, becomes a support of law, it also supplements law and prepares the way for its development. Thus business customs, gathering around law, are in time incorporated within it, as for example the provision of three days of grace on bills of exchange.¹⁰ On the other hand, law establishes conditions which bring new customs into being. Thus industrial legislation, such as factory and workshop acts regulating hours of labor or requiring hygienic conditions, undermines old customs

¹⁰ J. C. Gray, *Nature and Sources of the Law* (New York, 1927), p. 282.

and prepares the way for new ones. Laws establishing military training induce the customs associated with the military life and outlook while laws abolishing such training destroy the conditions on which these customs rest. It is in this indirect way, by creating an external order in which the old customs no longer correspond to our desires, that law is most effective in influencing custom, rather than by a frontal attack upon it.

If we turn finally to another kind of law than that with which we have been dealing, the fundamental or constitutional law of the state, we find that it is still more intimately related to custom.¹¹ Constitutional law, though in part formulated in special documents, lives by usage, and around it a further body of usage grows up which amplifies or modifies or even annuls portions of the written formula. Thus the custom that the President shall not seek a third term of office amplifies the American Constitution, the custom by which the Electoral College acts on party lines modifies it, and the custom of differentiating between the political rights of white and colored people in effect annuls certain of its provisions. Still more obvious is the part played by custom under an "unwritten constitution" such as England possesses, where the old forms are subject at every point to the growth of customary procedures. Formally, the king can refuse his assent to a bill passed by both houses of parliament, the cabinet can retain office after it has lost the support of the Commons, and so forth. But this formal "can" is through custom supplanted by an actual "cannot." In fact, one difference between constitutional and ordinary or "municipal" law is that in the former sphere custom is not so much a source and support of the law as an integral part of the system. A similar conclusion holds regarding the important and developing body of rules which is called international law.

FASHION AND CUSTOM

How fashion differs from custom.—Many sociologists have contrasted fashion and custom. Thus Herbert Spencer regarded fashion as a leveler of custom and especially of customary distinctions between classes.¹² He thought of fashion as gaining ground when custom declines, and associated both tendencies with the growth of industrialization. Again, Gabriel Tarde regarded fashion as the "imitation of contemporaries" and set it in contrast to cus-

¹¹ For the difference between constitutional and municipal law see the author's *The Modern State*, Chap. VIII, § 1.

¹² *Principles of Sociology*, II, pp. 205 ff.

tom, which was the "imitation of ancestors."¹³ But neither of these views is wholly satisfactory as revealing the relation of custom to fashion. To understand that relation we must first define fashion.

By fashion we mean *the socially approved sequence of variation on a cultural theme*. The variations occur in a more or less regular sequence, and they specially affect those aspects of the cultural factor which are regarded by the group as intrinsically indifferent. Fashion applies to such matters as opinion, belief, recreation, dress, adornment of all sorts, house decoration and furniture, manner of speech, popular music, literature, and art. In these areas it does not wholly supersede custom, but rather supplements it. Thus there is in every period a customary type of dress or of fiction or of song writing on which fashion rings the changes. But by its continuous modifications of the type fashion may undermine the customary factor and prepare the way for a new one. Moreover, as we shall presently see, the attitude associated with fashion tends to weaken the attitude that clings to custom.

If custom differs from law in the spontaneity of its origin and the immediacy of its sanction it differs from fashion by reason of the more enduring character of its prescriptions, its closer relation to the intimate life and temperament of the group, and its traditional quality. Fashion, on the other hand, is definitely anti-traditional. It controls those aspects and expressions of conduct, generally the more superficial aspects, which are apt to escape from the sway of custom. Thus with respect to dress there are general types of garment which are prescribed by custom for particular occasions, such as weddings or funerals or sports; or particular seasons, such as summer and winter; and for particular times of the day, such as morning and evening; while within these types the changing modes and styles are regulated by fashion. Fashion here determines the fugitive varieties of the custom-prescribed genus. If, however, the trend of fashion exhibits continuously the same direction, showing no doubt the influence of some deeper principle, it may at length undermine the custom which at first it merely variegated. Thus the trend of women's fashion in dress has led to the obsolescence or disappearance of certain garments which were previously sanctioned by custom. In a similar way fashions in art, in literature, in play, may lead to the disappearance of customary types and to the establishment of new customs.

Fashion, convention, and etiquette.—The fact that fashion deals with the free variations of an accepted form enables us to distin-

¹³ *Laws of Imitation* (tr. Elsie C. Parsons, New York, 1903), Chap. VII.

guish fashion from other social phenomena with which it is often confused. Thus fashion is distinct from *convention* or *etiquette*. Convention and etiquette are aspects of *custom*. Etiquette prescribes the detailed formalities to be observed on ceremonious occasions. Convention prescribes those usages the basis of which is felt to be merely social agreement rather than any significant connection between the usage and the meaning attached to it. Convention has many forms, such as the tacit agreement to ignore aspects of a situation that would breed difficulties if openly expressed, or the tendency to keep relations upon a superficial or arbitrary level, or the acceptance of the assumption that a person is acting from idealistic motives when there is reason to believe that more egoistic or less noble motives are involved. Convention thus serves to maintain a superficial but often serviceable type of solidarity. Etiquette, on the other hand, is that code of precise discriminations with respect to manners which distinguishes superficially a social class, a professional or other group, and is frequently made a criterion or "shibboleth" of a person's qualification to belong to it.

Thus both convention and etiquette take one of a number of equally possible ways of representing or symbolizing a social attitude and in a seemingly arbitrary manner rule out the others. Handshaking is an example, since alternative forms of greeting, such as saluting, might serve the purpose equally well. Any variation in the practice, such as a different mode of handshaking, may properly be called a fashion, but a change from handshaking to saluting would strictly be a change of convention and not of fashion. No doubt the line is often hard to draw, but we can discern the nature of fashion much more clearly if we think of it as concerned with the transient styles which can occur within a custom or convention or any cultural form. Where practically no variation or modification of the type is permissible, as in the case of a uniform, then fashion is almost entirely ruled out. This distinction also enables us to understand the significance of fashion as applied to artistic and other cultural changes. For every true artist his style is his own, but if any such style is followed widely by others, by those to whom it is culturally a matter of indifference, then the element of fashion enters in. The range of fashion is, in short, the limit of variation made possible by cultural indifference. It will be observed that we do not here regard as fashion the cultural current of a period, but only the more detachable manifestations and mannerisms which are capable of easy imitation. A fashion is not to be explained by imitation, for reasons that will presently appear, but yet part of the

nature of fashion is that it is an external form of observance capable of being easily imitated.

The social role of fashion.—Though fashion accordingly plays from moment to moment on the surface of social life, behind its seemingly inconsequent changes there may be deeper forces at work. In its immediate onset it is concerned with the externals and superfluities of existence. It deals with those observances which can be changed without affecting the things we hold dear, the associations which we cherish, the practical aims which we pursue—this being the negative condition of the strong tyranny which it exercises. It promises no utility, it makes no direct appeal to our reason.

One caustic writer, Thorstein Veblen, even goes so far as to claim that the two criteria of fashion are expensiveness or wastefulness and "ineptitude" or ugliness.¹⁴ Fashion certainly regulates those aspects of life concerning which we are, on the whole, individually indifferent and therefore socially susceptible. Within this region it curiously harmonizes the satisfaction of two strong demands of our nature which in other regions often come into conflict—the demand for novelty and the demand for conformity. In other words, it turns the desire for novelty into social practice. It makes novelty the right and proper thing for the group. Thereby it may limit the range of innovation at any one time but it compensates for this by accelerating the tempo of innovation. With the desire for novelty there is associated also the desire for distinction, and this desire also fashion succeeds in accommodating to the rule of conformity. For fashion generally, though not always, radiates from the elite, the prestige-owning groups. Moreover, fashion prescribes a style, not a uniform. Within it there is room for minor, but for the purpose of distinction, important variations. It admits of being individualized. People can still conform to fashion "with a difference." It may also be noted in this connection that although fashion is all-prevalent, it is always an item in the cost of living. There are various forms of it, in the matter of recreation and sport, for example, which are limited to those who can afford its expense. Democratic trends are accompanied by a wide prevalence of the same fashion types, the differences within the type expressing standards of income and of taste, while aristocratic trends seek to establish distinctive types for different social classes.

Why fashion is more widespread in modern times.—The area over which the same rule of fashion extends and the speed with which it makes and abrogates its laws have both greatly increased

¹⁴ *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, Chap. I.

within our modern civilization. The conditions of our age have given a free play to fashion which it never possessed before. This is due in part to the change in the character of our class structure which we have already discussed (pages 182-183) and in part to the enormous development of the means of communication. The former has broken down the class barriers of fashion, the latter the time and distance barriers. Spencer was probably right in correlating the growth of fashion with the transition from a military to an industrial society.¹⁵ At any rate, the former is bound up with the insistence on rank, ceremonial, and status, with an inflexible order of subordination which checks the democratizing reign of fashion. Another factor which has increased the range of fashion has been the increase of prosperity and leisure—this not only for the reason offered by Spencer, that it enables a larger class to emulate the style of living of the aristocracy but also because, as we have said, fashion is chiefly concerned with the superfluities of life or with the superfluous decoration of its necessities. We do not think of fashion in overalls; there is more of fashion in the body of an automobile than in its chassis; there are no fashions in steam shovels. Consequently, the higher the standard of living, the more material there is for fashion to operate upon.

One further point may be added to this explanation of the modern growth of fashion. In the numerous and complex contacts which our civilization produces, especially in the more populous centers, the area assigned to custom has diminished. Custom is always most powerful and far-reaching in the regions remote from communications. Contacts bring alien customs together and diminish the sanctity attaching to many of the established ways. Moreover, the cumulative inventions of the industrial age, as applied both to modes of work and to modes of living, are inimical to the older customs and introduce a continuous process of change which limits the formation of new ones. Thus there is an increase in that area of moral indifference which is controlled by fashion. Where custom loses hold fashion gains new ground. In extreme cases, among frivolous or very sophisticated groups, fashion may become the main guide of life. In decadent civilizations it may usurp the place of morals. Thus Tacitus, in deploring the decline of morals in the Rome of his day, declared that "to corrupt and to be corrupted is called the fashion."¹⁶ Within its proper sphere fashion serves a useful social function. It introduces a common pattern into the area

¹⁵ Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, II, pp. 213-214.

¹⁶ Tacitus, *Germania*, 19.

of indifference, an appearance or sense of likeness which enables people of very diverse interests and dispositions to meet on common ground and which makes it easier for them to retain beneath that surface, in harmony with one another, their essential individual and group characters. It has on that account a special significance in the extensive range of a diversified democratic civilization. But when its control passes beyond the superficialities of life, it offers a poor substitute for the more established sanctions. For its rule is shallow and inconsequent, concerned with the form and not with the substance of living, devoid of conviction and of stability.

How fashion is prescribed.—We have suggested some reasons why fashion holds such sway over the minds of men. What is perhaps less obvious is whence its commands proceed, who the leaders are, and why they should be so authoritative. Tarde's explanation that fashion is the "imitation of contemporaries" does not suffice.¹⁷ For the fashion must exist and be recognized before it is "imitated." It is followed because it is the fashion. It has leaders as well as followers, and the leaders are those who have prestige in their particular field. They also must have a flair for the prevailing mood or temper of the time, whether in matters of dress or of art, of language or of thought. Even the most reputed leaders may fail at times to divine this mood and lose prestige for the moment, as the Paris fashion experts have done more than once. Nor can fashion be explained in simple terms of economic interests. It is quite capable of dealing ruthlessly with any particular economic interests which do not serve its purposes, as the woollen and other textile industries have known to their cost. It is true that important economic agencies are at work to stimulate the growth of fashion and above all to accelerate the change of fashion. When once the new mode is sensed, vast publicity is applied by these to persuade the community that a fashion has arrived and to urge its adoption. The claim that a book is a "best seller" or that a new song is the "rage" or a new play the "hit of the season" or that some particular color or material is being worn in the "best circles," provided it has a modicum of truth, helps to substantiate itself. But economic interests do not create the appeal of fashion, they merely reinforce it. Nor is fashion purely wayward, equally ready to move in any direction that the leaders choose. Fashion in the long run may ally itself with profounder forms of social control, adapting its prescriptions to moral, religious, or economic changes which give it narrower or fuller play. While from season to season it seems to

¹⁷ G. Tarde, *op. cit.*, Chap. VII.

move forward and backward, in the longer perspective it exhibits distinct trends.¹⁸ These trends are sometimes indications of more important changes within the community. It is no accident, for example, that with the change in the economic and social status of women there should have gradually come about certain definite modifications of feminine dress. It is probably no accident that in the war and postwar period the dress of women was assimilated to that of men. Fashion, playing at the surface where resistance is least, responding to the social whim of the moment, discovering on this level a compensation for the restraints of custom and habit and the routine of life, may through its passing conformities be helping to bridge the greater transitions of the process of social change. It may create a series of seemingly inconsequent steps leading from one custom to another.

¹⁸ See, for example, Kroeber, "On the Principle of Order in Civilization as Exemplified by Changes of Fashion," *American Anthropologist*, N. S., Vol. 21, No. 3 (1919), 235-263.

XX

SOCIAL CODES AND THE INDIVIDUAL LIFE

CUSTOM AND HABIT

The problem before us.—Our study of the social codes raises again the fundamental question, already discussed in Chapter II and in Chapter VI as well as in various passages elsewhere, of the relation of the individual to his society. In this chapter we shall discuss it from the standpoint of the individual as he faces the demands and the sanctions of the variant and sometimes conflicting codes which bear upon his conduct. The nature of this problem will appear more clearly if we first consider how the social principle of custom is related to the individual principle of habit.

Distinction of custom and habit.—Few distinctions throw more light on the nature of society than that of custom and habit. It is unfortunately a distinction which is often clouded with ambiguities. We think of custom as a social, and habit as an individual phenomenon, and this is true if we interpret it aright. But it is not enough to regard customs as the habits of the group or as "widespread uniformities of habit."¹ It is true that any particular habit which, growing out of a common situation, characterizes many of the members of a group is likely to take on the quality of a custom, but as that occurs it becomes more than habit. A custom is then formed on the basis of habit, gaining the sanction and the influence, the social significance which is peculiar to custom. Wherever there is a widespread habit there is probably custom *as well*. Habits create

¹ So defined by Professor Dewey in *Human Nature and Conduct*, Chap IV. On this one point I differ from the author's account of custom and habit in that chapter, although it presents a penetrating and very suggestive analysis.

customs and customs create habits. But the two principles, though intricately related, are distinct. Customs could not exist unless the corresponding habits were inculcated into the rising generations, but habits can exist without the support of custom. A Kaspar Hauser must live without customs but he cannot live without habits.

Habits are modes of behavior which through repetition have grown canalized, so that the native tendency to respond in a similar way to a similar situation is confirmed and defined—grooved, as it were—by organic and psychical modifications. The transition from will to deed is thus rendered easy and familiar, relatively effortless and congenial. Habit means an acquired facility to act in a certain manner. What was once a potentiality becomes through habit a capacity which, in the profound unity of body and mind, is both incarnated in the organism and impressed on the personality.

When we form a habit we make it easier for ourselves, both mentally and *physiologically*, to act in a certain way, and more difficult to act in ways alternative to that which has become habitual. In this sense habit is "second nature," or, more strictly, our realized nature, the established, rooted, and often almost indelible modes of response for which we have exchanged the unformed potentialities of our heredity. Since human nature is so adaptable, so rich in potentialities, so accommodating, since the young life can be trained in any of so many diverse ways, indoctrinated in any of so many diverse skills and capacities, the formation of habits is of supreme importance in the process of education. For habit realizes one alternative by shutting out many others. Habit closes countless avenues of life in order that a few may be more easy for us to tread. Without habits we could not achieve anything, but *which* habits we form and perhaps still more *how* we form them is of decisive moment.

Automatic habit versus controlled habit.—How we form habits determines whether habit shall be a tyrant or an instrument of our lives. In this determination the varying limitations of heredity enter in, but so also does the manner of our education. Take, for example, the habit of learning itself, no matter what it is we learn. We may learn to do things by the authoritative imposition of a routine, in which the process of learning is denuded of meaning and only the mechanical result is counted. The supreme example of this type of habit formation is the average army-sergeant method of drilling recruits, the inculcation of automatic obedience—"theirs not to reason why"—but unfortunately it finds also frequent illustrations in the classroom when teaching becomes dictation, and knowledge, instead of being the exploration of a world of endless interest,

becomes a task of memory. "When we think of the docility of the young," says Professor Dewey, "we first think of the stocks of information adults wish to impose and the ways of acting they want to reproduce. Then we think of the insolent coercions, the insinuating briberies, the pedagogic solemnities by which the freshness of youth can be faded and its vivid curiosities dulled." Another type of automatic habit is that imposed in our industrial age by the machine, whose endless cycle of unvarying repetitions calls for a similar routine in those who feed and tend it. But this latter routine is in each instance so limited and specialized that, unless it is accompanied by other conditions which rob life of interest and dignity, it does not bite so deeply into character as the enslavement of habits which impose themselves in the name of authority and not merely of necessity.

Habit as the instrument of life economizes energy, reduces drudgery, and saves the needless expenditure of thought. Wherever there are purely repetitive acts to be performed, such as shaving in the morning or walking to one's work or typing letters or punching holes in steel, it is a vast gain to be able to entrust the *process* to the semiconscious operations of habit. We could never learn to do things easily or well if we had to think afresh each step of the process. This applies not only to mechanical tasks but to the finest and most creative arts. In the mechanical tasks thought, liberated from the conscious superintendence of the process, must divorce itself from an activity which offers no scope for its free play. In the creative arts the artist seeks to express himself through the habit-controlled technique, subordinates it to the thing he is seeking to express, and thereby prevents it from hardening into mere mechanism. His satisfaction, his achievement, is not merely an end result of the process but also a concomitant of it. When, for example, the musician is able to relegate to habit the technique underlying his art he is then free to devote himself to the interpretation of the music, so that he can both enjoy it himself and communicate to others what it means to him. Here we find the distinction between vital habit and mechanical habit. Where an operation is performed solely for the end result, where there is no interest sustained and developed within the process which leads to it, habit is drudgery or tyranny. If the conditions of life render it necessary, it is still an unhappy necessity, and men seek relief from it, unless at length it has wholly deadened their spirit, in sport or excitement or some hobby or creative employment of leisure which restores the unity of act and thought. But we should not regard such devitalized habit, itself most fre-

quently the result of economic necessity and at least as characteristic of preindustrial toil as of our own forms of labor, as revealing the inherent nature of a phenomenon the essential function of which is to save and thus to liberate our energies.

Habit as a conservative agent.—This caution should also be borne in mind when we speak of the “power” of habit. In an eloquent and famous passage William James described it thus:

Habit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent. It alone is what keeps us all within the bounds of ordinance, and saves the children of fortune from the envious uprisings of the poor. It alone prevents the hardest and most repulsive walks of life from being deserted by those brought up to tread therein. It keeps the fisherman and the deck-hand at sea through the winter; it holds the miner in his darkness, and nails the countryman to his log-cabin and his lonely farm through all the months of snow; it protects us from invasion by the natives of the desert and the frozen zone. It dooms us all to fight out the battle of life upon the lines of our nurture or our early choice, and to make the best of a pursuit that disagrees, because there is no other for which we are fitted, and it is too late to begin again. It keeps different social strata from mixing. Already at the age of twenty-five you see the professional mannerism settling down on the young commercial traveller, on the young doctor, on the young minister, on the young counsellor-at-law. You see the little lines of cleavage running through the character, the tricks of thought, the prejudices, the ways of the “shop,” in a word, from which the man can by-and-by no more escape than his coat-sleeve can suddenly fall into a new set of folds. On the whole, it is best he should not escape. It is well for the world that in most of us, by the age of thirty, the character has set like plaster, and will never soften again.²

Whether this hardening of character is “well for the world” may be an open question. In the instances here presented habit should be thought of as making more easy and tolerable, rather than as dictating, the persistent activities of men. Habit makes necessity tolerable, but it does not make the necessity. Habit accommodates us to necessity, so that it seems so no longer, so that at last it shuts out even from our imaginations the alternative experiences and goals which seemed more appealing before the exigencies of life closed upon us. In time the prisoner may come to love his chains.

But human nature is not so simple, and there is another side to this picture. The energies economized by habit, if they find no outlet

² William James, *Principles of Psychology* (New York, 1890), Chap. IV.

in or beyond the activity, the potentialities unutilized or obstructed by it, may break the dams and channels of habit, seeking in new ways a hitherto denied satisfaction. This is the phenomenon which in a particular religious manifestation is named "conversion." Another form of it is seen in the conquest of addictions, such as those created by drugs. It is usually thought of as the revulsion from "bad" habits, but it may no less occur as the sudden rejection of "good" habits, imposed by past authority or by social pressure. This abrupt habit-defying change of the personal life corresponds to the social phenomenon of revolution, the sudden rejection of custom and institution which have grown repressive beyond endurance. The parallel, though suggestive, is not complete, since the custom against which we rebel is now felt to be external and alien while the habit is still incorporated in our own nature.

When therefore we speak of the power of habit or the "slavery" of habit we should remember that habit is not some master ruling us against our will. This conception has a qualified significance when applied to the abnormal group of drug-induced habits with their peculiar physiological character, though even here the truth is rather that our will is divided against itself. We want both the drug and freedom from it. But in general habit is the accommodation of the individual life to the conditions under which it must carry on its existence. It is our will in operation, not as it chooses between alternatives but as it persistently follows an alternative already chosen. It is the set of our will, confirming the decisions we first made without its aid. There is a fundamental contrast between the rich variety of the alternatives which our nature admits and the narrowness of the choice which the necessities of livelihood enforce on most and the limitations of energy and time impose on all. Man can live in the snows or in the tropics, in the city or in the country, under the conditions of any social and almost any physical environment; he can enter on any one of a thousand occupations, and there are a multitude of interests and diversions which may claim his leisure. Somehow the choice has to be made, under the influences of the nearer environment, of education and training, of temperament and capacity, of economic opportunity. Once made, habits begin to confirm the choice, to counter its disadvantages and disappointments, to close the alternatives. In the earlier stages they are more subject to revision and readaptation, but once fully established, especially as we leave youth behind, they weave themselves into our nature, habit joining with habit to form the pattern of our lives.

Then only the strongest eruptive influences can prevail against them, and only with profound disturbance of our whole being.

The significance of habit—its function, its advantage, its sacrifice of alternatives—is seen with peculiar clearness in the case of those habits which, unlike more technical aptitudes, strike roots in the emotional deeps of our nature. Such are pre-eminently our moral and religious habits, including also our ways of thinking and acting on those economic and political issues which closely affect our interests. The spectacle of the endless diversity of moral codes and practices exhibited by different peoples or groups, while each nevertheless regards with strong revulsion the divergent practices of others, has been the subject of wondering comment since ancient times. It is an obvious anthropological fact that even in so vital a concern as sex relations different peoples can successfully accommodate themselves to a great variety of different systems. The primary instinct of sex, the same human nature, can adapt itself to such various forms of expression, but the various possible alternatives could not all remain open, since chaos and social disruption would result. Some one system is evolved under the particular circumstances of each group, suited to the modes of living resulting from its geographical and economic environment, to the fixations arising from its groping translation into law of the accidents and inevitabilities of experience, and to the whole complex of customs of which it is a part. Under each system custom becomes the ground of habit, and through their combined influence the deep emotions of sex convey a profound moral import to the accepted ways. No doubt also the strong centrifugal tendencies of an urge so imperative that there is always present the possibility of its breaking loose from the prescribed channel of custom and habit help to generate the corresponding strength of taboos and prohibitions. Similar considerations apply to the other habits which possess for us a high moral significance. With respect to them all the danger is that the very necessity which imposes them tends to wrap them in a shroud of blind emotion, thus precluding the possibility of growth, of flexibility, and of intelligent redirection. Here as well as elsewhere, here perhaps more than elsewhere, the only assurance against needless limitation, against stagnation, or against equally blind revolt, lies in the constant association of habit and reflection. When either habit or custom grows sacrosanct, beyond cool scrutiny, there is peril.

Conclusions regarding the relation of custom and habit.—We can now proceed to draw the distinction between habit and custom which was suggested at the outset of our discussion. If we are con-

tent to identify customs, as is commonly done, with "the habits of the group," then either there is no distinction at all or a merely quantitative one, between the two concepts. But such an identification ignores the social quality, the social sanction, of custom, a quality which is in no sense part of the meaning of habit. Habits formed in isolation, as by the hermit, or through personal idiosyncrasy, are just as truly habits as those formed under the influence of and in conformity with the conduct of the group. A custom, on the contrary, exists only as a social relationship. If, for example, I go to church because it is the thing to do, because it is the practice of the group to which I belong, because if I fail to do so, I am subject to some degree of social disapprobation, because by doing so I establish some useful business or social connections, then I am conforming to a custom. If when I am away from my group I have no prompting to attend church, then my former conduct, even if habitual, is to be attributed to custom rather than to habit. Custom has for the individual an external sanction. It is a mode of conduct of the group itself, as a group, and every custom is in consequence adjusted to the others which the group observes. It is part of a complex of determinate relationships sustained and guarded by the group. Each individual sustains it, even though it gains also the support of habit, in the consciousness of his membership in the group. We would not give the name of customs to those habits of technical aptitude which we acquire in learning a trade or a profession. It is true that we owe these also to our social heritage, but they need no social sanction because they are direct objective means to the ends we seek. The professional skill of the surgeon is habit, not custom, but his professional etiquette is custom though it may also be habit.

The peculiar social character of custom is revealed in the fact that there is one great class of customs which cannot be practiced except collectively. Nearly all celebrations, rituals, and ceremonies fall within this class. They derive their significance from the fact that people come together and by participating in a common occasion stimulate the social consciousness of one another. There are many emotions for whose full satisfaction a social setting and the participation of others is requisite, and a whole range of customs, the ritual of worship, the dance, the reunion, social games, and so forth, arises to meet this need. Such customs are in no sense uniformities of habit, and many of them in fact involve a diversity of role on the part of the various performers.

If custom and habit are thus distinct they are also bound in a

causal nexus. The customs of the group, impressed on the plastic natures of the young, shape and direct, focus and limit their native potentialities. Undirected potentiality is also sprawling helplessness. Education is rendered both possible and necessary by the pressure of alternatives. The customs of the group are translated through education into the habits of each new generation, and the habits thus formed perpetuate the customs. In this educative process customs may be thought of as preceding habits, but if this were the whole story the weight of the past would repress all innovation, all readjustment, all development. Human nature is assertive as well as plastic. It refuses to take on the perfect mold of the past. One aspect of this truth is that habits also precede customs. Our habits are a more intimate part of our personality than are our customs, and they arise not only from social education but also as our personal response to the immediate conditions of our lives. Thus they exhibit a greater variability than do customs and as they impinge on customs they make these in turn more flexible and subject to modification. When the habits thus personally created are sufficiently similar, such as those induced by the discovery of new techniques, they are apt not only to modify old customs but also to induce new ones. Many of the customs of our industrial age may in this sense be attributed to the habits necessitated by machinecraft or the opportunities released by invention. The new habits induced by the telephone and the automobile and the radio have undermined old customs and evoked new ones in their place.³

THE INDIVIDUAL CONFRONTING THE MORES

Opposing aspects of the mores.—From the standpoint of the individual the mores have two aspects. In part, through indoctrination and habituation, they are incorporated into his very nature. In part they confront him as sanctioned demands, bringing pressure to bear on his native inclinations, on his personal desires and personal calculations. Thus they arouse resistance and create conflict within him. The latter aspect is probably more obvious in civilized society. As the growing child is indoctrinated in the mores, he tends, under their prompting, to rationalize his first unreasoning acceptance. The mores appear to him as the external, the sacred, the God-given, the divine. This attitude is prevalent among primitive peoples and is common everywhere among the masses of men. But when the child or the adolescent comes into contact with new groups and new

³ For illustrations see *Recent Social Trends*, I, Chap. III.

situations, when he enters a world in which the authority of the family or the discipline of the school or the tradition of the local group no longer holds, the attitude is subject to challenge. The presence of new mores raises questions regarding the basis of acceptance of the old. The conflict of traditions may shake the sense of the inevitable rightness of the hitherto established, the security of the narrower sociocentricity of the young mind.⁴ This challenge is obviously more frequent and more formidable in civilized society. In primitive society, on the whole, adolescence means initiation into the old tribal ways. In civilized society it often means initiation into new ways, into some degree of liberation from former indoctrinations, and consequent uncertainty and conflict.

Hence a phenomenon of civilized life which seems to have no counterpart in primitive life. Because of the number and variety of codes they sometimes present the aspect of a great social pressure, of an overbearing demand for conformity, which may even lead to grave maladjustments or "neuroses."⁵ But the majority conform because, although at times everyone feels an inner resistance to some items of the code, most of us accept the code most of the time and nearly all of the time approve of the conformity of others. In a civilized society the number and variety of group codes impose on the individual the problem of personal selection. He acquires in consequence a code of his own compounded of many elements, selective within the limits imposed by the stronger sanctions of law and custom, deeply responsive to the influences of education and of the social environment but nevertheless expressive on the whole of his particular personality. This liberty of choice in code making is one of the essential marks of adult self-hood, and the range of this liberty reveals the culture of a society. It is of necessity accompanied by the mitigation of various drastic external sanctions, such as those of a compulsory fear-inspired religion, belonging to less advanced types of society.

The social codes are standards, but they are not in the full sense ideals, of conduct. They are for the most part workaday rules, deriving in part from tradition and in part from the exigencies of the common life, revealing also the dominant interests of the power-holders and constituting at best a rough translation into formulas of the limited experience and reflection of the average mentality of

⁴ The process above referred to is admirably revealed in J. Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*.

⁵ This point is frequently made in psychoanalytic and psychiatric literature. A good example is the work of Trigant Burrow, *The Social Basis of Consciousness* (New York, 1927).

the group. The selective code of every individual expresses, in proportion to the strength of his character and the clarity of his intelligence, a more definite and vivid and intimate set of valuations. These individual codes could not exist without the support of the social codes, but they exceed the latter in substance, vitality, and detail. The mainspring of life is in truth the inner set of valuations which the individual cherishes. Even within these valuations there is often conflict and contradiction, involving in normal cases a progressive if sometimes painful adjustment to new experiences but in extreme cases going so far as to disrupt the personality. At the same time there is also a degree of conflict between the individual code and some dominant social code, a conflict which is most apt to show itself in relation to the sex code, the economic code, and in many communities to the religious code of the group to which the individual belongs.

Two types of conflict between the individual and the code.—Here then are two main types of conflict, that in which personal interest or personal valuation is opposed to a prevailing code, and that in which the individual is pulled opposite ways by the prescriptions of different codes, such as the religious and the political, both of which are applicable within the situation. These two conflicts provide, because of their intrinsic interest and their social consequences, the supreme subjects of literature, especially of the novel and of the drama. The most significant variety of the first type of conflict is that where the individual conscience denies the rightness or validity of the code, as when, for example, the citizen who abhors war is called by the state to military training or service.⁶ An example of the second type is the situation, once so frequent and still by no means obsolete, in which the religion of the citizen prescribes a course of conduct contrary to that which is commanded by the state. One of the famous literary presentations of this problem is the drama of *Antigone*, by Sophocles, where the heroine has to choose between the prescriptions of her religion, involving her sacred duty to her dead brother, and the edict of the king. Frequently the two motifs are combined, as in the play of *Hamlet*. Confining our examples to the drama, we may say that in its whole range, from the Orestean trilogy to the plays of modern authors like Ibsen, Shaw, Galsworthy, and O'Neill, its main theme has been the predicament of the "hero," incarnating some personal code and beset by the sanctions of an opposing social code. It is significant that when, as in the *Agamemnon*, *Macbeth*, *Hamlet*, *Ghosts*, *The Emperor*

⁶ On the general subject see the author's *Community*, Book III, Chap. V.

Jones, the social sanctions triumph over the "hero," the drama takes the form of tragedy; but when, as in the Falstaff plays, *Peer Gynt*, *Arms and the Man*, and innumerable other plays with a "happy ending," the "hero" outwits, triumphs over, or achieves some form of reconciliation with the code, the result is technically a comedy.

Other forms of conflict between the individual and society.—It is not always easy to distinguish between the conflict of the individual with the code and his struggle with the limiting or thwarting circumstances in which his lot is cast. For he may regard these circumstances as in some sense imposed upon him by the social system. Especially is this true of the economic struggle, since the privations and restrictions against which he fights are in some measure dependent on the laws regulating property, inheritance, the accumulation and the distribution of wealth. The conditions obtaining within a society are so linked up with its codes that the latter at numerous points come into conflict with our individual desires and impulses, and especially with our strongest impulses, like those associated with property and with sex.

Moreover, the unequal conditions of power and privilege and wealth that obtain in all societies—no less, so far as the first of these inequalities is concerned, in communistic societies than in more individualistic ones—lead to frequent situations in which the individual finds himself pitted against the code. There are various types of dominance which bring about this result. Three may be here distinguished. In the first place, there are dominant groups which impose their will on other groups, bringing to bear strong social pressures under which the less dominant suffer. In one sphere the pressure takes the form of social ostracism, in another of economic exploitation, in another of arbitrary or tyrannical laws.

In the second place, within every group, no matter how small, no matter how united by common purpose, there is the tendency of authority and prestige to seek its own ends and to express its power at the cost of the variant individualities subject to it. To secure any common end there must be common rules, but the drive of authority, fostered by lack of understanding as well as by pride of position, goes beyond the degree of regulation which the common end requires. Even in the circle of the family this tendency is displayed. The divergent viewpoints of the older and the younger lead often to bitter compulsions and revolts and sometimes to tragic sacrifices. It is the sensitive, the imaginative, the original minds on whom the pressure bears most heavily. It is these too who feel most bitterly the tyrannies which are often imposed by officials and bureaucrats,

"clothed in a little brief authority." A sense of frustration ensues which may be expressed in a bitterness against the particular organization or even against society itself. There are, of course, beneficent restrictions, needful restrictions. All organization involves some restriction, some rules, if the object of the organization is to be obtained. There must be common policy for common ends, for common discipline. That, if wisely devised and maintained, is a means of strength. Without order there is no direction and no achievement in a common cause. And on the other hand individuality cannot be achieved without self-control. But there are restrictions which are due to the failure to understand differences, to the ambition or narrow-mindedness of power, to the willingness of men to exploit others without consideration of the cost.

A third source of social restriction arises from the almost impersonal control exercised through institutions. The social structure rests on a social heritage. It has been built through many generations. Its institutions express the prejudice and superstition as well as the intelligence of their countless builders. Although it is constantly being rebuilt according to the standards of each age, the process is never complete. Some of its institutions may be harmful survivals, repressive of the individuality of its present members. Conventions and mores, especially of the prohibitive type, may derive authority from the mere fact of long establishment. They are apt to grow sacrosanct and thus resistant of change, all the more because they fail to justify themselves by the only legitimate test, the service they render to the members of the society. The demand for conformity is often unreasoning, and history is strewn with instances of the suppression of those less gregarious and more original minds whose insight proved in the retrospect to be greater than that of the mass of their fellows.

Beyond these difficulties there lies another, involved in the very nature of society. Every social situation or environment, even the most intimate, is one which each individual shares with others. Each must adjust himself not only to these others but also to the *common* situation. Hence certain uniformities of conduct are demanded of him. The common code and the variant individual, the code demanding conformity and the individual seeking to be himself—these are the terms of myriad conflicts. Their more extreme manifestations are, on the one hand, the ruthlessness of power crushing individuality in the name of social authority and, on the other hand, the fear, distraction, revolt, and mental instability of those who from the

standpoint of the prevailing code are "abnormal" and in the eyes of authority are "antisocial."

Social revolutions and social utopias.—Confronted with the obstacles that social and material circumstances alike oppose to the fulfillment of personal ideals, men have in all ages either longed for or striven for a social order "nearer to the heart's desire." The striving is in the form of group activity, working for "reform" or for revolution of the social order. The longing finds individual expression in visions of social "utopias." These imaginary utopias are the individual's substitute for revolution, his private dream or myth of a new society. Though illusory, they nevertheless reveal the conflict between individual ideals and social realities. In all times, from the earliest conceptions of the "golden age" to the present, men have given literary form to these visions. They serve both as an escape from the world of reality and as an inspiration towards a possible future. In this sense, as Lewis Mumford has pointed out so well in his *Story of Utopias*, the utopia, the conscious literary projection of this dream, exercises a double function. On the one hand, "it seeks an immediate release from the difficulties or frustrations of our lot." On the other, it "attempts to provide a condition for our release in future." There are thus "utopias of escape" and "utopias of reconstruction," as one or the other function dominates. "In one we build impossible castles in the air; in the other we consult a surveyor and an architect and a mason and proceed to build a house which meets our essential needs; as well as houses made of stone and mortar are capable of meeting them."⁷

It is obvious that the social codes embody at best only the standards acceptable to the group in general. They can never meet the demands of every particular situation or fully regulate the attitude and the behavior of the individual towards his group. This consideration brings us to our final question, that of the reconciliation of two things perhaps equally necessary for the conduct of life, the social code and the individual judgment.

SOCIAL CODES AND MORAL LIBERTY

The code and the particular situation.—Aristotle in his *Ethics* contrasted law and equity, the former being like a rigid rod that can measure only flat surfaces and the latter a leaden rule that can be fitted into the flutings and cornices of actual buildings.⁸ A like

⁷ New York, 1922, Chap. I.

⁸ *Ethics*, 1137 a.

distinction may be drawn between social norms of every kind and the determinants of individual conduct in each concrete situation. The social norms never envisage the full particular situation in view of which conduct is always directed. They cannot descend from their high altitude of generality to prescribe in detail the course of action befitting the immediate occasion. In the infinitely varied texture of life no two occasions are exactly alike. Social norms are limiting principles within a zone of conduct, and even the most docile and subservient of individuals could not regulate his life by their aid alone. They are not schoolmasters which assign the definite task for the present hour. Seldom can they say, Do this here and now, and even when they go thus far, as political law in some degree does, the reference is then only to the external aspect of conduct. In fact the kind of law which prescribes the immediate external act cannot on that account prescribe the motive or spirit of action, while on the other hand the kind of rule, such as the moral code, which appeals to the spirit of conduct, is thereby prevented from laying down the immediate and particular act. The moral code enjoins truthfulness, but it would be absurd to hold that it calls for the telling of the whole truth about everything to everyone on every occasion. Should one tell the truth to a madman who is seeking one's friend to kill him? Should the doctor tell the truth to a nervous patient who would thereby be made worse? The code enjoins fair dealing between man and man but who beside the individual concerned can decide what fairness is in the hour of action? Who can decide which of the various codes and which of their various precepts is the most relevant to the situation but the individual who finds himself in it and who must interpret both the situation and the code?

How the code is applied to the particular situation.—There are two closely associated ways in which the social codes bear on behavior. In the first place, through indoctrination, they form the basis of habits. In the process of education the code is continually translated to the young in the form of specific injunction. Gradually, in proportion to their teachableness, they come to recognize a situation as one in which such and such conduct is expected of them. The similar elements in successive situations become the stimuli of the growing habit. To the youth trained to churchgoing the aspect of Sunday morning, with the changes in the household routine and the cessation of regular work, with the discarding of workaday clothes, the ringing of church bells, and so on, constitutes a total stimulus that readily evokes, as a step in a habitual series, the act of church

attendance. But we must not assume that human beings resemble insects, or the mere homunculi they appear to be to the imagination of extreme behaviorists, in their simple responsiveness to stimuli. The functioning of habit involves response to the similar elements which are recognized and selected for attention in constantly varying situations. The whole nature of the human being is implicit in every conscious act. He acts as a person endowed with intelligence and a temperament, and fits the act, dimly or clearly, into the scheme of his life. He cannot help forming habits of his own, but he may modify or reject altogether, if they prove out of harmony with his growing nature, many of those inculcated by authority or impressed by training in his earlier years. The codes become incorporated into habits, not simply because the younger generation is plastic to the teaching of the older, but also because, being of like nature to the older, it finds these ways of life congruous with and serviceable to its own desires. In the long run, when they cease to be so, because of growing knowledge or of changing technique, no amount of inculcation will assure their survival. As the Industrial Revolution has spread from people to people it has everywhere initiated vast transformations in the social codes.

But there is a second way distinct from its translation into specific habit, in which the code exercises influence over conduct. Man is a social being, sensitive to the opinions of his fellows. The proud motto of a Scottish family—"They say. What say they? Let them say."—may express a group attitude to an outer circle, but no man in his heart is indifferent to, or unaffected by, the views of his neighbors. As we have seen, the entire sanction of certain codes, including custom and fashion, is found in the pressure of public opinion, while it forms an additional sanction of other codes, such as those of religion and of law. The omnipresent sense of what others will think of us, expressing itself on the one hand in the positive satisfaction of conformity, and on the other in the aversion from the direct and indirect consequences of nonconformity, sustains and perpetuates the common code against many of the temptations of private rebellion. We are uneasy if we fail to do what our associates expect of us and this uneasiness readily assumes a moral significance. Our social nature conspires with our training to give the quality of wrongdoing to the acts which occasion it. (A like feeling of uneasiness and of moral violation accompanies the breach of habit, unless the habit is one of which our group disapproves.) We are thus led to select for attention in each concrete situation

those common aspects which are of interest also to our group and to conduct ourselves accordingly.

Nevertheless the complexity of the concrete situation cannot be disregarded nor can it be met in terms of social expectancy or by a simple appeal to a common code. The code prescribes a typical or standardized conduct. There is moreover the frequent situation wherein more than one precept or more than one code claims equal validity. How, for example, can the code solve the problem of the youth who has to choose between doing lip service to a creed he disbelieves or causing grave distress to an invalid parent, or of the girl who has to choose between her lover and her religion, or of the writer who must sacrifice his literary ideals to ensure a decent living, or of the businessman who has to decide between bankruptcy or the adoption of competitive methods of which he disapproves, or of the workman who is asked to participate in a strike which he believes is justified but which would bring his family to want? These are a few obvious illustrations of the problems of conduct which, in far more specialized and difficult forms, occur continually in everyday life. It is therefore going too far to say that "for practical purposes morals mean customs."⁹ No doubt the nearer we get to primitive life, the more true this statement becomes, but if we are seeking for the differences between social phenomena it is obviously to the more developed societies that we should look, and in these there is considerable opportunity to observe or reject customs, to approve or to adjudge them "more honor'd in the breach than the observance." It may even be misleading to identify moral conduct with social conduct unless we mean by the latter that mode of behavior which persons *ought* to exhibit in view of their social situation and the responsibility it imposes. It is misleading if it implies that there can be no moral conduct except in a social setting. This would involve the curious commentary that the decisions of a Robinson Crusoe, whether he yields to despair or lives on bravely, whether he lives like the animals or builds a decent hut, whether he grows addicted to a poisonous drug or maintains his self-respect, are morally indifferent, without distinction of right and wrong or its basis in better and worse.¹⁰

⁹ Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, Part One, § V. See also Part Four, § IV.

¹⁰ It is of course true that morality is historically and psychologically derived from the experience of social relationships, but we must distinguish between origins and developed significance. The conduct of a Crusoe is affected by his past social life, but the question is whether it has a present moral significance.

Why the code cannot be a substitute for individual judgment.—

The real significance of the concrete situation cannot be understood unless we perceive that the social codes are quite essential and yet quite inadequate for the conduct of the individual life. Even in the simplest situations the code has to be selected, accepted, interpreted, and applied. How large an element of personal discretion enters in can be seen if we consider the analogy of the judge, whose business it is to apply to a particular case the most explicit, detailed, and objective of all the codes, that of the law of the land, to a case which he knows only from the outside and without the distraction of personal interest. Yet even here with his books of recorded precedents before him, the judge has to rely largely on his own sense of what justice *should* be, and the issue is often doubtful until the decision is delivered. This applies to the interpretation of the Constitution no less than to the application of statute law, as the record of the Supreme Court of the United States abundantly reveals. Clearly, from that record, there is no infallible way of deciding whether the "commerce clause" has been violated, whether "due process of law" has been adhered to, whether a business is "affected with a public interest," whether competition has been "lessened," and so forth. Substitute for the professional judge the individual arbiter of his own case, who has to determine the course of action to be taken and not merely to assess it afterwards, who has no single authoritative code which it is incumbent on him to apply, who is immersed in the situation by personal interest and familiar engrossment and does not sit *in cathedra* in cool and ample reflection over it. The conclusion is surely clear that the mere acceptance of the social codes is quite inadequate for the guidance of conduct, apart altogether from the fact that such acceptance, were it feasible, would denude the individual of initiative and all the quality of character.

Yet if we deny the adequacy for conduct of the social codes, we must no less insist on their necessity. Without them the individual would be utterly distracted and helpless. Engrained in his nature through habit and continually impinging on him from his social environment, they reduce the limits of individual determination within practicable proportions. Without them the burden of decision would be intolerable and the vagaries of conduct utterly distracting. They build a solid foundation on which man can deal with man and fulfill his social nature in social relationships. They reveal to him both his likeness to and his unity with his fellows. They bring home to him his membership in the group, his present

hour of participation in the great continuity of the past and future of the race, his unit of contribution to the life of the whole society whose destiny includes and vastly transcends his own and the hidden law of whose being may be dimly discerned in the faltering deliverances of the social consciousness.

The final problem.—How far then can the necessity of the social code be reconciled with the antithetical necessity of individual judgment? A partial reconciliation, varying in adequacy with the temperament of the individual and with the character of the social order, is certainly attainable. We saw in Chapter III that individuality cannot develop apart from society, or society if it suppresses individuality. We saw that in two respects, through his *common* interests and through his *harmonious* like interests, the individual can be in full accord with the social order. In so far as the social order serves as the embodiment of the common, in our sense of that term, the individual is both free within and sustained in his individuality by society. Thus he is able, according to the strength of his individuality, to say "we" instead of merely "I," and thereby to liberate profound elements in his nature. For he finds himself also in that which he shares with others, in identifying himself with the common cause, in the exercise of his individuality through devotion to the group, the community, the nation, the party, the business, the trade-union, the cultural association. In this devotion he loses his isolation and finds his individuality. Were it otherwise, the group could not evoke as it does the greater loyalties and enthusiasms and aspirations.

The deeper loyalty, therefore, is not that which slavishly follows the code but that which responds to it in the spirit and the obligation of the common cause for which it, however imperfectly, stands. The individual who slavishly follows the nearest code is unconscious of or unfitted for a greater social obligation. For him society lies without; it has no deep roots within his being. He is bound to it by the superficial and uncreative bonds of imitation and compliance. He reflects but does not express society; for him it is not *community*. No human being is in fact so pure an embodiment of the herd spirit. The primitive savage has been so pictured by such writers as Bagehot, but more recent anthropology has undermined "the assumption that in primitive societies the individual is completely dominated by the group—the horde, the clan or the tribe—that he obeys the commands of his community, its traditions, its public opinion, its decrees, with a slavish, fascinated, passive obedi-

ence.”¹¹ What needs further to be observed is that this spirit of passive obedience, to which of course we find approximations both in civilized and in primitive society, especially in matters of belief, is the least and not the most fully developed expression of social-mindedness. To be fully social is to be socially *responsible*, to bring the whole social situation, as it affects and is affected by one's conduct, into the focus of one's consciousness and act accordingly. This however is a statement of the ideal, to which in actuality we find only various degrees of approximation.

¹¹ Cf. Malinowski, *Crime and Custom in Savage Society*, Introduction.

BOOK THREE
SOCIAL CHANGE

FOREWORD

The social structure is subject to incessant change, growing, decaying, finding renewal, accommodating itself to very variant conditions and suffering vast modifications in the course of time. Its contemporaneous aspect holds and hides the secret of its past. We know its nature, as we know the nature of the living person, only in the comprehension of it through a time-span. Its meaning is never revealed in any moment of its existence, but, finally and fully, only in the whole process through which it passes. To understand the social structure we must therefore view it in the historical process, seeking continuity, relating time-difference to time-likeness. We must, in other words, discover the direction of change, or all is meaningless. That is why the principle of evolution becomes of supreme significance.

But it is soon apparent that social change is a process responsive to other types of change, to changes in the man-made conditions of living, to changes in the attitudes and beliefs of men, and to changes that go back beyond human control to the biological and the physical nature of things. To understand how social change takes place and why it follows certain trends it is necessary to investigate its relation to the three great orders, the biophysical, the cultural, and the technological. This investigation occupies the central part of this Book. We then proceed to consider social change as such, and particularly in its evolutionary aspects.

XXI

SOCIETY AS PROCESS

IN WHAT SENSE SOCIETY ENDURES

The rapidity of social change.—A thousand years ago, in Europe and America, the face of society was vastly different from that with which we are familiar today. A thousand years hence it will assuredly have undergone vast new transformations. What it will be like ten thousand years from now—what shiftings and readjustments, what new groupings and solidarities, what changes in the very foundations of the most fundamental forms such as the family and the state, what permeations of new ideals into social institutions, what social responses to new scientific discoveries, will have taken place—lies beyond the power of the imagination to conceive. Men have in all ages played with social prophecies, but the distantly born future has always outwitted their dreams.

A thousand years is but a moment in the history of the earth, in the history of the rocks, of the species of living creatures, of human nature itself. Yet in a moment of that moment, in the course of a mere generation or two, significant changes can and do occur in human society. The society of Russia has been drastically reconstituted in the time that light takes to reach us from the nearest star. Since the Great War many of the countries of Europe have passed through revolutions and counterrevolutions that have changed in fundamental respects their social systems. In countries that have not experienced revolutions, in the ordinary sense, revolutionary processes have occurred. Thus the Research Committee on Social Trends in the United States, which reported in 1933, characterized the first third of the twentieth century as follows:

The World War, the inflation and deflation of agriculture and business, our emergence as a creditor nation, the spectacular increase in efficiency and productivity and the tragic spread of unemployment and business distress, the experiment of prohibition, birth control, race riots, stoppage of immigration, women's suffrage, the struggles of the Progressive and the Farmer Labor parties, governmental corruption, crime and racketeering, the sprawl of great cities, the decadence of rural government, the birth of the League of Nations, the expansion of education, the rise and weakening of organized labor, the growth of spectacular fortunes, the advance of medical science, the emphasis on sports and recreation, the renewed interest in child welfare—these are a few of the many happenings which have marked one of the most eventful periods of our history.¹

For reasons that we shall discuss later contemporary society appears to be unusually unstable, but history witnesses to the changefulness that besets all societies. Of all the objects we can study, none changes so rapidly before our very eyes as the works of the restless spirit of man, and particularly the social structures which he builds. Of all sciences, none is so dependent upon—and so embarrassed by—its changing historical content as is the science of society. For the astronomer, for the physicist, even for the biologist, the territory he explores has remained essentially the same since men first sought to be scientists. Though here, too, all is process, yet for purposes of study the past stays past even as the present stays present. Even a subject so closely allied to sociology as is psychology has to deal with a human nature which it cannot assume to have been different in important respects a hundred, even a thousand years ago. But the territory which the sociologist explores changes even as he explores it. This fact has an important bearing both on his methods and on his results. Here at least we cannot seek for eternal laws. If we seek for laws, it must be for principles of change. And it is with such that we shall be concerned in this last Part.

Social science and prediction.—Moreover, these principles are not such that they enable us to forecast with any assurance, even over a brief period, the changes which society will undergo. The reasons for this statement will appear as we proceed. It is sometimes claimed that the power to predict is the hallmark of true science. It is a dubious claim, if prediction means the forecasting of variation, and not of recurrent uniformity or of the persistence of processes already in being where no new factors intervene to change their

¹ *Recent Social Trends*, I, p. xi.

direction. As we pass from the physical sciences to the biological and then to the social, the conditions are more unstable as well as more complex, and therefore the limits of prediction are increasingly narrow.

We can predict with high probability that the beaches will be thronged in summer and empty in winter, that urban means of transportation will be most heavily utilized at particular periods of the day, that there will be a great increase of retail trade in the weeks before Christmas, that employment will be generally slack in the month of January, that the mortality rate will be relatively high in February, and so forth. But we cannot with any assurance predict long-term trends or the particular events of future years. The number of variables is too great and their relation to one another is too uncertain. We can predict in the fullest sense only where certain factors can be isolated so that they form a sufficient system by themselves and where the relation of each factor to the rest follows a precise quantitative law.²

Society and the time-process.—Moreover, social phenomena are historical phenomena in a profounder sense than any other. This point is a hard one to grasp, but if the student perceives it he will understand aright why unconditional prediction in sociology is impracticable, not merely on account of our inadequate knowledge but on account of the very nature of our subject matter. Society exists only as a time-sequence. It is a becoming, not a being; a process, not a product. To explain what this means, let us contrast a physical object and a social relationship, say a rock and an institution or a constellation and a class system. The physical object persists through time; throughout a particular period it may remain identical or so nearly identical that the difference is insignificant. During such a period time is, as it were, accidental, external to it; in other words, it has no history of its own. It is a product carried bodily through time, like a fossil. In degree the same is true not only of the material relics of man's past culture but even of his immaterial cultural achievements. They are products which are transmitted down the generations, such as the Homeric poems, and in so far as human nature retains the same capacities they remain a vehicle by which past generations communicate with the present. The process which created them has vanished, the product endures, and, enduring, has no inner history. But an institution or a class system is a product that endures only in the process which creates it.

² On this subject consult Harold A. Phelps, *Principles and Laws of Sociology* (New York, 1936), Chap. XXI.

If people no longer observe a custom, the custom no longer exists on the face of the earth. It has no body that remains after it dies. It exists only as a mode of activity, patterned in the minds of those who follow it. A mode of relationship cannot be abstracted from the life of which it is an expression. A social structure cannot be placed in a museum to save it from the ravages of time. The class system of Homeric days could no more stand still than the age of a living creature. It could not be preserved for later ages in the sense in which the Homeric poems were preserved.

The illustration we have just given will also show the importance of distinguishing the study of society from the study of culture or of civilization. The latter embody themselves in products which persist and exercise an influence by their continued presence, while the society in which they arose lives on only as a *changing equilibrium of present relationships*. Social change is therefore a distinct thing from cultural or civilizational change, entering in a different way into the time-process. Once more we must insist that our direct concern as sociologists is with social relationships. It is the change in these which alone we shall regard as social change. When we speak of social evolution we shall not mean human evolution, but only an aspect of it, nor shall we mean cultural evolution, but only a concomitant of it.

How we are to study social change.—A social structure is a nexus of *present* relationships. It lives only as it is maintained by the will of social beings in the present. It is upheld from moment to moment, as were the hands of Moses by Aaron and Hur. It is like a web that exists only as it is newly spun. If it seems to persist through time, it is because the attitudes and interests of social being persist so that they will its continuous existence. The most sacrosanct and seeming-permanent institutions exist by no other right and in no other strength than that which they derive from the social beings who feel and think and act in accord with them. If the conditions of human life were unchanging, then might the social structure be unchanging also. But these conditions are always unstable. There are primitive societies which we think of as stationary, partly because we know less about their past, partly because, owing to the limits of their control over nature, their relative seclusion, their smaller size and therefore greater homogeneity, the changes which occur are slower and less determinate. But it would be unwise to assume that they are really unchanging, and that the crust of custom, on which writers like Maine and Bagehot laid such stress, holds them inexorably. People have similarly spoken of the

"unchanging East," but they spoke with cultural aloofness, and the social ferment now apparent in Japan, China, India, Turkey, and other Eastern lands has already refuted these obsolete judgments.

Our theme is the changing ways in which human beings relate themselves to one another, the processes which institutions and organizations undergo, the transformations of the social structure and the forces that bring them about. We shall seek to show how the social system changes in response to the changing conditions on which it depends. We are not undertaking the immense task of tracing the history of mankind or even the history of society. Instead, our object is to suggest and exemplify a method of *interpreting* social change. We are taking one aspect of human history, the sociological aspect, and endeavoring to explain its relation to the main factors in the total human situation. These main factors have their own modes and conditions of change, and for the reasons given in the preceding paragraphs we regard social change as essentially a response to their changes. In accordance with our previous analysis, we shall classify these factors under three main heads: (1) the order of "nature" or of external causality, (2) the utilitarian, and particularly the technological order, and (3) the cultural order. The first of these orders here comprises all those factors of change which exist independently of human or social activity.

THE PERMANENT CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Interdependence of the factors underlying social change.—Whether or not human nature itself changes the conditions under which it expresses itself are never constant. The environment changes, partly through forces beyond human control, partly through man's own design; and every change in man's relation to his environment means some change in his relation to his fellows. A new machine, for example, dictates a new division of labor. So far the social change is a by-product of man's effort to control his external conditions. But the change does not end there. Child labor laws or labor unions are not a necessary consequence of the use of machinery. Thus in modifying his environment man sets up a double process of social change. Certain social relationships are imposed on him by his civilization, others are imposed by him on his civilization. Moreover, there are springs of change that lie deeper than either the direct or the indirect results of man's changing relation to his environment. The cultural values of every social group are incen-

santly at work to adjust the outer environment to their demands; to control, devise, and direct the technological means; and to win in the conflict with opposing cultural values. There are thus instabilities inherent in the very being of society. We may set out accordingly the following ever-present conditions of social change, passing from the more external to those which are inherent in the conditions of social life.

The order of "nature": (1) The physical environment.—We begin with the physical environment. The surface of our planet is never at rest. There are slow geographical changes as well as the occasional convulsions of nature in storm, earthquake, and flood. Besides the seasonal variations of climate there are longer alternations of weather conditions, secular variations of temperature, humidity, prevailing winds, and beyond these the epochal changes which raise and submerge portions of the earth's surface, which bring ice ages and thaw them out again, and so forth. Since such changes are practically unaffected by human activity, the social changes which they initiate may be regarded solely as adaptational responses. Here, and here alone, we find one-way causation.

The difference is clear when we turn to another order of environmental changes. Most of us have seen abandoned lumber towns or mining camps or depopulated farming areas. The natural resources of these regions have been impoverished or exhausted, and the social life has ebbed away. But it was man's activity which initiated these changes. Similar changes on a larger scale have in the past profoundly affected great areas of civilization and changed the whole future of human society. All round the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean, in Southern Italy, Greece, Palestine, Egypt, and westwards towards Morocco, a long process of dessication and soil impoverishment has taken place, changing not only the centers of population, the routes of trade, and the seats of empire, but also the modes of culture and the whole system of social institutions. In the regions where once the power of Arabia, Persia, Babylonia, and Assyria flourished similar processes have occurred. How far these changes were due to man's ignorance of scientific agriculture, to his destruction of the forests, to his devastation of the land in peace and in war, entailing unforeseen consequences of drought or giving opportunity to insect pests and other injurious influences, and how far to the operation of climatic changes outside of man's activity, remains a difficult question.³ Every civilization is exploita-

³ Some writers place much stress on inevitable climatic and geographical changes, as E. Huntington in *World Power and Evolution* (New Haven, 1919)

tive of the resources of its environment. Its continuance depends, *inter alia*, on its ability to conserve or replace these resources or to find substitutes for them. Our own civilization has reached a stage of control where it can maintain the fertility of the soil while satisfying its present agricultural needs, but it has as yet found no adequate means of replenishing the sources of power which it derives from the exhaustible supplies of oil and coal, nor is there an endless stock of the metals, such as iron and copper, which it finds so necessary.

The order of "nature": (2) The biological conditions.—Another source of social change lies in the biological conditions of social continuity; of the perpetuation, growth, or decline of the population, the race, or the stock; of the succession of the generations of men. We have already touched on one aspect of this theme in our discussion of land and population. Here we shall briefly refer to some others. All life, except the very simplest, arises from crossing, from intermixture, so that every new life is a different distribution of qualities and potencies. For mankind, being plastic, not instinct-bound like the lower animals, therefore variable, this mingling and crossing of hereditary factors is a guarantee of change. We tend to think of heredity as a conservative force, but it is also the basis of variation. Moreover, heredity is a selective agency. In the combination of the male and female unit characters, or genes, that determines the innate character of the new life, the biological mechanism, rejecting half of the unit characters of each of the germ cells, allows for a vast amount of diversity between the children of the same parents as well as between parents and children generally. And there are selective processes of various kinds determining who shall be parents, and to what extent. The combined action of intermixture and selection makes it impossible that society should be really static. Because of them no new generation can ever be an exact replica of the old. In a small homogeneous society these principles have less scope, but in a complex society with all its avenues of communication the range of potential variation is vastly increased.

What makes these biological factors of change so important in human society is that they co-operate with the other factors of

and other works. V. G. Simkhovitch has, on the other hand, traced the effects of soil impoverishment through unscientific agriculture on Roman society ("Hay and History," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 28 [1913], 385-403). Another aspect of the unsuccessful "struggle with nature" is suggested in Jones's study of the aetiology and consequences of malaria in Greece (W. H. S. Jones, *Malaria and Greek History* [Manchester, 1909]).

change initiated and developed by social beings as such. In this connection we must remember that apart from considerations of intermixture and selection altogether each new generation is a new beginning. Even were it a replica of what the old once was, it starts with new energies in an altered world. What has already been done furnishes a basis for its own doing. The social heritage is cumulative, though here too there is selection and rejection. The greater the social heritage the greater too the potentiality of change. Herein again human society differs from that of the lower animals. For they, having no accumulated possessions, no instruments they can improve, no culture they can modify, cannot build on the past any more than they can reject it. In human society, with its social heritage, the young cannot do over again just what the old have already done. It is part of the meaning of that heritage that no young life can be content with simple habituation to the conditions which once-young life has established. No matter what the direction, it must go a yet untraveled road.

In another sense also the biological conditions change and prepare the way for social change. At all times populations have increased and decreased, but in civilized society a new factor of instability is introduced because of the way the birth rate and the death rate alike respond to the new techniques and the changing valuations of civilized man. In most countries, two centuries ago, five or six or more births per marriage were needed to maintain the population; now in many countries three suffice. With the decline of the death rate and the birth rate the average age of the population has been increasing. The new controls over both birth rate and death rate have constantly been changing the composition of the population. It is not likely that the civilized world will again present the phenomenon still witnessed in rural Russia, where an average of seven children per family is recorded; but the way in which the new controls will work will, like all human controls, be subject to constant change in conformity to new conditions and to the consequences of past changes.

The technological order.—We turn now to the conditions of social change that are definitely created by man's own activities. In the endeavor to satisfy his wants man builds up a civilization. In utilizing all manner of techniques he provokes social changes far more extensive and profound than ever he intended. It is as when we build a new house and discover afterwards that we must change our settled habits to live in it. Here then is another source of social instability. In devising new means to satisfy old wants we stimulate

new wants as well. When only a few generations back the steam engine was made to work for man, neither the inventors nor the users realized that they were precipitating great social changes which would overturn old customs and institutions, old political systems and even old faiths. When the telephone and the automobile and the radio were made practicable, men did not dream of the ways in which these inventions would influence the life of the family. In a study of the influence of the radio Professor W. F. Ogburn lists one hundred and fifty "effects" which it has had on social life, ranging from a modest encouragement of "morning exercises" to "cultural diffusion among nations."⁴ The social repercussions of technological advance are so far-reaching and so momentous that some sociologists, such as Veblen, regard them as the main explanation of social change.

Man's utilitarian devices are also in a different way responsible for social change. In order to apply these devices effectively it is often necessary to establish new social relations. A hundred men can work side by side with pick and shovel, but when the steam shovel came along the men required to operate it had to assume their several definite functions in accordance with the specific requirements of the mechanism. Every change in the processes of production, every new attempt to utilize means either for private or for public gains, involves a new alignment of the human beings engaged in it. The nature and disposition of the machinery in a plant determine in degree the tasks and relations of the workers, but the management organizes and reorganizes these tasks and relations, changing the machinery in the process and sometimes preparing the way for the introduction and even the invention of new machines. In the plant the objective of the management is simple and predetermined. In a society a myriad of objectives, concordant and conflicting, are present. Man's desire to control nature is itself directed by its ulterior desire to express his own nature. Every new invention changes his opportunity to do so and thereby brings about changes in the social system.

There is a further reason why, particularly in modern society, technological change should be a powerful source of social change. As we shall show in Chapter XXVI, one difference between a primitive and a civilized society is that in the latter a great many things become merely or purely utilitarian, merely instruments or means.

⁴ *Recent Social Trends*, I, pp. 152-157. For further illustrations see W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*, Part II, and F. S. Chapin, *Cultural Change* (New York, 1928), Chaps. VIII-XI.

Now when anything is thought of merely as a means people try to improve it as a means—they constantly experiment with it to make it more efficient. An automobile engine is such a means, and it is changed almost every year. But a constitution is not regarded in the same way because of its cultural implications; only in times of crisis and then with difficulty is it liable to change in any important respects. The primitive mind regards the techniques and instruments of everyday use in the way that, among ourselves, the majority of people regard the Constitution. But with us technology has become detached, for the most part, from cultural limitations. It changes very rapidly. One indication is that in the five years ending 1845 the number of patents in the United States was 2,425, whereas in the five years ending 1930 the number was 219,384.⁵ One consequence of this free application of inventiveness is, for reasons we have already suggested, a more unstable and changeful social system.

The cultural order.—As we shall see later, we cannot assume that man's valuations are merely responsive to influences from without or in particular to his own changing techniques. These valuations are themselves intrinsically forces operative to direct social change. Different countries, for example, like the United States, Japan, and Russia, may adopt the same technology, but in so far as their prevalent outlook on life differs, they will apply it in different directions and to different ends. Industrialization and urbanization are only in part a response to the primary necessities of man's organic being under the conditions created by the advance of the arts; they assume a variety of forms and directions determined also by the variety of his cultural interests.

It is in the very nature of culture to undergo change. In one aspect culture is valuation; in another, it is expression. Valuations change with changing experience, whether the experience brings satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Every age has its own valuations, its own appraisal of the things worth while, revealed in its literature, in its thought-forms, in the "social movements" that characterize it. These change with the times. What appeals to the fathers no longer appeals to the children. Moreover, the mode of expression, the *style* of culture, is inherently changeful. The law of style is a law of change, in the fine arts, in philosophies, in ideals, as well as in mere fashions of the popular sort. No mode of expression ever fully or finally attains the goal it seeks; and if for a time it satisfies, there comes a later time, a new generation, when it ceases to satisfy.

Moreover, within every complex community there is a great

⁵ *Recent Social Trends*, I, Chap. III.

diversity of cultural interests. The valuations, the motivations, the mores, of its constituent groups large and small—families, classes, occupational groups, religious groups, and so forth—are at variance and often in conflict. Each seeks influence, prestige, control, partly at the expense of others. In this conflict of values each group seizes the opportunities of the changing situation to promote its own. Every change of circumstances, every advantage accidental or contrived, changes the status of groups with respect to one another. Trends develop according as conditions favor the relative success of this group or that. On a broader scale whole communities, even whole civilizations, are, in relation to one another, subject to similar trends. Thus in some periods ideas of liberty and democracy gain dominance over wide areas and in others, ideas of discipline and centralized order; in some periods religious orthodoxy prevails and in others religious nonconformity and the right of the individual "conscience"; in some periods women are regarded as the equal partners of men and in others they are relegated by the dominant mores to the domain of "children, church, and cuisine." These changing valuations are no doubt influenced by the technological factors, but it is a mere assumption that they are wholly determined thus.

The problem before us.—We have now mentioned the main factors which conspire to make society, the system of social relationships, so incessantly changeful. Viewing these factors together we see two great questions emerge, to which the rest of this book will be devoted. First, can we elucidate the role of each of these factors in bringing about social change, together with its relation to the other factors that enter into the total changing situation? Second, can we trace any direction, any continuity of meaning, in the multitude of changes to which society is forever subject? But before we attack these questions it will be well to deal with some preparatory points regarding the various modes or types in which social change presents itself.

XXII

THE WAYS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

PATTERNS OF CHANGE

Different modes of change: Type One.—There are many modes of change which respectively characterize different subjects of change. Take an invention, for example. It seems to be born suddenly, but before it is proclaimed there is generally a long series of preparatory steps, and once it reaches the stage of practicality and exploitation, there commences another long series of cumulative improvements. This process is illustrated by the history of the telephone, the automobile, the airplane, the radio, and so forth. What is distinctive of this mode of change is not its suddenness but the continuous cumulative development of a utilitarian device, until perhaps it is discarded altogether by some new device that has also undergone a similar process.¹ As we have seen, this continuity of direction is characteristic of technological change in general. Somewhat similar is the type of change which a science undergoes. The area of knowledge constantly increases and the science tends towards greater coherence and integration, partially disturbed from time to time by revolutionary discoveries or theories that prepare the way for a completer synthesis of its material. The growth of the science of biology in the nineteenth century, for the most part gradual but suddenly accelerated by the theories of Darwin and by the discoveries of Mendel, may serve as an example.

Type Two.—The mode of change just mentioned can be represented graphically by a line that always slopes upwards, though

¹ For illustrations see W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*, Part II, and F. S. Chapin, *Cultural Change*, Chaps. VIII-XI.


with constantly varying angles of ascent. Its relative permanence of direction distinguishes it from another mode of change which traces an upward line for a time but which is liable to reversals of direction. This mode of change is characteristic of economic phenomena and over longer periods of the phenomena of population. Cities grow and then decline, international trade advances and falls off, business activity rises, booms, and then slumps. In the first mode of change there is a practical certainty that, at whatever pace, the same direction at least will be maintained, both over long and over short periods. In the second mode there is no such assurance.

Type Three.—Somewhat similar to the second is a third mode of change. Seeking to represent it we resort to a wavelike curve. Many phenomena, alike of nature and of human society, are thought of as following a cyclical course. The variations of business activity are frequently referred to as the economic cycle. The illustrations offered by nature herself are perhaps more convincing—the orbital motions of atoms and of planets, the regular sequence of the seasons, the precession of the equinoxes, the succession of barometric “highs” and “lows,” and so forth. Sometimes the term “cyclical” is applied to the process that the individual organism reveals from birth through to maturity and then to decline and death—and there have been many thinkers who have regarded societies and civilizations as pursuing a similar course. Sometimes it is applied to the rhythm of successive ups and downs that repeats itself without definite beginning or ending, like that of the waves, and this pattern, too, many thinkers have thought they discovered in human affairs, in political movements of conservatism and radicalism, in long-range changes of population, in the tides of fashion, in the mores that are by turns more repressive and more free, and so forth.²

These three types of change may therefore be represented as follows:

TYPE ONE

Patterns of technological change, scientific advance, etc.




²For more detailed examples see P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 728 ff.

There are, of course, many types of change that cannot be represented by such simple diagrams. There are qualitative changes of various kinds that are not measurable in quantitative units, and these become more important as we pass from technology to culture. Even in the technological field the invasion of the cultural element complicates the processes of change. Thus a new invention mimics at first the older device that it replaces—as the automobile imitated the horse-drawn carriage—and then gradually establishes its own

TYPE TWO

Patterns of economic activity, population movements, etc.



TYPE THREE

Patterns of fashion change, cultural movements, etc.



type. If the device belongs to the class of "consumers' goods," then style changes will accompany, and sometimes interfere with, advances in efficiency. Wherever cultural values enter in, the way of change becomes complex and objectively indeterminate. Those parts of our civilization which are remote from final valuations move in a different way from those which are more subject to their influence. The science of electrical engineering has a simpler path to follow than the art of politics, and that art in turn goes through a more limited series of changes than the art of writing novels or of composing music.

Terms signifying modes of change.—We must next distinguish various terms which connote a mode or quality of change. The term "change" itself is wholly neutral, implying nothing but a difference through time in the object to which it is applied. When we speak of

social change, we suggest so far no law, no theory, no direction, even no continuity. The idea of continuity is introduced when we refer to a social change as a *process*. A process means continuous change taking place in a definite manner through the operation of forces present from the first within the situation. Thus we speak of the "group process," or the manner in which the relations of the members of a group, once brought together, acquire a certain distinctive character. In a process we observe a series of transitions between one state of being and another. There is no necessary implication as to the relative quality of the two states of being, or as to the direction followed. A process may be up or down, forward or backward, towards integration or disintegration. All that is meant by process is the definite step-by-step manner through which one state or stage merges into another.

Another set of terms is needed when we express not only continuity but direction of change, and for scientific purposes the most important of these is *evolution*. The idea of evolution is in other sciences, and especially the biological, the grand key to the comprehension of change. It would hardly be too much to say that where we cannot discover an evolutionary element in change, there the past belongs to the historian and not to the scientist. Evolution means more than growth. The latter term does connote a direction of change but only one of a quantitative character. Evolution, as we shall presently see, involves something more intrinsic, a change not merely in size but at least in structure also. So do the associated terms "development," "regression," "retrogression." The suggestion of "forward" or "backward," of "higher" or "lower" with respect to some scale is present in them all.

Here another distinction, of supreme importance to the student of society, must be introduced. When we speak of "higher" and "lower," of "more" or "less advanced," on the evolutionary scale, we do not, or certainly should not, impute any standard of valuation. We do not mean "better" or "worse" in any ethical sense. We should beware of confusing the *concept* of evolution and the *concept* of progress. When we speak of progress we imply not merely direction, but direction towards some final goal, some destination determined ideally, not simply by objective consideration of the forces at work. What defines this goal is the value-judgment of the spectator, not the inevitability of causation. It may be that the evolutionary process moves in accord with our conception of desirable change, but there is no *logical* necessity that it should, and in any event the judgment of final value varies with the mentality and

experience of the individual and the group, whereas the process of evolution is objectively given, waiting only to be discovered and understood. If the process so revealed satisfies also *our* sense of values, if the direction of evolutionary change brings also a fuller realization of the values we cherish, then *for us* it is also progress.

There remains a group of terms which signify not the change of one object or system in itself but the changing relation of two or more objects or systems to one another. These terms are often wrongly equated with the terms of the last two groups. They are "adaptation," "adjustment," "accommodation," "assimilation," and their negatives. To these we may add such vaguer terms as "harmony." We have already dwelt on their meaning. We should note, however, that the positive terms cannot as such *mean* either evolution or progress. They signify merely that the two objects conform to one another within a common process, but whether that process should be named evolution or progress or something else altogether remains thereby undetermined. There is not the slightest reason to regard the lowest forms of life as less adapted to their environment than the highest forms. The amoeba can certainly claim to be as well adjusted to its life conditions as civilized man to his.

We may now sum up these preliminary distinctions as follows :

TERMS SIGNIFYING MODES OF CHANGE

I. Determinate continuous change	<i>Process</i> Movement, etc.
II. Determinate continuous change in a specific direction	
(a) quantitatively defined, with respect to size	<i>Growth</i> Accumulation, etc.
(b) qualitatively defined, with respect to structural or functional differentiation	<i>Evolution</i> Development Regression Retrogression
(c) qualitatively defined, with respect to its conformity to a standard of value	<i>Progress</i> Decline Decay Decadence Degeneration
(d) defined by reference to some other object or system, with respect to their compatibility within a common process	<i>Adaptation</i> Adjustment Accommodation Assimilation Harmony and their contradictories

APPLICATION TO SOCIETY OF VARIOUS CONCEPTS OF CHANGE

Social change as cyclical process.—In every society there are numerous processes of change occurring simultaneously. Here adjustment is established and here conflict breaks down adjustment. Here dominance is attained, and here overthrown. Here there is revolution and here quiescence. Here men aspire to new goals, and here they return to old ones. In all this change can we discover any movement of the whole, of society conceived as a unity, whether in terms of a nation, or culture area, or a large civilization? Does society itself, however we define its limits, undergo any processes of change, and if so, have they any specific character or direction? This is a question many thinkers have sought to answer, and we shall here indicate briefly the nature of the answers that have most frequently been offered. Perhaps the oldest is that which conceives social change as following, over sufficiently large periods, a cyclical course.³

It is a common reflection that all life, in fact all being, exhibits recurrent rhythmic movement. Many illustrations lie near to us, the beat of the heart, the intake and exhalation of the breath, the recurrent appetites, the succession of the seasons, and the processes of organic growth and decline. Our mechanisms mimic the pulsations of the organism. The skies themselves move in rhythmic periods of the day, the year, and the mightier cycles of the outer cosmos. At the other extreme the scientist conceives the atom as a dance of electrons. The pulsations which thus permeate the universe seem to have their counterpart in social phenomena, in the seasonal rhythms of the volume of employment, the frequency of crime, the number of marriages, births, and deaths, and in the longer, less predictable oscillations of prosperity, population growth, fashion trends, political attitudes, and so forth. And if this rhythmic movement affects the particular phenomena of social life, may it not also be revealed in the total being of society?

The most impressive of these rhythms is that which has a definite beginning and ending, the closed cycle of birth and death forever repeated within the life of the species. This theme is renewed on the vast scale of the cosmos.

Worlds on worlds are rolling ever
From creation to decay.

³ For a list of cyclical theories see P. Sorokin, *op. cit.*, pp. 728 ff.

A rhythm so momentous to human beings, themselves manifestations of it, has a peculiar attraction for the interpreter of social change. In all ages men have found a correspondence between the course of the individual life and that of the group, the nation, the empire, the civilization. "Sceptre and crown must tumble down" in fulfillment of the like destiny of all that lives. Generally this principle is merely a form of the inadequate organic analogy, and as such we have dealt with it elsewhere.⁴ But sometimes other concepts of a more fruitful nature are combined with it, as we shall see later when we take up the cultural conditions of social change.

Social change as evolutionary process.—In recent times the evolutionary concept has been applied in diverse ways to the interpretation of social change, sometimes rather superficially and sometimes in a more penetrating and revealing fashion. Even in the ancient world the idea that society evolved occasionally caught the imagination of men, as is witnessed to, for example, by the account of the rise of humanity given in the *Prometheus* of Sophocles and in the remarkable poem by Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things*. But it was after the triumphant advance of evolutionary biology led by Darwin in the middle of the nineteenth century that the evolutionary clue began to be persistently followed by students of society. Herbert Spencer was a leader in this movement, although his somewhat hasty generalizations have not, for the most part, stood the test of time. This fact has led to a revulsion among sociologists that unduly depreciates the social significance of the evolutionary principle.

Evolution is literally "unrolling," a process in which hidden or latent aspects or characters of a thing reveal themselves. It is an order of change which unfolds the variety of aspects belonging to the nature of the changing object, in which potentialities lying within it are made actual. Evolution cannot properly be predicated of anything whose nature is already completely revealed in the present. Nor can we speak of evolution when an object or system is changed merely by forces acting on it from without. The change must occur within the changing unity, as the manifestation of forces operative within it, so as to constitute a fuller revelation through time of its own capacities. Since, however, nothing is independent of the universe about it, evolution is a process involving at the same time a changing adaptation of the object to its environment and a further manifestation of its own nature. Consequently it is a change

⁴ See pages 42-45. See also the author's *Community*, Book III, Chap. II, and Appendix, and *The Modern State*, Chap. X.

permeating the whole character of the object, a sequence in which the equilibrium of its entire structure undergoes modification.

We have not yet stated the basic moment of the evolutionary process, the essential criterion of its presence. The term "evolution" is often loosely used to signify any process of becoming, the series of transitions between two stages of the existence of anything. In more scientific usage it is still applied with somewhat varying significance to different types of object, though with a common core of meaning. Thus we speak of the evolution of an individual organism, of the evolution of a species, and of the evolution of life through different species. We speak also of the evolution of the earth, or the solar system, or the cosmos itself. We speak again of the evolution of any established system, though here the term loses its sharpness, for generally we mean no more than the process by which it has become established.

The concept of evolution gained its wide modern vogue as a result of its successful application in the field of biology. When Charles Darwin wrote of "the evolution of species" he traced a process by which the multiplicity of organic types emerged from earlier, fewer, less differentiated forms of life. The particular mechanistic explanation of this process which Darwin offered may or may not be valid, but the scheme of evolution which he so clearly traced does not stand or fall with any theory of the manner in which it has come about. The scheme itself is corroborated by myriad evidences; the scientific issue is no more the reality of biological evolution but the causal interpretation of it. The basis of the scheme is the correlation of the time-order with the order of appearance of more complex or more differentiated species. Many divergences occur, many collateral variations which do not exemplify this primary correlation, but it remains the nucleus of the grand plan of organic evolution. It is not, of course, implied that the later in appearance is necessarily the more evolved, but only that the more evolved is later in appearance than the less evolved and proceeds from it by means of the variations somehow emerging in the interplay of heredity and environment. The kernel of organic evolution is therefore differentiation, the process in which latent or rudimentary characters take on distinct and variable forms within the unity of the organism, giving rise to new and more complex types of life. We shall find presently that a similar principle has great significance for the study of society. We shall find too that the differentiation of structure must be related to the differentiation of function.

In this quest we shall not follow the dangerous method of analogy. Reliance on this method has impaired the contribution of Herbert Spencer and other sociologists who have followed the evolutionary clue. There are many unities or systems which reveal a process of differentiation, but the process itself varies with the nature of the subject which undergoes it. Thus differentiation occurs (a) where the subject is the whole organic world, branching into its genera and species, (b) where the subject is a particular species, revealing *either* a modification of its type in this direction *or* the emergence of several varieties from an earlier type, (c) where the subject is an individual organism, in the course of its development from the germ to the full-grown being, and (d) where the subject is any unity or system which comes to assume a more determinate form or a variety of forms through the operation of inherent forces. Society falls in the last of these groups, and there has been a constant danger of confusing it with one—or all at the same time—of the other three. For example, it is often treated as if it fell at the same time into both group (b) and group (c), a confusion appearing in the pages of Spencer and many other writers. We should observe particularly the difference between these two groups as subjects of evolution. Group (b) exhibits an evolutionary process which has no determinate limits, whereas the process in group (c) is bounded by the life of the individual organism. A species maintains its existence by the reproduction of its members, an individual organism is not self-perpetuating but only a factor in race-perpetuation. An individual organism therefore grows old and is always at some stage in the process from youth to age; its evolution is the expression of an initial life-energy within it. None of these statements can properly be predicated of a species, and it is only a hazardous guess which asseverates that they are true of other self-perpetuating unities, such as communities or even the social systems which they create.

All organisms grow old and die, and though life has flowed on some species have become extinct. We have found in differentiation the clue to the evolutionary order, but when the process of decline towards death or extinction sets in, differentiation ceases and some counterprocess takes its place. Or again, a species, once self-maintaining, becomes parasitic, like the duckweeds in the vegetable kingdom, and some of its evolved organs degenerate. Shall we then include within the meaning of evolution those reverse tendencies? It seems simpler to do so. Decay and parasitism, whether in a species or in a society, are never simple reversals of a former trend,

mere returns to an earlier stage. Age is never, literally, second childhood. From the beginning to the end new aspects of the nature of the organic being appear. We find in differentiation the clue to evolution and we can therefore also call evolutionary any process which comprises both differentiation and some sequel of differentiation, which includes an "upward" and a consequent "downward" course. When it is desirable to specify an "upward" course only, a process, that is, of increasing differentiation, we can use the appropriate term "development."

We are now in a position to see what evolution means in its social reference. Wherever in the history of society we find an increasing specialization of organs or units within the system or serving the life of the whole, we can speak of social evolution. Observe that such specialization does not mean simply more complexity and is not equivalent to the appearance of mere novelty, for to meet our sense of differentiation such complexity or novelty must be integrated within the social structure, or—what we shall see is here another aspect of the same principle—must contribute to the interrelation of function between the whole and the parts. A diseased condition of the organism may involve additional complexity and introduce new phenomena, but no one would call this an evolutionary process.

Often it is said that evolution is a process of differentiation *and* integration, but the term "differentiation," properly understood, connotes integration. In a society it manifests itself in such ways as the following: (a) a greater division of labor, so that the energy of more individuals is concentrated on more specific tasks and so that thereby a more elaborate system of co-operation, a more intricate nexus of functional relationships, is sustained within the group; (b) an increase in the number and the variety of functional associations and institutions, so that each is more defined or more limited in the range or character of its service; and (c) a greater diversity and refinement in the instruments of social communication, perhaps above all in the medium of language. We may regard the last of these conditions as rather a mark than a mode of differentiation, but as the history of language can often be more accurately traced than the life history of those who spoke it, it is obviously a record of very great importance for the study of the earlier evolution of different peoples and of the same people at different stages.

Various sociologists have laid stress on one or another of these aspects of evolution. Thus Durkheim has insisted on the pre-eminent importance of the social division of labor as a criterion of social

development.⁵ Other writers have taken the various aspects together and sought to show that society passes through a definite series of evolutionary stages.⁶ An extreme example of this procedure is the work of the German sociologist F. Müller-Lyer.⁷

Social change as progress.—In the earlier theories of biological evolution the ideas of evolution and of progress were closely associated. This association was emphasized by Darwin's conception of the "survival of the fittest" in the evolutionary process. A similar optimistic note was struck by the majority of the social evolutionists of the nineteenth century, from Comte to Herbert Spencer and Lester Ward. For them social evolution was, in effect, social progress. The rapid technological and industrial advance of the nineteenth century was another consideration that led many philosophers, historians, and sociologists to the position that the major trends of social phenomena made for social progress.

Any of us is free to hold this position—or to deny it—because our view of what constitutes progress depends on our desires and our ideals, and one man's desires and ideals are different from another's. What we are not free to do is to maintain that evolution *means* progress, that because a society is more evolved *therefore* it is more progressive. It does not follow that the people who maintain the more evolved system are "better" or better fitted to survive, or more moral or more healthy or more happy than those we call primitive. Even if the opposite were true, it would not refute the fact that their society is more evolved. The place of a people on the evolutionary scale does not depend on our ethical judgments. There must be, of course, some relation between the character of the social structure and the kind of life which is lived within it. But this correlation can, and for scientific purposes should, be expressed in terms that do not depend on our particular ideals or sympathies or prejudices.

Why evolution must be distinguished from progress.—Differentiation, where it occurs, is an evolutionary fact. We can therefore, provided we have the knowledge, classify different societies with entire objectivity as more or less highly evolved. We cannot be accused of arbitrary or subjective valuations when we say that a civilized society is more highly evolved than that of the Eskimos. But if we claim also that civilized life is a better one, the case is

⁵ *The Division of Labor in Society.*

⁶ For a classification of stage theories see M. Ginsberg, *Studies in Sociology*, Chap. V.

⁷ *History of Social Development* (Eng. tr., London, 1923).

different. The Eskimo might deny it—where is the common ground on which we can meet to decide between us? If our life better satisfies our ideals, so does his life his—who then is the arbiter of ideals? Moreover, we do not ourselves agree that civilization is better. Some deny it, and again who is to judge between us? If the rest of us affirm it, are these not equally entitled to deny it—as did the young Rousseau or Schopenhauer or Max Nordau or von Hartmann or Tolstoi or Spengler, as do the religious prophets who identify progress with the spread of a faith or with the heyday of a church, as do the hedonists who define progress as more happiness and assert that the savage is happier than the civilized man? Does it not appear that the affirmation of evolution depends on our perception of objective evidences whereas the affirmation or denial of progress depends on our ideals, and therefore on our temperament, on our fortune in life, on our age, perhaps on the state of our liver or our digestion; in short, that evolution is a scientific concept and progress an ethical concept?

Now there is no necessary opposition between the scientific and the ethical attitude, for the one is directed to the comprehension of what is and the other seeks to determine our relation to what is in such a way that what is and what is good shall so far as practicable coincide. But there is much confusion of the two attitudes, and consequent clashes. For our ethical judgments may rest on misconceptions of the scientific fact and our scientific conclusions may be warped by our ethical preconceptions. The social sciences suffer particularly from this confusion. To avoid it is a profoundly difficult task. The difficulty is twofold. In the first place, we are brought up and constantly indoctrinated in the valuations of our group. The business of living in society makes social valuations of some sort necessary. Unfortunately these vital valuations, owing alike to the prejudices of the group and to our individual misreading of experience, contain ingredients of scientific error. They rationalize the ultimate judgment, "This is good" or "This is bad" (with its corollary, "This is right" or "This is wrong"), into the relative judgment, "This is bad, because such and such results follow from it." Now the latter is a presumptive scientific judgment, in so far as it postulates a causal nexus between two phenomena. But the emotional drive of ethical ideals or social pressures often overrides the cool scientific scrutiny of the alleged causal nexus or forbids it altogether—the rationalization, for example, of the contradictory sex taboos of different cultures affords abundant illustration—and thus our science suffers.

In the second place, we cannot adopt the simpler solution of the physical sciences by keeping outside the realm of ethical valuations altogether. In a very important way these valuations, socially conditioned as they are, enter into our subject matter. Subjective themselves, they determine the objective phenomena of society. As scientists, we must endeavor to keep our own valuations from coloring our perception of social reality, but the reality we perceive is through and through permeated with the valuations of its creators. Ethical concepts have a direct power of moving the world which scientific concepts lack. In some manner they are active in every process of social change. We study, let us say, war or marriage or divorce, but the very existence of any one of these phenomena depends on a sufficient belief or disbelief in its desirability. A like statement can be made of every social organization and institution. In this respect our facts differ *toto caelo* from physical facts, and that is why we cannot dismiss valuations—or such concepts as progress—as lightly as can the physical sciences.

It is all the more important for us to distinguish carefully the two types of concept, the scientific and the ethical. It is one thing to recognize value-facts, to trace their operation, to study them as the realities they are; it is quite another to impose our own valuations on them. We should therefore not define social evolution as if it were the same thing as social progress. It may be that the course of social evolution is in harmony with the direction prescribed by our particular concept of social progress. The ideals or values which any of us accept may be more fully realized in the evolutionary process, and it is quite legitimate, when we have stated what we mean by social progress, to trace the degree or the manner in which it is embodied in evolutionary change. For this correspondence may be traced in a way which any student of society, whether or not he accepts our ethical postulate, can accept. But it is possible to do this only if we define social evolution in ethically neutral terms. Otherwise the confusion we have spoken of will be present from the start.⁸

⁸ This subject is dealt with more fully in Chapter XXVIII.

XXIII

BIOLOGICAL FACTORS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE

Scope of the chapter.—Since the physical environment changes but slowly except as affected by the ceaseless activity of man we shall confine our attention, in considering the first of our three main categories of the conditions underlying social change, to the biological processes that determine the numbers, the composition, the selection, and the hereditary quality of the successive generations. These processes may themselves be set in motion by social attitudes and interests, as the latter control sex relations, marriage, racial intermixture, the size of the family, and so forth, but once initiated, they follow their own principles and exhibit their own causality. First we shall describe the manner in which they are revealed in the demographic aspects of society, and then we shall consider some of the larger social issues which are thereby raised.

Changing size of the population.—The population of every community is always changing both in numbers and in composition. During the nineteenth century the population of most countries of Western Europe increased with unusual rapidity.¹ Between the period 1871-1875 and the year 1933 the birth rates of the countries of Western Europe fell from a range between 25 and 38 (per thousand of the population *per annum*) to a range between 20 and 14. During the same time the death rates of these countries fell from a range between 18 and 28 to a range between 10 and 16.²

¹ For statistics see R. R. Kuczynski, *The Measurement of Population Growth* (New York, 1936), pp. 230-231.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 104-105; 162-163.

This double phenomenon is probably unprecedented in the history of society. Population changes have been occurring all through human history, by reason of migration, invasion, war, pestilence, changing food supply, and changing mores. But the swift and steady decline of the two rates on which the natural increase of population depends witnesses to a great social transformation. The change was particularly marked in the birth rate, though an earlier change in the death rate probably prepared the way for it. First apparent in France, it began rather abruptly in England in 1878 and in the eighties was markedly revealed in the statistics of Sweden, Denmark, Holland, and Australia. Thence it spread to the countries of Central Europe, and to America, at length including within its range, though in various degrees, every country of Western civilization. This extraordinary development was accompanied by a no less remarkable continuation of the decline of the death rate, more especially of the infant death rate. This double phenomenon is perhaps the most signal instance the world has known of the sudden emergence of new forms of social selection, or as some prefer to put it, of new interferences with natural selection. The birth rate which now characterizes the countries of Western Europe ranges from 18 to less than 15.

There is of course a limit to the decline of both rates, and there are some evidences that the limit is in sight in certain countries. The rate of the decline of the birth rate diminishes markedly when a certain level is reached. For example, in the eighties of the last century Germany had a high birth rate (in 1876 it was nearly 41), while France, which led the movement, had what seemed an ominously low one. By 1927 the rates of the two countries were practically equal (19.5 for Germany as against 18.8 for France), but the convergence was due overwhelmingly to the fall of the German rate while the French moved very slowly lower. As for the death rate, the changing composition of the population under a falling birth rate must eventually put a halt to its decline, even if the application of medical science and the healthiness of living conditions continue to advance. The changing composition of the population tends, on the other hand, to lower the birth rate still further, even though the actual fertility, as measured by the number of children born to women of childbearing age, remain constant.³ But the future cannot be mechanically prognosticated by statistical projections of incompleting trends. This method would have led to

³ For the precise nature of this phenomenon see Kuczynski, *The Balance of Births and Deaths*.

false results if applied at any earlier stage of the decline. Those who interpret the decline in the birth rate as race suicide should turn their attention to the fact that, throughout the period of this decline, the absolute population of every civilized country, with the exception of France, where the control of the death rate has not kept pace with the fall of the birth rate, has considerably increased decade by decade.⁴ In fact, during the whole period of the declining birth rate, the actual increase of the populations of Europe and America has been enormous, and if we take instead the longer period since the decline of the death rate began the increase has been unprecedented in human history. Since many of the consequences of this growth do not appear until after the lapse of a generation, it is not surprising, particularly in times of large-scale unemployment, that many observers should still be impressed with the opposite fear, that of overpopulation. It is surely unreasonable to expect this absolute increase to continue forever. The adjustment of population to changing conditions is itself a changing adjustment and is perhaps more subtle than we generally realize. Only if the total population were seriously dwindling would the fears generated by the present stage of the process seem justified; and if that condition were to appear who can say that it would not in turn set in motion corrective forces? The history of population theories since the eighteenth century shows the precariousness of short-run interpretations and the difficulty—but also the necessity—of the long-run view. Where severe population declines have occurred in past civilizations they have been associated with war and invasion, with pestilence, or with the denudation of the soil. The primal urge of race perpetuation is not necessarily undermined because it accommodates itself to new conditions. The fear of race suicide may sometimes be another form of the ancient majestic terror that “men have become as gods, knowing good and evil.”

In no country have the changes in size of the population been more significant than in the United States. The increase has in fact been quite unprecedented in human history. “From about 2,500,000 in 1776, the population has increased to 122,775,046 in 1930, almost fifty fold in little more than a century and a half.”⁵ This growth

⁴ It is true that the higher absolute death rate of France, as compared, say, with that of the United States, is largely explained by the difference in age composition of the population, but it is nevertheless somewhat higher than the death rate of the United States or of the low birth-rate countries of Northwestern Europe would be under present conditions provided their age composition were the same.

⁵ W. S. Thompson and P. K. Whelpton, “The Population of the Nation,” in *Recent Social Trends*, I, p. 1.

has, of course, been due to a combination of natural increase and immigration. The conditions bringing it about are no longer operative. Net immigration to the United States fell to zero or below during the depression years and it is not likely to become an important population factor in the near future at least, owing to the severe restrictive measures which are in force. Natural increase has also fallen off. The birth rate for the United States has followed the same course as that of the countries of Western Europe and by 1934 had fallen to 17.1 for the registration area.

Changes in composition of the population.—With changes in size go changes in composition. While the birth rate is falling the proportion of younger people in the population decreases. In the United States "the median age of the population has risen from 16.7 years in 1820 to 26.4 in 1930."⁶ In the period between 1920 and 1930 the numbers in the age-group 45-64 increased by more than a third.⁷ Obviously the change in age distribution reacts in turn on the birth rate, since the percentage of the population above childbearing age increases. Less obvious, but probably quite significant, are the social changes responsive to a situation in which the proportion of youths declines and that of elders advances. But the change of age distribution is only one of the many aspects of the changing pattern of population. We have already seen that the proportion of urban to rural dwellers has been steadily increasing. Along with this have gone other processes of recruitment and of redistribution. Birth rates and death rates vary significantly for different areas, different nationality groups, different religious affiliations, different occupations, and generally different modes of living. Many modern studies of population reveal these facts, but for convenience of reference we shall quote mainly from the U. S. Census Monograph, entitled *Ratio of Women to Children, 1920*.⁸ This report shows that while the more rural areas everywhere exhibit higher birth rates than the adjacent urban areas, other factors are also involved in the territorial distribution. Thus, "the highest rate for the entire population in any of the states (Utah, 151.8) is slightly less than twice the rate in the lowest state (California, 77.6). . . . The highest rate for women born in the United States (Utah 64.5) is slightly more than twice the lowest rate (Connecticut, 31.2)."⁹ Another significant contrast is presented as fol-

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

⁸ Census Monograph XI, by Warren S. Thompson (Washington, 1931).

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 5. The rates are in terms of the number of births per 1000 women aged 20 to 49.

lows: "North Carolina, which stands highest in the ratio of children to native white women, has over two and two fifths times as many children per 1000 women as California, which stands lowest."¹⁰

There are also considerable disparities between the birth rates of the native-born and of the foreign-born, as also between the rates for the native-born of native parentage and for the native-born of foreign parentage. The full social significance of the relevant figures would require the breaking up of these broad categories into their component groups, but the general classification is sufficient to show the rapid response of the members of many and diverse peoples to the social conditions generated in the same new environment. Generally the birth rates of the foreign-born are considerably higher than those of the native-born, although in the Southern states, where they are few, and in Utah, "the rate for native white women is larger than that for foreign-born white women."¹¹ In different parts of the country the birth rates of foreign-born women and their ratio to the birth rates of the native-born vary greatly. Thus "West Virginia with 1,231 children per 1000 foreign-born white women has more than twice the ratio of Georgia with 560."¹²

It appears further that, while the percentage of the foreign-born who are married is much the highest for the three categories, the native-born of foreign or mixed parentage marry proportionately less than the native-born of native parentage. This very interesting fact is brought out in the following table.¹³

MARRIAGE AND NATIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1920

<i>Nativity</i>	<i>Per cent married</i>	
	<i>U. S.</i>	<i>Cities of 100,000 inhabitants and over</i>
Native white	74.2	66.5
Native parentage	77.0	69.6
Foreign or mixed parentage	67.3	62.9
Foreign-born white	85.5	82.9

Only in two of the agricultural states, Wisconsin and Utah, do the foreign or mixed parentage groups show a higher proportion of married women than the native parentage groups.¹⁴

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

Interaction of population change and social change.—The changes we have illustrated with respect to the size and the composition of the population are intimately related to social changes. It is obvious that economic conditions and population rates are interdependent, and this aspect of the situation we have already dealt with in Chapter V. But it is also clear that the changes in the death rate, the birth rate, and the marriage rate are both responsive to and determinant of changes in social attitudes and in social relationships. For example, countries with growing populations and relatively limited resources have, under appropriate conditions, an incentive to imperialism and to militarism, while these attitudes in turn encourage a further increase of population. Thus in Italy, which is both populous and relatively poor in resources, Mussolini has constantly proclaimed that empires cannot be won or be defended except by "fecund peoples." On the other hand, the increase of population threatens the standard of living and thus inspires a change of attitude. At a certain stage in the unprecedented growth of population in the nineteenth century the practice of birth control took a new development. This practice in turn has many repercussions on family relationships and even on attitudes towards marriage. In the Comstock anti-birth-control law of 1873 contraceptives were designated "immoral." There is evidence that a majority of the population no longer holds this view. With the consequent decrease of the size of the individual family the facility of marriage and of divorce, the relations between husband and wife, the relations between children and parents, the mode of upbringing of children, the position of the mother in the house, and the degree of economic self-sufficiency of the family have all been changing. These aspects of the situation we have already brought out in the chapter on the family. Now we shall consider some of the broader social aspects of population change.

THE LIMITATION OF NATURAL SELECTION

The principle of natural selection.—With the changes in the composition of the population and above all with the decline to new levels of both the birth rate and the death rate it becomes necessary to revise our theories of the role that natural selection plays in civilized society. The principle of natural selection, as formulated by Darwin, has been regarded as the great agent of biological evolution and in turn has been given a similar role in the explanation of social evolution. The principle itself can be stated in a few words.

Variation is always occurring under the laws of sexual reproduction. These differences from, or rather within, the type may be fluctuating results of transient conditions or—a point on which recent theories of organic evolution lay more stress—they may be distinctive “mutations” capable of hereditary transmission. In either event they are apt to occur in every direction, but they are not equally favorable to the existence of the variant individuals. The less favorable are eliminated in the struggle for existence, the more favorable are encouraged and, if they prove to be mutations, are perpetuated. This is a process which obviously admits a direction of change, through the accumulation of favorable variations, and thus can assume an evolutionary character.

The struggle for existence has various aspects. It includes adaptation to the rigors of nature, to climatic and seasonal changes, to variations in the food supply, and so forth. It includes the resistance to microbic and fungoid infections or the acquisition of specific immunities against them. But also it includes the struggle between the individuals of a species for food, for shelter, for mates. And to this struggle, involving sometimes the preying of individuals on one another, must be added the struggle between species, or, more strictly, the struggle of the preying species to capture their prey and of the latter to avoid capture. It was the pitting of individual against individual, whether of the same or of different species, on which the earlier Darwinian theory placed such emphasis, and it was this picture of nature “red in tooth and claw” which seized the imagination of those social thinkers who made conflict the spur of evolution, though they tended to substitute the conflict of groups for that of individuals.¹⁵

From natural selection we should distinguish sexual selection as well as the selection exercised through the differential birth rate. These latter forms, existing in the lower animal world, take on a new significance in human society, within which they are elaborated and intensified. But society itself is in many of its aspects, as a system of co-operation and interdependence, hostile to natural selection, since it sets a limit to the sheer individual struggle for mere existence. Moreover, the principle of natural selection requires not only the continual emergence of biological variations but also a considerable surplus of reproduction above the numbers necessary to maintain the species. The intensity of its operation is limited by

¹⁵ Among proponents of this doctrine of internecine conflict may be mentioned Ratzenhofer and Gumplowicz. See P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, Chap. VI.

the excess of reproduction over survival. Its range is thus more and more limited in human society as the survival rate approximates more and more nearly to the birth rate.

We are not here concerned with the debated question as to the efficacy of natural selection below the level of human society. It should however be noted that the term "natural selection" expresses not a fact of observation but an inference. The indisputable fact is natural elimination, which is so adjusted that it tends to preserve the balance of numbers of a species through time and relative to other species. Though this balance is liable to disturbance, it is generally maintained by the greater elimination of the individuals of those species which breed most or fastest. Not even the most extreme Darwinian would maintain that consequently the more prolific species, like the cod or the rabbit, are the most highly selected and therefore the most "fit."¹⁶ Obviously a considerable amount of elimination has no relation to "fitness." The more moderate Darwinian argument is, however, that in the sweep of the eliminative forces the weaklings are destroyed so that the level of the species is maintained, and that among the individuals which escape premature death are likely to be those which vary in a direction advantageous to their survival.

So stated, the principle is a truism. It is not on that account unimportant, but it ceases to be the master key which unlocks all the doors of evolution. It takes on the more modest role of a limiting condition, preventing variation from pursuing unfavorable roads. Nevertheless the facts show that the favored roads are also numerous. Fitness is always relative to environment, and there are many potential environments as well as many ways of adaptation to them. So far as the principle of natural selection is concerned, it is indifferent whether survival is assured by strength or by cunning, by boldness or by disguise, by speed to pursue or by speed to escape, by native vigor or by high fertility. And it has been sagely remarked that the very existence of the preying animals depends on

¹⁶ Yet some sociologists seem to reason in a similarly oversimple fashion concerning the intricate question of the efficacy of natural selection within society. Thus, for example, Sorokin (*Contemporary Sociological Theories*, p. 306) approves as follows certain conclusions of the natural-selection school: "A low birth rate, accompanied by a low mortality, means an elimination or weakening of the factor of natural selection; in other words, a survival of the weaklings who would be eliminated under the condition of high mortality which accompanies a high birth rate. Under such conditions, the population of such a society is likely to be composed more and more of the progeny of the weaklings and less 'superior' people." For a criticism of this simplification see my *Community*, Book III, Chap. VII, §§ 3-5.

the existence of the preyed-upon.¹⁷ Moreover, while natural selection may be adduced to explain the maintenance of organic fitness within a species, it certainly does not explain the emergence of variations, especially of mutations, and it further encounters grave difficulties when it attempts to explain the trend of these mutations towards more evolved types or species. The standard of fitness to survive justifies the unevolved amoeba at least as much as it justifies the piece of work called man.

Why less applicable to human society.—When we turn to consider the operation of natural selection in human society the simplicity of the principle is lost. With respect to the lower animal world it was the term "selection" which created our difficulties, here it is also the term "natural." The conditions of survival, of success in living and in reproducing, are profoundly modified by society. The struggle for mere existence becomes less individualistic and tends to be converted into struggle on other levels. The cohesion of groups destroys the sheer alternatives of nature under which the individual must wrest his living from her or perish. The struggle of groups with one another becomes more significant than the struggle of individuals, but this new struggle is not of the life-and-death character demanded by natural selection. (Life-and-death struggle survives only in the spasmodic outbreak of war between national groups, in which the fittest *individuals* are *socially* selected for destruction, an entire reversal of the presumptive plan of nature.) The range of co-operation extends more widely, restricting and modifying the action of the eliminative forces. We have seen that this extension of co-operation is a necessary concomitant or part of social evolution, so that there is an actual opposition between social evolution and the principle adduced to explain organic evolution.¹⁸ Above all, the excess of reproduction over survival, the raw material on which natural selection works, grows less and less as the evolution of society proceeds.

Some eliminative forces are intensified under socially created conditions, others are reduced, all are modified. It is only a blind transference of the principle to an alien sphere which could allow us to speak of the higher death rate of stonecutters from tuberculosis as natural selection, or the summer mortality from diarrhoea of slum-bred infants. If the congestion of cities or the conditions

¹⁷ Cf. Tönnies, *Soziologische Studien und Kritiken*, I, Chap. IX: "If only beasts of prey survived, what animals would remain at all? What would become of the beasts of prey themselves if their prey ceased to exist?"

¹⁸ This point was cogently made by Huxley in his *Evolution and Ethics* (New York, 1905).

of factory life are unfavorably reflected in the death rate or if, on the contrary, preventive medicine and hygiene applied to these situations lead to a diminution of the death rate, neither can the former be called "natural selection" nor the latter a perilous interference with it. Selection, we have seen, is always relative to the environment, as is the "fitness" which is selected, and now the environment itself has ceased to be, in the particular sense of the term implied by the principle, natural. Man follows his own road, widely diverging from that of all other animals. It is his nature to do so, and he must in doing so meet the demands of the universal nature to which he belongs. If he fails, the eliminative forces are always waiting to destroy him or force him back. In this sense, though in this sense only, he is subject to the limiting conditions of natural selection. But the ways to which natural selection is indifferent, which we have seen to be fairly numerous even in the lower organic world, are now vastly increased.

The social heritage everywhere modifies the stark alternatives of natural selection. The more advanced it is the more are the impulses of men set to other goals than mere survival. It increases the area of indifference within which variant ways of social living are possible and unchecked by natural selection. Society may even reject certain of the ways which natural selection prescribes for those forms of life which have no social heritage. Organic needs, in their raw simplicity, become a smaller part of the whole system of needs which urge men on. A further point is well made in these words of Lloyd Morgan:

While mental evolution as such is still dependent upon organic evolution, it is no longer wholly subservient to organic needs; nor is it save to a limited extent conditioned and controlled by natural selection. Mind to some extent escapes from its organic thralldom and is free to develop in accordance with the laws of its own proper being, but in relation to a new environment. And although continuity of mental development in the race is still rendered possible by organic heredity, mental progress is mainly due not to inherited increments of mental faculty but to the handing on of the results of human achievement by a vast extension of that which we have seen to be a factor in animal life, namely, tradition.¹⁹

The conclusion follows, in the words of the same author, that "natural selection is a constantly diminishing factor in the evolution of civilized man." As we shall see, another factor operating in a

¹⁹ *Habit and Instinct* (London, 1896), pp. 333-334.

very different way, social selection, becomes a substitute for it within the increasing area to which natural selection is indifferent.

Anthropological evidence.—This conclusion is confirmed when we consider the rich variety of folkways revealed by different societies or, in the larger civilizations, by different groups within the same society. If variations are the raw material of natural selection it is here in abundance. But the rooting-out process is little in evidence. No doubt folkways that are profoundly injurious to the group must be eliminated in time or else they will destroy the group either by their direct effects or indirectly, by sapping its vitality in the struggle with other groups. But the survival of folkways, even under relatively primitive conditions, is no convincing proof of their "fitness." Unfavorable folkways, cherished in ignorance and superstition, may be established, may persist and erect formidable barriers against favorable change. We may take as examples the endless magical devices for controlling disease, the taboos against valuable foods, Indian child-marriage, the celibacy of the more educated orders in the Middle Ages, and such curious practices as that of the Shingu tribes cited by A. G. Keller, where the old men obtain the young women for wives and the young men the old.²⁰ If even in the primary concern of sex every possible type of relationship is somewhere instituted, it would suggest that as between folkways natural selection does not act very rigorously. Groups have been eliminated in warfare or invasion by other groups, but this rude test is inconclusive since so many factors enter in besides the character of their respective folkways—numbers, economic resources, the possession of superior weapons, leadership, military organization, and so forth. Primitive peoples have been wiped out by the imposition on them of the conditions of an alien civilization, but this again has hardly more claim to be called natural selection than the extinction of animals held in captivity. Depopulation has overcome once prosperous peoples of the Eastern Mediterranean. This has frequently been attributed to their social vices, but without denying that such an explanation may sometimes be tenable, we must observe that the extreme depopulation in question occurred in regions where the conditions of nature became less hospitable to man.

In general, therefore, a survey of the diverse customs and institutions of many peoples leads to the same conclusion as before. There is a certain amount of effective competition, growing as the

²⁰ *Societal Evolution*. (New York, 1915), the reference being to an account of the Shingu tribes by von der Steiner.

range of social contacts increases, between the techniques and practical arts of different groups, leading to the elimination of the less effective *methods*. We may, by a stretch of language, speak of this as natural selection. But even this modified form has little application to the folkways. We may quote here the language of a writer who devoted his life to their study.

In short, as we go upwards from the arts to the mores and from the mores to the philosophies and ethics, we leave behind us the arena in which natural selection produces progressive evolution out of the close competition of forms some of which are more fit to survive than others, and we come to an arena which has no boundaries and no effective competition. The conflicts are freer and freer and the results of the conflicts less and less decisive. The folkways seem to me like a great restless sea of clouds, in which the parts are forever rolling, changing, and jostling, as temperature, wind currents, and electric discharges vary. . . . If they conform to the conditions and forces from moment to moment, that is the end of their existence.²¹

But where the eliminative processes are less in evidence, there is another selective process, peculiarly social in its character, which is at work, a process which takes over the area of indifference from which natural selection retreats.

THE RANGE OF SOCIAL SELECTION

Some contrasts between natural and social selection.—In so far as forces generated within human society and operating through social relationships create conditions which affect the reproduction and survival rates of the population as a whole and differentially of the various groups within it, we can term the process *social selection*. In its modes of operation it stands in marked contrast to natural selection. Natural selection acts solely through the death rate, selecting between beings already in existence and only thus determining who shall come into existence. Social selection also acts on the death rate, but its more characteristic action is directly on the birth rate. Natural selection offers only the alternatives of death or successful adaptation, social selection offers many alternatives. It is not merely or mainly eliminative; it is in part preventive and in part creative, determining the beings who are to be born and not only the beings who are to survive. It is concerned with preferences; it

²¹ Quoted in A. G. Keller's *Societal Evolution* (New York, 1915), Chap. VIII, from the essay, "Evolution and the Mores," by W. G. Sumner.

makes effective certain out of many possibilities. If we think only of one aspect of it, sexual selection, we can apprehend the infinite variety of its operation. Natural selection demands simply adaptation to an existing environment; it has no other standard. It favors equally the scrub of the desert and the tropical forest. Social selection creates its standards in accordance with the society. Natural selection stands on guard outside the increasing area of indifference which the social heritage assures; social selection works within it, turning this indifference into its service. Natural selection limits the directions along which humanity may travel; social selection decides the direction within these limits. Finally, before natural selection the organic being remains passive or merely resistant. It is in no wise an expression of his nature, still less of his desires. But social selection is in large measure volitional, the direct or the indirect result of human purposes or preferences.

Two modes of social selection.—A distinction is here suggested between two modes of social selection, one the mere sequel of social conditions established with different ends in view, the other the direct result of social planning towards the end thereby achieved. In a great many ways the organization of society, apart from any such intention on the part of its members, alters the balance of reproduction and survival. As an instance of the first mode we may cite the differential mortality from occupational diseases. If stonecutters have a high mortality from tuberculosis or if the children of workers in white lead have a lessened chance of survival, the lethal forces of nature are here implemented by conditions for which society is responsible. If, on the other hand, the child mortality of all classes, though in different degrees, is lessened by better nutrition and hygiene and the various applications of medical science, here the lethal forces of nature are checked by socially created conditions. The social conditions determining the relative success or failure of different groups, the rules regulating economic inheritance, the distribution of occupations responsive to technological advance, the opportunities for the employment of women, the length of the training required for the professions—these are simply a few of the more obvious factors which, as they change, affect also the modes of social selection.

But with these changes *direct* controls of various kinds and degrees emerge. Society directly controls the death rate by rules concerning sanitation and hygiene, by the institution of medical facilities in general, more especially by the application of preventive medicine, and by rules intended to safeguard its members against

material hazards endangering life and in some degree by penalties against homicide, infanticide, and abortion. Society controls the mating relationship partly by definite regulation of the marriage contract, establishing a minimum age limit, proscribing bigamy, permitting or denying divorce, requiring in some states a certificate of health, and so forth; but the control exercised through the mores is far more significant than that exercised through the laws. Society attempts to control the birth rate by prohibiting, permitting, or facilitating the dissemination of knowledge concerning birth control, by mitigating through tax exemptions, wage allowances, and other devices, the costs of raising a family; and by providing for the segregation, and in some instances for the sterilization, of the very "unfit." But here again the controls exercised through the mores of each group and community, controls made effective through individual volition and not through public regulation, are of vastly greater moment.

How social selection operates through the mores.—It is well established that economic conditions influence the marriage rate, that they are reflected in the average age at which members of different groups marry, that in times of depression marriages are fewer, that the size of the family varies for different standards of living. But we shall not understand how social selection operates unless we realize that the economic conditions in question do not *as such* cause the various changes with which they are correlated. If, for example, marriages are less numerous in times of depression or if professional groups postpone marriage to a later age than do unskilled workers, it is because of the socially accepted demand for certain prerequisites of marriage. In short, it is the mores of the various groups that are immediately operative. The mores set up the various standards on which mating, the conditions of marriage, and the size of the family depend. The social system establishes the conditions within which these standards operate. Thus in a highly specialized society the members of the same profession or craft are thrown more into one another's company. So teachers are more apt to marry teachers, scientists to marry scientists, musicians to marry musicians, doctors to marry nurses, and so forth. The greater the degree of specialization or of stratification the greater the tendency to selective mating of this sort.

The selective influence of the mores is revealed in many ways. We pointed out that marriage is less frequent among second-generation immigrants. This fact may be explained as due to the unsettlement of groups who are passing from one set of mores to another.

The ways of married life are apt to be more settled ways.²² Consequently we might expect the less settled, less adjusted groups to be less married. The first-generation immigrant clings the more closely to his traditional usages, but his children, subjected in the formative stage to the clashing demands of the old and the new environment, with family influences on the side of the old and education and generally social prestige on the side of the new, are faced with a different and sometimes insoluble problem of adjustment.

Perhaps a not dissimilar conflict may be present in the change of social environment to which college education introduces in this country so many young men and women, and may be adduced in partial explanation of the low marriage rates of women graduates and even of the peculiarly low birth rates of college graduates as witnessed to by certain studies.²³ No doubt other factors enter in. In the case of women graduates, for example, the argument may be put forward that a larger percentage of those girls who are in any event less likely or less disposed to marry may be expected to carry through a college career. But the author is inclined here, as also with respect to certain phenomena of urban life referred to in the discussion of the city, to lay more stress on the influence of the migration from one social status or one set of mores to another than on the effects of the new condition per se, in this case the effects of a system of education. An examination of this subject would, however, involve too detailed an analysis to be entered upon in this discussion.

The instances we have given may serve to suggest the omnipresent action of the mores as an agency of social selection. Wherever we find a group with a distinctive mode of living we find a group responding also in its own characteristic way to the selective influence of its mores. This fact is shown very clearly if we compare the statistics relating to birth, marriage, and death for different occupational groups. Evidently the processes of social selection are very intricate, as they exhibit the flexible accommodation to the variant conditions of all the distinctive groups within a community. Thus while the influences making for a lower birth rate and a lower death rate have permeated a whole civilization, they show a myriad of differences in their impact and mode of operation. There are, for example, highly significant differences between occupational

²² Cf. E. R. Groves and W. F. Ogburn, *American Marriage and Family Relationships*, Chap. X.

²³ See, for example, John C. Phillips, "A Study of the Birth-rate in Harvard and Yale Graduates," *Harvard Graduates' Magazine*, Vol. 25 (1907).

groups on the same income level. A study of these differences leads us behind the economic fact, behind the standard of living, to the modes of living of each group, in the determination of which the standard of living combines with cultural, occupational, and class differences. It is when we turn to the mode of living that we attain a more adequate understanding of social selection. Some illustrations of these differences will be offered so that we may perceive more fully how the mores operate.

Occupation and fertility as illustrative of social selection.—We shall use by way of illustration two census studies, one British and one American. The British *Report on the Fertility of Marriage* (Census of England and Wales, Vol. XIII, 1911, published only in 1923) is a landmark in our knowledge of this subject.²⁴ While the method of computing fertility adopted in the *Report* is open to some criticisms, these do not affect the particular conclusions to which we here draw attention.²⁵ The *Report* divides the population first into eight classes, the five social status classes referred to on page 168 and three classes taken, for reasons which will presently appear, out of the general ranking. These are the textile workers, the miners, and the agricultural workers. The *Report* shows the usual linking of higher child mortality and higher natality with lower economic and social status, but two of the special classes are anomalous in this respect. The textile workers vary unfavorably, having a relatively low birth rate with a high death rate; the agricultural workers show the opposite character of a death rate lower than that of the whole class into which they fall both economically and with respect to the birth rate. The third of the special classes, the miners, differs chiefly in the abnormally high birth rate level which it attains. Already in these broad classifications we see the necessity for taking the mode of living into account.

The *Report* gives statistics for practically every occupational group, showing its crude fertility in terms of children born per 100 couples, its standardized fertility when allowance is made for the average age of the wives at time of marriage, and its child mortality rate. Some of the correlations which are brought out by the statistics are as follows:

(1) The fertility of occupational groups in which the wives engage more generally in "gainful occupations" is lower than that of other groups in the same economic category. The outstanding

²⁴ Cd. 8678. Part II contains an admirable analysis of the statistics.

²⁵ The statistically minded student will find these criticisms in Kuczynski, *The Measurement of Population Growth*, pp. 130 ff.

case is that of the textile workers, who have, compared with any other large group of workers, a markedly low fertility.

(2) The fertility of occupational groups whose work involves considerable change of location or physical mobility is lower than that of other groups in the same economic category. This correlation is illustrated from every position in the social scale. Thus actors, though not given to postponement of marriage, have the lowest fertility in the whole occupational list—note that they fall also under the condition referred to in (1) above. Other groups with relatively low fertility for their respective classes are officers of the army and navy, commercial travelers, and “navvies” or pick-and-shovel laborers who migrate from job to job.

(3) The fertility of occupational groups tends to vary conversely with the length and the expense of the training required for the occupation. Thus while the fertility of the professional groups is throughout lower than that of other occupational groups, the professions which involve the longest preparation, such as those of the barrister and the physician, exhibit a specially low fertility. It is also noteworthy that they postpone marriage till a later age than do the other professions.

(4) The fertility of occupational groups engaged in arduous work requiring much physical exertion is generally higher than that of other groups in the same economic category. Thus the fertility rates of miners, agricultural laborers, and steelworkers head the list for the whole population.

(5) The fertility of those occupational groups whose work brings them into close contact with the members of the “upper classes” is generally lower than that of other groups in the same category. The statistics for such occupations as those of the hair-dresser, waiter, and domestic chauffeur bear this out.

The *Report* offers many further evidences of the sensitiveness of fertility to social conditions. One curious indication may be mentioned in conclusion. “The birthplace of the husband,” says the *Report*, “has much more influence upon the size of the family than that of the wife.” This means that in cases where either the husband or the wife has migrated from areas of higher to those of lower fertility, or *vice-versa*, the family tends to approximate more nearly to the fertility type of the area in which the husband was bred. For example, “rural-born husbands, married to London-born wives in London, return a standardized rate of 266, and rural-born wives, similarly married (i.e., to London-born husbands in London) one of 250, a male excess of 16, while London-born husbands, mar-

ried to rural-born wives in the rural counties, return a rate of 257, and London-born wives, similarly married, of 273, a female excess of 16." If we accept the hypothesis that the husband exercises the dominant influence—or did in England before 1911—the variation fits in well with our argument. A parallel is found in the English experience of marriages in which either of the contracting parties is an alien. Thus "Irish-born men married to English-born women have considerably larger families than English-born husbands with Irish-born wives, and the same difference applies to Anglo-Russian marriages" (*Report*, Pt. II, p. cliii). It would be extremely interesting to discover how far American experience, with its large proportion of internationality marriages, corroborates this conclusion, but adequate statistics are not available.

We turn next to some American statistics which reveal, though on broader lines, the influence of occupation and concomitant mode of living on the birth rate, while they also throw light on some other aspects of social selection peculiar to a country of immigration. We shall quote from the Census Monograph already referred to, *Ratio of Women to Children, 1920*.²⁶ The Census gives annual statistics showing by occupations the number of children ever born to wives who were reported as mothers of that year. The figures for 1920 show miners at the head of the list—the average number of children per family is given as 4.3 for mine operatives, while for foremen, overseers, and inspectors it is 4.6. Unskilled workmen (manufacturing and mechanical occupations, "laborers not otherwise specified") are high with 3.7; farm laborers show 3.5 and semiskilled workers 3.0, while various skilled groups are distinctly lower; clerical occupations come towards the end of the list, ranging from 2.2 for clerks to 1.9 for stenographers and typists.²⁷ These figures are obviously not so conclusive as those cited from the English *Report*, since they do not show the size of completed families, and hence those occupations which fall to older men have unduly high averages. If we take, on the other hand, the figures showing the number of children ever born to women completing the childbearing stage (aged 40 to 44), as given for the year 1925, we find again that Class V occupations head the list (miners 9.1, farm laborers 8.6, manufacturing laborers 8.3), followed by farmers with 8; that Class IV occupations, represented by semiskilled manufacturing operatives, come next with 7.2; that Class III, represented by carpenters and plumbers, follows with 6.9 and 6.7; and that in Class I

²⁶ Warren S. Thompson, *op. cit.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

clergymen are highest with 6.3, while bankers show 4.5, and physicians and dentists respectively 4.3 and 3.9. These figures show a differential fertility similar in most respects to that presented in the English figures, and the divergences can be explained by differences in occupational conditions in the two countries.²⁸ The American figures probably exaggerate the size of the families in all classes, since a larger number of the more fertile wives would likely be mothers in any given year, and again more of the more fertile would be likely to have children when aged 40 to 44. The classes practicing birth control are certainly least apt to have children at these ages of the wife. For other reasons also the samples cannot be regarded as adequate, especially for the groups having the smaller memberships. But the general conclusion that fertility everywhere varies with the conditions and the mores of specific social groups is confirmed by all the researches that have been made on the subject.²⁹

Social change and biological change.—The evidence we have offered strongly suggests that with respect to fertility modern humanity is very sensitive to social influences, as distinct from racial or biological conditions; that whatever biological changes are involved are specifically set in motion by changes within the mores. It is much easier to assume that the conditions of occupation control the variations they reveal than that men select themselves for occupations which discourage fertility, say the occupation of spinner or of bank official, by virtue of a weaker instinct for large families. A like conclusion forces itself upon us when we consider the unprecedented decline in crude fertility which has been in progress throughout the civilized world in recent times, or again when we reflect on both the divergences and the similarities of population rates for different peoples.

It is sometimes held that the decline of the birth rate is primarily a biological fact, due, that is, to increasing sterility or infecundity. In support of this conclusion there is some evidence that childless

²⁸ For example, dentists show a lower comparative fertility in the United States, a fact which may be related to the different standing of the profession in the two countries, at least as between the English conditions in 1911 and the American in 1920.

²⁹ Among these researches special reference should be made to a series of studies undertaken under the auspices of the Milbank Memorial Fund, such as E. Sydenstricker and F. W. Notestein, "Differential Age at Marriage according to Social Class," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 37 (1931), 22-48; F. W. Notestein, "The Relation of Social Status to the Fertility of Native-born Married Women," in G. H. L. F. Pitt-Rivers, *Problems of Population* (New York, 1932), pp. 147-163.

marriages are increasing, at least among the higher social classes.³⁰ The proportion of childless marriages among the graduates of Harvard and Yale increased somewhat between the period 1861-70 and the period 1881-90.³¹ Evidences of this kind are susceptible of other interpretations, though it is quite possible that they point to a biological factor. But the differential fertility rates we have been discussing indicate very clearly that the social factor is the predominant one. Only on this hypothesis does it seem possible to explain the various correlations between fertility ratios and social-economic conditions, the graded decline of the birth rate from the higher to the lower economic levels, the spread of the decline from the classes and the countries first affected to other classes and to other countries, the concomitance of declining birth rate and declining death rate, and such other statistically established facts as that the disparity in fertility between classes is greatest for early marriages and becomes rapidly smaller for marriages contracted at later age-periods.

The whole situation is far more easily intelligible if we assume that the decline in fertility is due to deliberate control responsive to changing mores and changing conditions. Take, for example, the abruptness with which in some countries the birth rate began to fall. In England the beginning of the continuous decline of the birth rate dates from 1878. It so happened that the previous year witnessed the famous trial of Charles Bradhaugh and Mrs. Annie Besant for their offense in publishing a new edition of an "obscene" book on birth control. Before the trial this book was selling at the rate of 700 copies a year. Owing to the great publicity given to the case 125,000 copies were sold in the three months between the arrest and the trial. In New South Wales a similar trial took place ten years later than the English one, and in the following year the birth rate of that colony dropped sharply.³² We are not, of course, suggesting that had these trials not taken place the subsequent continuous decline of the birth rate would not have occurred. But it seems a reasonable assumption that these episodes, with their

³⁰ A. J. Lotka ("Sterility in American Marriages," *Proceedings, National Academy of Sciences*, Vol. 14 [1928], 99-108) found a net sterility rate of 13.1 per cent. Mrs. K. B. Davis, in *Factors in the Sex Life of 2,200 Women* (New York, 1929), concludes that of upper-class marriages generally 20 per cent are sterile.

³¹ J. C. Phillips, *op. cit.*

³² For these cases see J. A. Field, *Essays on Population* (Chicago, 1931), Chap. VII.

sudden impact on the public mind, helped to precipitate attitudes which more deep-moving forces were fostering.

In order to interpret these movements it is particularly important to observe the manner in which they spread. Otherwise we may draw false conclusions as to their future course. They have arisen out of the conditions characteristic of modern civilization. First affecting the groups most responsive to these conditions, they have permeated gradually to all other classes.³³ The groups that are semi-isolated from these influences, living by themselves as quasi communities, such as the English agricultural workers and the miners, are those most exempt from the process. And again it is those relatively self-contained communities, with mores strongly opposed to cultural change, such as the French Catholics of Quebec, which retain the old equilibrium of a high birth rate and a high death rate. The power of prestige and the contagion of suggestion, as well as the slower impact of the same cultural influences, all work in the same direction. Nor are there economic obstacles to the spread of these influences such as limit the range of other practices of the well to do. In fact, in an age of compulsory schooling, child-labor laws, and old-age insurance, the former economic obstacles are transformed into economic inducements. The situation out of which this permeation of influences grows is well suggested in the following summary of conditions in a moderate-sized American city.

The behavior of the community in this matter of the voluntary limitation of parenthood—in this period [1890-1924] of rapidly changing standards of living, irregular employment, the increasing isolation and mobility of the individual family, growing emphasis upon child training and upon education and other long-term family plans such as insurance and enforced home ownership on a time payment basis—presents the appearance of a pyramid. At the top, among most of the business group, the use of relatively efficacious contraceptive methods appears practically universal, while sloping down from the peak is a mixed array of knowledge and ignorance until the base of ignorance is reached. Here fear and worry over pregnancy frequently walk hand in hand with discouragement as to the future of the husband's job and the dreaded lay-off.³⁴

The dark problem of social selection.—Reviewing the manifold evidences of the activity of social selection, we are impressed by one

³³ Significant evidence was given by Dr. Edin at the World Population Conference of 1927 (see *Report* of same, pp. 205-207) that in Stockholm the well-to-do classes were actually having larger families than the poorer groups among the working classes.

³⁴ Lynd, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-126.

great difficulty which all investigations along these lines encounter. We find social selection everywhere at work, but we never *see* its results as such. The causes are clear, the results are hidden. How, for example, does the present generation, because of the disproportionate recruiting of its members from the various economic and social classes of the past generation, differ from the latter? Can we *know* that the particular characteristics which its members display are differences in any degree due to social selection? They have been brought up in a changing social environment, and we can observe their responsiveness to these changes. The selective influences belong within that environment, and we can perceive how these influences affect their conduct, their social relationships. We can perceive how the lower birth rate and lower death rate are factors changing the family, not through selection however, but through the subjection to them of their present members. The results of accommodation to environment we can trace, the results of selection remain a hazardous inference. It is true that many writers speak confidently of the results of selection, writers like Ammon, Lapouge, Karl Pearson, McDougall, and a host of others, but their confidence depends on their various assumptions and not on the demonstrated establishment of a causal nexus. The most disconcerting fact, which they do not face, is that the whole social environment is changing at the same time that selection is taking place. It might be held—though even this assumption is, as we have already seen, somewhat dubious—that physical or biometric traits are withdrawn from the influence of the social environment, and that a study of their changes reveals the specific work of selection. But the conclusions thereby attained, such as Lapouge's "law" that the selective influence of urban life tends to eliminate the short-headed types in favor of the long-headed, are conflicting or contradicted by other evidences. We seem forced to the position that selection is always at work but what precisely it accomplishes remains unknown. It is certainly far easier to explain the genesis of a selective force, such as the differential birth rate, than to interpret the resulting selection.

XXIV

TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

CHANGING TECHNIQUES AND CHANGING SOCIETY

A contrast between the biological and the technological factors.—

We were baffled, in spite of the many evidences that biological selection is always operative, when we sought to trace its more profound effects on society. Social selection decides the hereditary composition of each new generation, but we cannot see *how* it operates, we cannot follow the nexus of biological cause and social effect. Social selection decides which of the endless variety of combinations of genetic elements possible at every moment will be actualized. But with the intricate complications of hereditary transmission, multiplied by the myriad diversely selective pairings which occur in a society, the attempt to learn what difference it would have made if selection had run on different lines is utterly hopeless.

The situation seems different when we turn to the technological factors. A new invention is suddenly introduced and rapidly developed. We can see how it brings about specific social changes. We can see how the radio sets up common standards of speech and how it makes the family once more a focus of recreation and how it gives the city a new cultural dominance over the country. We can see how the automobile expands the range of social relationships and reduces the communal character of the neighborhood. We can see how the technical conditions of the modern factory tend to strengthen industrial unionism and to weaken the older type of craft unionism. Moreover, technological advance, as we have seen, moves continually in the same direction, and therefore we can trace its continuous

influence over longer periods. At the same time it is concrete, measurable, demonstrable, and therefore the study of its influence on society seems to offer greater prospects to the scientific mind. In so far as we can establish a clear relation between its changes and corresponding social changes we seem to be on scientific ground. In fact it was when sociology began to follow this road that it emerged from the realm of philosophy.

Finally, the approach through technology has on other grounds a particular appeal and significance for our own age. The rapid changes of our society are obviously related to and somehow dependent upon the development of new techniques, new inventions, new modes of production, new standards of living. We live more and more in cities, and "in the city—and particularly in great cities—the external conditions of life are so evidently contrived to meet man's clearly organized needs that the least intellectual . . . are led to think in deterministic and mechanistic terms."¹ The most novel and pervasive phenomenon of our age is not capitalism but mechanization, of which modern capitalism may be merely a by-product. We realize now that this mechanization has profoundly altered our modes of life and also of thought.²

Attitudes, beliefs, traditions, which once were thought to be the very expression of essential human nature, have crumbled before its advance. Monarchy, the divine ordering of social classes, the prestige of birth, the spirit of craftsmanship, the insulation of the neighborhood, traditions regarding the spheres of the sexes, regarding religion, regarding politics and war, have felt the shock. The process, beginning with the external change and ending with the social response, is easy to follow and to understand. Take, for example, the profound changes which have occurred in the social life and status of women in the industrial age. Industrialism destroyed the domestic system of production, brought women from the home to the factory and the office, differentiated their tasks and distinguished their earnings. Here is the new environment, and the new social life of women is the response. The rapid transitions of modern civilization offer a myriad of other illustrations.

Society and the machine age.—The swift transitions of our industrial mechanized civilization have not only been followed by far-reaching social changes, but very many of these changes are such as appear either necessary accommodations or congenial responses

¹ R. E. Park, chapter on "Magic, Mentality, and City Life" in Park and Burgess, *The City*.

² See, for example, L. Mumford, *Technics and Civilization* (New York, 1934).

to the world of the machine. In the former category come the higher specialization of all tasks, the exact time-prescribed routine of work, the acceleration of the general tempo of living, the intensification of competition, the obsolescence of the older craftsmanship, the development, on the one hand, of the technician and, on the other, of the machine operative, the expansion of economic frontiers, and the complicated extending net work of political controls. In the latter may be included the various accompaniments of a higher standard of living, the transformation of class structures and of class standards, the undermining of local folkways and the disintegration of the neighborhood, the breaking up of the old family system, the building of vast changeful associations in the pursuit of new wealth or power, the increasing dominance of urban ways over those of the country, the spread of fashion, the growth of democracy and of plutocracy, the challenge of industrial organized groups, particularly the organizations of labor, to the older forms of authority.

With these conditions are bred corresponding attitudes, beliefs, philosophies. A great mass of contemporary social criticism seeks to depict and often to arraign the cultural concomitants of the machine age. Its tenor is generally as follows: Different qualities are now esteemed because the qualities which make for success, for wealth, and for power are different. Success is measured more in pecuniary terms, as possession is more detachable from social and cultural status. A form of democratization has developed which measures everything by units or by quantities and admits no differences in personal values save as they are attached to external goods or are the means of their acquisition. Men grow more devoted to quantity than to quality, to measurement than to appreciation. The desire for speed dominates, for immediate results, for quick speculative advantages, for superficial excitations. The life of reflection, the slow ripening of qualitative judgments, is at a discount. Hence novelty is sought everywhere, and transient interests give a corresponding character to social relationships. The changing interests of civilization absorb men to the relative exclusion of the more permanent interests of culture. Men grow pragmatic in their philosophies. "Things are in the saddle and ride mankind." The mechanistic outlook explains life itself in behavioristic terms, as a series of predetermined responses to successive stimuli. The unity of life is dissipated, since from the mechanistic point of view all things are means to means and to no final ends, functions of functions and of no values beyond.

Direct and indirect effects of technological change.—That the tendencies thus described are at least accentuated by the mechanization both of work and of the means and conditions of recreation is clearly established by a great mass of evidence. It can scarcely be a mere coincidence that in the periods and in the countries of rapid technological advance there should have developed corresponding or congenial ways of thinking and of living. Nevertheless we should be wary of concluding too hastily that social relations are in all important respects predominantly determined by technological changes. This conclusion would hold only if, culture also, the values men set before them as ends for which to live, were essentially the product of technology. But culture in turn seeks to direct technology to its own ends. Men may be the master as well as the slave of the machine. He has already rejected many of the conditions that accompanied and seemed to be imposed by the earlier technology of the Industrial Revolution. He has gone some way in all civilized countries to place a variety of controls on factory toil, on the squalor of factory towns, on the shoddiness and ugliness of many factory-made goods, on the risks and fatigues of many factory operations. Man is a critic as well as a creature of circumstance. Therefore we should distinguish between the more direct and less direct social consequences of mechanization or other technological process. Certain social consequences are the inevitable results of technological change, such as a new organization of labor, the expansion of the range of social contacts, the specialization of function, and the encroachment of urban influences on rural life. Others, not being inevitable conditions of the operation of the new techniques, are more provisional or more precarious, such as the increase of unemployment, the intensified distinction between an employing and a wage-earning class, the heightening of competition, and the prevalence of mechanistic creeds. In the remaining sections of this chapter we shall endeavor to show that the deterministic theories which make technological change the dominant or overruling cause of social change are one-sided or misleading. But first it is well to insist on the positive aspect, and show by citing some recent developments how real and how important an agency of social change is the quest of modern man to discover and to utilize new techniques, new and more efficient methods of accomplishing his ends.

How technological advance initiates social change.—Every technological advance, by making it possible for men to achieve certain results with less effort or at less cost, at the same time provides new opportunities and establishes new conditions of life. The oppor-

tunities, or some of them, are frequently anticipated in the development or exploitation of the new devices; the new conditions of life are in large measure the necessary and unanticipated adjustments to the new opportunities. A few illustrations will bring out the distinction. Take, for example, the advance of agricultural technology. The improvements in the breeds of cattle, in the use of fertilizers, in the varieties of seed, in mechanical labor-saving devices, and so forth, have had as their direct objective the increase in the quantity and quality of agricultural production. But as concomitants of the attainment of this objective there have gone changes in farm economy and in the manner of life of the farming household. And beyond these again there have gone changes in the relation of agriculture to industry, migrations from the farm to the city because of the lessened numbers required to supply the agricultural needs of the whole community, the decay or abandonment of marginal farm lands, tendencies to agricultural depression, new struggles for foreign markets and new tariff barriers. And these changes in turn have stimulated new and difficult economic problems. Thus the achievement of the immediate objective of agricultural technology has led by an inevitable nexus to changes of an entirely different order.

Even more far-reaching and complex are the social changes that spring from the development of the techniques of communication. For communication is at once a primary condition of social relations and a basis of nearly all other forms of technological advance. The course of civilization has been marked by a constant development of the means of communication, but never so rapidly as in our own days, when electricity is not only being adopted as motive power in place of steam, not only is a factor in the improvement of automobile and airplane, not only makes the motion picture a vast commercial enterprise and television a promising adventure, but also, resuming its distance-annihilating range, becomes in the radio a voice that is heard simultaneously by millions over the face of the earth. The impact of these changes on society is too enormous and too multifarious to be dealt with here except by way of incidental illustration.³ Every step of technological advance inaugurates a series of changes that interact with others emanating from the whole technological system. The radio, for example, affects a family situation already greatly influenced by modern technology, so that its impetus

³ For fuller illustration see *Recent Social Trends*, Chap. III, "The Influence of Invention and Discovery," by W. F. Ogburn and G. C. Gilfillan, and Chap. IV, "The Agencies of Communication," by Malcolm M. Willey and Stuart A. Rice. In reading these chapters the student should bear in mind the distinction made above between direct and indirect effects.

towards the restoration of leisure enjoyment within the home is in part counteracted or limited by opposing tendencies. Again, the radio combines with other technological changes to reduce the cultural differentiation of social classes and of urban and rural communities. On the other hand, by enabling an individual speaker to address great multitudes, it makes possible the rapid rise of new parties or social movements, provided the broadcasting system is not itself politically controlled. In the latter event it would tend to produce the opposite result, becoming a most powerful agency of propaganda monopolized by the ruling power. This last illustration should serve to show that what we call the "effects" of invention are in large measure dependent variables of the social situation into which they are introduced.

The general direction of social change with advancing technology.—Bearing in mind the caution contained in the last sentence we may still ask whether there is any major direction in which society moves under the continual impact of technological change. We have seen that technology itself tends always in the same direction, attaining ever greater efficiency in the performance of *each* of the various functions to which its devices are applied. In doing so it specializes functions more and more, and thus tends to create an ever-increasing division of labor, with whatever social consequences depend thereon. The social significance of this growing division of labor has been given classic treatment by Durkheim, though some of his conclusions, such as that greater liberty and a diminution of class differences are concomitants of specialization, are stated in too sweeping and universal a form.⁴ More certain is the correlation between technological advance and a more elaborate social organization with higher interdependence between its parts, greater mobility of the members with respect to location and to occupation, more elaborate systems of laws and of governmental controls, new concentrations both of economic and of political power, greater instability of the institutional order, greater leisure and generally higher standards of living for large numbers. These conditions seem to be directly bound up with growing technological efficiency, and they in turn have further repercussions on every aspect of social life. They also create some extremely important social problems, one being the unbalance of the economic system that accompanies the accelerated processes of technological change. But within our limits we can do no more than suggest some of the immediate social concomitants of technological advance.

⁴ *The Division of Labor in Society, passim.*

These concomitants are so obvious and so far-reaching that they have inspired various doctrines which attach primary importance to technology as the direct or indirect determinant of social change. Since such doctrines tend to minimize the role of the cultural factors which we are presently to consider and since they have attained a great vogue and thus, as beliefs, have themselves become *cultural* conditions of social change, we shall devote the remainder of this chapter to a review of them. For this purpose we shall take up two types of theory, first, the economic-technological interpretation of society which found its most famous exponent in Karl Marx; and second, the specific technological determinism, more congenial to American thought, which is represented by the incisive American sociologist, Thorstein Veblen.

THE MARXIST EXPLANATION OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Deterministic theories of society.—When the social phenomenon is thought of as purely a response, in other words, when the environmental change is regarded as prior, not itself dependent on changing human purposes, inevitably followed therefore by the particular response, we have the deterministic or, as it is often called, the materialistic explanation of social change. This type of explanation has many varieties, according as stress is laid on one or another aspect of the environment. If, for example, climatic or geographical changes are made primary, we are dealing with conditions which man certainly does not bend to his will, and the explanation becomes a very simple (though very inadequate) one. If, however, economic or technological conditions are stressed, the explanation becomes more complex, not only because these are constantly and often rapidly changing but also because they are themselves the expression of human activities and thus the determinism is never absolute. Such explanations can still be called deterministic if they assume that human nature remains unchanging through the process, so that the environmental change is always the initiating or precipitating factor of the social change, or if they make the social change the unintended but necessary result of environmental change which is indeed the work of man but only as the cumulative consequence of his efforts to satisfy his elemental desires. In one way or another we shall see that these assumptions underlie the important deterministic doctrines which we are presently to examine. In short, for the inter-

pretation of social evolution they make the process of civilization primary, and cultural processes secondary and dependent upon them.

An initial difficulty of any deterministic theory is that the environment to which we respond is very complex, so that our response to it must be selective. This difficulty is apparent when we try to reconcile the various types of deterministic theory. Suppose, for example, we are seeking to explain the peculiar characteristics of North American society. We cannot at the same time give priority, with Huntington, to the influence of climate and geography, and with Turner to the influence of the frontier mode of life, and with Marx to the economic system, and with Veblen to the habits engendered by the technique of industry. Any of these explanations may be sound for that matter, nor is one necessarily a determinist if he accepts any of them. The difficulty is that none of them can be established on purely deterministic grounds, for we cannot on these grounds explain why a society responds to some at one time and reacts against them at another. The true nature of this difficulty will be seen when we examine the more explicitly deterministic theories. We shall see that they emphasize indubitable factors in the social process, but that they are inadequate when they postulate the oversimple psychology of stimulus and response which every form of determinism requires.

The kernel of the Marxist theory.—The social stresses of the Industrial Revolution led in the nineteenth century to a revival, restatement, and sharper formulation of the theory that the structure of society is an economic creation and its changes essentially the sequel of economic changes. This movement may be said to have culminated in the evolutionary teaching of Karl Marx, particularly in what he called the materialistic conception or construction of history. In this construction we begin with the power of economic production as the determinant of primary economic relationships—given the stage of productive efficiency these relationships are “indispensable and independent of men’s will.”⁵ In other words, the stage of technological development determines the mode of production and the relationships and institutions that constitute the economic system. This set of relationships is in turn the chief determinant of the whole social order, or, as Marx puts it in the same work, “the sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social

⁵ *Critique of Political Economy* (tr. Stone, New York, 1904), p. 11.

consciousness.”⁶ The cultural life of man, his intellectual, aesthetic, spiritual life, his creeds and his philosophies, and the social forms which are their vehicles, are the reflection of the economic order. Here is the “material” reality which comes to consciousness in our ideals.

There is some controversy as to whether Marx and his collaborator, F. Engels, really meant to assert that social and cultural phenomena are wholly or only dominantly determined by economic or “material” conditions. Their various statements are not fully reconciled and are susceptible of either interpretation. They are generally put forward dogmatically, without attempted proof, but the tenor is, with occasional qualifications, deterministic. In their later writings and in their correspondence they several times object to the interpretation of their theories that makes other than economic factors purely derivative and noncausal.⁷ But they hold to the position that the economic situation is the foundation of the social order—in fact, it is this position which gives its distinctive character to the whole Marxist system. We are not, however, concerned here with the particular attitudes of individual authors but only with the validity of a mode of social interpretation that happens to be associated with them.

The lever of social change.—The “material forces of production” are subject to change, and thus a rift arises between the underlying economic factors and the economic relationships built upon them. The productive process demands—and of necessity will secure—a transformation of economic relationships and therewith of the whole social superstructure. But the social and economic order does not conform to the gradual emergence of the economic demand. For the older order has created its “ideologies” and its vested interests. It is those who are fettered by the now obsolescent order who awaken to the consciousness of its decay and accomplish its overthrow. A social revolution thus attends the birth of each new stage of society. The ideology of the dominant economic class opposes itself to the ideology of the class whom that order suppressed and whom the new would liberate. Thus, in the words of the *Communist Manifesto*, “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle.”

As it was in the past, in the days of ancient slavery and in the feudal age of landowner and serf, so it is today. The stage is dif-

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 11-12.

⁷ See, for example, Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence* (International Publishers edn., New York, 1934), Letters 213, 214, 229.

ferent, but the process of evolution is the same—and so it will be until one further stage is reached, which obliterates the “contradictions” latent or open in all preceding stages. The capitalistic order is in this sense penultimate. In it the class struggle is simplified, reducing itself more and more into the clear-cut conflict of two great classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. But the underlying processes of economic production are inevitably increasing the numbers of the proletariat in proportion to those of the bourgeoisie, preparing for the day when the latter shall become the whole and in the last revolution the class struggle shall end and the era of liberation from economic determinism itself shall begin.

How this last revolution will occur—and this is the only aspect of the social process on which Marx lavishes his interest—is as follows. The principle of capitalism is the principle of profit making through the hiring of labor. Labor is the only economic good that produces more than its “cost.” It reproduces its “cost,” that is, the exchange-value of its own subsistence and maintenance, in so many working hours. This is the price the capitalist pays for it, but his profit is a “surplus-value” that comes from the additional hours during which he secures for this price the services of labor. “Capital is a monster that is fruitful and multiplies.” It is the law of its nature that it must grow in the hands of those who possess most of it. The rich become richer but fewer, the proletariat of wage earners grows ever larger. This process moves to a climax. Capitalism begins with the “expropriation” of the small owner, turning him into a wage earner, then it advances to the “expropriation” of the smaller capitalists. So the situation ripens to its overthrow. At last “the integument is burst asunder” and “the expropriators are expropriated.”⁸

The challenge of the Marxist theory.—We need not here concern ourselves with the scientific quality, on which Marx prided himself, of his economic “laws.” His theory of value and its corollary of surplus-value, his theory of the sole productivity of labor as such, and his law of the accumulation of capital are derived from an outmoded, abstract, and narrow doctrine of the equivalence of price and cost which modern economic analysis rejects. The importance of Marx does not rest on his elaborate but uncritical formulations of economic theory. It was as a dramatic and apocalyptic prophet that he stirred the world, appealing to myriads who suffered the hazards and the exploitations which accompanied the growth of capitalism and to whom his dogmatic assurance and his clear-cut

⁸ *Capital* (tr. E. and C. Paul, London, 1929), Chap. XXIV, § 7.

forthright program opened a door of hope or revealed a vision of conquest. From the scientific point of view his significance lies elsewhere. He postulated a theory of economic cause and social effect which became a challenge to later thought. He himself offered no substantiation of this postulate, though he was an effective critic of opposing doctrines. Accepting it, he found many illustrations of its practical operation, but they were always illustrations, not proofs. For here we enter the perplexing realm of social interaction, and whatever factor we accept as prior in the process of change we can always show that it operates as prior, if only we ourselves begin with it. In seeking to answer Marx, later writers have been gradually forced back towards the apprehension of the intricate nature of social causation.

To see this problem aright we must set Marx in his historical setting. His theory of social evolution is methodologically akin to that of Hegel, whose postulate of the priority of reason as a causal principle was precisely opposite. Marx simply reversed the order. His "materialism" is the counter part of Hegel's "idealism." Hegel conceived social evolution as the unfolding in society of the universal spirit embodied in man. His interpretation leads from the postulated spiritual cause to the concrete phenomena of change; that of Marx from the concrete phenomena to the postulated spiritual result, the cultural reflection of the economic fact. Marx has the strategic advantage in this clash of opposites that he begins with the factor which can be objectively followed, so that the manner in which it is "reflected" in cultural and social phenomena can be made the theme of scientific investigation. But he himself does not follow this difficult road. The logic of the reversed process remains the dialectic of his master Hegel. It is still in form the three fold movement of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.

Every social and cultural stage is unstable, for Hegel because it is a necessarily inadequate expression of the demand of the spirit for the freedom of fulfillment, for Marx because the economic order depends on productive forces that develop to new forms. Each stage therefore contains the seeds of its own decay, and they ripen into the opposing order of its antithesis, the countermovement which asserts those aspects denied by the former. But the "antithesis" is also a development of what was implicit in the "thesis." It attains a higher level, and in its supersession the "synthesis" of the two comes into being. Here is the eternal process of evolution, but as Hegel was tempted to discover finality in the synthesis of the nation-state, so Marx, with his vision of a socialist

goal itself conceived as an ideal—though like all earthly paradises wisely left by him in visionary outline—ends with the synthesis of socialism. And perhaps the most curious thing in the whole Marxist theory is that at this stage the lever of change that has operated through all past history now ceases to function. With the abolition of classes and of class struggle we enter the realm of liberty, in which material forces no longer control mankind, in which instead human beings become “the masters of themselves.”⁹

The weakness and strength of Marxism.—In both the Hegelian and the Marxist systems social evolution is thought of as advancing through great well-defined stages, not by continuous sequence in the same direction but by the development of opposites. Marx gave a more drastic revolutionary quality to this concept. The Hegelian spiral becomes a kind of zigzag. The temper of the new stage is first a revulsion from that of the preceding. The established social and cultural superstructure is pulled down in order to be rebuilt. It is of course a common observation, confirmed by many instances, that modes of thought no less than of external fashion grow stale and breed antithetical modes, that there is a “swing of the pendulum,” a critical revulsion of one age or even decade from the philosophies of the preceding, or of the children from the ways of the fathers. Such movements are especially marked in times of crisis, as the period in which the Great War fell amply illustrates. On a broader scale of time puritanism is bred from libertarianism and in turn passes into it again, classicism and romanticism succeed one another, and so forth. But often these changes occur within the same economic framework, and it seems sheer dogmatism to assert that they are necessarily and mainly inspired by *its* changes. There are other causes obviously at work, some on the cultural level itself. The man who voted for the ostracism of Aristides because he was tired of hearing him called “the just” was not an abnormal human being. The critical attitude, especially on the freer cultural level, is always present lest “good” customs should corrupt the world or in order that “bad” ones may be reformed.

In short, the link between the social change and the economic process is far less direct and simple and sufficient than the Marxian psychology admits. An inadequate psychology is perhaps the fatal weakness of all determinisms. Marx asserted that human beings respond to the changes initiated in the productive system—how initiated, he does not tell us, for he speaks as though the changing

⁹ So Marx, *Critique of Political Economy*, Chap. I; F. Engels, *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific* (Kerr edn., Chicago, 1908).

technique of production explained itself and were a first cause—in a simple determinate manner. He ignores the complexities of habituation on the one hand and of revulsion on the other. He simplifies the attitudes that gather around institutions; the solidarities and loyalties of family, occupation, and nation are wholly subjected to those of class. Consequently he proclaims, in the words of the *Communist Manifesto*, that “our epoch has simplified the antagonisms of class” into those of bourgeoisie and proletariat, in spite of the fact that class lines are more simple, more demarcated, and fewer in a feudal order than in a developed capitalistic society.

Economic determinism, in short, does not solve the major problem of social causation. Its attempted solution rules out the influence of too many other factors. Economic influences are certainly powerful and penetrating. There are, for example, many indications that they profoundly affect political activities, and if Marx had merely taken the position that economic relationships are the clue to political relationships he could have offered, as other writers have done, a considerable, though by no means a total, substantiation of this view. Political like economic regulation is a means of control, and we have seen that these two means are directed in large measure to the same ends and are of necessity closely linked. But the relation of the economic to the cultural (and to its social embodiments) is less clear and certainly less conclusive. Our cultural interests are certainly affected by our economic interests. It is not difficult to establish correlations between social changes and economic changes, though it is harder to interpret them.¹⁰ But how do we pass from these indications of inter-relationship to the simple causal priority asserted by Marx? There seems no way, and certainly Marx failed to show one.

The strength of Marxism, the power of its appeal to large numbers struggling for bread within capitalist civilization, the drastic revolutionary impetus that enabled it to overthrow in time of crisis the feudal tyranny of Russia and to set up a vast experiment in communism, is the strength of a creed and not the validity of a science. It has created a new society, a form of collectivism radically different from any ever attained before by a great country, but in that society, whatever may be its new contribution to civilization and to culture, the fulfillment predicted by Marx, the inauguration of the realm of liberty, has not been attained. Marx belongs to the order of great prophets who by their predictions change the world

¹⁰ Cf., for example, Dorothy S. Thomas, *Social Aspects of the Business Cycle* (London, 1925).

but never in such wise that the changed reality corresponds to their predictions.

General grounds for rejecting the deterministic claim.—It is characteristic of deterministic theories of social change that they unduly simplify the situations with which they deal. Thus Marx oversimplified the class structure of society, declaring that "in relation to the working class all other classes are only one reactionary mass." Only under exceptional conditions and strong constraint does the consciousness of class divide mankind wholly or even mainly into a corporate bourgeoisie and a corporate proletariat, overriding cultural, religious, racial, and national distinctions. Again, he oversimplified the process of social evolution, accepting the grandiose conception of Hegel that history proceeds by definite stages from "thesis" to "antithesis." He oversimplified the dynamics of social change in giving always the paramount role to the class struggle. He oversimplified the evolution of capitalism by his assumption of the increasing concentration of wealth and the increasing proletariat. He oversimplified the role of the state, as an organization of a dominant class which with the socialist revolution would "wither away." The deterministic interpretation of social change is thus too simple.

In passing, we may suggest a general reason for the expectancy that no such simple solution is possible. In one sense economic interests are primary, because they are directed to the means which are a basis for the satisfaction of all other interests. In another sense, however, they are secondary, because they are inspired by interests beyond themselves, ulterior or intrinsic interests of which the economic means are merely the instruments, instruments which, as we have seen, are themselves relatively indifferent with respect to the alternative ends which they can serve.¹¹ They furnish the necessary equipment for whatever journey, to whatever destination, we undertake. We can agree so far with Marx that our dependence on the economic means determines largely our attitude to the whole social order which yields them to us in scantier or more abundant measure. We can agree that the conservatism or radicalism thus bred is apt to extend to the cultural realm, particularly to the "stabilizing" cultural factors such as religion. We can agree that the mode in which the economic means are acquired influences the nature of the satisfactions we seek through them, that, for example, the competitive spirit engendered in the economic struggle affects our manner of living, our recreations, our philosophies, our ideals. We can agree

¹¹ See pages 277 and 278.

that the struggle for the means of living, engrossing and perpetual as it is for the vast majority, must color, according to its character, the whole outlook of men. But in so agreeing we are simply admitting that the economic element is one highly important factor in the whole nexus of interactive influences which determine social phenomena. Its relative importance and its relation to other influences, varying according to the conditions, has still to be investigated—as we shall see, an intricate, difficult task. We cannot conclude that, because the painter is absolutely dependent on his paintbox, the nature of its contents explains the picture. No more can we conclude that the struggle of the artist to earn his living explains it. It would indeed be a remarkable conclusion, one certainly needing proofs which Marx never offers, that the means we use wholly elucidate the ends to which these means are applied.

Finally, even if we keep to the so-called materialistic ground we have no *a priori* right to single out within it the economic element as supremely determinative. Closely bound with the economic are the other aspects of civilization. The economic system, with respect to the distribution of property and the relation of producers to owners, may be revolutionized, as in Russia, while the technological system associated with the former order may endure and develop. We cannot assume that the social phenomena which distinguish a capitalistic civilization are essentially created by capitalism in the economic sense of the term. Within it are other factors, mechanization itself, urbanization, the persistent and ever-swifter contacts of communication and transportation, the development of pure and of applied science, which can never be left out of the reckoning. In fact other forms of determinism give priority to one or more of these factors. As an example we shall take the doctrine of Veblén.

THE STRICT TECHNOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Types of technological explanation.—We saw that for Marx the causal series begins with changes in the techniques of production, but he relates these changes indirectly, rather than directly, with the changing social structure. They determine economic relationships, and it is the latter which are crucial in his interpretation. There is indeed considerable obscurity concerning the actual mode in which technical changes function in his system. Other writers have much more explicitly sought to show how social conditions are responsive directly to technological conditions. We may include among them

F. J. Turner, who in *The Frontier in American History* depicted along well-known lines the social and cultural attitudes evoked by the life of the pioneer settler—the strong sense of self-determination combined with neighborly helpfulness, the rough practical versatility, the buoyancy and ready optimism, the belief in progress, the leveling spirit towards predetermined social distinctions together with the admiration of the “self-made” man—and proceeded to trace the pervasive influence of these attitudes on American institutions. Many other writers have followed this or similar paths. Some have carried the method to the deterministic extreme, and as these raise most sharply the issue of social causation we select one of the most thoroughgoing of them for study. Thorstein Veblen can quite strictly be called a technological determinist.

The Veblenian principle.—His guiding principle, reiterated insistently in his various writings, may be stated as follows: In human life the great agencies of habituation and mental discipline are those inherent in the kind of work by which men live and particularly in the kind of technique which that work involves. Here, above all, must be sought the influences which shape men's thoughts, their relations with one another, their culture and institutions of control. Habituation is the great molder of the minds as well as of the bodies of men. “The way of habit is the way of thought.” Man has certain drives or instincts, and these may be regarded as constants, but the habits to which they prompt vary according to the varying opportunity for expression, according to the material environment. It is thus the difference in environment which explains the difference in the social structure. “A genetic inquiry into institutions will address itself to the growth of habits and conventions as conditioned by material environment, and by innate and persistent propensities of human nature.”¹² These propensities are tendencies to act, to achieve, and they are fixed into determinate habits by the conditions of their expression. Man is what he does. “As he acts, so he feels and thinks.”¹³ The influence of the pragmatic philosophy is evident in Veblen's point of view, and combined with it is the influence of a contemporary mechanistic biology. Thus he tells us that “the forces which have shaped the development of human life and of social structure are no doubt ultimately reducible to terms of living tissue and material environment.”¹⁴

¹² *The Instinct of Workmanship* (New York, 1914), Chap. I.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

¹⁴ *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, p. 189.

The most explicit statement of Veblen's general viewpoint on social evolution is contained in the following passage:

Social structure changes, develops, adapts itself to an altered situation, only through a change in the habits of thought of the several classes of the community; or in the last analysis, through a change in the habits of thought of the individuals which make up the community. The evolution of society is substantially a process of mental adaptation on the part of individuals under the stress of circumstances which will no longer tolerate habits of thought formed under and conforming to a different set of circumstances in the past. . . . A readjustment of men's habits of thought to conform with the exigencies of an altered situation is in any case made only tardily and reluctantly, and only under the coercion exercised by a situation which has made the accredited views untenable. The readjustment of institutions and habitual views to an altered environment is made in response to pressure from without; it is of the nature of a response to stimulus. Freedom and facility of readjustment, that is to say capacity for growth in social structure, therefore depends in great measure on the degree of freedom with which the situation at any given time acts on the individual members of the community—the degree of exposure of the individual members to the constraining forces of the environment. If any portion or class of society is sheltered from the action of the environment in any essential respect, that portion of the community, or that class, will adapt its views and its scheme of life more tardily to the altered general situation; it will in so far tend to retard the process of social transformation. The wealthy leisure class is in such a sheltered position with respect to the economic forces that make for change and readjustment. And it may be said that the forces which make for a readjustment of institutions, especially in the case of a modern industrial community, are, in the last analysis, almost entirely of an economic nature.¹⁵

Veblen explains this last statement further as follows: "Any community may be viewed as an industrial or economic mechanism, the structure of which is made up of what is called its economic institutions. These institutions are habitual methods of carrying on the life process of the community in contact with the material environment in which it lives."

Application of the principle.—Veblen never tires of showing the correspondence between cultural conditions and underlying tech-

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 192-193. The whole chapter (VIII) from which the quotation is taken should be studied.

niques. Take the feudal order, for example. Technologically, it represents "a system of trained man power organized on a plan of subordination of man to man." This characterization holds alike of agriculture and of industry. In the cultivation of the soil it prescribes diligent unremitting toil and obedience to the superiors of the land. In industry what counts is, in the language of Adam Smith, the "skill, dexterity, and judgment of the individual worker," since as yet there is no place for the impersonal productivity of the machine and the qualities it evokes. The social structure has a corresponding character. The state is dynastic, based on personal authority and the subordination of class to class. Politics and war are fields of personal exploits, success depending on individual prowess and craft. Religion is personally authoritative, monarchical, hierarchical. But gradually the technological basis of this system is transformed, as mechanical power usurps the place of human power. New skills arrive and old skills pass, for the vocations of the designer, the engineer, the machine tender, call for other aptitudes than "dexterity." With habituation to the control of mechanism the idea of power itself changes. The dominating conception is no longer the arbitrary power of personal command, of will over will, but the regulated power of man over man-made mechanisms, obedient to inexorable law.

In this reconstruction of the nature of power is inherent a new attitude, a new logic, which fights a winning battle against feudal preconceptions. The new technology, reinforced by the social necessities it creates, destroys the old organization of society. The institutions which resist the process most are those which are most remote from industrial influences. Thus with respect to high politics, the politics of war and imperialism, the old preconceptions are most tenacious. But the thrones on which they sit are undermined. The ancient virtues of "patriotic animosity and national jealousy" are hard beset by the necessities of international commerce and by the mechanization of warfare. Veblen illustrates this conflict particularly in the book entitled *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution*, a conflict between the patriarchal imperial attitude of the ruling feudal class and the forces of industrialization within the country. The mores of the established order were contradicted by the lessons unconsciously learnt from devotion to technical advance, an advance the ruling class could not oppose because their own prosperity was bound up with it. Thus the system of control became archaic and when the shock came its hollowness was dis-

closed. In other lands, as they became industrialized, similar conflicts have occurred.

The peculiar habits of thought of each age are then to be traced back to the particular discipline of life which is imposed by its techniques. Moreover, in the more democratic form of society the impact of technique is more unified and therefore more powerful. This idea Veblen puts forward in a chapter entitled "Evolution of the Scientific Point of View."¹⁶ Here he points out that under a hierarchical system the technical basis of behavior has a widely different significance for the upper and the lower groups. The institutions of society are chiefly in the keeping of the upper classes, and their social function is the maintenance of the corresponding system of law and order. The discipline to which they are thus themselves subject diverges greatly from the discipline imposed on the subordinate or servile classes, to whom this maintenance of law and order is "at best a wearisome tribulation." Consequently there is a wide cultural difference between the upper and the lower classes. The upper are devoted to social institutions conveying prestige and authority, personal dignity and coercive control. The lower are disciplined by the specific techniques of everyday toil. But the spirit of this discipline, the habits of thought and life which their labor imposes, cannot penetrate to the upper classes who hold themselves aloof from participation in the productive process. Hence there are two cultures instead of one within society. Under the industrial-democratic regime, on the other hand, the influence of technique is more pervasive, and all behavior is more closely related to the same "work-day generalizations." Social attitudes and speculative thought conform more directly to the lessons and impressions derived from the industrial arts. All alike tend to think in terms of mechanism, of geometrical relations, of standardized patterns, of inexorable law.

For Veblen it is the "use and wont" of everyday life, whether it be pastoral, agricultural, or industrial in any of their forms, which is decisive. These habits embody themselves in institutions, and this "fabric of institutions intervenes between the material exigencies of life and the speculative scheme of things." There may indeed be a lag in the correspondence of the "speculative scheme" with the "material exigencies," because in times of transition men work in new ways while they still think in the old. The evolutionary process results from the accumulation of technical changes, from the "march of civilization," from the improvement in the industrial arts towards

¹⁶ In *The Place of Science in Modern Civilization* (New York, 1919).

greater efficiency. Social evolution is, in short, the process through which our social systems reflect technological advance.

Contrast of Veblen and Marx.—Here a contrast between Veblen and Marx appears. Marx, in spite of his insistence on the scientific quality of his socialism, cannot conceal his ethical bent. He is an idealist in a deterministic disguise—and to this fact may be attributed the strength of his appeal to large numbers. He projects a goal or consummation of social evolution which, while ascribed to the operation of rigorous laws, will bring about a great liberation of the human spirit and a new social harmony. It is a form of revelation. Veblen, more faithful to the deterministic hypothesis, offers no revelation, no goal. His exposition is, to all appearance, peculiarly matter-of-fact. The process he expounds has no dramatic denouement. "The growth of culture is a cumulative sequence of habituation."¹⁷ If the resulting scheme of life can be called higher, this is merely a way of saying that its technological foundations have become more efficient and more complex, that the pattern of civilization is more elaborate, more subtle, and more diversified.

On these terms Veblen interprets the salient features of the current "scheme of life." Take, for example, the luxury of the leisure class. Its quality of "conspicuous waste" is the expression of the pecuniary estimation of worth which springs from the devotion to detached pecuniary rewards made possible by the financial structure and control of modern business. Take economic unrest. It is the expression, not so much of privation or exploitation as of the spirit of emulation and envy which the competitive character of modern economic life engenders. The characteristics of the modern business world are due to the dominance of "pecuniary employments" over industrial activities. In the latter the desire for productive efficiency, a form of the "instinct of workmanship," rules, whereas the former are "predatory" and their spirit is one of "caution, collusion, and chicane."¹⁸

Some questions regarding the technological explanation.—In his description of modern society the matter-of-factness which we have attributed to Veblen is relieved—and perhaps contradicted—by his caustic irony. It appears especially in his attribution of motives—the danger point of all deterministic theories. Is it an adequate explanation which attributes the form of modern luxury to the principle of conspicuous waste? Does it differ in this respect from the luxury of Babylon or of Rome, or is conspicuous waste so much a motiva-

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 241.

¹⁸ *The Higher Learning in America* (New York, 1918), p. 373.

tion as a necessary concomitant of all luxurious spending? Is the dog preferred to the cat as a pet because, while he has "nasty" habits compared with the cat, he is also a more wasteful and unprofitable creature?¹⁹ Is ugliness deliberately sought in the realm of fashion so that styles may be discarded more rapidly? Or, to take a more extreme suggestion of our author, was the purpose of the wearing of corsets by women to make them "permanently and obviously unfit" for work?²⁰

We are not questioning the value of the contribution which Veblen has made to the study of social evolution. He has revealed with much insight the close relation between the basic arts and the changing structure of society. But we must question the adequacy of his interpretation. Is habituation to changing technique so all-sufficient an explanation? We find marked cultural differences between peoples at the same level of technical advance, especially primitive peoples living in semi-isolation. May there not be grounds of variation inherent in the group itself rather than expressive of its external conditions? Can we be so confident, when we survey the changing trends within a single civilization, that cultural and institutional patterns are not woven from the stuff of ideas and creeds and interests otherwise evolved than as a response to our own material contrivances? What of the borrowing and assimilation of cultural ingredients? What of the reactions against established modes and conditions which are so frequent in the higher expressions of culture? Man is a critic as well as a creature of habit—the irony of Veblen himself is a fine example of contemporary criticism of the social order. Criticism, like all other behavior, is relative to environment, but it is certainly not the expression of habituation. The environment, material and social, offers satisfactions and dissatisfactions, pleasures and pains, opportunities and repressions, in endless variety to the differently placed members of every large group. There is habituation and conformity on the one hand, there is stimulus and struggle and liberation and defeat and renewed struggle on the other. Is it not at the meeting points of old civilizations, in the shock of their opposing cultures, that in the past the greater cultures of the greater societies have arisen? And is there not, in the wider ambit of modern civilization, the continuous contact of divergent ways of life and modes of thought to stimulate further changes?

¹⁹ *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, Chap. VI.

²⁰ "The Economic Theory of Women's Dress," *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. 45 (1894), 198-205.

Once more the determinist theory seems too simple, too sweeping, too conclusive. Emphasizing the concrete perceptual measurable factors, it would follow the road of physical science to the goal of complete interpretation. But this tempting road does not lead us all the way to the social phenomena. For it does not come to grips with the continual interaction of ends and means, with the way in which cultural values, the beliefs and aspirations and dreams and hopes of men, instigate and direct and limit the search for means and modify and control the whole system of means. If we are adequately to understand the problem of social change we must look on this interaction from the cultural no less than from the technological or utilitarian side.

FROM DETERMINISTIC TO ANTIDETERMINISTIC INTERPRETATIONS

The determinist point of view.—All the interpretations of social change which we have so far examined have made it a function, as it were, of environmental change. They have not assumed that human beings and their social relationships are the mere playthings of external forces, but they have regarded them as essentially responsive to the conditions of the outer or material environment. If this position meant simply that with every change of his environment man also changes, it would be, as we have shown in Chapter IV, the most obvious of truths, the mere assertion of the universality of law. When the conditions are different society is different—a formula of this order is innocuous but unhelpful. But the deterministic theories give priority to one term in the universal correlation. The equally valid converse, when society is different the conditions are different, has little significance for them. But why should the ever-active principle of life, that follows its own determinate lines of development in tree and animal and man and the groupings of men, be regarded as merely formless plasticity poured into the cast of environment? Why should the more active factor in the correlation of life and environment be thought of as active only in response? So it is in all deterministic theories. Thus, to some, organic adaptation is the key word; to others, conscious adjustment or maladjustment; to others, habituation. To some, the response of life is immediate and semiautomatic; to others, there is a lag before the cultural conditions are adjusted to environmental changes.²¹

²¹ So W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change* and F. S. Chapin, *Introduction to the Study of Social Evolution* (New York, 1923).

To all the environment is the initiating factor in the process of social change.

We have seen that, suggestive as these theories are, they give an unvalidated priority to one factor or set of factors. The exponents of natural selection do not come to terms with the conscious element of control involved in social selection or with the broadening zone of indifference to the operation of natural selection which the social heritage ensures. The economic and technological determinists are too exclusively occupied with the psychology of adjustment or habituation, and, like the behaviorists, are apt to think they have explained a social phenomenon when they indicate that it is a "response" to the "stimulus" of given conditions. Certainly human nature is always responsive to environment, but how it responds may depend on its own creative character as well as on the environment which it in part creates.

The dogmatic element in deterministic theory.—Behind this doctrine of mere responsiveness there is hidden a peculiar dogma. Everywhere else we discover interaction, why here reaction only? The mind of man is plastic, impressionable, but why plastic only? Why should it alone be subject to no immanent process of change, in which it becomes itself an active source of change within its world? The dogma that human nature does not change (from within) would make it an anomaly in the cosmos. If the configurations of the earth are changeful, if the skies themselves are so changeful that we can discern their inconstancy through abysmal depths of space, if every living thing bears the signs of its own different past, if man's body has evolved from something anthropoid and beyond that from shapes of dim age-buried creatures—how can one share the assurance that his mind, so restless and energetic, so uniquely purposeful, remains miraculously the same, or is so lacking in character, in the quality of development, that it forever merely reflects a changing environment? If no two offspring of the same family are quite alike, if in truth men display remarkable diversities of disposition, why should the race be immutable or reveal no trend of change within itself? If man follows forever his unresting purposes, visioned before they are realized in space and time, why should not these too prepare a path of change and how can they be dismissed as the only inefficacious realities in the whole scheme of things?

To take this point of view is surely to misunderstand the extreme complexity of relationship between life and environment, and especially the incessant and intricate interaction between man

and his social heritage, that inner environment which is constructed not merely by his arts and his techniques but also by his beliefs, his desires, his fears, and his aspirations. It is here that the anti-determinists join issue with the determinists. They insist that human purposes are inherently creative. They insist, for example, that no scrutiny of the environmental conditions of ancient Greece suffices to explain the culture she developed. The old theories which attributed the culture or the social system of the Greeks or other peoples to the work of a few great minds or to the sheer genius of these peoples neglected the environmental factor. So do various modern antideterministic doctrines, those of the racialists and of certain "idealist" schools such as the Hegelian or the Spenglerian. But this contrary one-sidedness should not lead us to dismiss them altogether, any more than we dismiss the one-way theories of the determinists. We cannot thus rule out the cumulative work of human ingenuity, the critical discontent with things as they are, the endless trial and error, the visions baffled or fulfilled, the contagion of ideas. There may be many equally possible ways in which a group can adjust itself to the conditions of its material environment, many ways in which it can respond to its demands. There is room for the directive intelligence of the few. There is room for the play of conjuncture or chance, seized and directed in the unstable flux by the discerning mind. Even the social heritage does not impose one mode of conduct on those who "respond" to it. They respond selectively. There is not one way of writing a novel or building a city or establishing a system of credit. Environment, the total environment, may be only a half-explanation of change. That it is the easier half to deal with in current scientific terms is no scientific reason for being content therewith.

XXV

CULTURAL FACTORS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

CULTURE AS DETERMINANT OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Culture as dynamic.—Our rejection of the deterministic principle prepares us to look on culture as a dynamic of social change. Everyone acknowledges that there is an intimate connection between our beliefs and our institutions, our valuations and our social relationships. Certainly all cultural change involves social change, for, as we have seen, the social and the cultural are closely interwoven. What is less fully realized is that the cultural factor in turn is not only responsive to technological change but also acts back on it so as to influence its direction and its character. The apparatus of civilization is in a degree indifferent to the use we make of it. The powers we harness for productive purposes stand ready to produce whatever we will. The industrial plant can turn out necessities or luxuries, the comforts of life or the munitions of war. This increasing indifference of the agencies of production expresses the degree in which our culture is itself a determinant factor. The civilizational means may be represented by a ship which can set sail to various ports. The port we sail to remains a cultural choice. Without the ship we could not sail at all; according to the character of the ship we sail fast or slow, take longer or shorter voyages; our lives are also accommodated to the conditions on shipboard and our experiences vary accordingly. But the direction in which we travel is not predestinated by the design of the ship. The more efficient it is the more ports lie within the range of our choosing.

The history of culture offers many confirmatory evidences. We find, for example, cultural types, such as a religious doctrine, which

persists with variations throughout many centuries. Even if the variations could be construed as responses to different technological or environmental situations, the type itself, enduring through great diversities of historical circumstance, could not be interpreted in this way. We find, let us say, certain modes of valuation, certain attitudes towards social problems, which develop under one set of circumstances, spread over wide areas, and continue to dominate the thoughts of men under vastly different economic and political conditions. An example of this phenomenon is the view of the role of sex in human life which was formulated by the Church Fathers. Again, the way in which cultural movements spread, the way in which they are associated with the names of great prophets, leaders, and creative minds, and such distinctive features of the cultural process in general as that a cultural style of a long-past age may be revived in the present or that the most primitive and the most advanced cultural elements may live side by side, can hardly be reconciled with any purely responsive or determinist theory.

* Curiously, enough, the determinist school has provided the supreme illustration of the influence of cultural attitudes on society. The Russian Revolution was not inspired by the necessity to adjust the culture of Russia to the existing economic situation or to that of the other capitalistic countries. It was the social philosophy of Marxism, wrought into a dynamic evangelism and finding its opportunity in the suffering and disillusionment of a catastrophic war, which gained control of the economic and political order, and by persistent cultural propaganda, aided by the terrorism of the Revolution, transformed it over a vast feudalized territory.

In the quieter processes of industrial evolution the activity and creativeness of cultural forces may also be discerned. We are apt to think of the new industrial civilization as dethroning the old culture, and again there are many evidences which point in that direction. We are apt to fear for the culture of countries which, like Japan or China or Mexico, are threatened by the invasion of machine production. Some among us fervently hope that countries wherein the threat is not yet fulfilled will resist the process to save their souls.¹ But the alternatives are not so simply stated. Every new factor, whether it be a creed or a machine, disturbs an old adjustment. The disturbance created by mechanism was so great that it seemed the enemy of culture, as indeed all revolutions seem. The wealth-bringing machine brought also ugliness, shoddiness, haste, standardization. The utilitarian gain masked for a time the cultural loss.

¹ Cf. Stuart Chase, *Mexico* (New York, 1931).

But culture, if more slowly, acts in turn on civilization. It does not suffer even the machine to remain in crude utility, detached from the further purposes of living. It brings the machine also into the world of the imagination and endows it not only with power but also, often, with beauty. It makes the new means of living at length more tractable to the uses of personality, and new arts blossom on the ruins of the old. The new means become at length means to culture also, nor should we forget, because of the disturbance and the struggle for mastery, that a high culture needs the equipment of civilization.

Max Weber's contribution to the study of culture as determinant.—We are justified, therefore, in regarding culture as, no less than civilization, a basic condition of social change. It operates not only directly as a source of social change but also indirectly, by its impact on the utilitarian order. This subject, however, has received comparatively little attention from sociologists. One of the few important contributions to it is that made by Max Weber in his *Sociology of Religion*. The best-known part of this work is the study of the relation between certain forms of protestantism and early capitalism.² Weber saw that there is a direct relation between the practical ethics of a community and the character of its economic system, but he refused to accept the position that the latter determines the former. Each influences the other, and at times the cultural element prepares the way for economic change. Weber was a profound student of scientific method and appreciated the complexity of the problem. He saw that there is a relation between practical ethics and religious beliefs, but also that many factors other than the religious one are involved in the creation of the effective forms of conduct. Nevertheless the religious system of any group is a characteristic historical phase, with its own typical thought forms, its own world view, common to the group as a whole though in varying degrees represented in the concrete attitudes of its individuals. With this religious ideal-type cohere the ideal-types of social conduct and the ideal-types of social institutions. The historical correspondence of religious and economic phenomena was studied by him along these lines. He concluded from certain evidences of the historical priority of particular religious forms that they stimulated the economic systems to which their practical ethics were congenial, and in particular that the worldly ascetic, Protestant sects prepared the way for capitalism.

He drew a picture of "the pious bourgeois conducting his busi-

² *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (tr. T. Parsons).

ness as a calling to which Providence has summoned the elect," and thus by his devotion to the virtues of thrift, saving, assiduous toil, and "worldly asceticism" establishing the conditions appropriate for the development of the earlier phases of capitalism.³ Guarded and penetrating as is Weber's analysis it is not wholly conclusive.⁴ The institutional complex of certain religious forms and of certain economic procedures can be adequately shown. Thus the interaction of Protestant religious beliefs and of the practical activities characteristic of early capitalism can be demonstrated *within particular historical situations*. But these situations contain so many other elements so variously combined that a clear nexus between the selected factors is exceedingly hard to establish, especially when we find other historical situations, such as that of late nineteenth-century Japan, in which one of the two develops in the entire absence of the other.

Concomitance of cultural and social change.—The difficulty then does not lie in Weber's approach but in the complex nature of social causation. We saw in Chapter XXI that every social phenomenon is an event belonging to an historical moment. More precisely, it does not endure an instant longer than it is maintained by the contemporary attitudes and activities of social beings. It is a life-expression which must change with the life which it expresses. Not only social relationships themselves but also the modes or formulas in accordance with which they occur, their institutional framework, are subject to this law. Institutions cannot live on like shells within which life is extinct, though, of course, they can endure to the detriment of the life which still upholds them. Social systems are thus directly or indirectly the creations of cultural values, directly in the organization of culture itself and indirectly in the organization of utility. Every change in valuations on the part of social groups registers itself in institutional change. In this respect Max Weber's position is wholly justified. But unfortunately the correspondence, though complete, is also complex. The unity of the social structure corresponds to a diversity of social attitudes and interests. These attitudes and interests are not only variant, and variantly influential, they are also in part conflicting as well as in part co-operant—and the social structure is the resultant of them all. To discern how they combine to sustain the structure requires therefore a keen and difficult analysis of each changing situation. We may agree with Hobhouse that there is "a broad correlation between

³ From R. H. Tawney's Foreword to Parsons' translation, p. 9.

⁴ See *supra*, Chapter XIX, footnote 4.

the system of institutions and the mentality behind them.”⁵ But as the system is the same for many divergent minds, the mentality to which it corresponds is, as it were, a composite mentality of various levels.

Yet for the reasons given there must always be a definite relation between changing social forms and changing attitudes, beliefs, and cultural activities. As we have shown, technological change as such does not prescribe the specific direction of cultural change, but instead opens up various alternatives. For example, the economy of effort which is the counterpart of higher technological efficiency means that less toil is needed for the satisfaction of primary organic needs. The organic needs of food, shelter, warmth, are relatively satiable. A surplus of energy and of wealth is thus made available, unless the advantage of the higher economy is consumed by a proportionate increase of population, for the satisfaction of various cultural demands. These latter fall into two classes, between which every society strikes some kind of balance. On the one hand there are the expressions of our like competitive interests, seeking forms of possession, luxury, power, distinction, all relative goods because they are valued by comparison. On the other hand there are the expressions of our common interests, absolute goods in the sense that all can share in them without diminution or apportionment, the inclusive cultural or spiritual satisfactions. The degree in which one or the other of these alternatives is followed is culturally determined.

The specific principle of cultural change.—In Chapter XXII we suggested that in so far as cultural processes can be represented graphically they tend to exhibit a rhythmic undulating motion instead of the continuous trend in a single direction characteristic of technological processes. Numerous attempts have in fact been made to show that not only cultural but also economic and political processes are cyclical in character, following a repetitive pattern and possessing a definite periodicity in the succession of their stages.⁶ Some writers are even led to postulate for various human phenomena, from fashions to civilizations, a regular order of rise, development, and fall, or else a perfect symmetry of rhythmic recurrence. This hypothesis, for example, is presented on the scale of world history in the erudite if pretentious volumes of Oswald Spengler on *The*

⁵ Hobhouse, *Social Development*, Chap. XII.

⁶ For a list of such attempts see H. A. Phelps, *Principles and Laws of Sociology*, Chap. XIX, and P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, Chap. XIII.

Decline of the West. In a more matter-of-fact way it is used by F. S. Chapin for the interpretation of the synchronous changes of the diverse aspects of human life.⁷ And it is meticulously applied to the changes in a single fashion type by A. L. Kroeber.⁸ The danger lurking in the hypothesis, that of fitting the wayward facts to the preconceived symmetry, is flagrantly illustrated in Spengler's work. We are prone to look for the order or balance of simple patterns. The early astronomers found it in the movements of the heavenly bodies. Historians found it in the cycle of history, economists in the economic cycle. But as knowledge increased, as the intricacy of the changeful world was revealed, these notions had to be discarded. Everywhere nature and history give us intimations of rhythm, but seldom do they follow the pattern of our impatient imaginations.

Yet rhythm in some sense is implicit in cultural processes. Culture is life expressing itself in valuations and in styles. It is always selective between the potentialities of expression. Styles are always changeful and valuations always partial. No style can please forever, and no valuations can satisfy the capacities of experience. In those areas where culture is most free from authoritarian controls, as in the fine arts, we have a constant succession of styles, a frequent return with variations to former mores, a supersession of the old by the new and then of the new by the old, presenting something of the pattern of an undulatory rhythm. Even in the more authoritarian and institutionalized areas of culture, even in the fundamental mores, there are aspects of undulation. There are oscillations between conservatism and radicalism, between more asceticism and more libertarianism, between a stronger orthodoxy and a larger tolerance, between self-containedness and expansion. Such oscillations occur in the course of the individual life as well as in the life history of peoples. But in the latter, with the ever-renewed energies and creative impulses of overlapping generations, they repeat themselves without term. It is this fact that gives plausibility to the Hegelian doctrine of social evolution, according to which one historical stage gives place to another that is a revulsion from it, asserting what the former denied. Culture is always in flux, not merely because civilization changes, but because changefulness inheres in it.

Indices of cultural change.—In order to appreciate how cultural change stimulates social change, it is very desirable that we should

⁷ *Cultural Change*, pp. 211 ff.

⁸ See reference *supra*, Chapter XIX, footnote 18.

develop methods of tracing or measuring cultural trends. This is a harder task than the measurement of technological change, since the latter reveals itself in concrete and comparable embodiments. But many aspects of culture are elusive and intangible. It is relatively easy to trace changes in the arts and in externalized styles, such as those of architecture, decoration, and dress. It is not difficult to trace changes in the range of opinions that register themselves through such devices as voting. It is less easy to study the changes in the ideas that cluster round the everyday life, the popular philosophies, the notions of authority, the doubts and the certitudes, the fears and the hopes of men. Even those larger principles, such as nationalism or socialism, which reveal the character of an age, are seldom intensively studied as *processes of opinion* that emerge and rise to power. We know far more about the rise and fall of institutional systems than about the changing valuations that explain their rise and fall.

In an earlier chapter we cast doubt on the validity of the attempts of psychologists and sociologists to "measure" attitudes. To measure *changes* of group attitudes, we should here point out, is a very different thing and not open to the same objections. It is true that we have to depend on a variety of indices, none of them fully revelatory of the subjective change and all of them therefore requiring careful interpretation. But changes of attitude are indicated in many ways, through their effect on habits, customs, fashions, and modes of living as well as through their expression in art, entertainment, and literature. An example of the way in which popular magazine literature can be used to reveal changes of attitudes is offered in a work to which we have several times referred, *Recent Social Trends*.⁹ Among other signs of the somewhat rapid shifts in attitude characteristic of modern society it is there pointed out that the "discussion of sex morals in *Reader's Guide* periodicals was three times as frequent in 1930-31 as in 1919-1921. . . . In the *New York Times Index*, entries under 'moral,' 'moral conditions,' etc., rose from 0 in 1914, 1915, and 1918, to 92 in 1926 and then sank to 6 in 1931."¹⁰ Another significant indication is that "while popular scientific periodicals increased their proportion of the total circulation about four times, the circulation of Protestant religious periodicals decreased to about one-sixth of what it was in 1900."¹¹ This last illustration provides an example of the need

⁹ "Changing Social Attitudes and Interests," by Hornell Hart, I, Chap. VIII.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 417.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 391.

for the interpretation of indices. In the same work it is pointed out that "the total number of church members in the United States has been growing at virtually the same rate as the population."¹² The one index suggests a stability, the other a weakening, of religious attitudes. We leave it to the student to explain the disparity and to consider in what respects one or other of the two indices is a better reflection of the changing situation.

THE HYPOTHESIS OF "CULTURAL LAG"

The current use of the expression "cultural lag."—We can conveniently reinforce our argument, that culture changes in accordance with its own principle and that therefore it must be regarded as an initiator of social change, by examining the current sociological doctrine of "cultural lag." The writers who put forward or who accept this doctrine do not draw the distinction between culture and civilization on which our argument is based, but while they speak of culture in a more inclusive sense, the concept of "lag" is applied in such a way as to imply some aspects of that distinction. The concept has been formulated principally by W. F. Ogburn, in his book *Social Change* (Parts IV and V). He distinguishes between "material" and "nonmaterial" culture. When changes occur in the "material" culture, these in turn stimulate changes in some part of the "nonmaterial" culture, particularly in what he terms the "adaptive" culture, or the ways of utilizing, exploiting, or rendering more serviceable the material changes. But this adaptive culture may be slow to respond. The forests of the country may be depleted or destroyed because the art of conservation does not keep pace with industrial or agricultural development. The factory system is well advanced before, the need for the protection of workmen from accident and industrial disease and for workmen's compensation acts is realized. The system of political representation may remain unchanged though the character and distribution of the population changes.

A caution regarding the use of the concept.—The distinction between "material" and "nonmaterial" culture, as applied above, seems to us somewhat out of place. Advancing technology is not itself a material thing, though it reveals itself in material changes. But apart from this difficulty the important thing is the implication generally underlying the doctrine of "cultural lag." The concept of "lag" has a clear application *within* the field of technology. If

¹² *Ibid.*, "Changes in Religious Organizations," by Luther Fry, II, p. 1020.

a majority of factories adopt up-to-date machinery while some retain the more antiquated type, we may properly say that the latter are failing to keep pace. If many departments of a firm employ modern methods while one or more adhere to old-fashioned ways that retard the efficiency of the whole, we may reasonably speak of a technological lag. If the engineers give us finer automobiles at decreasing cost but the city streets are so congested with them that travel is sometimes slower than with the old-time horse and carriage, clearly there is a lag within the system of transportation. If in the administration of government methods appropriate to older conditions remain in use without adaptation to the new conditions, again it is fitting to speak of a lag. But the not infrequent implication, encouraged by such distinctions as that between "material" and "nonmaterial" culture, that the problem of social progress is that of adapting our valuations and our attitudes to the external conditions of advancing civilization, is based on a misconception. If culture, as we define the term, has its own principle and its proper autonomy, if culture is the realm in which final values reside, the goal is not the adaptation of culture to civilization but rather the direction of civilization by culture.

There is no *a priori* reason why, if we speak of a lag at all in this connection, it should not be conceived as a lag in which factors of civilization are inadequately adapted to cultural requirements. Nor is there any reason why we should not set out to discover the impact of culture on civilization as well as the reverse process. If new devices of civilization, developed without consideration of their cultural and social effects, have profound influences on the pre-existing culture, why should not new or old cultural demands mold the new civilization also? The hypothesis springs as simply from the fact of correlation, and its investigation, if seemingly more difficult, may be no less fruitful.

Technological change as a source of cultural maladjustment.—While then within the area of technology we can appropriately speak of lags in the relation of one part to another, within the area of culture itself, and also as between changing civilization and changing culture, the more apt concept is that of adjustment and maladjustment. Maladjustment occurs generally when technological change is suddenly or abruptly introduced, so that it disturbs the established culture. Cultural values are attached to the older techniques and are threatened when these are superseded. Hence there arises what on the surface seems a conflict or clash between new technology and old culture but what at bottom is a conflict between the cultural

associations of the older technology and the cultural implications of the technology that displaces it. We can distinguish two main forms in which this conflict has developed under modern conditions.

(1) Sometimes the new technology is introduced from without into a community or country where culture is wedded to a quite different system. The extreme case here is that in which the industrial and other technological methods of an advanced civilization are imposed on a relatively primitive people. We have seen that in primitive society culture and civilization are peculiarly interdependent and inseparable. This harmony is destroyed when an alien technology is imposed on them. It destroys the media through which their native culture expressed itself. Occasionally this may happen through the direct introduction of an alien *culture* possessing higher prestige, as, for example, through missionaries, but generally the native is able to resist this impact whereas he cannot succeed in resisting the modern methods of trade and commerce and of industrial production that the more advanced civilization demands. So his life is uprooted. The depopulation and disintegration of many of the more primitive peoples in contact with modern civilization, in North America, in South Africa, in New Zealand and Tasmania, and elsewhere, may be attributable to this process of cultural dissolution.

The situation is different when the alien technology is introduced to or imposed upon peoples of relatively high culture, but here, too, serious disturbances are apt to occur. If the alien technology is deliberately introduced under the control of the government of such a people, as in Japan and to some extent in Turkey, the prevailing culture may be able to readjust itself to or even to dominate the new conditions, though some vehicles of the traditional culture are thereby rendered obsolete. But where outside forces are mainly or largely responsible for the new order of things, as in India and in China, a genuine clash of cultures occurs and brings grave disturbances in its train.¹⁸ In China the permeation of the new technology has been due to a combination of internal and external influences. The abandonment of the classical examination system in 1905, the attack of Chen Tu Hsiu on Confucianism in 1915, the advocacy of Western democracy by Sun Yat Sen, and the introduction of a paper currency in 1935 illustrate the operation of forces of change working from within. But these have been preceded and accompanied by a series of external impacts on the old order. Since

¹⁸ See, for example, Paul Monroe, *China; a Nation in Evolution* (New York, 1928).

Chinese culture has been peculiarly attached to family institutions and since industrial development limits the functions of the family and its social role, there has been strong cultural resistance to the new technology and a danger of cultural disintegration where it has been introduced. This may in large measure explain the slow industrial development of China and its exposure to the assaults of industrially more developed countries.

In India, on the other hand, the new technology is associated with alien domination and has incurred widespread resistance. When Ghandi and his followers, clinging to the old ways of spinning and weaving and pottery making it is obvious that their revolt is animated not so much by a love for the older techniques as by a desire to maintain the culture associated with them. An Indian poet paints the contrast between the old order and the new in such words as these:

I look for the goats coming home in the haze of the evening;
I see the trams jerking down the streets crowded with tired
workers.

I look for the blue threads of smoke rising from the huts at
the cooking of the evening meal; I see the tall chimneys of the
factories sending forth black clouds.¹⁴

But it is the loss of the sentiments and the values regarded by him as belonging to the older ways that he really laments.

(2) The peoples of the Western world have also been subjected to the sudden impact of a new technology on their older culture, but for them the technology is indigenous and neither imported nor imposed. Hence there has been, on the whole, a readiness to adopt and to advance the new devices, though generally without forethought concerning their effect on cultural values. Thus the modern industrial town arose purely in response to immediate utilitarian demands, and its ugliness and lack of amenity, its rows of squalid uniform houses, its smoke and its litter, its devastation of the countryside, were accepted at first with little question, just as were the hazards and the human costs of the labor that operated its unsafeguarded and insanitary factories. A few prophets of the old order, like Ruskin and William Morris and Hilaire Belloc, fulminated vainly against the new system as a whole. It was sufficiently evident that the more effective techniques and the practical applications of advancing science could not be successfully opposed. Only where specific inventions or applications seemed definitely to strike

¹⁴ Quoted from Margaret Read, *The Indian Peasant Uprooted* (London, 1931).

against prevailing moral or religious traditions was there any concerted opposition. In some instances the discoveries of science in the fields of astronomy, geology, and biology were decried by the representatives of traditional beliefs. More obstinate, perhaps, has been the resistance to certain practical controls provided by science which directly conflicted with the earlier mores, such as the use of contraceptives or the prophylaxy of venereal disease. But even here the resistance to indigenous technological advance has been, on the whole, a losing cause. It has become increasingly clear that culture cannot successfully oppose the advance of civilization but that instead its task is to accept and to direct that advance, controlling it to serve cultural ends. Only thus can the maladjustments of culture, and civilization, which must constantly arise in the course of technological advance, be progressively reconciled.¹⁵

¹⁵ On this subject see L. Mumford, *Technics and Civilization*, Chap. VII, where he develops the thesis that "our capacity to go beyond the machine rests on our power to assimilate the machine." See also, with special reference to resistance to technological change, the report of the National Resources Committee on *Technological Trends and their Social Implications* (Washington, 1937).

XXVI

THE BROAD PATTERN OF SOCIAL CHANGE

HOW TO INTERPRET SOCIAL CHANGE

A note on method.—As we reviewed in the last three chapters the basic conditions to which social change is responsive, it became manifest that the latter must be explained as a process contingent on the interaction of numerous factors. Any instance of social change is, in other words, the resultant of a specific and probably unique conjuncture of a considerable diversity of conditions. Suppose we are seeking to explain a crime wave, an increase of suicide, a new religious movement, an outbreak of class strife. Without a change in attitudes these phenomena could not occur, and thus we must take cognizance of cultural trends in our explanation. But the change of attitudes is in some sense responsive to the manner in which the interests and drives of men are affected by changes in the conditions under which they are pursued, and thus we must admit into our explanation the economic and technological and political aspects of the total situation in which the phenomenon occurs. And back of these again may lie changes in the human material—organic changes responsive perhaps to new conditions of work, to new stresses, to variations of diet, to the biological factors affecting energy, vitality, mortality, to varying degrees and types of adjustment to the physical environment. Thus our sociological focus of interest, the particular change of social relationships, involves us in the consideration of a multiplicity of factors, themselves not specifically social, but somehow conspiring to bring the social change into being.

Hence the interpretation of social change is a task beset by great

difficulties. For the conspiring factors belong to different orders of reality. How, for example, in studying the causes of the falling birth rate, can we apportion the contribution of such disparate factors as the decline of religious authority, the greater economic independence of women, the increase of social mobility, and the development of contraceptives? On what common scales can these seemingly non-comparable conditions be placed and weighed? What common unit of measurement shall we apply to them? How shall we bring under a common denominator the attitudes and valuations of the cultural order together with the technical devices or the biological adjustments of our second and third orders?

This essential and surely very obvious problem has not received the attention it deserves. Those who have specifically approached the problem have generally followed one of two paths, neither of which leads to the scientific goal they sought.¹ Some have simplified the issue by assuming that all the factors in the situation can be treated as quantitatively measurable forces and thus reduced to terms capable of statistical or mathematical manipulation. The others have equally simplified the issue by regarding one of the orders, or even one factor belonging to one of the orders, as the dominant or primary determinant of all the rest. The latter inadequate method we have already reviewed; concerning the former a few words should be said by way of caution.

The danger of assuming that the methods of quantitative science are applicable arises from the fact that the problem itself is in an important respect unlike the problems with which physical science deals. We cannot apply a similar experiment to a large number of social instances, as one puts a toxin in the blood of guinea pigs. We cannot isolate a single factor x and then introduce it to a total situation to observe in what degree the total situation is thereby changed. It is quite certain that there is no mechanical solution. By no assiduous collection of instances, by no computation of coefficients of correlation, can we ever measure the contribution of each co-operative factor. Collection and computation serve their own important purposes, but quantitative methods yield only quantitative results. Here we are not dealing with like units of homogeneous forces which combine to produce a total. The service of statistical methods in the study of social causation is to prepare the way, to reveal more precisely the nature of the factors involved, to isolate quantitative indices of aspects of the situation, and to show the

¹ A few social scientists, and notably Max Weber, have squarely faced the problem.

degree of their coherence or noncoherence. But these quantitative indices are merely evidences of an interaction which they do not explain; they are not the dynamic factors of which we are in quest. If we appreciate at all the nature of social causation we shall never expect to find that this factor A, presumptively measured by this quantitative indication α , contributes 20 per cent, and so forth. Much ingenuity and still more energy have been lavished on the attempt to reach results which the very nature of the subject matter precludes. Social phenomena are not, like certain physical phenomena, isolable components of a situation. Social phenomena are aspects of a total nonmechanical, consciously upheld system of relationships. Because the system is nonmechanical, the possible aspects are numerous and dissolve into one another, and we select from among them either by convention or because those selected have a preconceived or discovered significance for us. Behind every social relationship lie social attitudes and interests, which are not separable forces but type-phases of dynamic personality. And even when we pass from the social relationships themselves and deal with their merely tangible products we still remain outside the region where the quantitative contribution of the combining factors can be assessed. We can say that land, labor, capital, and organization—to take the old categories—are all necessary to produce a steel rail, but the question, how much of it does each produce, remains not only unanswerable, but meaningless. If a number of factors are alike *necessary* to the production of a result, there can be no quantitative evaluation of their respective contributions. And if this is true of material categories, themselves measurable, and their material products, themselves also measurable, it is *a fortiori* true of the more subtle interactions of personalities, variantly responsive to complex conditions, which determine every social situation.

How factors combine to produce social change.—In creating a material product the various factors, whether guided by human intelligence or not, meet on the same level of causality. Physical forces suffice to explain the result. But in the creation of social attitudes, movements, or institutions, the causes which we adduce work, as it were, on different levels. To take the simplest type of situation, fear does not “combine” with a gun to explain a case of manslaughter as wind combines with water to produce a storm at sea. The gun is an instrument of the fear in a sense in which the water is not an instrument of the wind. In social causation there is a logical order of relationship between the factors that we do not find in physical causation. There is an essential difference, from the standpoint of

causation, between a paper flying before the wind and a man flying from a pursuing crowd. The paper knows no fear and the wind no hate, but without fear and hate the man would not fly nor the crowd pursue. If we try to reduce fear to its bodily concomitants we merely substitute the concomitants for the reality experienced as fear. We denude the world of meanings for the sake of a theory, itself a false meaning which deprives us of all the rest. We can interpret experience only on the level of experience. Social changes are phenomena of human experience and in that sense *meaningful*. Hence to explain them we must see not merely how the factors combine, but how they are related within the three orders with which we have already dealt, the order of values or the cultural order, the order of means or the utilitarian order, and the order of nature on which man's valuations and man's devices alike depend.

How the factors are related in processes of social change.—Let us suppose that the social phenomenon we are seeking to explain is an increase in the amount of crime or, more specifically, of crimes of violence in the United States during a particular period. If we look over the literature we find that some authors lay stress on the lack of home training of youth or the disorganization of family life or the conflict between the mores of the home and the mores of the large community.² Other authors find the main explanation in more general cultural conditions, such as the decline of religion or of authoritarianism.³ But others give prominence to economic factors,⁴ or to technological conditions, such as the opportunities for crime in the modern city, the relation between criminals and politicians, the availability of automobiles, firearms, and "hide-outs," the urban development which creates certain favorable areas, sometimes called "interstitial areas."⁵ Whereas others again resort to biological explanations, such as "endocrine imbalance" or to neuroses bred in the organism by modern civilization.⁶

At first sight these different modes of explanation seem quite contradictory, and often they are treated as though this were the case. They would be contradictory if we regarded the various "causes" of a social phenomenon as belonging to the same level and

² For example, Edwin H. Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology* (Philadelphia, 1934).

³ For example, Harry Best, *Crime and the Criminal Law in the United States* (New York, 1930).

⁴ For example, W. A. Bonger, *Criminality and Economic Conditions* (Boston, 1916).

⁵ For example, F. M. Thrasher, *The Gang* (Chicago, 1927).

⁶ For example, Max G. Schlapp and Edward H. Smith, *The New Criminology* (New York, 1928).

therefore combining in a quantitative manner to produce the phenomenon. But if they belong on different levels the problem is of quite another kind. A number of different explanations may be equally justified provided they recognize the true nature of social causation. Observe that we have adduced three distinct modes of explanation, each of which has, of course, many variants. All three may be justified on their respective levels. An increase of crime *may* be the direct reflection of cultural changes, such as a decline of religious authority; and here the problem would be to trace the relation between a general change in the prevailing mores and the particular attitudes that find expression in criminal behavior. The same increase of crime *may* be explained by the new opportunities, conditions, or means of the changing technological order, and here the problem would be to show how this new situation corresponded with or evolved the attitudes that inspire to crime. Finally, the same increase of crime *may* be explained by organic predispositions, hereditary or acquired, and here the problem would be to show how the changing situation either stimulated these conditions or led to their finding to an increasing extent the expression or outlet which we name crime. These various problems, it will be seen, are all aspects of a single problem, since the various "causes" are all interdependent within the social order which is characterized by an increase in crime.

Thus in every process of social change we have to deal with attitudes dependent on a cultural background and focusing into particular objectives; with a system of means, including opportunities, obstacles, and occasions within which the objective shapes (and perhaps is shaped by) its available instrumentalities; and with the larger environment, the physical and biological conditions that sustain and prompt the changing objectives and the human nature that pursues them. To understand social causation therefore it is not enough to enumerate factors, to set them side by side, to attribute to them different weights as determinants of change. The first and essential thing is to discover the way in which the various factors are *related* to one another, the logical order within which they fall, the respective modes in which they enter into the causal process. In order to bring out this truth we shall survey the changing relations of our three great orders as they appear in a broad historical perspective.

FROM PRIMITIVE TO CIVILIZED SOCIETY

The primitive fusion.—Many contrasts can of course be drawn between primitive and civilized society, but here we shall dwell on one only. We choose it because it throws much light on the manner in which social change, and more particularly social evolution, occurs. It is the contrast between the mode of relationship of the three great orders which characterizes primitive life and that which becomes more and more apparent in evolved society. To grasp its significance the student should bear in mind our previous discussion of the distinction between culture and utility (Chapter XIV) as well as the subject matter of the last three chapters.

Primitive societies differ in a multitude of respects from one another, but in certain respects they present in common a contrast to more advanced types of society. Durkheim and others have dwelt on the lesser role of the division of labor in primitive as compared with civilized life. Behind that difference there lies another. In the simpler societies the distinction we have drawn between the cultural and the utilitarian is scarcely discernible. The means of living are not, as so often with us, detached from the ends of living. A modern factory or transportation system is operated purely as a utility, as a means of making profits or earning dividends from the point of view of the shareholders (if it is privately owned), as a means of providing wages from the point of view of the employees, as a means of supplying goods or services from the point of view of the consumer of these utilities. A factory, or a mechanism like the printing press or the ring spindle, does not count among the things that people enjoy or venerate or dance around or sing songs to or in any sense "live for." It is thought of solely as a productive mechanism. Its efficiency is its sole and sufficient justification. It is controlled and directed under a system of management and of organization which has the definite objective of making it as gainful as possible, except in so far as certain safeguards are applied to limit the human costs of mechanical efficiency.

Turn to a primitive society and the contrast becomes manifest. Read the account of any of the simpler peoples, such as the Kwakiutl Indians or the Trobriand Islanders or the Samoans.⁷ Such people hunt and fish and dig and weave and trade, but these utilitarian

⁷ F. Boas, *The Social Organization and Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians* (Washington, 1897); B. Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (London, 1922), and *Crime and Custom in Savage Society* (New York, 1926); Margaret Mead, *Coming of Age in Samoa* (New York, 1928).

processes are woven into the social life and are invested with cultural significance. They are surrounded with tradition, with ceremony, with legend, with tribal lore. Scarcely anything is purely utilitarian, and conversely there is scarcely anything that is purely cultural. The latter aspect is seen, for example, in primitive art. As Franz Boas has pointed out, this art is mainly decorative. "It consists of designs applied to useful objects. Works of fine art, made for the sake of art alone, are rare."⁸ The useful objects themselves, the basket, the mat, the bowl, the spear, the bow, are foci of cultural associations and symbols of cultural values.

Custom and tradition have thus incorporated the simple apparatus of living. Change is not rapid enough to detach the productive techniques and instruments from their cultural setting. Specialization of tasks has not reached the stage where the tasks themselves are too varied and too technical to be clothed with the valuations of a pervading culture. The simplicity of the mode and standard of living makes possible the undisturbed and permanent attachment of sentiment to the objects of daily use. As Malinowski says, "the meager furniture, the hearth, the sleeping bunks, the mats and pegs of a native hut, show a simplicity, even poverty, of form, which, however, becomes immensely significant through the depth and range of sociological and spiritual association."⁹

This fusion is revealed in every aspect of primitive life. Ritual is as important as craftsmanship in the making of a canoe or in the cultivation of the soil. Prayers are as important as arms in the conduct of war. Religion is compounded with magic and cannot be divorced from the business of living. The dance is as much a means of warding off evil spirits or of inducing fertility as it is a mode of social recreation. The success of a fishing expedition is as much endangered by a woman's touching the fishing tackle as by unfavorable weather. Sickness comes from spells and the breaking of taboos. The people are bound in spirit to the soil, the home of their ancestors and their gods. Everything in nature is instinct with social meaning and enshrined in social ceremony. Culture, technique, authority, people, and land are subjectively unified."¹⁰

The breakup of the primitive fusion.—In the course of every great civilization this primitive fusion has been in various degrees

⁸ Article "Anthropology," in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.

⁹ Article "Culture," in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.

¹⁰ Quoted from the author's article "The Historical Pattern of Social Change" (*Journal of Social Philosophy*, Vol. 2 [1936], reprinted in the Harvard Tercenary volume, *Authority and the Individual* [Cambridge, Mass., 1937]), where the contrast presented in the text is more fully developed and illustrated.

and in different modes subjected to a process of differentiation, but perhaps never so thoroughly as in the more recent evolution of our Western civilization. The process itself is intricate and we cannot here do more than suggest its nature. The medieval way of life was much nearer to the primitive fusion than is ours today. A strongly authoritarian culture, based on religious orthodoxy, was enthroned and sought to be all-embracing and to control to its purposes the utilitarian aspects of life. But the fusion was incomplete. It proved impossible to weld into one the religious authority and the secular power. Economic activities developed in response to their own impulses, and the church, which for a long time condemned "usury" and laid down rules about just prices, found it increasingly hard to control the direction of economic change. As a money economy replaced a barter economy and as labor became more free to offer itself to any employer, economic organization grew detached from the control of the traditional culture. At length the great technological advance of the later eighteenth century cleft with a new and sharper wedge the unity of culture and utility. The principle of utilitarian efficiency was liberated and built up its own systems devoted exclusively to the means as distinct from the ends of living. We have already seen that technological advance has its own tempo, its own mode of expansion and accumulation, and that culture does not proceed in the same way or at the same pace. The elaborate mechanism of Western civilization is becoming dominant all over the world, in Turkey and in Japan, in India and in Africa, in Russia as well as in the United States. But a thousand differences of tradition, of religion, of national sentiment, and of other cultural valuations strongly divide the groups or the peoples which increasingly share a common civilization. Here is one of the great problems of social evolution, the problem of the social organization whereby the divergent cultural values of men may be adjusted to the conditions or even to the necessities of the civilization they have built.

It could be shown that a similar problem has always arisen wherever civilization developed, as for example in ancient Greece and in Rome. But we are concerned only to show how this process inevitably arises in the evolution of society. The student of history can find ample illustration of its operation in the past. The student of contemporary society can find no less illuminating cases of the growing detachment of the cultural and the utilitarian. One, intensive form of it, for example, is to be seen in those countries where the more advanced Western civilization is introduced or, it

may be, imposed, and where the invading technology threatens to disrupt the old cultural life, as in India and in China.

Another aspect of social evolution is the growing distinction or even detachment of the cultural and the biophysical factors. Culture in primitive thought is bound both to the land and to the kin or the blood-group. Religion, for example, is native to and limited to the soil. The gods are tribal gods just as the ways of life are tribal ways. This is again part of the primitive fusion. It is still accepted by many who cling to a traditional culture. "We believe in the absolute oneness of Land and Man," so begins the manifesto of a Japanese cultural organization. It goes on to say: "In our national classics, which describe in plain but stately words the creed and faith of our forefathers, it is related that in virtue of the creative power of *musubi* the Ruler, Land and People were born in the most natural way from the same divine womb."¹¹ But growing civilization means wider and more frequent contacts. Science, art, philosophy, literature, technology, as they develop, refuse to be circumscribed within tribal or national boundaries. The scale of community is extended. Petty tribes are merged into great nations. Migration and interbreeding, the concomitants of improved communications, render it no longer plausible to identify the culture and the racial stock. Cultural differences develop within the larger, more heterogeneous peoples, and cultural likenesses unite men beyond the limits of any nation. We showed in an earlier chapter how with the growth of civilization man's dependence on the conditions of locality is reduced.¹² This is true of his culture no less than of his economic dependence. His ideas, his traditions, his valuations are shaped and sustained by influences coming from thousands of miles away as well as by those that are bred on his own doorstep. The people are not one blood apart from other bloods and the culture is not that of one people apart from all other peoples. The only uniqueness that a people or a culture can possess any more is the particular combination of the elements it draws from sources common to many peoples and to many cultures.

In short, it is an essential condition of every advancing civilization that it involves the growing demarcation of the three great orders out of that primitive scheme of things which made them one and indivisible.

How social unity is affected.—It should be obvious now that in the more evolved society—and generally in periods of rapid changes

¹¹ "Manifesto of Nippon Bunka Renmei," *Cultural Nippon*, Vol. 4 (1936).

¹² Chapter V.

whether or not they possess an evolutionary character—the type of social solidarity characteristic of a primitive group is no longer attainable. The social being can no longer live and move and have his being in a wholly integrated and all-inclusive community, native to his land and to his blood, marked off by clear-cut bounds from all other communities. This most significant distinction between primitive and civilized society has been stated in a variety of ways by different sociologists. Thus Ferdinand Tönnies distinguished the “organic” solidarity of what he called *Gemeinschaft* (“community”) from the looser, less profound, contractual system of inter-relationships which he called *Gesellschaft* (“society”).¹³ To Tönnies the former was a “natural” solidarity, not deliberately willed but springing from the fundamental social character of man, the unity of those bound by the instinct of the family and the common blood. He regarded the historical process of society as a passage from the solidarity of the “community,” so understood, to the more varied, more superficial, and less unified attachments of the civilized life. Another famous statement of the process is that presented by Durkheim, who thought of it as a passage from the solidarity of likeness, in which individual differences are submerged in the homogeneity of the mores, to the solidarity of interdependence, in which functional differences play an increasingly large part in the structure of society.¹⁴ This evolved type of unity Durkheim spoke of as “organic,” a term applied by Tönnies to the primitive type. We may perhaps find in this contradiction of usage a warning of the dangers lurking in the sociological application of the concept of organism.

In the more advanced social system, with its specializations, its cultural diversities, its numerous groups and associations, its mingling of many elements into a complex whole, we cannot expect to find the all-embracing solidarity of a simpler society. A nation has inevitably a type of unity different from that of a clan or a tribe. The individual has to choose his cultural loyalties, to maintain his own values, to decide his own attachments, in far greater measure. He must seek for the *common* to which he really belongs, the common to which his individuality responds. The unity of the social group is not to be identified with that of one cultural community. He can share in both kinds, but he has to adjust for himself the one loyalty to the other.¹⁵ Society no longer integrates all his values for

¹³ In his pioneer work, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (3rd ed., Berlin, 1920).

¹⁴ *Division of Labor in Society*.

¹⁵ See Chapter XX, pages 377-382.

him—that becomes the task of his own integrating personality. The old unity was “totalitarian,” and a great modern society cannot revert to this totalitarianism without repressing the very forces that have built it up to greatness, without retracing the road that society has followed from the dawn of civilization.

XXVII

THE REALITY OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION

MISLEADING TRAILS

Skepticism regarding social evolution.—Can society or its forms properly be said to have passed through evolutionary stages in the sense in which the species of organism have evolved? It has been fashionable in the last decade or two for American anthropologists and sociologists to abandon the concept of social evolution. Some have declared it an advance that sociologists generally speak of social change instead. One school of anthropologists is constantly attacking the doctrine of “unilineal evolution” and tends to disparage the evolutionary method altogether.¹ These tendencies may signify revulsions from oversimple and sweeping formulations of the evolutionary hypothesis, from the school of Spencer and Ward and Giddings. With increasing knowledge we learn the endless diversities of social systems. Primitive peoples as well as civilized exhibit a myriad of different patterns in their social systems. But it is equally true that there are endless diversities in the species of life, which fact does not prevent the biologist from discovering the evolutionary stages to which they belong. There can be vast differences between societies at the same evolutionary level, and in fact at any of the higher levels there must be—for this itself is part of the significance of evolution—great variations of one from another. If the ambiguous phrase “unilineal evolution,” means a sequence in which specific institutions of the simpler societies pass by similar processes into specific institutions of the more advanced societies, then it is

¹ Cf. A. Goldenweiser in *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences* (ed. Barnes, New York, 1925), pp. 221 ff.

certainly to be rejected. But we have no reason to interpret evolution in this way. Differentiation, the emergence of more distinct organs to fulfill more distinct functions, may take a multitude of forms. The system of law differs widely in, say, the United States and in France, but in both countries it has a character which entitles us to call it more evolved than the corresponding system in Melanesia.

One reason for the neglect of the study of social evolution is that social change is, as we have seen, often confused with technological and cultural change and thus, embracing everything that happens to human beings, is regarded as too complex and many-sided to reveal an evolutionary process. Another reason is that the evolutionary principle is often itself misunderstood. Cats do not evolve from dogs, but both dogs and cats are products of evolution. The patriarchal family may not have evolved from the matriarchal family, but both types have undergone evolutionary change. What we mean by social evolution, which has nothing to do with what is called "unilineal" evolution, should be clear from our earlier discussions. But there is one frequent misunderstanding with which we have not dealt and which deserves some attention. It is a mistaken search for the *origins* of things.

The problem of origins.—The question of origins has always been an engrossing one for the human mind, and the mythology of all peoples contains crude answers to it. But the question itself, in most of its forms, belongs to pre-evolutionary thought. People used to ask—and answer—the question, How and when did society begin? That particular question has grown obsolete, and the answers to it, such as that of the "social contract" theory, have been discarded. The seed of society is in the beginnings of life, and if there were such beginnings in any absolute sense we know nothing of them. But we still raise similar questions regarding the family, the state, the church, the law, and other social formations, though the quest for their origins may be as vain as that of the social contractualists. It seems at first sight a reasonable enough question. There was certainly a time when there was not a state or a church, therefore, we argue, they must have had a historical beginning. So we have various theories of origin, that the state, for example, was the result of war and conquest and slavery or of the establishment of a dominant class or even of some convention or constitution on which people all at once agreed. But all these theories are misleading because they misconceive the nature of an evolutionary process. There was a time when there was no state, and yet the state has no beginning in time, no point of origin. This is a paradox but not a

contradiction, as it would have seemed to pre-evolutionary thought. We recognize now that even salient or revolutionary social changes need have no absolute moment of origination. When, for example, did the "Industrial Revolution" begin?

When and how did the state begin?—Let us take one theory of the origin of the state to show how such theories mislead us. Franz Oppenheimer in his book, *The State*, gives the following version of the well-known Marxist doctrine of its origin.² There are, he points out, two fundamental and fundamentally opposed means whereby man seeks to supply his needs. One is work, the other robbery, or exploitation of the work of others. The former is the economic, the latter the political means, and the state arose when the political means was organized. There are peoples who possess no vestige of the state, primitive grubbers and huntsmen. They have a social structure but no political structure. The latter originates among herdsmen and among vikings, the first groups to exploit others or rob them of the rewards of their toil. Among these arise class distinctions based on wealth and poverty, on privilege and the denial of privilege. The most decisive of these distinctions is that between the slaveowner and the slave. It was the warrior nomad who invented slavery, the seedling of the state. The grubbing peasant who toils for his own would never have discovered it. When he is subjected to the warrior and pays tribute, the land state begins. Similarly, through coastal raids and robberies the vikings created the maritime state.

Now if Oppenheimer had set out to show the importance of the role played by robbery and exploitation in the early making of the state, it would have been a valid enterprise. It would have involved a study of the relation of this factor to other factors and a close and difficult historical investigation which he avoids only by making certain dogmatic assumptions. It is, in the first place, arbitrary to *define* the political means as robbery, from which it follows all too simply that the state, being the organization of the political means, was established in the manner he describes. On this definition a pirate band would be a state, and not because it is organized but because it is organized to rob. Since the organization of the state certainly serves other ends, since it is concerned to establish some principle of internal justice so that the disputes between man and man are settled by a tribunal and not by violence, since the eco-

² English translation, New York, 1926. The exploitation theory is not peculiar to Marxist writers; it is also put forward by authors of quite different schools, such as L. Gumplowicz in his *Soziologische Staatsidee* (2nd ed., Innsbruck, 1902).

conomic factor is only one of its interests, only one of the ways in which from early times the solidarity of the group was maintained by the state, to identify the political means with exploitation is the simplification of an inadequate psychology. Significant as that motive was, it did not work alone. The authority of the elders over the younger kin was not exploitation, but it played a part in the making of the state. The tribal sense of justice evoked agencies of jurisdiction, and they too were conditions of the emerging state. And many factors contributed to create the kind of political loyalty without which the state could never have grown to maturity.

We are thus thrown back on the question, What does the state, *once it has clearly evolved*, mean? It implies, we may say, a territory over which a unified order is maintained by means of law, involving some kind of coercion of those who violate the order and therefore some kind of authority to which appeal can be made. This is the objective fact, the expression, surely, of more than one aspect of human nature. Now, there seems to be no people among which there are not rudiments of this order, a foreshadowing of the state. There may be no settled government, but there are always some elements of organization out of which such government may evolve. There will be elders, or an individual headman or medicine man who wields some sort of authority. This authority will be ostensibly based on age or birth or prowess or religious lore or magical power, but the authority is not wholly without a political aspect. In a small group, say of Andaman Islanders, there is no state as we define the term, but there are already germs of the state organization, custom which prevails by social sanction over a locality, and skilled or aged men who have prestige and win respect and obedience.

Emergence, not beginning.—We should speak then of the emergence of the state rather than of its origin. It is a structure which in a certain process grows more distinct, more elaborate, more permanent. Its organization becomes distinguished from the organization of kinship. Custom passes into law. The patriarch becomes the political chief, the judge becomes the king.³ Following this process historically, we can better understand the statement that though there was a time before the state was, the state itself has no beginning in time. Its birth is a logical fact, only its evolution belongs to history. The idea of historical origins is here related to that of specific creation, in the pre-evolutionary sense. There is no state among the Yurok Indians or the Andamanese, yet in some degree

³ See the author's *The Modern State*, Chaps. I-IV.

these are political beings, just as in some degree they are religious beings, though they have no church.

We pointed out in another context that our application to earlier social stages of terms indicative of later and more evolved conditions is apt to confuse our understanding of this fact.⁴ Sometimes a term is sufficiently generic to comprehend the less evolved and the more evolved types of the social form referred under it. The term "family" is an example. But in other instances our modern terms denote specializations which did not exist as such in earlier stages. Of these the term "state" and the related terms "sovereignty," "government," and "law" are examples. The specific forms and functions so denoted are lacking not only in primitive tribes such as the Melanesians and the Eskimos, but also under much more advanced conditions. And even when political institutions are themselves highly evolved, as in classical Greece, it is often doubtful whether we should use our term "state" concerning them. As we shall show presently, specific institutions evolve earlier than specific associations. The people of Athens or of Sparta had themselves no separate term for the state. Their word "polis" did not distinguish the state from the community.⁵

Every community, no matter how primitive, contains germinal elements of the state. We think of primitive communities, in contrast to modern ones, as based on kinship. But this does not mean that the general bases of community, the common living and the common earth, were absent from their consciousness of solidarity. In some degree they were both present and determinative. R. H. Lowie well brings out the point that in the ostensibly kin-based community locality also served as a social bond.⁶ If the sense of contiguity had not also been active, the social cohesion of the kin-group would have been dissipated. It is in part at least because of this sense of contiguity that the tribe exercises jurisdiction over the differences between families within its area, that it adopts strangers into the kin, and so forth. And other bonds, such as that of religion, merged with the bond of kinship. In fact, under the aegis of kinship were half concealed all the grounds of social relationship, including the rudiments of the state.

What we have shown concerning the state, that the search for specific origins is vain, could also be shown concerning the other

⁴ See pages 332-333.

⁵ Cf. *The Modern State*, Chap. III, § 3.

⁶ *The Origin of the State*, Chap. IV. Cf. also A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, Chap. XII.

significant elements of the social structure. We have already seen how unsatisfactory has been the attempt to find an original specific form of the family.⁷ And we shall presently see, when studying the emergence of the church, how that process precludes the idea that it had a specific historical beginning. In this context it is permissible to speak of origins only if we mean thereby a process of formation which itself has no *precise starting point*.

What kinds of social phenomena have definite beginnings and endings?—But surely, it may be said, some social phenomena have beginnings and endings. Have not many institutions disappeared and others come into being? Is history not strewn with accounts of the passing of organizations, from empires to outworn sects? We answer that we are dealing with social types, not with individual embodiments of the type which, of course, are always appearing and disappearing. But the type itself is a different category, and is revealed only as process. Here again it may be objected that type-forms also disappear at historical moments. Has not slavery passed away or, if it lingers in some parts of the earth, is not its total abolition practicable? Have not totemism and the classificatory system of kinship disappeared in the more advanced societies? If things have an end, have they not also an origin?

Let us take the last two cases first. It is not indeed necessary to our argument that no social types should vanish altogether. In the same way the doctrine of the continuity of species is not affected by the disappearance of some forms of life. Nor does the argument hold that what ends in a historical moment also begins in a historical moment. For what ends is a specialized form, and it does not begin as such but only grows into specificity. Even so, the social type-forms which we think of as dead are remarkably persistent. Totemism in its full significance as a basis of social identification and classification is absent in civilized society while characteristic of a wide range of primitive peoples. But the type-form of totemism is present vestigially among ourselves, as Goldenweiser points out, in the use of animal mascots, the emblems of political parties, badges and crests and other tokens, in such symbols as the flag and the college colors, in such orders as the Elks, the Lions, and so forth.

The names and things that are thus used as classifiers and symbols habitually rest on a background of emotion. In the case of regimental banners, the emotions may reach great violence, while in the instance of animal and bird mascots there arises a complex of attitudes and rites so curiously exotic as to invite an exag-

⁷ Chapter XI, pages 202-204.

gerated analogy with primitive totemism. The fact remains that the supernaturalistic as well as the social tendencies of totemic days live on in modern society. But, in our civilization these tendencies, in the absence of a crystallization point, remain in solution, whereas in primitive communities the same tendencies . . . function as a highly distinctive vehicle of culture.⁸

Conversely it may be said that many tendencies which "remain in solution" in primitive society are "crystallized" in our own civilization. Again, the classificatory system which is seemingly so alien to us has its paler analogues among ourselves. We apply the terms "brother" and "sister" to the members of various social orders, and, as Goldenweiser also points out, we even use for classificatory purposes some kinship terms, such as "uncle" and "aunt," which were not so employed in primitive groups.

Finally, let us take the case of slavery, since it illustrates a further distinction. Slavery was abolished from among us at a precise moment of history. It was an ancient institution of mankind. We need not pause to consider whether the surviving use of the term, in such expressions as "wage slave" and "white slave," are significant or fanciful, for certainly the definite type of economic relationship properly called "slavery" has disappeared. What has here happened is that a once socially accepted system has been legally or constitutionally disestablished. Since slavery involved an essentially coercive relationship, it could exist in a complex society only if legally established. Modes of social regulation can be set up and can be discarded. All specific institutions which depend for their existence on convention or prescriptive law have an hour of birth and may have an hour of death. But the great social forms are more deeply rooted. Regulation may modify them, but it neither creates nor destroys them.

Social relationships are subject to an endless process of transformation, of growth and decay, of fusion and separation. Since they are all expressions of human nature, the social relationships of the present are found in germ at least in the past, and those of the past survive, if only as relics, in the present. We distinguish social stages, not by the sheer presence or absence of social factors, but by their prominence, their relation to others, their organizing function.⁹ (Even abolished institutions, like slavery, may be present

⁸ Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, Chap. XIII.

⁹ We may distinguish technological, as distinct from social, stages by the presence or absence of particular devices or inventions, as F. Müller-Lyer, for example, constantly does in his *History of Social Development* (Eng. tr., London, 1923).

"in solution," ready to "crystallize" again if an opportunity is given.) The most significant social changes are not those which bring an entirely new thing into being, but those which alter the relations of eternal or omnipresent or universal factors. The pattern is always changing but the threads endure. What is new is the emphasis, rather than the factor emphasized. Thus, for example, democracy is not a kind of rule—or a mode of life—wholly apart from oligarchy or dictatorship. The elements of all are present together—the difference is the degree of dominance of one over the other.

Continuity, then, is an essential character of the evolutionary process. Continuity is the union of change and permanence, and when in this union we move in the direction of social differentiation we are following the road of evolution. The general nature of this road will occupy us next.

GENERAL VIEW OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION

Primitive society as functionally undifferentiated.—The functional interdependence of the groups and organizations of an advanced social system is almost totally lacking in primitive society. The main divisions of the latter—families, clans, exogamous groups, totem groups—are segmentary or compartmental. It may have a fairly elaborate system of ceremonial offices, and a more elaborate system of kin-distinctions than is characteristic of an evolved society. But there are few groupings or categories into which, for the practical purposes of co-operative living, the members fall. The kin-grouping is usually predominant and inclusive. To be a member of the kin is *ipso facto* to share the common and inclusive rights and obligations, the customs, the rituals, the standards, the beliefs of the whole. These are, of course, certain "natural" groupings, particularly those of age and sex. There may be prestige groups, perhaps a simple system of classes or castes, though these latter are not found under the most primitive conditions. There may be some rudimentary occupational distinctions, but the division of labor is narrow and usually follows "natural" lines, such as that between the sexes or between the older and the younger. The great associations do not yet exist. There is no separate organization of religion—still less of religions; there are no schools, no distinct cultural associations; there is little specialization of economic productivity and exchange. The only clearly associational groups, other than temporary partnerships in trading ventures and so forth, are usually

"secret societies," not specifically functional, and the very fact that they are "secret" is significant, implying that the group has not yet found a way to incorporate them effectively within its unity.¹⁰

The undifferentiated character of primitive society is seen in the prevalence of a simple form of communism. The kin is a larger family and exhibits something of the communistic character of the family. The tribe devises a system of participation in the booty of the chase and the products of the earth. Where private or family rights are admitted, it is in the usufruct, not in the ownership, of the land. Even what are to us the most intimate or personal of rights were then rights pertaining to the blood brotherhood. The lending of wives to tribal guests, common to American Indians and many tribes of Africa, Polynesia, and Asia, may be regarded as a mode of admission to the "freedom" of the tribe. It may be, as Julius Lippert interprets it, that thus "the guest enters into all the rights of the tribal members, and the special sanctity of the relationship revives the ancient rights of the latter."¹¹ The sanctioned license at primitive marriage feasts, the institution among some African peoples of the "bride-hut" where the bride was free to the men of the tribe, the premarriage prostitution established as a Babylonian temple rite, may be interpreted as survivals of sexual communism or at least as the assertion, before their alienation through marriage, of rights regarded as belonging intrinsically to the tribe.¹²

Such a communism typifies the simple solidarity of an undifferentiated community. Such differentiations as exist are based on the natural distinctions of youth and age, of man and woman, of different aptitudes such as that for leadership, and on a few socially acquired distinctions, such as the inheritance of ceremonial office or of magical lore. The myriad aspects of differentiation belonging to a civilized society are latent. The divergent interests, aptitudes, capacities which may appear in rudimentary forms have no opportunity to develop within the restricted range of the communal life. The social heritage is too rude to afford them selective stimulation.

¹⁰ On primitive secret societies see H. Webster's book so named (New York, 1908); also F. Boas, *The Social Organization and the Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians*.

¹¹ *Evolution of Culture* (tr. Murdock, New York, 1931), p. 217.

¹² Thus many writers, such as Sir J. G. Frazer (*Golden Bough* [New York, 1935], V, pp. 36 ff.); Sir J. Lubbock (*Origin of Civilization* [New York, 1882], pp. 535 ff.); Lippert (*Evolution of Culture*, pp. 207 ff.); G. E. Howard (*History of Matrimonial Institutions* [Chicago, 1904], I, p. 50); and Briffault (*The Mothers*, I, Chap. XI) have interpreted these practices. Westermarck (*History of Human Marriage*, I, pp. 218 ff.) takes a different view.

The mores appropriate to that narrow heritage tend to be repressive of such differences, as endangering the solidarity of like-mindedness, the only solidarity of which the group as a whole is yet capable.

The civilizations of the past and of the present emerged from that early stage. How they emerged, through what blind forces of conquest and subjection and expansion, creating differences of wealth and of class, through what nurture of the arts, through what clashes of customs and faiths leading to some liberation of the mind, through what increments of scientific knowledge and its application, is the main theme of human history. For as here it is enough to point the contrast. It is characteristic of our own stage that we have a vast multiplicity of organizations of such a nature that to belong to one has no implication of belonging to the rest, that every kind of interest has created its correspondent association, that nearly every kind of attitude can find some social corroboration, and that thus the greater social unity to which we belong is conceived of as multiform, not uniform. This is the necessary intellectual feat demanded of the participants in the "great society," and the many who still cannot achieve it belong to it in form but not in spirit.

The role of diffusion in social evolution.—Long and difficult as the evolutionary process may seem in historical perspective, it has been remarkably rapid if we take the larger perspective of organic evolution. We have already commented on the relative rapidity of social change; we may now add that social evolution has likewise moved at a pace vastly quicker than that of evolution in the biological order. No primitive type of animal evolves into an advanced type in so short a period as that comprised by recorded human history—the very idea seems absurd. But in that period one primitive society after another has moved to a stage that at least by comparison reveals a highly evolved structure. Social evolution is liberated in a sense from organic evolution because human beings can use for their purposes instruments that are not part of their own physical structure and because in using them they are in a measure guided by intelligence and not merely by instinct. Thus equipped, they can rapidly increase their social heritage and transmit its evolutionary potentialities to their descendents and communicate them to others over the whole face of the earth.

Sometimes diffusion and evolution are regarded as opposing principles in the interpretation of social change. But in truth there is no need for this opposition. Diffusion should be regarded as one of the most important factors in social evolution. The great socie-

ties of the past all reveal, in so far as records remain, the formative and challenging influence of cultural intercourse. The civilization that arose on the Nile penetrated as far, as India. The thought-systems of India reached into China and later contributed elements to the awakening civilizations of the West. The Greeks built on the heritage of Mycenae, Crete, and Egypt. Rome from its earliest days began to feel the impact of the cultural forces already full-grown in Greece. And so it has been down to our own days.

Anti-evolutionary influences.—Needless to say, the establishment of this present stage of differentiation was the task of many centuries, and pressures emanating from the older conception of solidarity have been strongly directed against it and are still in some measure operative. In the making of modern society it has usually been the state—though sometimes the church—which has sought to prevent further differentiation by making all other organizations a part of its own structure and subject to the conformity it imposed. Hobbes in the seventeenth century had denounced free associations as being like “worms in the entrails of the natural man,” and as late as the end of the eighteenth the French Revolution had sought in the name of liberty to abolish all corporate bodies. Rousseau no less than Burke, the philosopher of revolution as much as the philosopher of reaction—so slowly do our minds perceive the growing social fact—could still not admit the separate organization of state and church, still believed in the “universal partnership” or the “total surrender” which made the membership of a society culturally inclusive. Even today partial attempts are made to re-establish great societies on the basis of the simpler solidarity, as seen in some of the manifestations of both the fascist and the communist principles and still more in the policies of national socialist Germany. But whatever the claims of these opposing principles—and again it should be clear that we are speaking of social evolution and not of social progress—it is significant that the attempts in question have succeeded only in countries which had experienced to a lesser extent or for a shorter period the diversifying conditions of modern industrialism, the cultural variations revealed in divergent faiths, and the conflict over the issue of free association; that they have succeeded only by establishing a coercive control suppressive of the differentiations which would otherwise arise; and that they have occurred as the sudden sequel of catastrophic and abnormal events, not in the more orderly course of social change.

The main line of social evolution.—We cannot attempt to trace the historical process by which these various grades of differentiation have come about, but if we turn to our primitive societies we can see the generic lines which that process follows. Since the social structure exists only as the creation of mentality, behind the differentiated form lies always the differentiating mind. Before institutions come attitudes and interests. As these grow distinct they become reflected in customs which assume a more and more institutional character. The continuum of social thought is interrupted by the spur of special interests which experience and circumstance detach from the undifferentiated^a sense of solidarity. There is thus a constant deflection of the social being from the uniformity of the social path, to be ignored, winked at, or suppressed by the guardians of the tribal ways. But if the deflection occurs repeatedly and in the same direction, aided by changing circumstance or opportunity, it may gain recognition, creating a zone of indifference within the older institution or establishing a new one beside it. Thus the ways of the group are diversified without loss of unity. Moreover, by slow accretion lores and skills are increased and particular members of the group become their repositories and acknowledged practitioners. Specific modes of procedure, specific taboos, specific approaches to the mysterious powers of nature or to the *sacra* of the tribe, are thus developed—in other words, new institutions are formed.

The formation of institutions usually precedes, and often by a very long interval, the formation of associations. In fact, in relatively primitive societies the step from institutions to associations is seldom taken at all. For the associational phase implies an elasticity of the social structure which primitive conditions and primitive mentality can hardly admit; it implies the more difficult unity which difference combines with likeness to create. Social *évolution* must be already well advanced, the scale of society expanded and the pressure of the common mores lightened, the diversification of interests enlarged through the advance of knowledge and the specialization of the economic life, before the right of free association becomes effective. Only under these conditions does the family detach itself sufficiently from the social matrix to become an autonomous unit, dependent for its creation and for its maintenance on the will of the consenting parties. Only under these conditions does the uniformity of communal education break into the variety of particular schools, and other educational associations. And finally the great politico-religious system which claimed to control all the rest reveals

the internal disharmonies of its enforced unity, and in their different ways the associations of the state and of the church are formed.

Schematically this process may be presented as follows :

I. COMMUNAL CUSTOMS

The fusion of political-economic-familial-religious-cultural usages, which pass into

II. DIFFERENTIATED COMMUNAL INSTITUTIONS

The distinctive forms of political, economic, familial, religious, cultural procedures, which become embodied in

III. DIFFERENTIATED ASSOCIATIONS

The state, the economic corporation, the family, the church, the school, etc.

The passage from the second to the third of these stages means a momentous transformation of the social structure. There may, of course, be some minor incidental associations under primitive social conditions, but the great permanent forms of association, as we define that term, are as yet unthinkable. Primitive solidarity requires that if you belong to the tribe you belong also to—or are adopted into—the kin, that if you share its life you share also its gods. The diversity of institutions, as they unfold themselves, is at first only the diversity of the aspects of communal life. In that growing diversity is hidden the germ of a new order, but it takes ages to develop. For the new order means a new and freer diversity. In our second stage there is one set of political institutions for the whole community. In our third stage there is still one state, but there are also political organizations embodying diverse ideas concerning the state. In our second stage there is one set of religious institutions recognized by the community, and these are bound up with its political institutions. In our third stage not only have they become detached from the state, culturally autonomous, but they have in consequence created a variety of religious associations. This freedom of association admits an indefinite multiplicity of contingent forms, with endless possibilities of interrelationship and independence, based on the general foundations of a community life, the obligatory aspects of which are now safeguarded by the state.

The differentiation of the great associations, from one another is accompanied by vast differentiations within their respective structures, responsive to the same forces which bring about the former. To deal in any detail with this whole process would occupy a large volume in itself. All we can do in the present work is to offer, in rather brief compass, a single illustration of it, so as to bring

out more clearly the main principle. For this purpose we shall examine the process by which the organization of religion has evolved.

How the evolutionary clue helps us to understand society.—Before we turn to this illustration, it may be well to point out the way in which the evolutionary clue helps us to understand society. While there are many social changes which may seem as undirected and inconsequential as the waves of the sea, there are others which clearly fall within an evolutionary process. And in tracing these the student gets a firmer grip on the social reality and learns that there are great persistent forces underlying many movements which at first he apprehends as mere events in the historical flux. More particularly, the evolutionary clue, where it can be traced, has the following advantages.

In the first place, we see the nature of a system better as it “unfolds” itself. Evolution is a principle of internal growth. It shows us not merely what happens to a thing, but what happens within it. Since in the process latent characters or attributes emerge, we may say that the very nature of the system emerges, that, in Aristotelian phrase, it becomes more fully itself. Suppose, for example, that we are seeking to understand the nature of custom or morality, things we are still very apt to confuse. We understand each the better by seeing how the two, fully merged in primitive society, have grown distinct as the range of conduct over which custom rules has diminished. And so with many another distinction, such as that between religion and magic, or crime and sin, or justice and equity, or right and privilege, or economic and political power.

Again, the evolutionary clue enables us to set a multitude of facts in significant order, giving them the coherence of successive stages instead of tying them on the purely external thread of chronology. For the historical record presents us with a confusing multitude of events, a mere chaos of change until we find some principle of selection. Inevitably we seek to discover the type or type-situation which these events indicate in a particular frame of time and space, and then to relate that type to earlier and later ones. The latter aim is realized if we discover an evolutionary character in the series of changes. Take, for example, the endless changes of the family. In studying them we discover that within a certain area of modern history the functions of the family have become more limited to those essentially arising out of its foundations in sex; in short, a significant time-succession is revealed. Just as biological science achieved order by following the evolutionary clue, so here at least does social science. And the evolutionary principle, where dis-

cernible, is of far-reaching significance because it relates whole successive situations, no matter what their magnitude, to one another and consequently has proved serviceable in every field of science. So universal a clue must lead us nearer to the very nature of reality than any more partial one. It is surely a primary order of change that is revealed alike in the history of Rome and of Japan and of America, alike in the record of the snake and of the bird, of the horse and of man, alike in the brief story of each organic being and in the inconceivably immense record of the cosmos itself.

Again, the evolutionary principle provides us with a simple means of classifying and characterizing the most diverse social systems. If we tried to classify all societies on the basis of the kind of customs they followed or creeds they accepted, or of their diverse ways of making pottery or pictures or the like, our classifications would be elaborate, cumbrous, difficult, and limited. When, on the other hand, we classify them according to the degree and mode of differentiation shown by their customs and creeds and techniques, we are taking as our basis a structural character applicable to society as such, and one with which the endlessly variant manifestations of customs and creeds are integrally bound.

Finally, the evolutionary clue spurs us to the quest of causes. Where we discover direction in change we know that there are persistent forces cumulatively at work. Some of these are indeed sufficiently obvious. We can trace, for example, the differentiation of the professions, and it is easy to see how the principle of efficiency or economy—which is one form of the expression of intelligence—would, given the conditions for its exercise, such as greater economic resources, a wider market, and better technological equipment, lead to this result. As early as the days of Hesiod it was said of a man that “he had skill in many things, but little skill in any.” In its degree this is true of every nonspecialist. The following quotation from an American historian illustrates the condition out of which the differentiated professions arose:

In the *Boston Gazette*, February 6, 1738, Peter Pelham advertised that he taught “Dancing, Writing, Reading, painting upon Glass, and all kinds of needle work”; he was a painter, an engraver and also gave instruction on the harpsichord and in the elements of psalmody. . . . Really, that society of 1738 did not have sufficient occasion for him in all these varied forms of competence to keep him alive and he had to piece out as a merchant of tobacco. Eventually there would be engravers, dancing masters, painters, musicians, various teachers of elementary subjects including manual

training, who could track back the converging lines of their respective developments to such an unforked stem of their general branch.¹³

This particular development is readily explained but the broader trends of social evolution, like those of organic evolution, raise profoundly interesting and difficult questions of causation.

AN ILLUSTRATION: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CHURCH AS A SOCIAL FORM

Primitive cults.—It must be premised that in this illustration we are considering not the evolution of religion but the differentiation of a social form through which religion is in part expressed. Religion has other aspects which do not directly concern us here, since it is not religion, but society, which we are studying. It should also be observed that in tracing the evolution of the church we are not following a process which has occurred within the limits of any single society or social area. No one society is so permanent and definite, so self-identical through the broad reaches of social evolution, that it could serve for this purpose.

We are concerned with a series of social transitions, leading at length to the establishment of the church, as a free association within the community. The first step was the formation of specific religious institutions, demarcated though not separated from other social institutions. Under the most primitive conditions of which we know the religious element is wholly fused with others. Primitive mentality has itself less power of, or less exercise in, discrimination. As Lucien Lévy-Bruhl puts it, "the mystic properties with which things and beings are imbued form an integral part of the idea to the primitive, who views it as a synthetic whole."¹⁴ Religion was an aspect of his way of thinking about things, about all significant things. "It was at the first, as it were, a mental atmosphere which enveloped every society, clinging most densely, like mist on the hills, to the salient features and occasions of its life, to sex and birth, to spring and harvest, to death and pestilence, to darkness and to the light that pursues it, to the sudden revelations of natural powers, to the kin-custom, and to the authority of the chief."¹⁵

Perhaps we should not call this pervasive emotional attitude, so

¹³ From an article by Dixon Ryan Fox, "A Synthetic Principle in American Social History," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 35 (1930), 256-266.

¹⁴ *Primitive Mentality* (tr. Clare, New York, 1923).

¹⁵ *The Modern State*, Chap. V, § 2.

hard for us to appreciate or describe, by the name of religion at all. It is rather the attitude out of which religion grows. Since the primitive mind has no conception of the operation of natural laws, the distinction of the natural and the supernatural, even the disturbing distinction of the physical and the spiritual, is not yet developed. It is not merely that disease and misfortune are attributed to malignant powers against which a system of protection, by the evocation of other powers, may be devised. It is that these powers themselves are both physical and nonphysical, like the *mana* of the Polynesians and other peoples, mysterious properties indwelling in things, combining with the rain and the sunshine to make things grow, combining with the flight of the spear to hurt a man. The "ghost" of a man, even his name or his mark or his painted image, has the same kind of potency as the man himself. Or again the man and his totem are one, identical expressions of the same quality. Even when the gods became distinct, they were but greater men living on the same plane or descending to it. For, as in Genesis, "the sons of God saw the daughters of men that they were fair."

This native response of the primitive mind towards an unknown world becomes, in time, traditionalized in the social heritage, becomes a lore with its rituals and creeds. Guesses at the unknown become formulated, socially accepted, instituted. The mysterious potencies of earth and storm, of animate and inanimate nature, become more definite beings, who must be approached according to prescribed formulas. Priests and interpreters, medicine men and workers in magic arise. The fused religious emotion, thus institutionalized, is gradually narrowed to certain aspects and phenomena of life. Thus cults are formed and are elaborated with accretions from various sources. Among the California Indians, for example, Kroeber sums up this process as "a progressive differentiation during four fairly distinct periods. During these four eras, the most typical cults gradually changed from a personal to a communal aim, ceremonies grew more numerous as well as more elaborate, influences from the outside affected the tribes within California, and local differences increased until the original rather close conformity had been replaced by four quite distinct systems of cults."¹⁶

These cults are not yet religions in the proper sense of the term. They are hallowed ways of doing things or of celebrating things done, and the sanctity is apt to be transferred from the function or occasion to the rite associated with it. The social is still fused with

¹⁶ A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (New York, 1923), Chap. XII.

the suprasocial. There seems to be no clear distinction of quality between the "ghost" which migrates from the body and dwells in some physical object—the form of possession called fetishism—and the spirit which pervades inanimate nature. Above all, religion and magic are still closely intertwined. The distinction between them must emerge before we can speak of religion in any adequate sense. For magic is an art based on a pseudoscience, translating for purposes of manipulation noncausal association into causal connection. It takes, for example, the parings of a man's nails and by fanciful processes works evil on the man himself, or it makes a waxen image of him and believes that the treatment to which it is subjected befalls the man also. It stills the storm by incantation and makes the earth produce by a charm. In magic there is no mediation; the act by its inherent virtue produces the result. It has certain elements that belong also to religion—ritual and mystery—but in essentials it is utterly different. For the object to which religion is directed is to be approached in an attitude of reverence, creating relations of worship and of communion as with something high or divine, leading to a rule of life. It is true that even in developed religions the element of magic lingers, such as the belief in the mystic efficacy of ritual or again the belief that a religious ceremony by itself makes something good, such as sex relationship, which apart from it is evil. But in developed religions these are nonessential and even alien elements.

The formation of specifically religious institutions.—Such religions could not arise until the human was set in clear contrast to a suprahuman reality regarded as divine and to be worshiped as a first cause. But since life was full of perils and pains, of injustice and violence, the growing moral sense was often compelled to distinguish between suprahuman principles of good and of evil. Demons and devils thus became the counterpart of the gods, and as the issue between them was defined, a new fusion, of great significance for the later development of religion, appeared, that of the moral and the religious principle. In some advanced civilizations, the moral principle becomes so dominant that the religious principle proper grows obsolescent, as in the "religions" of China and India. In others the two remain integrated, leading to many difficult problems of interpretation and preparing the way for the evolution of sects, as the variant moral sense sought to harmonize itself with theological traditions.

But that is a much later part of the story. The earlier follows another road. As religion is institutionalized, it becomes in a sense

the property of the community. Dead heroes, dead kings, dead ancestors, real or mythical, are translated to the ranks of the gods, and the living kings already possess the attribute of divinity, as in Japan. The nature-powers, not only of native rock and plain and shore, but also of the air and the sky, become localized deities. Among this plethora of divinities order is achieved by the dominance of one over the rest, and according to the degree of dominance the religion tends either to henotheism or to polytheism. The henotheistic type, waiting to develop into full monotheism, was characteristic of many Semitic peoples, worshipers of Yahweh or Baal or Chemosh or Dagon or Milcom. The Aryans tended to polytheism. Sometimes there were the special gods of the small community and beyond them the gods of the larger people, as in Attica the local deities were distinct from the Olympians. Localization went still further, down to the presiding deities, the Lares and Penates, of the household.

Religion, thus localized and institutionalized, became the exclusive possession of the group. To leave the community was to leave its gods also. The gods of the tribe watched over them, rewarded and punished them, gave them victory in battle—an attitude to which civilized peoples also revert in time of war. Religious institutions are then gradually demarcated from other social institutions. Religion itself tends to develop the distinction between the profane and the sacred, its organized mysteries are set apart from the everyday life. Special "religious societies," that is, groups who severally possess certain religious beliefs and "secrets" and practice their own rituals, arise within many communities. Sometimes the distinction takes a curious form. Thus among the Southern KwaRiutl Indians religious societies alternate seasonally with totemic clans. "In the summer (the *profane* season) the clans constitute the social organization; whereas in the winter (the season of the *secrets*) these are replaced or, more accurately, overshadowed by a system of religious societies."¹⁷ Among more advanced peoples the relation of the priest to the ruler becomes the crucial issue in the process of differentiation. Where the two once coalesced, both the functions and the officials tend to grow distinct. In Israel the people demand a king apart from the sacerdotal judge. In ancient Greece as in Rome the priestly functions of the rulers atrophy and are in part invested in separate officials. In Egypt the conflict for supremacy between priests and kings assumes an age-long character.

¹⁷ A. Goldenweiser, article "Totemism," in *New International Encyclopædia*, XXII (New York, 1930).

From religious institutions to specifically religious associations.
—The process in which religious and secular institutions become demarcated is too variant and elaborate for examination here. We must pass to the next transition, from the religious institution to the religious association, the church. The "religious societies" of the primitive world were not at all religious associations in our sense. They were semicommunal, partitioning the community like clans or totem-groups; they were not composed of members drawn selectively, by their own adherence, from a whole community. The institutions of religion grew distinct long before the concept of a church arose. The socio-religious organization of each group remained a unity. It was a question of harmonizing religious and other social institutions, more particularly religious and political authority, and the discords that arose were due to the struggle of the two powers exercised over the same community. Sometimes the socio-religious unity was threatened by the introduction of alien religions, not accommodated to the social system, like that of Baal in Judaea or the Orphic and Thracian mysteries in Greece, or the Oriental faiths and finally Christianity in Rome. But either they were driven out or they existed on sufferance, as exotic cults. China presents an interesting contrast here, for the religious principle was so dominated by the ethical that it lost its other-worldly theological characteristics and became a traditionally inspired way of life, admitting without great difficulty the variant interpretations of its prophets, native or introduced. Thus the struggle was far less acute. It is true that sometimes Buddhism was the official religion, sometimes Taoism, that on occasion the one endeavored to suppress the other, while at least once both were officially suppressed in the name of Confucianism. But on the whole these "religions" were able to exist side by side without much disturbance.

In the ancient Western world the greatest assault on the socio-religious unity was that made by Christianity within the Roman Empire. Christianity, perhaps for historical reasons arising out of the situation of the Jews within the Roman Empire, definitely dissociated itself at the outset from the political realm. Its kingdom was "not of this world." It formed a conclave distinct from, in fact separate from, the social order. With the introduction of such a faith the unity of the old socio-religious system was threatened. But the issue never culminated. By a strange reversal, in the disintegrating Roman Empire, Christianity, changing vastly in the process, became the established religion, driving its predecessors underground. In its new form it gained at length an extraordinary

control over a social life which had lost its other bonds of unity. The nascent association, with its distinct membership, disappeared, and the socio-religious union is reasserted. Throughout the Middle Ages two sets of institutions, two forms of order, two differently derived authorities, controlled the same society. The communities, themselves simple, relatively passive, predominantly agricultural recipients of a common culture, are subject to strains and stresses arising not within them, but in the unstable hierarchy that ruled them. The favorite medieval conception of the "two swords," the secular and the spiritual, reflects the ultimate conflict of authority. The issue was whether the two powers should be in the same hands, or whether they should be separated, and, if separated, which should dominate the other, or how, in general, they should be related. The idea of two separate memberships, of two associations with distinct spheres and not necessarily the same range, was not yet born.

In the European Middle Ages the conflicting claims of ecclesiastical and political authorities were never reconciled. The spiritual sword might compel an emperor to do penance in the snow, or the secular sword might send the papacy into exile. But neither Avignon nor Canossa settled the question. Nor did the Reformation establish a new principle in this regard. The claims of Calvinism were at least as absolute as the claims of *Unam Sanctam*—the bull of Boniface VIII which roundly proclaimed, as a tenet necessary to salvation, that all the peoples of the earth were the subjects of the Pontiff. The functions of the two authorities, the ecclesiastical and the political, were not delimited with respect to one another. The ecclesiastical authorities exercised political functions through their own courts and councils, and the political authorities exercised religious functions, making religion compulsory, controlling ecclesiastical appointments, and so forth. These conditions prevented the formation of the distinctive religious *association*, the church, having free spiritual authority over its own members only. And we may observe also that it prevented the clarification of the nature of religion also—and more particularly of the religion in the name of which the issue was fought, for it immersed religious institutions in the atmosphere of political intrigue and above all it injected into this religion the alien element of enforcement. The nature neither of church nor of state could be realized until this element was extruded. Hand in hand with the social confusion went an intellectual confusion.

A long process of differentiation was necessary to remove this confusion.

After, as before the Reformation, the parish continued to be a community in which religious and social obligations were inextricably intertwined, and it was as a parishioner, rather than as a subject of the secular authority, that (the villager) bore his share of public burdens and performed such public functions as fell to his lot. The officers of whom he saw most in the routine of his daily life were the church wardens. The place where most public business was transacted, and where news of the doings of the great world came to him, was the parish church. The contributions levied from him were demanded in the name of the parish. Such education as was available for his children was often given by the curate or parish schoolmaster. Such training in co-operation with his fellows as he received sprang from common undertakings maintained by the parish, which owned property, received bequests, let out sheep and cattle, advanced money, made large profits by church sales, and occasionally engaged in trade. Membership of the Church and of the State being co-extensive and equally compulsory, the Government used the ecclesiastical organization of the parish for purposes which, in a later age, when the religious, political, and economic aspects of life were disentangled, were to be regarded as secular.¹⁸

The ecclesiastical authorities might properly seek, provided they used only "spiritual" means, to make religion permeate the social order, but when they sought to extend their rule over that order they were faced with a hopeless dilemma. They could not grasp the secular sword without losing their proper identity. This was in fact the problem of the later medieval church, torn between the Catholic conception of it as the all-comprehending arbiter of society and the contrary conception of its more spiritually minded members and groups. The issue was complicated by all manner of moré earthly motives on both sides, but without this internal conflict could not have come that final disruption of the "universal church" which was in a measure the unintended result of the teaching of men like Luther, who attacked at the same time the immersion of the "church" in the evils of the social order and the control which it exercised over that order, who protested in the name of "religion pure and undefiled," the religion of the heart—a concept whose far-reaching implications utterly escaped him—who distrusted all institutions and handed them ruthlessly over to the civil power. Within the reformed church the inveterate belief in theocracy arose again to strength with Calvin, who restated the Catholic tradition for a society of burgesses and small traders, and to secure its su-

¹⁸ R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, Chap. III (ii).

premacý translated religion into a tyranny more irresistible than that of any temporal Caesar, in that it rested for popular support on the inculcated superstition of hell-fire. Its intolerable character was sufficiently revealed in the Geneva of Beza, the Edinburgh of John Knox, and the Boston of Cotton and Endicott.

The basis of differentiation.—These conditions, with their cultural confusions, have in Western civilization been, on the whole though by no means completely, dissolved in the process which from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century led to the establishment of the church on an associational basis and the concomitant differentiation of church and state. This differentiation, now attained in many Western societies, is based on these principles: (1) that the church is a body of believers, a distinctly organized membership, distinct in its offices and services, possessing as a corporate body only cultural means of influencing its members and not claiming to exercise any kind of control over those who are not its members, membership being voluntary and based on fellowship within a faith; and (2) that the state, being an organization exercising compulsion and claiming territorial control, refrains from interference on religious grounds with the members or non-members of any church.

The establishment of these principles in Western civilization, subject as they still are to qualifications and exceptions, was the work of centuries of struggle. It was the solution of a problem, the reconciliation of the unity of citizenship with the diversity of belief. But the problem was not solved as problems in engineering are solved, by the deliberate intelligent consideration of its true nature. Politics and religion are too close to human prejudices and passions to admit this method on so crucial an issue. The solution was reached because the old socio-religious unity broke down and every attempt to reassert it was defeated by the underlying conditions. Suppression and persecution and the compromise of "toleration" alike failed.¹⁹ Conditions had arisen under which authority could no longer secure religious conformity. Various influences conspired to bring this result—what stress should be laid on one and another of these interactive forces is a much debated question. Certainly among them must be included the advance of science leading gradually to new conceptions of the universe and disturbing old thought-forms, the

¹⁹ For the transition from toleration to religious autonomy see *The Modern State*, pp. 171-175. For the subsidiary questions of relationship between state and church which arise under this autonomy see *ibid.*, pp. 175-180. Cf. also Everts Greene, "Persistent Problems of Church and State," in *American Historical Review*, Vol. 36 (1931), 257-273, and W. A. Brown, *Church and State in Contemporary America* (New York, 1936).

more critical and more realistic thinking stimulated by the rediscovery of the Graeco-Roman culture and the changing attitude towards authority engendered in the political and economic struggles of an age in which nationalisms were forming and the bases of the economic life were shifting.

Under these conditions the great ecclesiastical schisms occurred, and religious sects, hitherto held in check by the suppressive unity of church and state, arose and multiplied. Religion, in short, became to a vastly greater extent a personal affair. The final result was that the organizations of religion lost in many countries much of their social control. The earlier result was that in the countries where anti-authoritarian influences were most in evidence Protestant churches, on a definitely associational basis, grew strong. It has been excellently shown by Max Weber that the spirit of these churches was more favorable to the industrial capitalism which was emerging in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.²⁰ How far that spirit prepared the way for the new economic order and how far it was itself an accommodation to changing economic conditions is again one of the open questions of social causation. Certainly, however, the two were congenial. The corporate individualism of the new industry was animating an evolution of the economic order and raising a problem of its relation to the state which, though it required a different type of solution, was in this respect similar to the evolution of the religious order, that it led from a stage of specialized institutions to a stage of specialized associations. The variety of economic interests, like the variety of religious interests, expressed itself in a world of manifold associations. This is the evolved character of the social structure in which we live, and it is from this basis that any further changes of an evolutionary character must proceed. Perhaps, for example, we may expect a future development of many varieties of other cultural associations whose seeds were hidden in the once dominant organization of the church. As we have suggested, the associations of the cultural life are capable of a degree of detachment within the unity of the social order which is not possible for the associations of the economic system.²¹ Economy, order, and peace require that men live in a closely integrated economic-political system, but the system is in itself indifferent to the endless variety of potential human ends which it may serve.

*The fact that society has evolved is of course no guarantee that

²⁰ Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*.

²¹ Cf. Chapter XVII.

this evolution will proceed further or even that the reverse process of a return to primitivism will not set in. We have pointed out that anti-evolutionary forces always resist the evolutionary trend. This condition is also manifest in our present world. As regards the relation of church and state, for example, there has been in some countries, notably in Germany under Hitler, a drive towards the restoration, in a new form, of the more primitive identification of the two and towards the dissolution of the independent existence of the church. The success of the drive remains doubtful, since religious groups, perhaps more than any other cultural organizations, offer a persistent opposition to the dominance of the state.²²

²² Cf., e. g., the forthright address of ten leaders of the German Evangelical Protestant Church to Chancellor Hitler, as reported in the press of July 28, 1936, in which they declared to the Führer that the commands of God took precedence.

XXVIII

SOCIAL EVOLUTION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS.

WHY SOCIAL PROGRESS CANNOT BE IDENTIFIED WITH SOCIAL EVOLUTION

Evolution does not mean progress.—That society has evolved is a demonstrable certainty. Can we demonstrate with no less certainty that society has progressed? We may assuredly *believe* in progress, but we cannot demonstrate it to others unless they first accept our valuations. Different people may look on the same social changes, and to some they may spell progress, to others decadence. The evolutionary changes we described in the last chapter are welcomed by some and are opposed by others. Primitivism has always had its champions and it still has them today.¹ Apart from that, many of the conditions on which depend important human values, such as contentment or abiding faith or economic security or freedom from over-heavy stress and strain, are not obviously realized more adequately in the more evolved society—in fact, strong indictments have been drawn against civilization on these counts. Clearly then we cannot, without confusion, introduce the idea of progress into our *definition* of evolution.

The danger of confusion.—Auguste Comte and many of his followers fell into this mistake, which gravely affected the scientific character of their work. But as an illustration of the danger we will take a modern writer who has made a broad and thoughtful study of social evolution, L. T. Hobhouse. Nevertheless his concept of social development seems to sway between the concepts of social

¹ See, for example, H. O. Lovejoy, *et al.*, *Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity* (Baltimore, 1935).

evolution and of social progress. Thus in his book called *Social Development* he sets out the following criteria: "a community develops as it advances in (1) scale, (2) efficiency, (3) freedom, and (4) mutuality of service." By efficiency he means the "adequate apportionment and co-ordination of functions in the service of an end, whatever the end may be and whether it be or be not understood by those who contribute to it." By freedom he means "scope for thought, character, and initiative" on the part of the members. By "mutuality of service" he means "the service of an end in which each who serves participates." In so far as these four are combined "we have efficient organization with all its power of collective achievement based on the intelligent will of individuals because it meets their needs, and relying on their support in all difficulties."²

These criteria are in several respects unsatisfactory. Increase of scale, of the size of the community, may be a condition—but it is a doubtful criterion—of social evolution, and a more definite structural clue seems necessary. Hobhouse's next criterion, efficiency, is functional, but again lacks precision. Efficiency, or economy in the utilization of social energies, may be a concomitant or a consequence of evolution, but if we define it only as the "adequate apportionment and co-ordination of functions *in the service of any end*," it gives us relatively little help in the evolutionary comparison of different societies, for the ends themselves change in the process. A society organized for war is efficient in a different respect from a society organized for industry; a society highly organized for money-making from a society in which cultural interests are stronger. These, however, are minor difficulties. The more serious one is that the two further criteria, freedom and mutuality, belong to a different order altogether. What Hobhouse is now putting forward is his concept of progress. What he is now thinking of is that condition of society, whatever its form, in which there is more opportunity and stimulation for initiative, freedom of thought, and strength of character, and in which there is free participation in the common benefits of reciprocal service. We may approve these formulations of a social ideal—the present writer in fact does—but the attempt to combine these attributes with the former two in a concordant set of evolutionary criteria is unfortunate. Not only does it introduce an element of subjectivity but it prevents us from investigating clearly the real problem, the correlation between the

² *Social Development* (London, 1924), Chap. IV. Other works in which Hobhouse deals with social evolution include *Morals in Evolution* (New York, 1919) and *Social Evolution and Political Theory* (New York, 1911).

order of evolution and an order which accords with a particular concept of progress. The two orders are merged at the start, and therefore their relation to one another is either assumed or obscured.

The need for a clear distinction between them is shown in another work of which Hobhouse is co-author.³ In this work over four hundred of the "simpler peoples" are classified according to evolutionary stage. The basis of classification is here definite and objective, being the degree in which these peoples have advanced in "material" culture, that is, in the control over nature reflected in their arts—a more precise form of the criterion of efficiency. The authors then take certain institutions which have an obvious ethical import and investigate the extent to which they are present in the different stages. Some of the results are given as follows:

CASES OF PEOPLES HAVING CERTAIN INSTITUTIONS SHOWN AS FRACTIONS
OF TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLES IN EACH CLASS

Class	<i>Polygamy general</i>	<i>Nobility</i>	<i>Slavery</i>
Lower Hunters	.29	0	.02
Higher Hunters	.32	.11	.32
Agricultural I	.18	.03	.33
Pastoral I	.53	.20	.37
Agricultural II	.43	.15	.46
Pastoral II	.74	.24	.71
Agricultural III	.64	.23	.78

The last column suffices for our purpose. Clearly the institution of slavery contradicts the principles of freedom and of mutuality and yet it is more in evidence among the more advanced of the primitive peoples included in the study. The authors also point out that for these stages "organized war rather develops with the advance of industry and of social organization in general."⁴ How then could we classify these peoples according to evolutionary stage if we sought to combine the four criteria given by Hobhouse?

Is progress a "scientific concept?"—The relation of social evolution to social progress is in fact a problem which presents many difficulties, and they arise chiefly because of the variable and inconclusive character of the concept of progress. It has a different significance for different individuals, for different times, and for different social groups. To the eighteenth-century "enlightenment" progress meant emancipation from the bonds of tradition and the tyranny of power. To late-nineteenth-century America is seemed to

³ Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg, *The Material Culture and the Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples*.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 228.

be identified with the triumphant expansion of society and the exploitation of the resources of the earth.⁵ The concept of progress is a chameleon that takes on the color of the environment, when we are adjusted to that environment, and some contrasting color when we feel maladjusted.

It is still sometimes claimed that progress is a "scientific concept," in other words, that it can be so defined as to express an ideal on which all who use the term "scientifically" can agree and one which is itself present in actuality in a degree which can be positively ascertained. Thus one sociologist regards the goal of progress for the individual as "the complete functioning of an integrated personality," and thence proceeds to define social progress as consisting "in those changes in the social structure which release, stimulate, facilitate, and integrate human functioning."⁶ But any such solution is apparent, not real. The expressions "complete functioning" and "human functioning," are, like the term "progress" itself, not symbols of definite meaning but verbal brackets which are given different content by different users. Complete functioning, if we try to take the phrase strictly, would turn the plastic human animal into a chimera. All functioning is selective, and everyone defines progress, for himself, in terms not only of the extent but also of the quality of the functioning.

Why the concept of progress can have no universally accepted reference.—Can we get no further than this negative result? Although different minds interpret progress differently, is there not a common core of meaning? Are there not fundamental desires common to all mankind, and do they not provide the raw material of the concept of progress, however differently it may be worked up by men of different extraction and circumstances? Do not our psychologists reveal to us the deeper urges of the race, and do not our sociologists tell us of the "four wishes" and other simple formulations of the primary motivations of all men?⁷ And if there are perversions and mutilations and aberrations of these, cannot we regard them as deviations from the norm and still find in the norm

⁵ "It is a misfortune," said V. L. Parrington in Volume III of his *Main Trends of American Thought (The Beginnings of Critical Realism in America)*, p. 19 "that America has never subjected the abstract idea of progress to critical examination."

⁶ Article entitled "Is Progress a Scientific Concept," by Professor Hornell Hart in *Sociology and Social Research*, Vol. 13 (1929), 303-314.

⁷ The "four wishes" of W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki (*The Polish Peasant*, I, Methodological Note, pp. 72-73, and III, Introduction) are response, recognition, security, and new experience.

itself the ground on which to construct a sufficient concept of progress?

To answer these questions let us state more explicitly the character of the valuation which the concept of progress involves. When we speak of progress without a qualifying adjective, such as "economic" or "material," we invoke an ultimate, not an intermediate or conditional, standard of value. Economic progress means no more than increase in the economic means to progress. The latter can be measured, but what cannot thereby be measured is the degree in which the measurable increase of the means contributes to the ill-defined and unmeasured end, which is progress itself. On this account we should not, as economists such as Pigou do, speak of economic welfare as a part of total welfare—it is a condition, not a part.⁸ By increasing welfare, or progress *per se*, we must mean the nearer or fuller realization of a state of being which accords, not even with our desires, but with our sense of the desirable. We are in the realm not only of ultimate values, but of ultimate *ethical* values. In this realm agreement proves nothing except that we agree. If Bornean tribes accept success in head-hunting as progress, it is merely their judgment and may be denied by another people or another civilization. And so with our own social goals. We must go by our own sense of values, for there is no appeal to any higher court, and yet the judgment of the only court we have does not bind even the conscience from which it emanates.

Moreover, when we leave out the qualifying adjectives, like "economic" or "material," we are then evaluating not this factor or that in the scheme of things but the whole scheme itself. There are so many diverse elements involved that it is hard to comprehend the whole and still harder to evaluate it. In the great movements of social change there is, whatever standard we adopt, loss as well as gain. In what we may designate advance there is assuredly not an equal advance of all the items in our catalogue of goods. Every achievement has its costs, and men often differ as to whether the costs outweigh the values accrued. The "simpler peoples" achieved higher social organization with the aid of slavery—was this progress as it was certainly evolution? Our own civilization has multiplied commodities and services through mechanized, standardized routine. The facilities and stimulations of urbanization go with congestion and the loss of the free contacts of nature. To balance the gain and loss in each total emerging situation is a

⁸ Cf. A. C. Pigou, *The Economics of Welfare* (London, 1929), Chap. I.

hazardous personal judgment, and yet such an accounting is involved in every attribution of progress.

It may be said that we ourselves create by our preferences these new social situations, that it is our own devices and techniques which bring them into being, and that therefore they express at least the majority choice, the general estimate of the direction in which progress lies. But the truth is not so simple. Whole situations are not presented to us to choose between. They may be the result of a large number of partial conditioned preferences but they are certainly not the result of an all-round preference. Whatever motives lie behind the inventive spirit, whether the sheer joy of technical mastery or the desire for profit or for fame or for the lightening of toil or the increase of goods, it is certainly not actuated by the desire that more men should live and work in cities and fewer in the country. Yet the chain of causes into which invention enters brings inexorably the last-mentioned result. The various individual items of desire which we pursue—even when they can be co-operatively or harmoniously achieved—do not merge into a whole which is the fullness of our desire. Besides, the distinction between the desired and the desirable here again arises to confute our attempted solution. Mill was surely wrong when he stated that there is no way of knowing what is desirable except that men desire it.⁹ Our ideals not only stretch further than our desires—sometimes the two are in actual conflict. Creatures of habituation as we are, there are crucial situations when we must say, "I want this, but I know I would be happier or better if I did not want it, or wanted that instead." What we desire and what we feel we ought to desire are here opposed, and it is with the latter and not with the former that we link the idea of good, envisaged as realized or as in process of realization. Even were there universal agreement on the fundamental urges or the "wishes" of mankind, that agreement would not yield an adequate definition of progress.

From these difficulties in the way of a "scientific" concept of progress there seems no escape. Two paths tempt us, but they both lead to the same impasse. We may accept the subjectivity of the concept, and seek a definition in subjective terms. Of these the favorite is "happiness." Suppose then we agreed that progress means more happiness—though dissent would in fact arise from various quarters—yet happiness has no common reference. The lover and the religious enthusiast, the epicure and the ascetic, do not merely find it in different directions but actually experience it

⁹ J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism*, Chap. IV.

as different subjective states. And if we say, "Be it so, but a precise definition of *social* progress is not on that account barred, for social progress means a change of social conditions such that more people achieve happiness, or more happiness, in their respective ways," then again we are faced with the utilitarian difficulty of the computation and comparability of happiness and with that even more formidable difficulty before which the greatest of the utilitarians yielded when he said that it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.¹⁰

Finally we may try the other path. Premising that human beings are fundamentally alike, have the same organic natures, the same initial appetites, the same germinal capacities varying in degree of potency or of evocation, we may seek for a common content of progress by setting down those goods or forms of satisfaction which all men seek in the degree of their opportunity. If we examine the actual conduct of men—and all conduct is practical valuation—do we not find a large agreement concerning the things they both desire and find desirable? Can we not place in this list of goods—health, length of life (given health), assurance of the means of living, sustaining social companionship, the respect of one's fellows, and some degree or kind of power and prestige? And can we not then say that social progress means such change in the conditions of a society that these are provided in greater measure for its members? Observe, however, that our very limited list of common goods already contains two categories, certain minimum requirements of organic well-being and certain desiderata of a social nature. Now the first group contains nothing the desire for which distinguishes the savage from the civilized man or even the man from the lower animal. We should surely regard these fulfillments as elemental conditions of progress rather than as substantial contents of it. The establishment of the social conditions necessary to establish these requirements for the great majority is still far from being attained, and concerning these at least we may agree, concerning this first step on the road of progress. The second category gives us a little more trouble. In it we include one desire that is characteristically, well-nigh universally, human, that for distinction, prestige, or power in some direction. But the peculiarity of this desire is that it cannot be translated into a social ideal, for the reason sufficiently summed up in the homely words of the satirist, "when everyone is somebody, then no one's anybody."

Moreover, our minimum list omits certain of the more pro-

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Chap. II.

foundly human purposes in living. If there is a large measure of agreement concerning its items it is because they are thought of chiefly as means rather than as ends of life. As soon as we try to import into it those cultural items which are more strictly ends, the consensus goes. It is in times of expanding civilization, when men are much preoccupied with means, that whole peoples are most apt to share a common belief and a common confidence in progress, merely because it is falsely identified with the means in which they are engrossed. In short, it is only when civilization and culture are confused that progress is thought of as a "scientific" concept. When that distinction is adequately recognized and people endeavor to express their ideals of the "good life," the difficulties we have already discussed reappear. There is, to begin with, the question of the priority of the goods in our list. The relative importance attached to primary or bodily satisfactions varies greatly. Temperament and education become involved, and the relative, fluctuating, subjective nature of the concept of progress is then apparent.

THE PLACE OF THE CONCEPT OF PROGRESS IN SOCIOLOGY

In what sense the social sciences can be "value-free."—If the concepts of evolution and of progress belong to such different orders of thought, if the one reveals the emotional neutrality of scientific thinking, and the other the varying coloration of our purposes and of our dreams, is it not the business of sociology, in studying social change, to discard the latter altogether? Is it not one of those alien intrusive concepts which have perturbed, from the days of Plato to the present, the attempt to see society as it is?

Certainly we must oppose the confusion of evolution with progress. We need always to be on guard lest our personal valuations distort the reality we are seeking to understand. We must, as scientists, care more for the truth than for the consequences of the truth. The causal nexus of things must be investigated with scrupulous care for the evidences, whether they confirm or deny our prior beliefs. But if we endeavor to meet the conditions imposed by science we must also reconcile them with the conditions imposed by our subject matter. As has been pointed out, this is no simple task. For human valuations are themselves an aspect of the *subject matter* of the social sciences. These valuations affect and even determine the social relations and institutions with which we deal. They do not affect the realities with which the physical sciences deal. More-

over, these human valuations do not lie objectively before us as the atom or the star lies before the physicist. We discover them only in so far as we ourselves can enter into the experience of other evaluating beings, of the present or of the past. We must apply our own discernment of values if we are to pierce through the confusing layers of overt professions and rationalizations that often conceal the actual valuations of men in society. We must even be able to distinguish between the values actually maintained or fostered by an institution or organization and the values attributed to it by its adherents and its enemies. For unless we know the institution as it is thus set in the antagonisms and harmonies of a social system, we do not know it at all, and we certainly cannot interpret its changes.

In what sense then can subjects such as sociology be, in the German phrase, "value-free" (*wertfrei*)? Certainly not in the sense that they leave human values out of account, uninvestigated, unscrutinized. Nor yet in the sense that while they must deal with valuations, or value-facts, they treat them as facts without seeking to comprehend the operative significance of the values they embody. That would be to denude them of their dynamic and essential character. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether sociology can be value-free in the sense that the investigator can or should adopt a standpoint from which all human valuations are to him equally indifferent, for if he attained such a standpoint then he would probably be unable any longer to *understand* the impulses that control human behavior. The patriot, the religious devotee, the ambitious leader, the lover, the man of affairs, would alike become no more than organisms curiously gesticulating in a social void. We are driven to the conclusion that *the only clear and indubitable sense in which sociology can be value-free is that in dealing with value-facts the sociologist should never suffer his own valuations to intrude into or affect his presentation of the valuations which are registered in the facts themselves.*

Many formulations of the claim that sociology and the other social sciences should entirely abjure the realm of valuations fail to recognize the full significance and the full difficulty of the problem. Even the fine exposition of sociological *Wertfreiheit* by that excellent sociologist, Max Weber, leaves something out of account.¹¹ The difficulty is illustrated by the writings of those

¹¹ *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre* (Tübingen, 1922), pp. 146-214, 451-502. A good survey of the whole problem, with special reference to Max Weber, is given in F. Kaufmann, *Methodenlehre der Sozialwissenschaften* (Vienna, 1936), Part II, Chap. III. See also A. von Schelting, *Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre* (Tübingen, 1934), pp. 58-64.

sociologists themselves who make the largest claims for *Wertfreiheit*. Thus Leopold von Wiese ends a discussion of the subject with the words: "Value judgments, adieu."¹² But in the body of the work to which this forms an introduction, he not infrequently admits explicit or implicit value-judgments. Witness the following passage: "The bristling frontiers of such countries as France and Italy, Germany and Poland, China and Russia, the systems of protective tariffs and subsidies, the ever-recurring attempts to monopolize the means of communication, the insatiate expansion of imperialism, the unprecedented growth of war-waging systems, the startling proliferation of technical means of man's destruction . . . can be regarded as advantages only by optimists of the most myopic, resolute, and unwavering stamp."¹³ And in a later part of the book he introduces a strong condemnation of modern warfare, which he calls "irrational and absurd."¹⁴ Again, no sociologist has prided himself more on his complete "objectivity" and his exclusive reliance on "logico-experimental" analysis than Vilfredo Pareto. But critical value-judgments abound in his work, and the criticism is directed with particular pungency and more abundant illustration towards certain tendencies or movements, such as socialism, religious nonconformity, pacifism, and sex asceticism.

One cannot of course conclude that a principle is unsound or an ideal false because its proponents fail to live up to it. But the manner in which they do so is illuminating. It suggests the need for a more adequate definition of the sense in which value-judgments do not come within the orbit of social science. *While no science can ever validate any thesis of final values, science nevertheless can and does enter the area of value-judgments along two roads.* (1) It can test the accuracy, adequacy, and representativeness of the factual evidences adduced in support of a value-judgment. (2) It can test the validity of conclusions concerning what is better or worse in so far as these are supported by reasoning from premises containing statements of fact. It can, for example, prove or disprove such theories as attribute superior moral or intellectual qualities to a particular race or class, such theories as attempt to show the relation to human well-being of a state of peace or a state of war, such evidences of the truth of a religion as consist of historical records or allegations of the occurrence of

¹² *Systematic Sociology* (New York, 1932), p. 8.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 163. The quotations are taken from the amplified English translation of Howard Becker but are not an interpolation by the translator.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 611.

supernatural phenomena, such views of the beneficence of a system of sex morals as proclaim the social consequences of its establishment or maintenance to be conclusive proof of its value, and so forth. Difficult as some of these matters may be to investigate, they all lie within the potential area of scientific demonstration.

While then there remain some controversial issues regarding the manner and degree in which the social sciences are qualified to deal with certain types of value-judgment, there need be no disagreement on the fundamental relation of scientific inquiry to the affirmation of final values. In particular, there should be no dubiety on the following points, which are implicit in the very conception of scientific investigation:

(1) Science is concerned not with the establishment of ultimate ends or values, but only with the relation between means and ends; the ends can never be demonstrated, but only the relevance or adequacy of means to postulated ends.

(2) Science is concerned with what *is*, not with what in the last resort *ought* to be; and it must always avoid the confusion of the *is* and the *ought*, of the fact and the ideal.

(3) Social science has *as part of its subject matter* the valuations operative in social institutions and organizations, but not the valuations of these valuations on the part of those who investigate them.

(4) Social science in investigating the instrumental character of institutions and organizations, that is, their services and dis-services as means to postulated ends, must always guard against the danger that the bias of the investigator will magnify those aspects of service or of disservice which give support to his own valuations.¹⁵ This is the great practical difficulty that faces the student of the value-impregnated processes of society. He must always select from the myriad facets of the presented reality, and is always in peril of selecting in terms of one or another of the various biases to which human beings, whether scientists or laymen, are subject.

The concept of progress in human history.—The concept of the desirable, and therefore of that which would be more desirable, or progress, is never absent from human affairs. All conduct implies a consciousness of welfare, of less and greater welfare—we could neither live nor act without it. To live is to act, and to act is to choose, and to choose is to evaluate. Hence as human beings we can-

¹⁵ By *bias* we mean a disposition to reject the logic of evidence in favor of a preconceived belief.

not get rid of the *concept* of progress, though we are of course entitled to deny the reality of progress. The fact that men inevitably differ about it, that we cannot demonstrate the validity of our concept as against theirs, only makes it more indubitably ours. If none can prove it none can refute it. At the least it is a vital myth, ineradicable from the creative strivings of life. What alone is subject to scientific scrutiny is the historical reality of progress, however defined; the manner of the dependence of progress, past or future, on specific means or agencies; and the content of the concept as it is framed by different individuals or groups.

It has been stated that the concept of social progress is a modern one, a birth of Western civilization whose parents were the Darwinian theory and the Industrial Revolution. It would be truer to say that the confidence in the reality of continuous progress is modern. The *concept* of progress may be as old as mankind. True that often it appeared in the reversed form, so natural to every ageing generation, that the world is growing worse, but logically we cannot have the *concept* of "worse" without that of "better." The lamentation for the "good old times" is a commonplace of all literature. We find it in folk myths everywhere. It is present in the third chapter of Genesis, which tells of the loss of Eden and the fall of man. Even thereafter "there were giants in the earth in those days." But sometimes the eyes of the prophets were filled with the vision of future greatness and their minds with the belief in a deliverer who would usher in a new era. In classical literature, as in Jewish, the golden age was generally thought of as lying in the past, but there were dreams of its return, as in the fourth *Eclogue* of Virgil. The belief in achieved progress is not, however, absent. It underlies the *Prometheus* of Sophocles and it rings through the funeral speech of Pericles. On a wider scale, and most notably, it is the theme of the *De Rerum Natura* of Lucretius. Lucretius, who also had remarkable intimations of the modern principle of evolution, implicitly distinguished it from progress and significantly saw the latter as essentially a liberation from the thralldom of superstitious atavistic beliefs and practices. After the classical period the dominance of religious authority, with its rigid views of the preordained lot and destiny of mankind, weighted down all interpretations of social progress. Such limited expressions of the principle as did emerge, from Augustine's "City of God" to Dante's *universitas humana*, were conceived in an entirely different spirit.

Many other examples could be given, but these may suffice to show that the concept of progress is not a modern invention. What

is modern is the placid assumption, characteristic of groups or peoples living in an expanding industrial economy, that progress is the normal quality of social change. And perhaps no less the assumption that material gain, statistically measured economic increment, is a sufficient indication thereof. But in some sense or another the concept of progress operates as an historical factor in social change and must be reckoned with as such.

Scientifically legitimate investigations bearing on the concept of progress.—A further question can now be answered. Since science is concerned with the actual, the given, and since in the field of the social sciences the actuality is pervaded by, sustained and even determined by, valuations, in what ways can these valuations, and in particular the attribution of progress or decay, be scientifically investigated? Finally, can the sociologist in any of these investigations legitimately introduce his own concept of progress or of its opposite? Or must he lay it aside altogether as a scientist while returning to it as a man?

Our preceding discussion suggests various types of investigation, differing in range and also in hazard but all of them admissible and even important subjects of scientific inquiry.

(1) We may examine how particular concepts of progress are related to the social conditions of the age in which they prevail. Why was there a tendency in various past ages to look back to a golden age or to dream of its return? Why at certain times has the progress of society been thought to depend on the coming of a great deliverer? Why at some periods is progress conceived of more in cultural terms and at other periods more in utilitarian terms? Why is it that at certain times a belief in rapid progress pervades a particular society, as in France and England of the late eighteenth century, in Western Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century, in many periods of American history, and in Russia at the time of the Five-Year Plan? How are such variant conceptions related to the advance of science, the development of the industrial arts, changes in the form of government, changes in religious belief, and so forth?

(2) We may investigate how prevailing concepts of progress operate to influence social and economic trends. One phenomenon of our own times is the attempt of propagandists of certain schools to develop dynamic creeds or "myths" as a way of rallying men to a particular social order.¹⁶ Is it possible to trace the spread and the

¹⁶ These attempts are exemplified by Georges Sorel, *Reflexions Sur la Violence* (5th ed., Paris, 1921), in which the author develops the "myth" of the general

influence of such beliefs or of the various ideas of progress that have animated groups or peoples? In a more concrete way it is possible to show how some form of optimistic (or pessimistic) spirit explains certain characteristics and trends of a particular society, as, for example, F. J. Turner sought to do in his study, *The Frontier in American History*.

(3) We may take a particular concept of progress, any standard of what is the social good or the conditions of social welfare, and examine the questions, (a) how far and under what conditions it has been advanced or retarded in some area of society over a given period, (b) by what adaptation or application of means to ends it may be further advanced. The latter is of course a more precarious question, but still scientifically permissible. A study of the conditions under which political liberty expands or contracts or a study of the conditions under which wealth is more equally or more unequally distributed may be a very important contribution to the understanding of society. The degree of democracy and the manner of the distribution of wealth are social facts, and bias lies in wait, and must be avoided, whatever our attitude to them. Even neutrality is no prescription against bias, for neutrality may spell an indifference which fails to comprehend the social emotions clustering round the facts.

(4) We may, as already suggested, investigate how far the course of evolution is accompanied by, or itself fosters, particular attributes of living which have a bearing on the concept of progress. This is in fact what various sociological writers, such as Spencer, Ward, Hobhouse, Oppenheimer, have done, though not always with a clear distinction between the two orders thus correlated. If we follow the objective course of social differentiation we see that it has a demonstrable relation to certain standards and modes of social life, that it creates new problems of social relationships, that it evolves or demands different social attitudes and human qualities.

The last of these types of investigation will be more fully examined in our concluding section. Before we turn to it let us restate the essential and unbridgeable difference between the concepts of evolution and of progress. Evolution is the "unfolding" of the nature of a thing, in the course of which it adapts itself in new ways to its environment, reveals more fully its potentialities, shows the variety and complexity hidden in its earlier stages and does so by

strike; by Alfred Rosenberg, *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Munich, 1930), in which the Nazi "myth" is expounded, and by the writings of such Fascist propagandists as Gentile and Rocco.

objective signs which are summed up in the word "differentiation." Progress, on the other hand, is the approach of reality to some ideal. The concept of this process, is formed in terms of our ideals, not simply of our knowledge. Progress implies a selective process of a different kind from that of evolution, for it chooses and rejects among the actualities of existence, whereas evolution chooses among its potentialities. It is thus rooted in our practical life, in our conscious needs. It is a cause of change and is always relative to the conditions we want changed. It involves a picture of something seen by the mind but not yet visible on earth. It contains the sense of a present imperfection, an inadequacy which we seek to remove—only to find another inadequacy beyond it. It is one form of the quest for fulfillment, which all life seeks in its degree.

SOME PROBLEMS OF THE MORE EVOLVED SOCIETY

The challenge of social change.—In a highly differentiated society modes of living and of social intercourse must obviously differ from those that prevail within a more simple society. But the difference is not merely that between one system of folkways and another, each appropriate to its own time and place. The profounder difference is that between the attitudes of the primitive and those of the civilized being towards the folkways themselves. This difference we have already suggested at various points in the discussion of social change. Here, in concluding, we shall seek to bring out more directly its significance for the problem of living in the more evolved society.

Under all conditions life is a process of continuous readjustment. The changing organism readapts itself to the changing environment. It establishes a moving equilibrium between its needs and the conditions of their attainment. The folkways themselves are built up in this process, not by definite design, as man constructs a machine, but by gradual responses and habituations. They are a solution to various problems of adjustment, both between man and nature and between man and man; and they change in the same gradual responsive undesigned manner in which they were initiated. They assume a world in which change itself is slow and gradual.

But the world of civilization is not that kind of a world. With specialization and complexity, and the more rapid tempo of change that accompany them, new attitudes are required, as a precondition of successful adjustment. In the first place, social institutions can no longer be taken as constant, as a secure system of procedures by

the aid of which the individual adjusts himself to the changes in himself, in his fellow men, and in outer nature. Institutions and mores do remain a necessary aid to personal equilibrium, but they no longer assure it, for they themselves have become merged in the flux of things and to them too, as to the rest of his changeful world, the individual must constantly readjust himself. This means a vital difference of attitude, and much of the disorganization and maladjustment of modern life may be interpreted as a failure to meet this demand.

When people migrate from a rural to an urban area changes occur not only in their customary ways of living but also, unless they have already lost the ability to respond to new conditions, in the underlying attitudes they tend to exhibit towards these customary ways. They are more ready to modify them at need, to regard them as subject to rational reflection concerning their utility. The transition from the old to the new attitudes has its perils, for when men give up the absolute assurance of old certitudes they may never attain the relative assurance of new quests. It is the same problem that frequently faces the young brought up in a home environment where some strong orthodoxy prevails and moving into a world that disregards the indoctrinated ways. Every transition from one social situation to another offers the alternative of readjustment or maladjustment. An obvious index of this is the greater frequency of crime among migrants, whether from one area to another or from one country to another. It has been shown, for example, that the migrants from Canada to the United States have a criminal rate 50 per cent higher than that of the native white population and, conversely, that the migrants from the United States to Canada exhibit a rate nearly twice as high as that of the native Canadian population.¹⁷ While migration from one social environment to another makes a particular and abrupt demand for readjustment, the transitions occurring within every modern society are such that a constant readiness to make readjustment to new situations is now required.

But there is another, and no less challenging, demand arising

¹⁷ This and other interesting illustrations are offered in the contribution by E. H. Sutherland, "Is There Undue Crime among Immigrants?" *Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work, 54th Annual Session (1927)*, 576-577. It should be recognized, of course, that other factors are involved in the explanation of the higher criminal rate of migrants, in the impulses lying back of migration itself. Furthermore, there is some evidence that the transition to a new social environment may stimulate achievement as well as maladjustment. See also the author's article, "Maladjustment," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 10.

from the rapidity with which the conditions that underlie the social order, and particularly the technological conditions, undergo change. We can no longer, it would seem, depend on the gradual undesigned adjustment of social institutions to our changing needs. The social system is too intricate, too specialized, too unstable, and its parts too elaborately and delicately interdependent, for us to trust to the slow "natural" processes of adaptation. The great mechanism is thrown out of balance too easily and does not recover it spontaneously. If the system itself was built up without survey or blueprint, it is becoming more apparent that it cannot be sustained without the introduction of whatever intelligence man can apply to its understanding and control. Nor will it suffice that he apply his intelligence to the individual parts and let the whole take care of itself. The history of world disorganization since 1914 refutes that principle. The readjustment of institutions to meet changing conditions calls for a kind of concerted intelligence that under simpler conditions seemed unnecessary. As Julian Huxley remarks, "this is one of the most remarkable facts of evolution—that consciousness, until a very late period, has played a negligible part," and he goes on to suggest that co-operative intelligence becomes an ever more pressing necessity for the more evolved society.¹⁸ The challenge is indeed so obvious that a few illustrations will suffice to show its nature.

The increasing need for the application of intelligence to social organization.—We are not raising the question whether the old ways are in any absolute sense better or worse than new ones. The point is that our attitudes, our ideas, our mores must change with changing needs and changing conditions if we are to satisfy these needs and meet these conditions. Perhaps the most obvious illustration is the transformation of the significance of warfare. Under modern conditions war between great nations is tremendously different in its operations and in its consequences from what it was under more simple conditions. Those who still think of war in the old nationalist terms are not facing the realities. The militarist mentality may reasonably be said to be dangerously maladjusted to the world in which we now live, since it fails to comprehend the train of irremediable and overwhelming ruin that modern war involves.

The illustration we have just given owes its cogency to two processes of change, one the technological change which has revolutionized the arts of warfare, and the other the change, itself technologically derived, in the degree and range of interdependence between nations. The way in which increasing interdependence calls

¹⁸ *Essays of a Biologist*, p. 41. See also pp. 92 ff.

for change of attitudes and of interests may be illustrated from every sphere of economic or of political activity but nowhere more revealingly than in the relations between states. The traditional concept of political sovereignty dates from a time when countries were more nearly self-sufficient, before large-scale industry and international finance developed, when therefore governments could assert that they were absolute powers without obligation to one another, each supreme and unlimited and final. On the line of that tradition economists postulated the "closed national state," determined by its exclusive economic interests. Philosophers proclaimed the state to be "the world the spirit has made for itself" and denied that it had even moral obligations beyond its frontiers.¹⁹ The results of the partial acceptance of these principles in the postwar period are now generally acknowledged to have been grave or even disastrous. The facts of interdependence challenge the old doctrine of sovereignty and raise the problem of its restatement to meet the new conditions. Here as elsewhere it is a question of the transition from absolute to relative unities, from independent to interdependent systems, from exclusive to inclusive loyalties and obligations.

The evolution of modern industry likewise affords many illustrations of the need for a redirection of attitudes and the application of intelligence to social reorganization. The old-time business, conducted as a family affair or by a single craftsman with perhaps an apprentice or two, admitted no great distinction of interests, and therefore no complexity of organization, either within itself or in relation to the business activities of others. But when it changed into a factory or workshop and the owner employed an increasing number of hired men, the interest of the wage earner became more distinct from the interest of the employer. As the scale of business increased still further, new distinctions of interest arose. The ownership and management of the business, especially in the corporate form, ceased to be identical and no longer had identical interests.²⁰ Nor was there any guarantee that the interest of the new class of passive owners, the general body of shareholders, would coincide with the interest of the few active owners, the board of directors. Hence there arose not only the larger issues between labor and capital but also subsidiary conflicts of interests within each category, between skilled labor and unskilled labor, between those whose inter-

¹⁹ Cf., for example, J. G. Fichte, *The Closed Commercial State* (1800), and B. Bosanquet, *Philosophical Theory of the State*, Chap. XI. See the author's *The Modern State*, Chaps. XV and XVI.

²⁰ See, for example, A. A. Berle and G. C. Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* (New York, 1932), Chap. VI.

est required the distribution of surpluses in the form of dividends and those whose interest lay in the accumulation of reserves or in the expansion of the business.

Interest complications similarly arose on the larger scale of industry. The size of the market increased, and with this went an increase in the area and in the intensity of competition. What any one business did began to affect powerfully the interests of other businesses. If it cut prices seriously or if it gained any special advantage in the attempt to reduce costs, it created difficult problems for all its competitors. As a result of these and other developments nearly every industry has come to present a curious combination of agreements and competitive practices, a continually shifting adjustment of harmonious and conflicting like interests.²¹ And this situation in turn has intensified the distinction between the interests of the industry and the interest of consumers. Compare with this complex situation that of a simple agricultural community, where every farmer is owner, manager, and worker all in one, where he cultivates the soil with the aid of only his own family, and where he and his family consume a large portion of their own products. The diversity of interests has not arisen, nor has the need for elaborate adjustments to a continually changing situation.

This differentiation of interests creates problems on two levels. On one level it demands the skill of the social engineer, and in the last resort of the statesman, whose task it is to maintain and to establish the necessary conditions of the larger co-operation rendered necessary by the extension of interdependence and therefore to reconcile or to regulate the diverse and often conflicting interests of the various special-interest groups and organizations. In the simpler societies the adjustment of interests may not need any special oversight, but in the more evolved society, with its elaborate specialization and far-reaching interdependence, new forms of regulation, demanding high skill and intelligence, become imperative. Those who think in *laissez-faire* terms, as though these problems solved themselves, fail to understand how the world has changed. Perhaps the greatest and certainly the hardest task that faces civilized man is to discover how, through the co-operative application of intelligence, he can maintain, advance, and redirect to the service of common ends the elaborate complex of material means and social institutions to which, almost unwittingly, he has fallen heir.

²¹ See, for example, A. R. Burns, *The Decline of Competition* (New York, 1936), Chaps. I, XI.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES
NOTES ON FURTHER READING

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

The questions and exercises are divided into two groups, those under *B* being more difficult or for other reasons suitable for more advanced students.

CHAPTER I

A

1. Why does the definition of terms require particular attention in the field of the social sciences?
2. Under which of the definitions given in the text would each of the following be placed: *a tribe, a pioneer settlement, a community center, a department store, a church service, a fraternity, initiation ceremonies, a hospital, a government department, primogeniture, a folk dance?*
3. Would you call the relation of a newborn child to its mother a social relation? Would you call the relation of mother to babe a social relation? What is the essential difference between these two forms of relationship from a sociological standpoint?
4. Point out some differences between a family and a community, a class and a community, a crowd and a community, a state and a community.
5. Give instances of institutions created by (a) associations, (b) communities. In which class would you place: *property, marriage, public holidays, market places, social gatherings, rules of etiquette?*
6. It is a common observation that every group has its special mores. What are the special mores of the college or of the college group to which you belong? In what ways do they tend to control your actions or the expression of your desires?

B

7. In his book on *Social Actions* (Chap. I, p. 1) Znaniecki gives as examples of social actions the following: "greeting an acquaintance, helping a beggar, writing a letter, proposing to a girl, lynching a criminal, or fighting an enemy troop in battle." He distinguishes

them from nonsocial actions such as "eating, dressing, hunting, plowing, harvesting, making a chair or a horseshoe, painting a landscape, writing a poem, storing gold in a hoard or depositing it in a bank, praying, performing a religious sacrifice, formulating and solving a mathematical problem." He defines here *social* actions as "actions which deal practically with social beings, whom the agent experiences as conscious objects."

- (a) Would you distinguish "writing a letter" as a social action from "depositing gold in a bank" as a nonsocial action?
- (b) Would you regard "fighting an enemy troop in battle" as a *social* action? If so, would you regard the relation of the hunter and the deer as a *social relation*?
- (c) Do you see any difficulty in distinguishing at all between certain *classes* of actions as being social and others as being wholly nonsocial?

Give the grounds on which you answer "Yes" or "No" to these questions.

8. Compare the distinction between "community" and "association" given in the text with that made by F. Tönnies between "community" (*Gemeinschaft*) and "society" (*Gesellschaft*). For Tönnies' distinction see P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 491-493.
9. Mention some reasons, both theoretical and practical, why it is important to view the state as an association and not as a community.

CHAPTER II

A

1. How does the sociological *focus of interest* differ from the psychological? How, for example, would a sociological study of delinquency differ from a psychological one?
2. Would you distinguish social psychology from sociology, and if so, how?
3. Explain and illustrate the statement that *interests* and *attitudes* are correlative.
4. Every social situation involves a specific adjustment of attitudes and interests. Take some situation you know and describe it from this point of view.
5. Show the complexity of attitudes by an analysis of some variants of any one of the following: *patriotism, resentment, family pride, hero worship, jealousy*.
6. What diverse attitudes may underlie the following social acts: *congratulation, adulation, emulation, imitation, submission*? (Consult F. Znaniecki, *Social Actions*, for suggestions on the treatment of this question.)

7. Illustrate the divergent attitudes with which each of the following interests is frequently associated: *money, the home, the college, prohibition, dance halls, publicity, the Charity Organization Society, child-labor laws, war.*
8. Discuss the distinction between *like* and *common* interests. Why cannot we make a similar distinction with respect to attitudes?
9. Why are *common* interests of particular significance for the understanding of social unity?
10. Suggest some situations in which interests are (a) *like* and *harmonious*, (b) *like* and merely *unconflicting*, (c) *like* and *conflicting*, (d) *unlike* and *complementary*.
11. Why are *motives* so difficult to deal with in social investigation?
12. Examine some important decision which you have had to make, and endeavor to disentangle the motives which determined your choice of alternatives.

B

13. Discuss the attempt to "measure" attitudes, taking the work of Thurstone and Chave (see text, page 26) as an example, and asking particularly these questions:
 - (a) What is the unit of measurement?
 - (b) What attribute of the attitude is being measured, as length, for example, is measured by a yardstick?
 - (c) Since different people have different attitudes towards the same generic interest (say "the church") and since such an interest is itself particularized and interpreted in different ways by different people, what is the common factor that is subject to measurement when we speak of the attitudes of people towards, say, the church?
14. Bring out the difference of meaning between the various terms in any one column (under I, II, or III) of the classification on page 24, giving illustrations in each case.
15. "Attitude connotes a neuropsychic state of readiness for mental and physical activity" (G. W. Allport). Is this definition explicit enough to enable us to distinguish between *attitudes* and *habits*?
16. In what sense, if any, can motivations be said to be subconscious or unconscious?
17. Discuss Pareto's treatment of motives. See particularly *The Mind and Society*, I, Chap. III.

CHAPTER III

A

1. Why is it not possible for human beings to develop their individuality except in society? On the basis of your answer criticize the social contract theory.

2. Point out some ways in which the relation of individuals within society resembles the relation of cells within an organism, and also some of the ways in which the organizations of society resemble the organs of an organism. Mention any respects, beyond those referred to in the text, in which either of these analogies breaks down.
3. In what sense is it true to say that in the process of normal development the child passes from an "egocentric" to a "sociocentric" universe? Illustrate your answer from the studies of Jean Piaget referred to in the text.
4. "Society is co-operation crossed by conflict." Explain and illustrate.
5. Show by an analysis of instances of competitive practices in what respects the interests of competitors are (a) *discordant*, (b) *harmonious*, (c) *common*.
6. Bring out the factor of conflict as it enters respectively into *competing* and into *bargaining*. (On this subject consult also Chap. XVI, pages 305-306.)
7. Point out any sociological differences between conflicts for power, authority, or prestige on the one hand and conflicts for material goods on the other.

B

8. "In the eighteenth century it was held that men are born free; we on the contrary realize that men *become* free in society." Suggest some historical reasons for this change of attitude to the problem of liberty.
9. Durkheim in *The Division of Labor in Society* calls the cohesion of primitive society "mechanical" and that of civilized society "organic." Tönnies in his *Community and Society* maintains that primitive society is more "organic" than civilized society. What does each of these authors mean when he speaks of society as "organic"? (Consult references in text.)
10. Examine the argument put forward by W. McDougall in Chap. I of his *Group Mind*. Read in this connection Chap. IV of Morris Ginsberg's *Psychology of Society*.
11. Explain and illustrate the process of *compromise* as a mode of resolving conflict? (See, for example, F. Znaniecki, *Social Actions*, Chap. XVIII.)
12. The argument is sometimes put forward that war can never be abolished because the tendency to conflict is inherent in human beings. Examine the logic of the conclusion.
13. "A separate individual is an abstraction unknown to experience, and so likewise is society when regarded as something apart from individuals. The real thing is Human Life, which may be considered either in an individual aspect or in a social, that is to say, a general aspect; but is always, as a matter of fact, both individual and

general." (C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, Chap. I.) Write an essay on this theme.

14. "Is there nothing beyond my fellow-man? If not, there is nothing beyond myself, beyond my own throat, which may be cut, and my own purse, which may be slit: because I am the fellow-man of all the world, my neighbor is but myself in a mirror. So we toil in a circle of pure egoism." (*Letters of D. H. Lawrence* [New York, 1932], p. 360). Make this statement the starting point of an essay on the nature of society.

CHAPTER IV

A

1. Why should we not think of environment as merely that which environs us?
2. Distinguish, with illustrations, between physical adaptation and social adjustment.
3. Why are new forms of maladjustment so attendant on human strivings for completer adjustment?
4. When groups representing different races or nationalities are subjected to various psychological tests, such as the Army Alpha and Beta intelligence tests, what is it that these tests *actually* measure? Can it be properly said that they measure *racial* or *national* characteristics? (See for such tests and their results R. M. Yerkes, *Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences* [1921], Vol. XV, p. 697.)
5. What does race psychology really mean? (Consult T. R. Garth, *Race Psychology*.)
6. Catell found that of 895 American men of science 43.1 per cent were the children of professional fathers, 21.2 per cent the children of agricultural fathers, and 35.7 per cent the children of fathers engaged in manufacture and commerce. The respective percentages of the professional, agricultural, and manufacturing and commercial groups to the total population were 3, 41.1, and 34.1. What conclusions can you draw from this study? What further questions for investigation would suggest themselves to you?
7. "It is true that in general white children do better on the tests than Negroes. It is also true, however, that Negroes in the North do much better than Negroes in the South." (Otto Klineberg in *Opportunity*, December, 1931.) How would you interpret these facts?
8. Study in detail the articles on identical twins in *Journal of Heredity* for 1929, and draw any inferences you can.
9. Which human traits appear to change most readily when the environment, social or physical, changes, and which appear to change

least or not at all? Give illustrations from the researches referred to in the text.

10. Suggest some wrong or misleading questions which may be raised regarding the relation of heredity and environment. Suggest also some significant problems of relationship.

B

11. Read Graham Wallas' *The Great Society*, Chap. IX, and discuss his theory of "balked dispositions."
12. Does scientific research into the relation of heredity and environment strengthen or weaken the theories which attach dominant importance to the factor of race in human history?
13. "You cannot make a silk purse out of a sow's ear." Does it follow that heredity is more important than environment?
14. Give some illustrations from recent history which tend to show that the creeds and social philosophies of nations or smaller groups are strongly influenced by changing environmental conditions.

CHAPTER V

A

1. Distinguish between the direct and indirect influences of the geographical environment.
2. Show how the location of industries and centers of population in the United States is determined by geographical conditions.
3. Show how the industrial and social life of the region in which you live is affected by geographical considerations.
4. Investigations show (a) that homicides in Seattle are most frequent in the winter months and fewest in the summer months, (b) that homicides in North Carolina are most frequent in December with July coming second. What considerations other than seasonal ones would you adduce in the attempt to explain these facts?
5. The following headlines appeared in the *New York Times* (December 11, 1935), announcing a report from the Department of Justice:

HOMICIDES HIGHEST IN HOT WEATHER

COLD SPURS BURGLARIES

How must these statements be interpreted to guard against misleading conclusions?

6. Set out some reasons why in the higher stages of civilization the density of population is not in proportion (a) to the fertility of the soil, (b) to the natural resources of the immediate region. Give examples.

B

7. "Between the facts of the physical order there are sometimes relations of causality; between facts of human geography there are usually only *relations of connection*" (J. Bruhnes, *Human Geography*). Read Chaps. I and II of Bruhnes' work and explain his statement.
8. In the controversy between Malthus and Godwin how far would you say that each was right in the light of later history?
9. Why has the nature of the population problem changed since the time of Malthus? (See A. M. Carr-Saunders, *The Population Problem*, Chap. I, and E. B. Reuter, *Population Problems*, Chaps. I-V.)
10. What is the primary difficulty besetting the broader conclusions of the "geographical school"? How has it limited the contribution they have made to sociology?

CHAPTER VI

A

1. Point out some differences between biological heredity, the social heritage, and economic inheritance.
2. Discuss and illustrate some differences between the manner and degree of adjustment to environment characteristic, respectively, of primitive and civilized man.
3. Mention some characteristics (a) of particular immigrant groups, (b) of particular communities into which they enter, which tend to delay or render more difficult the process of absorption or assimilation.
4. What peculiar problem of social adjustment do second-generation immigrants frequently face? Give illustrations and evidences.
5. Discuss, with examples, some of the forms of culture clash as they affect the lives of either individuals or groups.

B

6. "Things are nuclei of social relationships." Explain and illustrate this statement.
7. Why is it that adequate educational preparation is both more difficult and more necessary in the more changeful societies?
8. When we speak of the assimilation of the American immigrant, what is it to which he becomes assimilated? (See, for example, M. E. Ravage, *An American in the Making*.)
9. Discuss the "ecological approach" to the study of society, taking as your example C. R. Shaw, *Delinquency Areas*, or L. Wirth, *The Ghetto*.

CHAPTER VII

A

1. Illustrate, expand, and, if you see reason, modify, from personal experience or from descriptions of rural life, the account of its common features given in the chapter.
2. In what sense is the rural environment more homogeneous for those in contact with it than is the urban environment?
3. How would you explain the unparalleled growth of cities in modern civilization? (Consult A. F. Weber, *The Growth of Cities*, or N. Carpenter, *The Sociology of City Life*.)
4. Show how the village or the small town acts as a focus through which certain urban influences permeate the countryside. (Consult J. H. Kolb, *Rural Primary Groups*, and E. de S. Brunner, *Village Communities*.)
5. How would you explain the specialization of areas within the urban community?
6. Why is the social life of women so different in the modern city from what it was in the cities of classical times or of the feudal age?
7. Why do modern cities tend to dominate the country and affect its mode of life to a greater extent than did the cities of earlier civilizations?
8. Discuss any modern novel which seems to you to present an accurate picture of country life.
9. Trace the process by which rural areas are affected by urban influences. (Consult *Recent Social Trends*, Chap. X.)
10. What is meant by "rurbanization"? How and why does it occur? (Consult C. J. Galpin, *Rural Life*, Chap. II, W. H. Wilson, *The Evolution of the Country Community*, and D. L. Sanderson, *The Rural Community*.)

B

11. "Disorganization of the family as a primary group is an unavoidable consequence of modern civilization." (W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant*, II, p. 1168.) Discuss in the light of the present chapter.
12. In what respects is the life of the city more competitive than that of the country? Can you think of any exceptions to this characterization?
13. What evidences are there that cityward migration is selective or nonselective? Analyze the argument in P. Sorokin and C. C. Zimmerman's *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology*, Chap. XXV.
14. On what grounds would you suspect that certain dysgenic features of urban life are phenomena of transition and cityward migration rather than permanent consequences of the urban environment?

(For some evidences see N. Carpenter, *The Sociology of City Life*, pp. 193ff.)

CHAPTER VIII

A

1. Show how the character of any urban community you know is affected by its main lines of communication.
2. Douglas C. Ridgley ("Geographical Principles in the Study of Cities," in the *Journal of Geography*, Vol. 24 [1925]) puts forward the principle that cities tend to develop wherever there is a break in transportation. Give illustrations of this principle and suggest reasons for it.
3. What is a neighborhood? Mention some ways in which social relations in a neighborhood differ from those characteristic of a large city. In what areas of the large city do you find most evidences of the neighborhood spirit?
4. It is often said that with the increase of communications neighborhood sentiment declines. How would you explain this? Give examples.
5. Apply to any community you know the analysis of community sentiment given in the text.
6. What are the chief signs of community sentiment (a) in the village, (b) in the large city?
7. Take the following grounds of the sentiment of nationality: *race, consciousness of race, language, religion, existent political unity, exclusive culture, historical tradition*, and show by comparison of American, British, German, French, and Swiss nationalities that no one of them is a necessary condition of the sense of nationality.
8. Why cannot we identify nation and race?
9. What forms of conflict are most apt to break up the solidarity of a nation or other large community? Cite historical instances.

B

10. Point out some characteristic differences between the sentiment of community and the sentiment of class.
11. Show how the physical pattern of any urban community you know is the result of the combined impact of various economic and social factors.
12. Discuss the "ecological approach" to the study of the urban community. (See, for example, R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *The City*).
13. Discuss the conditions under which the sense of nationality can be accommodated to the necessities of an international order.

14. Show the historical relationship between the growth of democracy and the growth of the sense of nationality. (Consult the author's *The Modern State*, Chap. IV.)

CHAPTER IX

A

1. Give some evidences to show that each of the following factors plays a role in creating class distinctions: *wealth, birth, race, nationality, period of residence, place of residence, religion, education, cultural affinity*.
2. Examine the problem of measuring social distance, with special reference to E. S. Bogardus's article, "Social Distance between Groups," in *Journal of Applied Sociology*, Vol. X, No. 5; see also his articles in Vols. XI and XIII of the same journal.
3. Compare the feudal class system with that prevailing today in North America.
4. Make a study of the clubs and other social organizations of your own locality in order to show how their membership is affected by class consciousness.
5. What cultural and economic conditions are favorable to the maintenance of caste, and what others tend to weaken it?
6. Point out and illustrate the main contrasts between corporate class consciousness and competitive class consciousness.
7. Expound Veblen's theory of the leisure class, as set out in his book so entitled, examine the evidences he offers for the principle of "conspicuous waste," and consider whether it is specially relevant to capitalistic conditions of modern civilization.

B

8. How would you explain the fact that the study of social classes has been given much more attention by European than by American sociologists?
9. Discuss the influence of social mobility, economic opportunity, and educational opportunity on the character, range, and intensity of class consciousness. (For illustrative material see P. Sorokin's *Social Mobility*.)
10. Discuss and illustrate the effects of a long-established system of social distance, as shown in L. Wirth's study of *The Ghetto*.
11. Discuss the arguments advanced in favor of and against the social utility of a social aristocracy.
12. "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle" (Marx). Consider how far this is true for any historical period with which you are acquainted.

13. Discuss the possibility of a classless society, with special reference to present-day Russia.
14. Discuss the relation between opportunity and class distinctions. (See, for example, C. H. Cooley, *Social Process*, Chap. VIII.)

CHAPTER X

A

1. Describe in as great detail as possible the behavior of any crowd which you have had the opportunity to witness.
2. Describe the social process of the crowd from its first assembling to its dispersion, as revealed in some particular instance. Use for this purpose the materials offered in Kimball Young's *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chaps. XXII-XXIV or in any other descriptive account of crowds.
3. Examine the account of the herd spirit given in P. Odegard's *The American Public Mind* (especially Chap. II) or in W. Trotter's *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*.
4. Why is it that in time of war the herd spirit is peculiarly manifest?
5. Point out some differences in the character of both herd and crowd manifestations according as either like interest or common interest dominates.
6. Discuss the statement of Martin that the crowd is always "a creature of hate."
7. Enumerate and describe the chief devices which leaders or agitators employ to enhance the crowd spirit.

B

8. Can you offer any explanation, in the light of historical reading, of the fact that the period of the Black Death in Europe was marked by peculiar and intense mental epidemics, such as that of the Flagellants?
9. Discuss the view that the crowd liberates emotions which are suppressed in normal social life.
10. Give historical illustrations of the part played by crowds in revolutionary movements.
11. How do you account for the phenomenon of lynching in the United States?
12. Discuss the theory that the crowd exhibits the working of a "collective mind."
13. In what way does the study of the crowd throw light on the nature of society?
14. What is the peculiar significance of the common-interest crowd?

CHAPTER XI

A

1. In what respects does the family seem to you to be different from other social organizations?
2. Why is it that problems of personal readjustment are so frequent in the life history of the individual family? Give illustrations.
3. "When we say that 'the family' exists in all known human societies . . . it cannot be taken to mean . . . the biological family, i. e., father, mother, and children, but must instead be interpreted as the permanent group which rears the children and gives them status in the community." (Margaret Read, in the March, 1932, issue of *The Annals* of the American Academy [Vol. 160].) Explain and illustrate.
4. Enumerate and classify the various types of social relationship which you would expect to find in a family consisting of grandfather, father, mother, two sons, and daughter. Show how these various types together may fall into a coherent pattern of family relationships.
5. Why is it that conflict is apt to occur in the family circle between the generations? What particular conditions may accentuate such conflict in the families of immigrants?
6. Enumerate the different forms in which the five generic features of the family mentioned on page 197 may occur.
7. What is the classificatory system? What functions does it fulfill in primitive society? Are there any relics of it in our own society? (Consult A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, Chap. XII.)
8. How would you account in general for the fact that very diverse forms of the family are found throughout primitive society?
9. What are the main contrasts between the matriarchal and the patriarchal type of family? Why is it that under the patriarchal system the family tends to be a more compact unit of the social order?
10. Show from the United States Census the gradual entrance of women into "gainful employments," and consider the relation of this change to the changing family.
11. "Today the family is no longer the stable social unit for the socialization of the child that it once was." (F. S. Chapin in *The Journal of Applied Sociology*, Vol. 9 [May, 1925].) In what respects? Why not?
12. What evidences are there that the nature of the marriage contract has changed in recent times in Western society?
13. How would you account for the fact that the divorce rate is high in the United States and comparatively low in England? How would you account for the fact that the divorce rate is higher in

the Pacific States than in the South Atlantic States or in New England?

14. What changes have taken place in the economic activities of the family as a working unit, as a productive agency, and as a domestic establishment? (For recent changes see *Recent Social Trends*, Chap. XIII.)
15. Explain how changes outside the family have caused the changes referred to in question 14.
16. What do you regard as the essential functions of the family? Justify your answer.
17. Suggest some differences between the influence of the automobile and that of the radio on family solidarity. If you were making a research on this subject, what evidences would you seek to obtain?
18. Discuss the arguments for and against divorce by mutual consent.
19. Show how the modern stress on romantic love has affected the stability of the marriage relationship.
20. Enumerate and classify the various ways in which the state has come in different countries to the aid of the modern family.
21. In what ways does the state exercise a special control over the family?
22. Classify the activities of the modern state with respect to the family under the headings (a) coercive regulation and (b) noncoercive support.
23. What problems of the modern family are more likely to be solved by social education than by state regulation?

B

24. Why may the question as to the original form of the family be misleading? (Consult on this point also pages 486-487.)
25. What are the difficulties of (a) Westermarck's theory, (b) Briffault's theory, as to the origin of the family?
26. "The family in Colonial days was nearer to the authoritarian conditions of the Old World, was bound down by a primitive technique that allowed most of the population but a very low standard of living, gathered up into itself a whole range of economic and social functions that have since been in process of passing out of the home into the public sphere, and . . . was more under the spell of supernaturalism than is the family today." Illustrate and explain this statement taken from an article by A. W. Calhoun in *The Annals of the American Academy*, Vol. 160 (1932).
27. By a comparison of any outstanding novels of the early nineteenth century (such as those of Jane Austen) with present-day novels bring out the change of attitude regarding the place of women in society.

28. Discuss the effects on the nature and the concept of the home which are attributable to life in a large city as compared with life in a rural area.
29. Suggest some ways in which the specialization of work, of play, and of cultural interests generally, has affected the scheme of family life.
30. Expand the statement that the modern family has to depend, more than the patriarchal family, on the cohesive forces within itself.
31. What other evidences are there, besides the extent of divorce, bearing on the degree of disorganization within the modern family?
32. Discuss Professor W. F. Ogburn's account, in Chap. XIII of *Recent Social Trends*, of what he calls the "personality functions" of the family.
33. Suggest some probable relations between the practice of birth control and (a) the extent of illegitimacy, (b) age at marriage, (c) the extent of extramarital sex relationships, (d) the prevalence of prostitution.
34. What reasons are there for supposing or not supposing that the continuance of the trends of which the modern family is a result would lead to the disappearance of the family altogether?
35. If the primary ground of state control over marriage and the family were clearly defined as the welfare of offspring, what extensions of existing legislation might logically ensue, and what forms of existing legislation might cease to be operative?

CHAPTER XII

A

1. Show concretely, from your own experience of any group to which you belong, how association with others has changed your understanding of the interest to which the group is devoted.
2. Show how through membership in some club or other primary group your attitude to the other members has developed and changed.
3. Analyze the respective ways in which a debating society, a jury, an executive committee, and a joint committee of employers and workers in a wage dispute typically reach a conclusion or verdict. Give illustrations where you can.
4. What kinds of difference in viewpoint are apt to be changed by discussion with others? Are there any kinds of difference that are apt to be confirmed rather than changed in this way?
5. Point out some main differences between the nature of a primary group and a large-scale association.

6. Discuss and illustrate the tendency to officialism or bureaucracy in the large-scale association.
7. Discuss the service, range, and limits of the federative principle.
8. Show how changes in the means of communication and in other techniques may (a) limit and (b) extend the localization of interests.
9. Why is it that in a highly organized civilization the primary group retains an important role? Suggest some changes that occur in the character of the primary group as civilization grows more complex.

B

10. "The small group is normally a breeding place for what is new in substance and in ideas." (W. E. Hocking, *Man and the State*, Chap. XVI.) Discuss.
11. Explain and illustrate the distinction between the subjective harmony of a group and objective agreement, that is, agreement on a common policy or the acceptance of a common viewpoint.
12. "The things we do and achieve together will give us much greater satisfaction than the things we do and achieve by ourselves." (M. P. Follett, *The New State*.) How far and in what respects and with what limitations do you find this true in your own experience?

CHAPTER XIII

A

1. Show by examples how different qualities of leadership are necessary for the promotion and the maintenance of different kinds of association.
2. Point out some differences between the interests which unite the members of a business firm and those which unite the members of a family, and show how these differences affect the characteristic solidarity of each.
3. If you were conducting a club for boys or for girls of a particular age (specify), what devices for enhancing the sense of common interest would you try out?
4. What are the interests for which the following associations stand: *the college you belong to, the Chamber of Commerce, the American Legion, the Ku Klux Klan, the League of Women Voters, the Y. M. C. A., the Boy Scouts, the Anti-Saloon League, the American Federation of Labor*? Where possible, distinguish subsidiary from dominant interests.
5. Classify in accordance with the table on page 262 all the associations mentioned in a current issue of any large newspaper. Where difficulties of classification arise, state the reasons for it.

6. What is the "broken plate" situation? Discuss the peculiarities of associations which fall within the category which it represents.
7. Examine the conflicts of interest which occur in the following situations:
 - (a) that of a lawyer defending a client whom he believes to be guilty;
 - (b) that of a business firm which is forced by competition to adopt methods of its competitors, even though it regards these methods as unethical;
 - (c) that of a physician who is asked to divulge in court confidential medical information concerning a patient;
 - (d) that of a statesman who in time of peace gives out misleading information for the sake of what he believes to be the welfare of his country;
 - (e) that of a fashionable church in which a Negro of fine character applies for membership.

B

8. Explain and discuss the distinction between primary and secondary interests and show its relation to the distinction between culture and civilization developed in Chap. XIV.
9. Compare the classification of interests given in the text with those of E. A. Ross (*Foundations of Sociology*), C. A. Ellwood (*Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*), A. W. Small (*General Sociology*), E. Faris (in L. G. Brown's *Social Psychology*), and Ulysses G. Weatherby ("Habitation Areas and Interest Areas," in *Journal of Applied Sociology*, Vol. 10 [1926]).
10. How would you explain the tendency of left-wing or radical groups, whether in church or state, to develop schisms?

CHAPTER XIV

A

1. Why is it that economic institutions and political institutions always enter into some sort of institutional complex?
2. What are the main differences between the institutional complex of capitalism and that of communism?
3. Compare democracy and Fascism with respect to the institutional complexes characteristic of each.
4. State in your own words and with your own illustrations the distinction between culture and civilization.
5. Which of the following would you regard as dominantly cultural and which as dominantly civilizational: a hospital, an arts college, a boxing match, a detective story, a constitution, a religious code,

a skyscraper, the boy scouts' organization, a patriotic society? Give the grounds for your answer in each instance.

6. Explain carefully why our automobiles improve from year to year while this year's plays are not necessarily any improvement on those of Shakespeare.
7. In what ways can we apply measurement to the products of civilization and not to the products of culture?
8. Why is it scientifically justifiable to speak of the "march of civilization" but not of the "march of progress"?
9. Show how culture is transferred or borrowed in accordance with a different principle from that relevant to the transference or borrowing of culture.
10. In what sense is civilization (a) a vehicle, (b) a condition, and (c) an indirect determinant, of culture?

B

11. How has the institutional complex of capitalism been modified by (a) antimonopoly legislation, (b) social legislation?
12. Why has the complex of political and religious institutions ceased to characterize modern Western society? What traces of it remain in the United States?
13. Suggest any reasons why, for sociological purposes, the distinction of culture and civilization may be more serviceable than the anthropological use of the term "culture."
14. "It is in the light of our culture that we conceive all the *unities* to which we belong." Explain, amplify, and illustrate.

CHAPTER XV

A

1. Why is it necessary to distinguish between the state and the community? Make some assertions which would be true of the state's functions and activities, but not of those of the community.
2. In what sense is it true that individuals are (a) more than citizens, (b) more than social beings?
3. What are the distinctive features of the state as compared with all other associations?
4. What are the broad differences of viewpoint regarding the sphere of the state which are involved in the present activities of (a) the Fascist state, (b) the Soviet state, (c) the United States of America?
5. Why is it that in a complex civilization the task of maintaining order is more fully assigned to the state?
6. Give illustrations to show that the conservation and development of natural resources require the service of the state.

7. On what grounds should the state provide for the education of its citizens? Would you assign any limits to the kind of education which the state should provide, and if so on what grounds?
8. Why is it (a) difficult, (b) inexpedient for the state to regulate (1) religion, (2) fashion?
9. Examine the differences between the ways in which the state exercises force in its domestic and in its external affairs respectively.
10. Discuss the chief obstacles to the establishment of a secure international order.

B

11. What are the reasons for conceiving the state as an agency of the community? What other viewpoints are possible?
12. Examine the following definitions of the state:
 - (a) an organization of one class dominating over the other classes (Oppenheimer);
 - (b) a supreme, irresistible, uncontrollable authority, in which the rights of sovereignty reside (Blackstone);
 - (c) the whole social fabric (Bosanquet);
 - (d) the world the spirit has made for itself (Hegel);
 - (e) a territorial corporation endowed with an inviolable competence to rule (Kantorowicz).
13. Why does the problem of social order involve equally that of social justice?
14. What is the peculiar difficulty in our present civilization with the resort to war as an instrument of national policy? (Consult J. T. Shotwell, *War as an Instrument of National Policy* [New York, 1929].)
15. In a famous essay William James expressed the need for a "moral equivalent" for war. How is this need affected by the development of the modern mechanism of warfare?

CHAPTER XVI

A

1. Sometimes wage rates are fixed by government agencies, sometimes by agreements reached between employers' and workers' organizations, sometimes by "free competition." Make these facts the starting point of a discussion of the distinction between the economic method and the political method.
2. Mention some objectives that in a socialist state are pursued by the political method and in a capitalist state by the economic method. Contrast the two processes as illustrated by particular cases.

3. What conditions of modern civilization have especially fostered economic associations?
4. What is the significance of incorporation? Distinguish between a corporation and a partnership. Account for the increase of corporate enterprise.
5. State carefully the problem of the conflict between the economic interest and the social function of economic associations.
6. Explain and illustrate the difference between competition and bargaining.
7. What is a profession? Why is it true that "the more nearly an association approximates the pure economic type the less does it present the aspect of a profession?"
8. What is bias? What forms of group bias are apt to appear in professional associations?
9. Compare, with illustrations, the types of interest represented by (a) a business firm, (b) a manufacturers' association, (c) a trade-union, (4) a profession.

B

10. In what sense is the adjustment of the factors of the economic order an automatic adjustment?
11. Adam Smith maintained that free competition assured the most equitable distribution of the rewards of economic service (see, for example, *The Wealth of Nations*, Book I, Chap. X). What assumptions underlie this argument? In what respects are these assumptions invalid for modern economic organization?
12. Study any particular professional organization, analyzing the complex of interests for which it stands and bringing out some of the harmonies and conflicts within the complex.

CHAPTER XVII

A

1. Compare the modes of participation characteristic, respectively, of the shareholder of a large corporation, the citizen of a state, the member of a social club, the member of a church.
2. Explain carefully why cultural organizations can pursue their ends more fully as well as more freely when they are not incorporated into political-economic organizations.
3. In what ways is the church distinctive as a type of association?
4. How would you explain the conservative character which the church usually exhibits?
5. What interests tend to seek satisfaction through the church at the present day?

6. In what ways does the church serve as an agency of cultural cohesion? Give illustrations.

B

7. "While there may be many religious systems in the same social area there can be only one political system." State as clearly as you can why the one is possible and the other not possible.
8. Show by historical illustrations how cultural spontaneity may be repressed by the subjection of cultural activity to political or economic controls.
9. According to von Wiese (*Systematic Sociology*, adapted by Becker, Chap. XLIV, pp. 617-642) the church faces a perpetual dilemma because of the contradiction between its religious principles and its social interests. Examine the nature of the dilemma which von Wiese presents.

CHAPTER XVIII

A

1. Explain and contrast the meaning appropriate to the term "law" in each of the following expressions: (a) *the laws of nature*, (b) *the laws of health*, (c) *the laws of the state*.
2. How would you account for the marked differences between the social codes of different peoples?
3. Discuss and illustrate the difference between the sanction of a rule and the motive for obedience to it.
4. How would you distinguish between mores and morals? Why is the distinction more necessary in civilized than in primitive society? When is a custom "more honored in the breach than in the observance"?
5. Why is the legal code so different, with respect to its sanction, from all other codes?
6. Discuss the social significance of rank in an older "aristocratic" society and in the United States respectively. (See, for example, the article "Aristocracy" in Volume II of the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.)
7. Why is indoctrination peculiarly stressed after a social revolution? Give examples.
8. Discuss the distinction between authority and leadership.
9. Discuss ritual as a conservative agency. Give illustrations.
10. Explain the role of initiation ceremonies (a) in some primitive culture (see, for example, Margaret Mead, *Coming of Age in Samoa*), (b) in present-day fraternal orders.
11. Why may a symbol be potent enough to unite in one membership people of different ages, attitudes, and temperaments? Give examples.

12. Write an essay on the social functions of symbols, taking the flag as an example of a community symbol, the badge or pin as an example of an associational symbol, and the handshake as an example of a personal-friendship symbol.
13. Have any changes taken place recently in the administration of justice in your city or state which reveal a tendency to rely less exclusively on force in the treatment of lawbreaking and the law-breaker?
14. Read some good account of prison life (such as Warden L. Lawes' *Twenty Thousand Years in Sing Sing* [New York, 1932]), and consider how far it bears out the argument of pages 343-347.
15. Why are the so-called Utopian communities significant for the study of conditions of social cohesion?

B

16. Are there social laws of a non-normative character, analogous to the laws of the physical world? (Consult K. D. Har, *Social Laws*, Chapel Hill, N. C., 1930.)
17. Explain and examine the distinction made by Znaniecki between authority and prestige. (See his *Social Actions*, pp. 182 ff.)
18. "A symbol is something static, petrified, turning towards what has been and crystallized against what shall be." (D. H. Lawrence, *Letters* [New York, 1932], p. 365.)
19. How would you judge whether or not, or how far, the use of force is justified in the prevention or control of industrial disputes? Give examples to show the kind of compulsion you do or do not approve and state your grounds.
20. Make a study of some one Utopian community (read, for example, about it in E. S. Wooster's *Communities of the Past and Present*), so as to bring out the special methods of social control which it adopted.

CHAPTER XIX

A

1. Why is it necessary to make a distinction between religion and morals? Why is that distinction less easy to make with respect to a primitive society?
2. Show with illustrations how the conservative tendencies of religion create difficulties of social adjustment in a changing society.
3. What types of social regulation which custom assures in a primitive society are in a complex society assured by law? What types of social regulation remain in the guardianship of custom?
4. Give instances of laws which are upheld by prevailing custom and of laws which are challenged by prevailing custom, drawing any inferences which seem to you to follow.

5. Discuss the relation of custom and constitutional law.
6. Distinguish between fashion and convention. Explain in this connection the role of the "shibboleth."
7. What is the particular function of professional etiquette, such as that of the medical profession? Is there any distinction between professional etiquette and professional ethics? (For data on this subject see the May, 1922, issue of the *Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 101.)
8. Discuss Veblen's criteria of fashion and his theory of its relation to "conspicuous waste."
9. Discuss the theory that fashion follows a regular order of change and recurrence over a sufficiently long period (see Kroeber's article referred to in the text on page 369).

B

10. Discuss the statement that at the present time "morality has seceded from its historical union with religion." (See, for example, the article entitled "Morals Secede from the Union" by H. E. Fosdick in *Harper's Magazine*, Vol. 164 [May, 1932].)
11. Illustrate from a study of any early code (such as that in the book of Leviticus) the manner in which religious and moral conceptions are fused in the simpler societies.
12. Illustrate the process by which custom is converted into law.
13. Illustrate the process of fashion in any of the fine arts, such as music, drama, the novel, interior decoration, and so on.
14. Discuss the relation of fashion and democracy.

CHAPTER XX

A

1. "Habit is second nature." Explain.
2. Distinguish between habit as automatism and habit as the basis of constructive or creative activity. Give illustrations.
3. Comment in detail on the passage quoted from William James on page 373.
4. Illustrate and explain (a) the custom basis of habit, (b) the habit basis of custom.
5. Show how in *Hamlet* the action revolves around the conflict of codes as it presents itself to the mind of the chief character.
6. Illustrate from modern novels the situation in which an individual confronts the mores.
7. Illustrate, from life histories or from actual instances known to you, the situation referred to in question 6.
8. Why are the social codes inadequate for the conduct of the individual life and why are they necessary for it?

B

9. Why should we not define customs as "widespread uniformities of habit"?
10. Does a hermit or a Robinson Crusoe live (a) without customs, (b) without morals? Draw some inferences from your answer.
11. Discuss the function of habit (a) in the economy of the individual life, (b) in the social economy.
12. Characterize the different types of conflict between the person and the code which are presented respectively in *Hamlet* and in *Faust*.
13. Read any one of the "utopias of escape" (see L. Mumford's *Story of Utopias*) and show how it expresses the sense of frustration arising out of a present disharmony between personal demands and social conditions.
14. Bring out, with illustrations, the analogy between "conversion" and revolution.
15. Show how the problem of obedience to any social code reveals the nature of morality as a determinant of conduct.

CHAPTER XXI

A

1. In what sense is the subject matter of the sociologist more affected by change than that of the physicist, and why?
2. What does *prediction* mean? Distinguish *prediction* from *inference*. What kinds of social occurrences can be predicted (a) as certain, (b) as probable?
3. Give instances of social changes that can be traced to (a) climatic or other natural changes, (b) the depletion of natural resources, (c) the disturbance of the plant or animal balance of nature through human activity.
4. List some of the social changes that, in your opinion, have been occasioned by the development of the automobile, and give your reasons for thinking that the automobile is in any sense "responsible" for them.
5. Why is it desirable to draw a distinction between social change and cultural change?

B

6. Discuss the limits of prediction in the social sciences.
7. Explain carefully what is meant by the statement that social phenomena are historical phenomena.
8. Why must the social structure change whenever a change occurs in its outer environment? Give illustrations.
9. Why is the character of the hereditary mechanism a condition of social change as well as of social continuity?

10. Explain the statement that culture is inherently changeful and a cause of social change.

CHAPTER XXII

A

1. Distinguish, with examples, between quantitative change and qualitative change.
2. Mention some examples, besides those given in the text, of changes that fall under each of the three types represented by diagrams.
3. Why is the cyclical principle of change more easily exemplified in the sphere of culture than in that of technology? Give examples.
4. Why is it a mistake to identify evolution with either growth or adaptation (to environment)?
5. Why is it important to distinguish between the *concepts* of evolution and of progress?
6. Why is it not possible to identify progress with more perfect adaptation to environment? Give illustrations.
7. Discuss the relation of the division of labor to social evolution.

B

8. Take any recent invention, any present form of artistic expression, and any social institution, and compare the processes of change which they are undergoing.
9. Read the account of some primitive society (see list of books in Notes for Further Reading, Chapter XXVI) and list the chief respects in which this society seems to you less evolved than our own.
10. Discuss the view that the idea of progress is a modern one. (See J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress* [London, 1920].)
11. Compare Herbert Spencer's concept of social evolution as given in his *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1893), I, Part I, with that given in this chapter.

CHAPTER XXIII

A

1. What changes in the composition of the population of the United States have accompanied (a) population growth, (b) the decline of the birth rate?
2. Give instances of social changes that can in any sense be ascribed to changes in the size, composition, distribution, and degree of congestion of the population.
3. How would you account for the differential birth rates of the native-born and the foreign-born in the United States?

4. Distinguish between (a) natural selection in lower organic life, (b) natural selection in human society, (c) social selection.
5. In what sense and how does society establish an area of biological indifference?
6. How would you interpret the decline of the birth rate in the past sixty years?
7. Give some instances to show the socially selective operation of the mores.
8. How would you account for the differential fertilities of (a) actors and clergymen, (b) army officers and schoolmasters, (c) domestic chauffeurs and taxicab drivers, (d) general laborers and miners, (e) textile workers and agricultural workers?
9. What evidences suggest that the decline in fertility is to a large extent volitionally and not biologically determined?
10. Give some evidences to show that influences affecting fertility permeate from people to people and from class to class.

B

11. "Natural selection is a constantly diminishing factor in the evolution of civilized man." Discuss.
12. In what sense and how does society establish an area of biological indifference?
13. With the aid of the works referred to in the text investigate the conditions determining the disparity between the marriage rate of native whites of white parentage and that of native whites of foreign or mixed parentage.
14. Why is it impossible to show that the differences of outlook or of achievement between one generation and the next are attributable to the operation of social selection in the former?

CHAPTER XXIV

A

1. Discuss the list of "social effects" of the radio given in *Recent Social Trends*, I, pp. 153-156.
2. Discuss the social concomitants or consequences of recent improvements in communication or in transportation as revealed in any locality with which you are acquainted.
3. Illustrate the distinction between the direct and the indirect social consequences of technological change.
4. Compare the interpretations of social change given respectively by Marx and by Veblen.
5. Give some instances from recent social history of the "swing of the pendulum."

6. Discuss the saying that "the way of habit is the way of thought."
7. Write a critique of Veblen's *The Theory of the Leisure Class*.

B

8. Give some evidences from contemporary life of the way in which the mechanistic character of modern technology tends to pervade (a) the fine arts, (b) social attitudes and social philosophies.
9. Set side by side the views of (a) E. Huntington on the influence of climate, (b) F. J. Turner on the influence of the frontier, and (c) Karl Marx on the influence of the system of economic relationships; and consider whether they are compatible with one another. (See Huntington, *Civilization and Climate*; Turner, *The Frontier in American History*; and Marx, *Critique of Political Economy*, Chap. I.)
10. Discuss, with special reference to Marx, the theory that every social system contains the seeds of its own decay.
11. Write a critique of the "materialistic interpretation of history."
12. Estimate the significance of Veblen's interpretation of social change.
13. Examine the general assumptions of the deterministic point of view. Give illustrations from your reading.

CHAPTER XXV

A

1. Can you find any evidences in our present-day society that culture is not merely responsive to technological change but also modifies or gives direction to technological change and its applications?
2. What is meant by saying that cultural change has its own specific principle?
3. Make a classification of the cyclical theories of social phenomena. (See Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 728 ff.)
4. Show how external indices serve to reveal changes in attitudes, referring to some recent researches in this subject.
5. Offer an interpretation of the fact referred to in the text, that while church membership in the United States has kept pace with population the circulation of religious periodicals has declined to a large extent.
6. State and discuss the concept of "cultural lag" given in W. F. Ogburn's *Social Change*, Part IV.
7. In what sense and how does a clash arise between culture and civilization?
8. Why is it that cultural resistance to the introduction of new technology is rarely successful for any considerable time? Give illustrations.

B

9. What is the substance of Max Weber's thesis in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*?
10. State and sum up the issue between H. M. Robertson and Max Weber.
11. Why is the effect of the impact of new technology more serious for primitive than for civilized peoples?
12. State and discuss the argument set forth in M. R. Cohen's *Reason and Nature*, Book II, Chap. III.

CHAPTER XXVI

A

1. What is the difference between correlation and causation? Show by examples that the computation of an index of correlation is not in itself, no matter how high the established coefficient, any demonstration of a causal nexus.
2. In an investigation by a religious organization into the factors determining the views of the young regarding "temperance," parents were rated at 60.8 per cent as the chief influence, newspapers at 11.6 per cent, and moving pictures at 3 per cent, while teachers, friends, and books contributed the remaining 24.6 per cent. What logical grounds are there for rejecting such conclusions?
3. (a) "The automobile is a cause of crimes." (b) "The automobile is a cause of accidents." Explain carefully the different significance of the term *cause* in these two statements.
4. In order to explain a social phenomenon, what more is required than an enumeration of factors combining to produce it?
5. Explain the statement that in a simple society scarcely anything is purely utilitarian.
6. Show how rapid technological advance tends to detach from cultural significance large areas of utility.

B

7. How do we discover which of the concomitant facts are relevant and which irrelevant to the interpretation of a particular phenomenon of social change?
8. Read R. Bain, "Trends in American Sociological Theory," in G. Lundberg *et al.*, *Trends in American Sociology* (New York, 1929), Chap. II, together with the author's article, "Is Sociology a Natural Science?" *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. 26 (May, 1931); and state your own point of view on the question at issue.
9. Discuss the question as to whether (and if so how) the problem of physical causation differs from that of social causation.

10. What evidences can you find that in our present society utilitarian systems, mechanisms, and activities are in important areas detached from the cultural life?
11. Discuss the problem of the basis of social unity in a complex and changeful society. Examine the "totalitarian" solution of this problem.

CHAPTER XXVII

A

1. In raising the question of the origin of the family we may be asking:
 - (a) What particular attribute or attributes of human nature explain the existence of the family?
 - (b) What was the original form of the family?
 - (c) Under what social conditions did the family first come into being?
 - (d) How did the family come to assume its present (or any past) character?

Which of these questions seem to you to be legitimate and which do you regard as misleading? Give reasons.

2. Carefully explain the remark that though there was a time before the state existed the state has yet no definite beginning in time. Why is a similar statement true of every system which has an evolutionary character?
3. What types of social phenomena have (a) neither specific beginnings nor specific endings, (b) specific endings but not specific beginnings, (c) specific beginnings and also specific endings?
4. Can you find any relics of (a) totemism, (b) animism, (c) fetishism, (d) magical potency attached to office or authority, in our own society? (Look up the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* or some other authority for the meaning of the terms in question.)
5. Explain why the formation of specific associations is usually later in time than the formation of institutions.
6. How does the evolutionary clue help us in the study of social change?
7. What is meant by the statement that the religious attitude was undifferentiated among very primitive peoples? Give illustrations from the account of some primitive people.
8. Outline the process by which the church as an independent religious organization has evolved in Western society.

B

9. What grounds are there for regarding the "social contract" theory as an example of pre-evolutionary thought?

10. Read an account of some primitive societies to find out the character of such associations as they may contain, and compare these associations with respect to structure and function with any analogous associations of civilized society.
11. How would you account for the greater functional specialization of advanced as compared with primitive societies?
12. How would you distinguish between a religious cult and a religious sect?

CHAPTER XXVIII

A

1. Study the views on the nature of social progress offered by any one of the following writers: Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Ferdinand Tönnies, Benjamin Kidd, Lester Ward, F. H. Giddings; and consider whether or not the writer in question tends to identify or to confuse social evolution with social progress.
2. Examine, in the light of the discussion in the text, the view of social progress put forward by Julian Huxley in *Essays of a Biologist* (London, 1923), Chaps. I and II.
3. In what ways, if any, does it seem to you legitimate for a sociologist to introduce his own concept of social progress, and in what ways does it seem illegitimate?
4. In what ways can the social scientist include as part of his subject matter the valuations underlying social institutions? In so doing what dangers must he guard against? Give illustrations.
5. What is meant by the demand for objectivity in the social sciences? In what sense, if any, do you consider that sociology (a) *can* be, (b) *should* be, objective? Examine in this connection the argument of C. A. Ellwood, *Methods in Sociology* (Durham, N. C., 1933), Chap. III.
6. What evidences can you find that culture conflict is associated with an increase of crime? (See, for example, Louis Wirth, "Cultural Conflict and Misconduct," *Social Forces*, Vol. 9 [1930-1931], 484-492.)
7. Show how (a) the increasing range of interdependence, (b) the increasing complexity of social and economic organization, creates the need for continuous readjustment of social attitudes.
8. Show how the conditions referred to in question 7 increase the need for the co-operative application of intelligence to human affairs.

B

9. What is meant by those who claim that progress is a "scientific concept"? Discuss the validity of the claim.

10. Why does it not help us, in the attempt to find a scientific criterion of progress, to identify it with "maximum satisfaction," "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," or similar hedonistic conceptions?
11. What is the serious difficulty the social scientist meets when he seeks to follow the lead of the natural sciences by discarding value-concepts altogether?
12. Why is it more difficult to apply intelligence to the direction of the more inclusive social organizations, such as the state, the economic system of the nation, the international order, than to less inclusive organizations, such as the industrial corporation, the banking system, the college?

NOTES ON FURTHER READING

These notes are intended to serve two purposes, on the one hand to indicate representative contributions to the subjects treated in the text and on the other to direct the student to works that are specially relevant to the argument presented in the chapters under which they are listed. These latter works are marked with an asterisk. Publication data are given when not already recorded in the text and are those of the most generally accessible or the most recent edition.

CHAPTER I

In the present stage of sociology different authors define even the most essential terms in different ways. Many references would therefore be only confusing. The student seeking to find the usage of different authors should consult:

E. E. Eubank, *The Concepts of Sociology* (New York, 1932). He should also be aware that for this and other purposes the most valuable general work of reference is the monumental

Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (ed. E. R. A. Seligman and A. Johnson, New York, 1930-1935).

The definitions presented by the author are developed also in his other works:

R. M. MacIver, **Community*, Book I, Chap. II
Elements of Social Science (London, 1921), Chap. I
**The Modern State*, Chaps. I and V.

These definitions are followed in the main in

L. T. Hobhouse, **Social Development*, Chap. II
E. T. Hiller, **Principles of Sociology*, Chap. II
G. D. H. Cole, *Social Theory* (London, 1923), Chap. I
E. Jenks, *The State and the Nation* (London, 1935), Chap. I.

The definition of "the social" has been much discussed, particularly by European sociologists, but this issue, as one of them (L. von Wiese, *Systematic Sociology*, Chap. I) points out, "belongs not at the beginning but at the end of analysis." In passing, we may note that a particularly good statement of the relation of "the social" to "the physical,"

and of sociology to psychology, is given in the work just mentioned, pp. 64-68.

On folkways and mores consult

W. G. Sumner, **Folkways*, pp. 53-64

W. G. Sumner and A. G. Keller, *The Science of Society*, I, pp. 1-43

W. I. Thomas, *Primitive Behavior*.

CHAPTER II

The subject of "interests" was introduced into American sociology mainly in the attempt to derive social phenomena from specific attributes of human nature, a perilous quest the pitfalls of which are fairly obvious in the work of Sumner. This led to various classifications of interests, or, more vaguely, human wishes or drives. Following

G. Ratzenhofer, *Die soziologische Erkenntnis* came the classification by

Albion W. Small, *General Sociology* (Chicago, 1905), pp. 197-198.

Other sociologists have presented diverse classifications, generally based on no clear or adequate principles. The student will find examples in

E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1930), Chaps. IV-VII

W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant*, I, pp. 21-23, 72-73

C. A. Ellwood, *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects* (New York, 1926)

E. Faris, in L. G. Brown, *Social Psychology* (New York, 1934).

The distinction between types of interest is developed by the author in R. M. MacIver, **Community*, Book II, Chap. II

*"Interests," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 8.

The distinction of like and common interests is suggested also in

M. Ginsberg, **Sociology* (London, 1934), Chap. IV.

The concept of interest, with reference to the discussion contained in the text, is examined in

F. Znaniecki, **Social Actions*, pp. 54-56.

The literature on "attitudes" is scarcely more satisfactory than that on interests. Apart from the studies of the measurers, reference may be made to

E. Faris, *"The Concept of Social Attitudes," in K. Young's *Social Attitudes* (New York, 1931)

"Attitudes and Behavior," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 34 (1928), 271-281

E. B. Reuter, "The Social Attitude," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, Vol. 13 (1922-1923), 97-101

- K. Young, *Social Psychology* (New York, 1930), pp. 454-502
 L. L. Bernard, **Introduction to Social Psychology* (New York, 1926), Chap. XVI.

On motivations, the student should begin by reading the relevant part in some textbook of psychology, such as

R. S. Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology* (New York, 1918), Chaps. I-IV, or

G. Murphy, *General Psychology* (New York, 1933), Chap. IV.

A good study of the problem of interpretation raised by the psychological approach is to be found in

M. Ginsberg, **Studies in Sociology*, Chap. VII.

CHAPTER III

For the contract theory of society the student should read

T. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Chaps. XII and XVII

and for a general account of this school of thought

T. I. Cook, *History of Political Philosophy* (New York, 1936), Chaps. XVIII-XX.

For the opposing standpoint the student may well begin with the famous passages of Aristotle:

Aristotle, **Politics*, Book I, Chaps. I-II; Book IV, Chaps. I-III.

This Greek conception of society was, in his own manner, adopted by

J. J. Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, especially Book I, Chaps. VI-VIII

and more thoroughly, under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, in

B. Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, Chaps. III-VII.

Modern formulations of the relation between individuality and society will be found in many works, including

J. M. Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations* (New York, 1906)

C. H. Cooley, **Social Organization* (New York, 1929), Part I
**Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York, 1922), Chaps. I-VI

J. Dewey, **Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, 1930)

"The Social as a Category," *The Month*, Vol. 38 (1928), pp. 161-178

M. Ginsberg, *The Psychology of Society*

A. G. A. Balz, *Basis of Social Theory*, Chap. II

W. E. Hocking, *Man and the State*, Part III.

Other aspects of the argument of the text will be found in

R. M. MacIver, **Community*, Book I, Chaps. I-II; Book II, Chap. I; Book III, Chap. III

**The Modern State*, Chaps. V, XVI.

There is a large literature on social conflict. In fact, it is made the primary datum of some schools of sociology, such as that of L. Gumpowicz and G. Ratzenhofer, that of the racial theorists, and that of the theorists of class struggle. (For references on these schools consult P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 219-356, 480-487, 523-544.) Much stress is laid on the role of conflict in the more general works of the "ecological school," such as

R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Study of Society* (Chicago, 1921), pp. 579-603.

Among theories of the social significance of conflict attention should be directed to

G. Simmel, "The Sociology of Conflict," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 9 (1903-1904), 490-525.

The literature of co-operation as a social principle is not so extensive, though there are numerous criticisms of the conflict theories, such as

J. Novicow, *War and Its Alleged Benefits* (New York, 1911)

G. F. Nicolai, *The Biology of War* (New York, 1918)

P. Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid*.

The role of co-operation is emphasized by a group of French writers who uphold a doctrine of organic solidarity, among them

C. Gide, *Essai d'une Philosophie de la Solidarité* (Paris, 1902)

L. Bourgeois, *La Solidarité* (Paris, 1897)

C. Bouglé, *Le Solidarisme* (Paris, 1907).

In his famous *Division of Labor in Society* E. Durkheim distinguishes different stages of society according to the nature of the social co-operation they exhibit.

As general reference, see

F. Znaniecki, **Social Actions*, Chaps. VI, XIV-XVIII

E. T. Hiller, **Principles of Sociology*, Chaps. XIII, XIV, XVII-XIX.

CHAPTER IV

A good review of the literature on heredity and environment is given in

Gladys C. Schwesinger, **Heredity and Environment*, especially Chap. VI.

The case for heredity is stated in

S. J. Holmes, *The Trend of the Race* (New York, 1921)

and with less discretion in

P. Popenoe and R. Johnson, *Applied Eugenics* (rev. ed., New York, 1933).

These works contain useful bibliographies for further study of their point of view. Perhaps the outstanding scientific exponent of the claims of heredity has been Karl Pearson; see

K. Pearson *et al.*, *Eugenics Laboratory Lecture Series* (London, 1911—).

A number of investigations into the relationship of heredity and environment, with a good bibliography, are contained in

Nature and Nurture, Twenty-Seventh Yearbook, National Society for the Study of Education (Bloomington, Ill., 1928).

The best all-round introduction to the problem by a biologist is

H. S. Jennings, *The Biological Basis of Human Nature* (New York, 1930), especially Chaps. V, VII, IX.

A review and criticism of hereditarian theories is offered in

P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, Chap. V

F. H. Hankins, *Introduction to the Study of Society*, Chaps. VI-VII

M. Ginsberg, *Studies in Sociology*, Chaps. VIII-X
Sociology (London, 1934), Chap. III.

Among contributions dealing with race and environment mention should be made of

T. R. Garth, *Race Psychology*

and such specific investigations as

O. Klineberg, "Racial Differences in Speed and Accuracy," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 22 (1927), 273-277

E. B. Reuter, *The American Race Problem* (New York, 1927)

R. S. Woodworth, "Racial Differences in Mental Traits," *Science*, new series, Vol. 31 (1910), 171-186.

Of the works asserting the influence of environment, special mention may be made of

F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man* (New York, 1931)

Anthropology and Modern Life (New York, 1928), pp. 18-61

F. Hertz, *Race and Civilization*.

With some qualifications a similar viewpoint is presented in

F. H. Hankins, *The Racial Basis of Civilization*.

On biology and the advance of human well-being see

H. S. Jennings, *Prometheus* (New York, 1925).

CHAPTER V

The "geographical school" is well represented by

E. Huntington, *Civilization and Climate*
World Power and Evolution

E. C. Semple, *Influence of Geographic Environment*
American History and Its Geographic Conditions

E. G. Dexter, *Weather Influences*

H. J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (London, 1919).

A broad survey of geographical factors is offered from the geographer's point of view in

J. Brunhes, **Human Geography*

J. Russell Smith, **North America* (New York, 1925), Chaps. I and II

D. C. Ridgley, "Geographic Principles in the Study of Cities,"
Journal of Geography, Vol. 24 (1925), 66-78

and from a sociological point of view in

K. Kelsey, *The Physical Basis of Society* (New York, 1920).

P. Sorokin, **Contemporary Sociological Theories*, Chap. II

and from an historical perspective in

A. J. Toynbee, **A Study of History*, Vol. I, pp. 249 ff.

Among regional studies may be mentioned

R. B. Vance, "The Concept of the Region," *Social Forces*, Vol. 8
(1929-1930), 208-218

R. Mukerjee, "The Regional Balance of Man," *American Journal*
of Sociology, Vol. 37 (1930), 455-460

H. W. Odum, "Notes on the Study of Regional and Folk Society,"
Social Forces, Vol. 10 (1931-1932), 164-175.

On the relation of land to population the classic is, of course

T. R. Malthus, **Essay on Population*.

Of the many recent studies on the subject it may suffice here to mention

W. S. Thompson, *Population Problems*

F. Lorimer and F. Osborn, *Dynamics of Population* (New York,
1934)

**The American People*, issue of the *Annals* of the American Acad-
emy for Nov., 1936, Vol. 188, especially 205-289.

CHAPTER VI

The subject of this chapter is broadly treated in

A. G. A. Balz, **The Basis of Social Theory*, especially Chap. II.

In more concrete fashion it is dealt with in some textbooks of sociology, particularly

R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, **Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chap. X

C. A. Dawson and W. E. Gettys, *Introduction to Sociology* (New York, 1929), Chaps. VIII-XIII

E. T. Hiller, *Principles of Sociology*, Chaps. XX, XXIII-XXIV.

One aspect of it is discussed in

R. M. MacIver, *Sociology and Social Work* (New York, 1931), Chap. II.

Of books specially devoted to the subject mention may be made of

R. C. Dexter, *Social Adjustment* (New York, 1927).

The nature of a total environment is suggestively dealt with in

L. L. Bernard, **Introduction to Social Psychology*, Chap. VI

"Culture and Environment," *Social Forces*, Vol. 8 (1929-1930), 327-334; Vol. 9 (1930-1931), 39-48

G. Wallas, *The Great Society*, Part II

**Our Social Heritage*, Chap. I.

There are numerous studies of the adjustment and maladjustment of immigrants, among them

N. Carpenter, **Immigrants and Their Children*

L. G. Brown, **Immigration*, Chap. XII

Grace Abbott, **The Immigrant and the Community*

R. E. Park and H. A. Miller, *Old World Traits Transplanted*

C. Panunzio, *Immigration Cross Roads* (New York, 1927)

H. P. Fairchild, *Immigrant Backgrounds* (New York, 1927).

Among studies of the adjustment of particular immigrant groups the outstanding example is

W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant*.

Mention should also be made of

Christine A. Galitzi, *A Study of Assimilation among the Roumanians in the United States* (New York, 1929).

Studies dealing with a special racial problem are

E. B. Reuter, *The American Race Problem*

L. Wirth, *The Ghetto*

H. A. Millis, *The Japanese Problem in the United States* (New York, 1915).

CHAPTER VII

A good basis for the comparison of city and country may be found in the study of the peasant, on which the outstanding sociological work is

W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, **The Polish Peasant*.

But no less illuminating are the characterizations given in such novel-studies as

- K. Hamsun, **Growth of the Soil* (New York, 1921)
 O. E. Rölvaag, *Giants in the Earth* (New York, 1928).

Among studies of rural neighborhoods should be mentioned

- J. H. Kolb, **Rural Primary Groups*
 E. de S. Brunner, **Village Communities* (New York, 1927)
 D. L. Sanderson, **The Rural Community* (Boston, 1932)
 C. J. Galpin, *Rural Life* (New York, 1918).

For the influence of the pioneer economy on North American civilization the classic is

- F. J. Turner, **The Frontier in American History*.

The transition from pioneer conditions is suggestively treated in

- W. H. Wilson, *The Evolution of the Country Community* (rev. ed., Boston, 1923)
 J. M. Williams, *Our Rural Heritage* (New York, 1925).

A mass of information is contained in

- P. Sorokin and C. C. Zimmerman, **Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology*
 P. Sorokin, C. C. Zimmerman, and C. J. Galpin, *A Systematic Sourcebook in Rural Sociology* (Minneapolis, 1930).

The small and the relatively small town are well represented by

- A. Blumenthal, **Small Town Stuff* (Chicago, 1932), and
 R. S. and H. M. Lynd, **Middletown*
**Middletown in Transition* (New York, 1937).

For reasons given in the text it is harder to find comprehensive works dealing with the social life of the city. The socio-economic aspects of a metropolis are revealed in the monumental co-operative work

- C. Booth *et al.*, *Life and Labor of the People of London* (16 vols., London, 1892)

recently brought up to date in the undertaking sponsored by the London School of Economics and Political Science

- Sir Huber L. Smith (Director), *The New Survey of London Life and Labor* (London, 9 vols., 1930-1935).

The German series on the great city (*Die Grosstadt*) contains valuable studies, including

- G. Simmel, *Die Grosstädte und das Geistesleben* (Dresden, 1903).

Special urban areas and types have been studied by the "ecological school," including,

- N. Anderson, *The Hobo* (Chicago, 1923)
 C. R. Shaw, *Delinquency Areas*
 L. Wirth, *The Ghetto*
 H. W. Zorbaugh, *The Gold Coast and the Slum*
 E. W. Burgess (ed.) **The Urban Community*
 R. E. Park *et al.*, **The City*.

Aspects of metropolitan life are dealt with in

R. D. MacKenzie, "The Rise of Metropolitan Communities," *Recent Social Trends*, Chap. IX

The Metropolitan Community

N. B. S. Gras, "The Rise of the Metropolitan Community," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. 20 (1925), 155-164

R. M. Haig, "Towards an Understanding of the Metropolis," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 40 (1925-1926), 179-208, 402-434.

There are few "urban sociologies," but mention should be made of

N. Carpenter, *The Sociology of City Life*

N. Anderson and E. C. Lindeman, *Urban Sociology* (New York, 1930).

Certain aspects of the urban environment are sympathetically revealed in

Jane Addams, *Twenty Years at Hull House* (New York, 1923)

Mary K. Simkhovitch, *The City Worker's World* (New York, 1917)

Caroline F. Ware, *Greenwich Village, 1920-1930* (Boston, 1935)

J. F. Steiner, *The American Community in Action* (New York, 1928).

The possibilities of urban development are nowhere more thoroughly explored than in the various studies of the Regional Survey of New York and Its Environs (New York, 1927-1929). Some of these possibilities are treated with a certain imaginative insight in

P. Geddes, *Cities in Evolution* (London, 1915).

The trends of city growth and the social consequences thereof are discussed in many works. The more pessimistic viewpoint is given in

G. Hansen, *Die Drei Bevölkerungstufen* (Munich, 1889)

R. Kuczynski, *Der Zug nach der Stadt* (Stuttgart, 1897).

More matter-of-fact is

A. F. Weber, *The Growth of Cities* (New York, 1899).

CHAPTER VIII

Most of the references listed under Chapter VIII are equally relevant for this chapter.

On the general concept of the community see

R. M. MacIver, **Elements of Social Science*, Chap. II.

On the relation of community and communications consult

E. T. Hiller, **Principles of Sociology*, Chaps. VIII-IX.

On the physical aspects of the community see, in addition to works of the "ecological school" already listed,

D. L. Sanderson, *"Factors Which Determine Area and Structure in the Rural Community," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. 24 (1929), 189-192

N. Carpenter, *Urban Growth and Transition Areas," *ibid.*, 254

E. W. Burgess, *"Residential Segregation in American Cities," *Annals, American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 140 (1928), 105-115.

There are many books on nationality and nationalism, but mostly from an historical or political standpoint. See

C. J. H. Hayes, **Essays on Nationalism* (New York, 1926)

Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York, 1931)

R. M. MacIver, **The Modern State*, Chap. IV, §2.

CHAPTER IX

The sociology of class and caste has been developed almost entirely by European writers, including

K. Bucher, **Industrial Evolution* (New York, 1912)

P. E. Fahlbeck, *Die Klassen und die Gesellschaft* (Jena, 1922).

T. Geiger, *Die Masse und ihre Aktion* (Stuttgart, 1926)

W. Sombart, *Der moderne Kapitalismus* (3 vols., Munich, 1924-1927).

On the role of class in the social structure see

H. Speier, *"Social Stratification in the Urban Community," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. I (1936), 193-202

"Honor and Social Structure," *Social Research*, Vol. 2, (1935), 74-97.

On the trends of modern classes consult

P. Sorokin, **Social Mobility*

T. Veblen, **The Theory of the Leisure Class*

C. C. North, **Social Differentiation* (Chapel Hill, 1926)

A. Bauer, *Les Classes Sociales* (Paris, 1902)

R. Heberle, *Über die Mobilität in den Vereinigten Staaten* (Jena, 1929).

The Marxist class doctrine is expounded in numerous works, including

K. Marx, **Capital* (see Vol. III, Chap. 52)

K. Kautsky, *The Class Struggle* (tr. Bohn, Chicago, 1910)

L. Corey, *The Crisis of the Middle Class* (New York, 1935).

The criteria of class are discussed in

T. H. Marshall, "Social Class," *Sociological Review* (London, Vol. 26 (1934), 55-76

M. Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Part III, Chap. IV.

The relation of classes to other social groups is discussed in
H. A. Miller, **Races, Nations, and Classes*.

On the relation of caste to the social structure see

E. Senart, *Caste in India* (tr. Ross, London, 1930)

C. Bouglé, *Essais sur le Régime des Castes* (Paris, 1908)

M. Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* (Tübingen, 1933), II, pp. 33-133.

G. S. Ghurye, *Caste and Race in India* (New York, 1932).

An interesting and original study of the relation of caste to class in the American environment is contained in

L. Warner, *"American Caste and Class," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 42 (1936), 234-237.

The concept of "social distance" has been applied by E. S. Bogardus and others, but more frequently to investigate racial, national, and cultural attitudes than those of class itself, as for example in

E. S. Bogardus, *Immigration and Race Attitudes*.

CHAPTER X

The subject of the crowd is dealt with in various books on social psychology, including

K. Young, **Social Psychology*, Part V

• *Source Book for Social Psychology* (New York, 1930), Chaps. XXII-XXIV

L. L. Bernard, *Introduction to Social Psychology* (New York), 1928), Chaps. XXVIII-XXIX.

An analysis of crowd behavior is given in

L. von Wiese, **Systematic Sociology* (ed. Becker), Chaps. XXXIV-XXXVII.

Reference should also be made to

W. McDougall, **The Group Mind* (Cambridge, 1927), Chap. II

B. Sidis, **The Psychology of Suggestion* (New York, 1921)

G. Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics* (New York, 1924).

There are a number of books specially devoted to the study of the crowd, including the pioneering work,

G. Le Bon, *The Crowd* (Eng. tr., London, 1925).

Interesting, though somewhat uncritical, treatments are given in

E. D. Martin, *The Behavior of Crowds* (New York, 1920)

W. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War* (London, 1920).

A study of a single type of crowd is offered in

W. White, *Rope and Faggot* (New York, 1929).

CHAPTER XI

The literature of the family is enormous, the subject forming a part of nearly every anthropological study and of very many sociological studies.

On the early family consult

E. Westermarck, **Short History of Marriage* (London, 1926), especially Chaps. VIII-X

History of Human Marriage (New York, 1922)

and the contrasting account in

R. Briffault, **The Mothers* (New York, 1927), especially Book I, Chaps. III-VI and X.

There are various histories of the family, including

W. Goodsell, *History of the Family* (New York, 1930)

G. E. Howard, *History of Matrimonial Institutions* (Chicago, 1904)

A. W. Calhoun, *Social History of the American Family* (Cleveland, 1917-19).

See also

W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*, Chaps. IX-XI.

Of textbooks or general works on the family the most distinguished is J. K. Folsom, **The Family*.

The following also deserve a place in a select list:

M. F. Nimkhoff, *The Family* (Boston, 1934)

H. Bosanquet, *The Family*

E. B. Reuter and J. R. Runner, *The Family* (source materials) (New York, 1931)

E. R. Groves and W. F. Ogburn, **American Marriage and Family Relationships*.

There is a good chapter on the family (Chap. XIII) in

F. H. Hankins, **Introduction to the Study of Society*.

Some problems of the modern family are well stated in

R. Reed, **The Modern Family* (New York, 1929).

On divorce see

J. P. Lichtenberger, *Divorce* (New York, 1931)

A. Cahen, *Statistical Analysis of American Divorce*.

For the pathology of the urban family consult

E. R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization* (Chicago, 1927).

Recent changes in American family conditions are recorded in

W. F. Ogburn, **"The Family and Its Functions," Recent Social Trends*, Chap. XIII.

The subject of authority in the family is treated from a number of different standpoints in

M. Horkheimer (ed.), *Autorität und Familie* (Paris, 1936).

CHAPTER XII

On the primary group see

C. H. Cooley, **Social Organization*, Part I

Grace Coyle, **The Social Process in Organized Groups*

M. P. Follett, **The New State*

E. C. Lindeman, **Social Discovery*

L. von Wiese (ed. Becker), **Systematic Sociology*, Chaps. XXXVIII-XL

F. R. Clow, "Cooley's Doctrine of Primary Groups," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 25 (1919-1920), 326-347

T. D. Eliot, "A Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Group Formation and Behavior," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 26 (1920-1921), 333-352.

Much material on the subject is contained in studies of the social life of children, such as

J. Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*

W. I. and Dorothy S. Thomas, *The Child in America*;

in studies of rural life, such as

D. Sanderson, *The Rural Community*

R. D. MacKenzie, *The Neighborhood* (Chicago, 1923);

in studies of gangs and similar groups, such as

F. M. Thrasher, *The Gang* (Chicago, 1929);

and in some of the more expert "case-work" studies, such as

Ada E. Sheffield, *The Social Case History* (New York, 1920)

Social Insight in Case Situations (New York, 1937).

CHAPTER XIII

For the nature and classification of interests see references under Chapter II.

An elaborate analysis of the conditions determining the formation of associations is offered in

L. von Wiese, *Systematic Sociology* (ed. Becker), Part II.

See also

F. Znaniecki, *The Laws of Social Psychology* (Chicago, 1925)

H. A. Phelps, *Principles and Laws of Sociology*, Chap. XVI

J. O. Hertzler, *Social Institutions* (New York, 1929), Chap. IV.

A brief but suggestive study of sects and sectarians is given in

E. Faris, *The Sect and the Sectarian*, in *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XXII.

On the subject of conflict and solidarity there is suggestive material in
 Grace Coyle, **The Social Process in Organized Groups*
 G. E. G. Catlin, **A Study of the Principles of Politics*, Chap. V
 F. Znaniecki, **Social Actions*, Chaps. XI, XIV, XVII
 L. P. Edwards, **The Natural History of Revolution* (Chicago, 1927).

See also the references on conflict and co-operation listed under Chapter III.

CHAPTER XIV

The "institutional complex" has not been treated as such in works on sociology, so that no specific references can be given. The interdependence of social institutions is stressed in various sociological works, such as

L. von Wiese, *Systematic Sociology* (ed. Becker), Chap. XLV
 F. A. Bushee, *Social Organization* (New York, 1930), Chap. XV.

There is, of course, much illustrative material, especially in works dealing with the relation of economics and politics, such as

C. A. Beard, *Economic Basis of Politics*;
 also in works dealing with the relation of economic and technological to political factors, such as

T. A. Salter, *Modern Mechanization and Its Effects on the Structure of Society* (London, 1933);
 and in works dealing with the relation of church and state (see references under Chapter XVII).

For the anthropological concept of culture consult

R. H. Lowie, *Culture and Ethnology* (New York, 1929)
 C. Wissler, *Man and Culture* (New York, 1923)
 B. Malinowski, "Culture," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 4.

For the distinction made in the text see

R. M. MacIver, *The Modern State*, Chap. V, §2
 *"The Historical Pattern of Social Change," *Journal of Social Philosophy*, Vol. 2 (1936), 35-54
 A. Weber, "Prinzipielles zur Kulturosoziologie," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, Vol. 47 (1920), 1-49
 J. W. Woodard, "A New Classification of Culture and a Restatement of the Cultural Lag Theory," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 1 (1936), 89-102.
 R. K. Merton, "Civilization and Culture," *Sociology and Social Research*, Vol. 21 (1936), 103-113.

CHAPTER XV

The function of the state as an organ of society is the subject of many interpretations. The point of view of the present author will be found more fully developed in

R. M. MacIver, *The Modern State*, especially Chaps. I, V, XVI.

Similar viewpoints will be found in

G. D. H. Cole, *Social Theory*

E. Jenks, *The State and the Nation*

A. D. Lindsay, *The Essentials of Democracy* (Philadelphia, 1929).

Reference should also be made to

G. E. G. Catlin, *A Study of the Principles of Politics*, Chap. VIII

W. W. Willoughby, *An Examination of the Nature of the State* (New York, 1928)

W. C. MacLeod, *The Origin and History of Politics* (New York, 1931)

L. von Wiese, *Systematic Sociology* (ed. Becker), Chap. XLIII.

The relation of the state to the economic order is discussed in many works, including

H. Laski, *The Grammar of Politics* (New Haven, 1931)

F. Delaisi, *Political Myths and Economic Realities*, especially Part IV

A. F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago, 1908).

The inclusive theory of the state is well represented by

B. Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*,

which is criticized in

L. T. Hobhouse, *The Metaphysical Theory of the State* (New York, 1918).

The class theory of the state is given in

F. Oppenheimer, *The State* (New York, 1926)

N. Lenin, *The State and Revolution* (New York, 1927).

A review of sociological theories of the state will be found in

H. E. Barnes, *Sociology and Political Theory* (New York, 1924).

CHAPTER XVI

Vast as is the literature of economics, peculiarly little has been done on the sociological problem of distinguishing and characterizing the type-form of economic organization. See

R. M. MacIver, *The Modern State*, Chap. IX

J. R. Commons, *Legal Foundations of Capitalism* (New York, 1934)

G. Simmel, *Soziologie* (Munich, 1923), pp. 213-232

N. J. Spykman, *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel* (Chicago, 1925), pp. 121 ff.

W. Sombart, *Der moderne Kapitalismus* (Leipzig, 1902), Vol. 2, pp. 423 ff.

"Capitalism," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 3.

The specific character of economic activity and economic organization is incisively brought out in the writings of Veblen, particularly

T. Veblen, *The Instinct of Workmanship*

The Theory of Business Enterprise (New York, 1904)

On professional organization see

A. M. Carr-Saunders and P. A. Wilson, *The Professions* (London, 1933).

CHAPTER XVII

There is practically no sociological literature dealing directly with the subject treated in the first section of this chapter. See, however, the references on culture and civilization under Chapter XIV.

On the social form and function of the church see

L. von Wiese, **Systematic Sociology* (ed. Becker), Chap. XLIV.

N. Figgis, **Churches in the Modern State* (New York, 1914), especially App. I

H. A. Miller, **Races, Nations, and Classes*, Chap. V

R. M. MacIver, **The Modern State*, Chap. V, § 2

H. P. Douglass, *The Church in the Changing City*

E. C. Lindeman, *The Church in the Changing Community*

P. J. Tillich, **"The Social Functions of the Churches in Europe and America," Social Research*, Vol. 3 (1936), 90-104.

CHAPTER XVIII

On the subject of social codes pioneer work of importance was done by earlier sociologists, notably

W. G. Sumner, **Folkways*

W. Bagehot, *Physics and Politics* (New York, 1906)

Sir Henry Maine, *Ancient Law*

H. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*

G. Tarde, *The Laws of Imitation* (tr. Parsons, New York, 1903).

Modern anthropology has thrown a fuller light on the subject, and special reference should be made to

B. Malinowski, **Crime and Custom in Savage Society*

** Sex and Repression in Savage Society*

E. S. Hartland, *Primitive Law* (London, 1924).

On social sanctions consult

- E. A. Ross, **Social Control*, especially Chaps. X-XIX
- E. T. Hüller, *Principles of Sociology*, Chap. XXXVIII
- F. E. Lumley, *Means of Social Control* (New York, 1925).

On leadership and authority consult

- G. Simmel, *"Superiority and Subordination as Subject Matter of Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 2 (1896-1897), 392-415
- C. H. Cooley, **Human Nature and the Social Order*, Chap. IX
- F. Znaniecki, **Social Actions*, Chaps. VI-X
- E. S. Bogardus, *Leaders and Leadership* (New York, 1934)
- L. Leopold, *Prestige* (London, 1916)
- R. Michels, "Authority," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 2.

On political leadership in particular see, for example,

- R. Michels, *Political Parties*
- C. E. Merriam, *Political Power* (New York, 1934)
- H. D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (New York, 1927)
- S. P. Orth, *The Boss and the Machine* (New Haven, 1919).

On ritual consult

- W. G. Sumner and A. G. Keller, *The Science of Society*, II, Chap. XXXII
- E. S. Hartland, *Ritual and Belief* (London, 1914)
- Ruth Benedict, *"Ritual," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 13
- L. S. Cressman, *"Ritual the Conserver," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 35 (1930), 564-572.

The place of ritual in primitive life is treated in

- E. Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (New York, 1926)

and is abundantly illustrated in

- J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough* (3rd ed., New York, 1935).

On symbolism and society consult

- Grace Coyle, **The Social Process in Organized Groups*, Chap. VII
- J. Markey, *The Symbolic Process* (New York, 1928)
- H. L. Hollingworth, *The Psychology of Thought*, Chap. XI
- E. Sapir, "Symbolism," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 14
- L. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning* (New York, 1923), Chap. X.

The social role of coercion is brought out in

J. Dewey, **Human Nature and Conduct*, Chap. I

"Force and Coercion," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 26 (1916), 359-365

G. H. Mead, "The Psychology of Primitive Justice," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 23 (1918), 577-602

A. C. Ewing, *The Morality of Punishment* (London, 1929)

and in various works on criminology, such as

E. H. Sutherland, *Criminology*, pp. 314 ff.

For social control in "Utopian" communities, in addition to the references given on page 348, see

L. E. Deets, "The Origins of Conflict in the Hutterische Communities," *Publications*, American Sociological Society, Vol. 25 (1931), 125-135

R. A. Parker, *A Yankee Saint: John Humphrey Noyes and the Oneida Community* (New York, 1935)

M. Choukas, *Black Angels of Athos* (Brattleboro, Vt., 1934).

CHAPTER XIX

On religion and morals see

H. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. 3, pp. 150 ff.

and the brilliant analysis given in

H. Bergson, **The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* (New York, 1935).

The views of a French school of sociologists will be found in

E. Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (New York, 1926)

L. Lévy-Bruhl, *How Natives Think* (London, 1926).

These views are criticized in

C. C. J. Webb, *Group Theories of Religion* (London, 1916).

On the changing relationship of the two see

L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals and Evolution* (New York, 1923)

C. Bouglé, *The Evolution of Values* (tr. Sellars)

A. N. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making* (New York, 1926).

A good brief review of the subject is given in

F. N. House, **The Range of Social Theory* (New York, 1929), Chap. XIX.*

The whole subject is comprehensively explored in

M. Weber, **Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, of which Volume I is translated by T. Parsons as *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*.

Much suggestive material is contained in

E. Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches* (New York, 1931).

On custom and law see

J. Dickinson, "Social Order and Political Authority," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 23 (1929), 293-328, 593-632

R. M. MacIver, *The Modern State*, Chaps. V and VII

W. H. R. Rivers, *Social Organization*, Chap. I

B. Malinowski, *Crime and Custom in Savage Society*.

On custom and fashion,

H. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, II, pp. 205 ff.

W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*, pp. 184-220.

M. Davis, "Folkways," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 6

E. Sapir, "Fashion," *ibid*.

J. C. Flügel, *The Psychology of Clothes* (London, 1930).

CHAPTER XX

For this chapter the references given under Chapter XIX may in general suffice.

For the relation of the individual and the mores see also

R. M. MacIver, *Community*, Book III, Chap. V

F. Znaniecki, *Social Actions*, Chap. XIII

C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, Chap. X.

CHAPTER XXI

Very useful data for the study of social change are contained in

President's Research Committee on Social Trends, *Recent Social Trends*, 2 vols. The introductory "Review of Findings" (pp. xi-lxxv) should be read in connection with the present chapter.

The literature interpretative of social change in its larger aspects is far from adequate. Of general works the following are suggested:

A. G. Keller, *Societal Evolution*

W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*

P. Sorokin, *Social Mobility*

F. S. Chapin, *Cultural Change*

J. H. Randall, *Our Changing Civilization* (New York, 1929).

Various aspects of social change are dealt with in numerous books, including

C. H. Cooley, *Social Process*,

where social change is viewed as an organic process, and

C. C. North, *Social Problems and Social Planning* (New York, 1932)

J. H. S. Bossard, *Social Change and Social Problems* (New York, 1934), Part II.

On the prediction of social change see

H. A. Phelps, **Principles and Laws of Sociology*, Chap. XXI and further references given therein.

On the peculiar time-character of the social structure the more advanced student will find something in

H. Freyer, *Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft* (Leipzig, 1930), Chap. I, §8 and Chap. II, §6.

On the "three orders" underlying social change see the Introduction to *Recent Social Trends* cited above and the author's article on "The Historical Pattern of Social Change" already referred to.

A significant attempt to grapple with the interpretation of social change is made in

A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*.

CHAPTER XXII

For illustrations of the modes of change see the works of Ogburn and Chapin above cited. See also

E. T. Hiller, **Principles of Sociology*, Chap. XXV.

On the meaning of evolutionary change see

M. Ginsberg, **Studies in Sociology*, Chaps. IV and V

L. T. Hobhouse, **Social Development*

R. M. MacIver, **Community*, Book III

E. Durkheim, **The Division of Labor in Society*

F. Müller-Lyer, *History of Social Development*

C. L. Morgan, *Emergent Evolution* (New York, 1925).

For processes of adjustment, assimilation, and so forth, see

Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, Chaps. X and XI.

For the idea of cyclical change, see

P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, Chap. XIII

H. A. Phelps, **Principles and Laws of Sociology*, Chap. XIX.

On the idea of progress, see

J. H. S. Bossard, "The Concept of Progress," *Social Forces*, Vol. 10 (1931-1932), 5-14

J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress*.

CHAPTER XXIII

For the facts of demographic change see

R. R. Kuczynski, *The Measurement of Population Growth*

W. S. Thompson and P. K. Whelpton, "The Population of the Nation," *Recent Social Trends*, I, Chap. I

A. M. Carr-Saunders, *The Population Problem* (Oxford, 1922)

and the collection of articles entitled

**The American People*, *Annals of The American Academy of Political Science*, Vol. 188 (1936).

On natural selection the classics are, of course,

C. Darwin, *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex*
The Origin of Species.

The difference between natural and social selection is sharply stated in

T. H. Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics*

and in another form in

C. L. Morgan, *Habit and Instinct*.

• See also .

J. Huxley, *Essays of a Biologist* (London, 1923), Chap. I.

Another biologist's view will be found in

J. A. Thomson, *Darwinism and Human Life* (New York, 1917).

Few sociologists have adequately studied the subject, but reference may be made to

A. G. Keller, *Societal Evolution*

F. Tönnies, *Soziologische Studien und Kritiken*, Vol. I.

A short account of the history of birth control is given in

J. A. Field, *Essays in Population*

and an elaborate one in

N. E. Himes, *Medical History of Contraception* (Baltimore, 1936).

An entirely different view of the cause of the falling birth rate from that suggested in the text is given in

R. Pearl, *The Biology of Population Growth* (New York, 1930)

G. U. Yule, "The Growth of Population and the Factors Which Control It," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Vol. 88 (1925), 1-61

C. Gini, "The Cyclical Rise and Fall of Population," *Population* (Chicago, 1930), Chaps. I-III.

CHAPTER XXIV

The influence of invention and technological change on society is treated in a number of works, including

- W. F. Ogburn, **Social Change*
 L. Mumford, **Technics and Civilization*
 S. Chase, *Men and Machines* (New York, 1929)
 S. C. Gilfillan, *The Sociology of Invention* (Chicago, 1935)
 R. B. Dixon, *The Building of Cultures* (New York, 1928)
 J. K. Folsom, *Culture and Social Progress* (New York, 1928)
 L. L. Bernard, "Invention and Social Progress," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 29 (1923), 1-33
 W. F. Ogburn and S. C. Gilfillan, "The Influence of Invention and Discovery," *Recent Social Trends*, I, Chap. III
 M. M. Willey and S. A. Rice, "The Agencies of Communication," *Recent Social Trends*, I, Chap. IV.

For the Marxist theory there is, in the first place,

- K. Marx, **Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy Capital*, I, Part VIII
 K. Marx and F. Engels, **The Communist Manifesto* (tr. Moore), (New York, 1933).

For his successors one or two references out of a vast literature must suffice:

- K. Kautsky, *The Class Struggle*
 A. Loria, *The Economic Foundations of Society* (Eng. tr., London, 1899)
 N. Bukharin, *Historical Materialism* (New York, 1928).

Of the numerous interpretations and criticisms of Marxism we must limit reference to a few works:

- M. Beer, *Life and Teachings of Karl Marx* (New York, 1929)
 A. D. Lindsay, *Karl Marx's Capital* (Oxford, 1925)
 M. Eastman, *Marx, Lenin, and the Science of Revolution* (London, 1926)
 S. Hook, *Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx* (New York, 1933)
 E. Halévy, **La Formation du Radicalisme Philosophique* (Paris, 1901-1904).

Technological determinism is seldom stated as explicitly or definitely as economic determinism is postulated by the Marxists, but it is implied or suggested in such works as those of Ogburn, Stuart Chase, F. Müller-Lyer, and others previously cited. For the views of Veblen see particularly

- T. Veblen, **The Theory of the Leisure Class*, Chap. VIII
**The Instinct of Workmanship*, Chap. I
 J. Dorfman, *Thorstein Veblen and His America* (New York, 1934), especially Chaps. XII-XIV.

CHAPTER XXV

The idea that cultural or spiritual forces are dominant in social change has found expression in the theories of various philosophies, such as Hegel, Spengler, Bergson; but the scholarly attempt to show the actual influence of culture in changing situations is scarcely older than the work of Max Weber. See particularly

M. Weber, **The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*

A. Salomon, "Max Weber's Methodology," *Social Research*, Vol. I (1934), 147-168

A. von Schelting, *Max Weber's Wissenschaftslehre* (Tübingen, 1934), Part II.

On the general theme see

M. R. Cohen, **Reason and Nature* (New York, 1931), Book II, especially Chap. III.

Various views on the subject are brought together in

W. D. Wallis, *Culture and Progress* (New York, 1930)

J. K. Folsom, *Culture and Social Progress* (New York, 1928)

A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress* (New York, 1926).

For the doctrine of "cultural lag" consult

W. F. Ogburn, **Social Change*, pp. 200-265

F. S. Chapin, **Cultural Change*, especially Chaps. X and XI

H. A. Phelps, *Principles and Laws of Sociology*, Chap. XIX

J. W. Woodard, "A New Classification of Culture and a Restatement of the Cultural Lag Theory," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. I (1936), 89-104

M. Choukas, "The Concept of Cultural Lag Re-examined," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. I (1936).

Many historical illustrations of the clash of culture and civilization within Western society are given in

L. Mumford, **Technics and Civilization*.

The cultural effects of the introduction of Western civilization into Eastern communities are recorded in many studies of the industrialization of China, India, Japan, and other countries. A number of articles on this and other aspects of culture-civilization conflict will be found in Volumes 24 (1929-1930) and 25 (1930-1931) of the *Publications of the American Sociological Society*. See also

E. T. Hiller, **Principles of Sociology*, Chaps. XXI-XXIII.

The periodical literature of the subject is very extensive, and only an example or two can be given, as

A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, "The Revolt of Asia: A Clash of Civilizations," *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 134 (1928), 586-593

- Ruth Shonle, "The Christianizing Process among Pre-literate Peoples," *Journal of Religion*, Vol. 4 (1924), 261-280
- A. L. F. Pitt-Rivers, "The Effect on Native Races of Contact with European Civilization," *Man*, Vol. 27 (1927), 2-10.

CHAPTER XXVI

The interpretation of social change involves important and difficult questions of method (see the references already given on the work of Max Weber). In American sociology the main issue has been between those who accept and those who reject a significant difference between the character of social causation and that of physical causation. Representative of the former viewpoint are

- C. H. Cooley, *Sociological Theory and Social Research* (New York, 1930)
- C. A. Ellwood, *Methods in Sociology* (Durham, N. C., 1933)
- R. M. MacIver, "Is Sociology a Natural Science?" *Publications American Sociological Society*, Vol. 25 (1931), 25-35
- "Sociology," in *A Quarter Century of Learning* (ed. Fox, New York, 1931).

The opposing viewpoint is vigorously stated in

- R. Bain, "Trends in American Sociological Theory," in G. A. Lundberg *et al.*, *Trends in American Sociology* (New York, 1929), Chap. II
- G. A. Lundberg, "Quantitative Methods in Social Psychology," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 1 (1936), 38-54
- "Is Sociology Too Scientific?" *Sociologus*, Vol. 9 (1933), 298-320.

The student should endeavor to reach his own conclusion on the subject. To this end he should consult

- M. R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature*, Book III, Chap. I
- W. F. G. Swan *et al.*, *Essays on Research in the Social Sciences* (Washington, 1931)
- F. Znaniecki, *The Method of Sociology* (New York, 1934)
- T. Abel, *Systematic Sociology in Germany* (New York, 1929)
- W. Waller, "Insight and Scientific Method," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 40 (1934), 285-297.

To appreciate the contrast between the social patterns of primitive and civilized societies respectively, and also as preparation for the subject of the next chapter, the student should be familiar with the social organization of some primitive peoples. To this end he should read an account of one or more particular societies, such as

- F. Boas, *The Social Organization and Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians*

- A. W. Hewitt, *Native Tribes of South-East Australia* (London, 1904).
 B. Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (London, 1922)
Crime and Custom in Savage Society
 B. Spencer and F. J. Gillen, *Native Tribes of Central Australia*
 (New York, 1899)
 Margaret Mead, *Coming of Age in Samoa* (New York, 1928).

Among comparative studies may be mentioned

- F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*
 L. T. Hobhouse et al., *The Material Culture and Social Institutions
 of the Simpler Peoples*
 A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology*
 R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*
 W. H. R. Rivers, *Social Organization*
 Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*
 R. Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York, 1936)
 W. I. Thomas, *Primitive Behavior*.

The position taken in the text with respect to the contrast between primitive and civilized society should be compared with that of Durkheim and that of Tönnies in the works already cited.

CHAPTER XXVII

On the question of origins consult

- R. H. Lowie, *Origin of the State*
 A. M. Tozzer, *Social Origins and Social Continuities* (New York, 1925)
 W. I. Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins* (Boston, 1929).

For the role of diffusion consult, in addition to the comparative anthropological studies cited under Chapter XXVI,

- E. T. Hiller, *Principles of Sociology*, Chap. XXXI
 F. Boas, "Evolution or Diffusion," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 26 (1924), 340-344
 A. A. Goldenweiser, "Diffusionism and the American School of Historical Ethnology," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 31 (1925), 19-38.

The student should however be warned that diffusion and evolution are not incompatible, and that the views of the diffusionist school are still controversial.

On the evolution of the church as a social form consult

- R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*
 M. Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* and also the second and third volumes of his *Religionssoziologie*

- Various authors, **“Religious Institutions,”* *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 13, with extensive bibliography
 W. A. Brown, *Church and State in Contemporary America* (New York, 1936), Part I.

CHAPTER XXVIII

For various theories of the nature of progress see

- A. J. Todd, **Theories of Social Progress* (New York, 1926)
 J. B. Bury, **The Idea of Progress*.

For the views of some modern biologists on the relation between evolution and progress see

- C. L. Morgan, **Emergent Evolution* (London, 1923)
 J. Huxley, **Essays of a Biologist*, Chaps. I and II.

The subject is treated also by

- L. T. Hobhouse, *Development and Purpose* (London, 1919)
 C. H. Cooley, *Social Process*, especially Parts VI and VII
 W. D. Wallis, *Culture and Progress* (New York, 1930).

The references given for the earlier part of Chapter XXVIII are relevant also for the discussion of the place of value-concepts in the social sciences. See also

- L. von Wiese, *Systematic Sociology* (ed. Becker), Chap. I, §2.

There are, of course, numerous books dealing with the problems of modern society, but it should be remembered that in these books the expression “social problems” is usually extended to mean “problems of human well-being,” most of which are not merely or specifically social in the sense in which we have been using the term throughout this book.

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